TELOS

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COUNCILS AND STATE IN WEIMAR GERMANY

by Guido De Masi and Giacomo Marramao

1. Crisis of the Socialization Program and the Economic-Institutional Consequences

Even before the implementation of the Weimar Constitution, Rudolf Wissel, finance minister of the first socialdemocratic government in German history, pointed out with bitter disappointment to the Party Congress of June, 1919: "By building the edifice of *formal* political democracy, we have done nothing but pursue the program already begun by the imperial government of Prince Max von Baden. We have completed the constitution *without a profound popular participation* and we have not been able to placate the masses' tacit resentment because we did not have an adequate program... We have failed to influence the revolution so that Germany would have been animated by a new spirit. The very essence of our culture and of our social life seems to have changed very little—and often not for the better. People think that the revolution's conquests have an exclusively negative character, that an individual's military and bureaucratic domination has been substituted by another kind, and that the criteria of government are not substantially different from those of the old regime... I think that history will harshly judge both the National Assembly as well as the government."[1]

This sharp and unequivocal declaration of the bankruptcy of the socialization program tended to underscore the *political* reason for this failure: the lack of active mass participation in the governing of institutions. Social democracy's self-criticism focused here on the crux of the problem: the fundamental *economism* of the party and the fatal obliteration of the mass base, of the socialized dimension, of politics understood as the specific dynamic form of the relation between the "political" and the "social" and, at the same time, as the working class' ability to run in the first person the transition phases by hegemonically recomposing—in so far as it was the main productive force—the segments of the "general intellect." The failure of a vast and ambitious program of economic reconstruction by the SPD also put an end to the various attempts by the members of the "Socialization Commission" led by Kautsky, Wilbrandt, Heimann, etc.,[2] to reconcile planning

1. *SPD—Parteitag zu Weimar, Juni 1919. Diskussionsprotokoll,* p. 363; the passage is also cited by Arthur Rosenberg, *Storia della Repubblica di Weimar* (Florence, 1972), p. 94 (italics added). For a general account, see *Illustrierte Geschichte der deutschen Revolution* (Berlin, 1929), reprinted by Verlag Neue Kritik (Frankfurt a. M., 1970); Wolfgang Abendroth, *Aufstieg und Krise der deutschen Sozialdemokratie* (Frankfurt am Main, 1969), pp. 51-67.

2. On the failure and the progressive demobilization of the *Sozialisierung-Kommission,* cf. Peter von Oertzen, *Betriebsräte in der Novemberrevolution* (Düsseldorf, 1954), pp. 249-269; also Gerhard Albert Ritter and Susanne Miller, *Die deutsche Revolution 1918-1919* (Hamburg, 1975), pp. 259-276, and Schneider-Kuda, *Mitbestimmung* (Munich, 1969), pp. 88-115.

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and workers' councils (*Arbeiterräte*), socialization, and "industrial democracy."

Wissel's reference to the last imperial government was very pertinent. In fact, for several decades the German labor movement had adapted its organization and struggles to the structure of the Bismarckian state,[3] and after the November revolution the new constitution based itself on the model of pre-war union structure. The June, 1919 Nuremberg union congress, for instance, fully ratified the agreements of the November Convention.[4] Indeed, it went further by promoting studies and projects for a type of "labor community" (*Arbeitsgemeinschaft*) in which the relative functions of unions and employers would be regulated according to the new political course. The resolution of the Nuremberg Congress assigned to workers' councils the task of carrying out and controlling the socialization program gradually decided upon by the council of peoples' commissars and proposed by the socialization commission.

The timing was particularly inappropriate for this union and social-democratic project of parallel control of the economy and of the councils.[5] Its failure on the eve of the implementation of the constitution ushered in a phase of rethinking for all components of the labor movement. Between the November revolution and the January repression a particular type of state developed in which it was difficult to recognize any class imprint.[6] As the direct expression of the November movement, the councils ended up caught between the new state, which was the product of the very labor organizations hegemonized by the "social doctrine" of the majority of social democracy, and individual employers now free to move within this new type of "labor community" which they opposed, but which they temporarily accepted while waiting to take over management and control of the social relations of production.

Between November and December of 1919, the social democrats had done everything in order to exorcise the specter of the "anarchic-bolshevik"

3. On the relation between social democracy, unions, and the Bismarckian State, cf. Gunther Roth, *I Socialdemocratici nella Germania di Weimar* (Bologna, 1971); and William Harbutt Dawson, *Bismarck and State Socialism* (London, 1890).

4. The "Stinnes-Legien Agreement," ratified by the November Convention, established that all the mobilized workers had the right to return to their old workplace; furthermore, for the first time, German employers recognized the right to a collective labor contract for enterprises with more than 50 workers. In addition to the introduction of an eight-hour workday, there were also provisions for the constitution of "arbitration committees" and "conciliation councils" with equal representation of blue collar workers, clerks, and employers for mediating all contractual matters and labor conflicts in the spirit of the *Arbeitsgemeinschaft*. On this, see Wolfgang Abendroth, *Die deutschen Gewerkschaften. Ihre Geschichte und politische Funktion* (Heidelberg, 1955), pp. 22-24; and G. Giaccaro, *Storia del Movimento Sindicale Europeo* (Florence, 1940), pp. 259-260.

5. On the union project of parallel control of the economy and of the councils, see von Oertzen, *op.cit.*, pp. 153-196; and Walter Tormin, *Zwischen Rätediktatur und sozialer Demokratie. Die Geschichte der Rätebewegung in der deutschen Revolution 1918-1919* (Düsseldorf, 1954).

6. Cf. Paul Levi's important observations in "Die politische Lage in Deutschland," in *Die kommunistische Internationale*, 14 (November, 1920), pp. 114-125.

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model—expressed in the slogan "All Power to the Councils"—by largely retreating behind the directives of the old Erfurt Program.[7] The failure of the socialization commission[8] opens a cycle of theoretical and practical re-evaluation of both the Second International socialdemocratic tradition and the Leninist theoretical and organizational model. The reasons for this must be sought in the peculiar form of Weimar Germany's political and economic structure more than in the international economic and political situation (to which labor movement historiography usually refers in order to explain this complex phase).[9]

For too long, the SPD had derived political categories from the features of a specific social-productive structure (that of Wilhelminian Germany). During the first weeks of government, it was convinced that a unity of party, union, and councils (excluding some extremist fringes) could breathe life into that sophisticated whole of bourgeois juridical norms which, elaborated by Hugo Preuss, became the Weimar Constitution.[10] But the failure of the socialization project undermined the unity of the three organizing parts of the labor movement, and only the legislative apparatus of the young republic was left standing. It was certainly not very easy for social democrats to operate with a constitution which did not vindicate the tradition of the well-being and happiness of all citizens, but which accorded "to every social category the right to take part in political life on the basis of equality, to participate in the regulation of working conditions and of retributions, along with all of the economic development of the nation's productive forces."[11] The Weberian constitutional scheme prevented workers' councils from expressing themselves in the state in an hegemonic way since they were counterbalanced by other elements in a complex representative framework. Consequently, it ruled out the creation of any stable alliance between the various classes and social stratifications. In fact, the Weimar constitution was a complex of non-hierarchical representative organisms within a consolidation of power

7. In the December 31, 1918, speech concerning the program at the founding Congress of the German Communist party (The Spartacus League), Luxemburg pointed out that: "Up to its collapse of August 4, German social-democracy adhered to the Erfurt Program in which the so-called immediate minimal tasks were in the forefront, and socialism was allowed to spark only as a far-away falling star, as an ultimate goal" (*Rede zum Programm gehalten auf Gründungsparteitag der kommunistischen Partei Deutschlands [Spartakusbund] am 29-31 Dezember 1918* [Berlin, 1918]). Up to the Junius pamphlet (January, 1916), the Spartacist Left accused social democracy of having betrayed the Erfurt program. Only in the *Rede zum Programm* did Luxemburg reject as completely obsolete the 1891 socialdemocratic program. For the appropriate documentation, see Hermann Weber, ed., *Der Gründungsparteitag der KPD. Protokoll und Materialien* (Frankfurt am Main and Vienna, 1969).

8. The Socialization Commission resigned February 3, 1919, after the government had rejected the proposal to socialize the mines (January 15, 1919). Although it withdrew the resignation on request of the minister R. Wissel, it actually did not propose any more concrete socialization proposals, but only research projects. Cf. Ritter-Miller, *op.cit.*, pp. 282-301.

9. A late example of this "internationalist" tendency is Ernest Mandel's anthology *Controle Ouvrier, Conseils Ouvriers, Autogestion* (Paris, 1970).

10. On Hugo Preuss and the Weimar Constitution, see Erich Eyck, *A History of the Weimar Republic*, Vol. I (Cambridge, 1962), pp. 64-79. Cf. also W. Ziegler, *Die deutsche National-Versammlung 1918-1920 und ihr Verfassungswerk* (Berlin, 1932).

11. Article 165 of the Weimar Constitution.

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relations based on proportional representations only capable of temporary and precarious alliances, which were soon replaced by other even more precarious ones. Thus a full state forum could not arise.

The objective need for a politics of alliances able to weld the labor struggle (with its high level of consciousness) with other strata of the "laboring population," especially the peasants, was weakened by immediate tactical concerns and tacit compromises among individuals who proclaimed themselves spokesmen for the various class sectors. It was therefore no accident that the army, the parliamentary group of the SPD and the general commission of unions agreed to put an end to the "council anarchy" into which the Reich had collapsed. Only a swift agreement between the social-democratic majority (SPD), the independent social democrats (USPD), and the councils on the sixth of December, 1918, prevented the first military *coup* against the executive committee of the workers' council of greater Berlin.[12] Subsequently, Groemer and Noske would play their macabre roles in the Spartakus revolt of January, 1919.[13]

The failure of the Kapp putsch on March 12, 1920, due to massive union mobilization, the relaunching of the council movement and the electoral collapse of the SPD on June 6, 1920, closed this initial phase of the republic and thus threw light onto the specificity of class relations in Germany. The practical objectives and organizational requirements of the revolutionary process were only slightly controlled by the movement's vanguard, rarely understood by party theoreticians and only partly satisfied by political leaders.

As stated above, despite its juridical formalism, the Weimar constitution reiterated the deliberations of the June 1919 Nuremberg union council: in a state with no hegemonic class, the union tends to integrate its functions. Thus, the Army and the union emerged as the protagonists of the initial events and continued a power confrontation that had arisen during the war under the regime of special laws concerning labor regulations and war production.[14] The union's success in blocking the Army leaders' counter-revolutionary offensive revealed both strengths and weaknesses in the movement. At any rate, it is an important development in the history of the republic during a period of intense political and theoretical debate concerning relations among party, union and councils, while the army began

12. In agreement with General Lequis, a regiment guided by Captain Spiro was to arrest the executive committee of the councils of greater Berlin and the peoples' commissars supporting the USPD (Haase, Dittman, and Barth), and elect Ebert as President of the Republic. Cf. A.J. Ryder, *The German Revolution of 1918* (Cambridge, 1967), pp. 188-193.

13. On the relations between the military and some socialdemocratic leaders, cf. Wolfgang Elben, *Das Problem der Kontinuität in der deutschen Revolution. Die Politik der Staatssekretäre und der militärischen Führung vom November 1918 bis Februar 1919* (Düsseldorf, 1965); and Gerhard Ritter, *The Sword and the Scepter: The Problem of Militarism in Germany*, Vol. III (Coral Gables, 1969-1973), pp. 7ff.

14. Legien, the president of the union, had made an agreement with the minister of interior for banning strikes during the war. On this, see Wolfgang Abendroth, *Die deutschen Gewerkschaften, op.cit.*, p. 19.

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to appear as the principal bourgeois force.[15]

While on the eve of the Kapp putsch a republican court would even sacrifice the center party leader Erzberger, the only "non-militarized" representative of the bourgeoisie in the days of the November revolution, to the *Dolchstoss-Legende* (the knife-in-the-back theory),[16] personalities such as Stresemann (ex-nationalist and leader of the *Volkspartei*) and Wirth (center party) were growing politically by adjusting to the new social reality. They appeared as lucid representatives of a capital which already felt able to collaborate and to compete on an equal footing with the SPD and, eventually, to replace it in the direction of the state. Thus, a dialectic of compromises (rather than of alliances) begins, in which the determining element is social-democracy's *hegemonic inability*. The main points of the tacit agreement, never officially endorsed, for a stable institutionalized arrangement after the putsch attempt included: (1) the socialdemocratic and union control of labor power within the productive process; (2) capitalist and monopolist control of the economy and finances; (3) abandonment (according to the SPD, only "suspension") of all socialization programs in view of the rapid and rational relaunching of the development of the productive forces; (4) Army intervention in public life only in case labor pressure in the factories explodes to the outside.

It is incorrect to contend that at this point a linear plan of "rationalization" of the economy began.[17] It is a symptomatic error of recent scholarship to

15. Actually, rather than stepping aside from political life, the Army chose to keep the Weimar Constitution's institutional framework with the aim of hegemonizing the more intransigent sectors of the nationalist right (judiciary, bureaucracy and the press). Big capital is absent from this "nationalist bloc" for all the first half of the 1920s. Instead, it seeks an "alternative use" of the socialdemocratic *Arbeitsgemeinschaft*. During this period, the nationalist satire against "capitalist sharks" as war profiteers and traitors of the German people, is not very different from that of Grosz' caricatures. Cf. Ernst Nolte, *Die Krise des liberalen Systems und die faschistischen Bewegungen* (Munich, 1968).

16. Erzberger had sued Helfferich, a deputy of the German Nationalists, for "continued and aggravated calumny." Helfferich then accused Erzberger of treason for having signed the armistice, and incompetence. On May 12, the court for all practical purposes sided with the nationalist deputy, although it did assess him a token fine.

17. For example, Massimo Cacciari, in the introduction to an anthology of writings by the young Lukács, *Kommunismus 1920-1921* (Padua, 1972), in order to show the ideological "backwardness" of the council movement with respect to corresponding levels of class composition, too enthusiastically accepts capital's ideology. Germany's portion of world industrial production in 1913 had fallen to 15% with respect to 17% in 1900, notwithstanding the very great increase in military contracts. Cf. Charles Bettelheim, *L'Economie Allemande sous le Nazisme. Un Aspect de la Décadence du Capitalisme* (Paris, 1971), pp. 16-34. Heinz Wolfgang Arndt, *The Economic Lessons of the 1930s: A Report* (New York, 1965), pp. 25-30. The defeat recalls the whole pre-war productive framework and, naturally, also class composition, into question. But, contrary to what is usually believed, the leading industries in the immediate post-war period are not those that have introduced substantial innovations in the productive process and into the composition of the class, but rather, precisely the technologically more backward ones. At the same time, on the level of subjective-politcial behavior, "productivism" and the so-called "labor ideology" are not restricted to "craft workers" and to remnants of "professionalized" strata which have escaped capital's restructuring violence, but appear in even stronger forms in workers employed in factories which were technologically the most advanced. Thus, the ideology of rationalization runs through a political and economic reality much more complex and differentiated than indicated by recent interpretations of the European council movement.

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believe that the simple sum of the majority organization of the working class with the sectors (even the most advanced) of financial and industrial capital should lead to the rationalization of production. The reality of German capitalism in the spring of 1920 was much less rosy—unless one confuses the figure of Hugo Stinnes[18] and the complex of factories, mines, hotels and financial institutions that he operated, with a new cycle of development. Even the social democrats understood the difference between concentration and cycle.

The chronic inability of German capitalism to carry out an efficient restructuring of the productive apparatus boiled down to the bothersome problem of war credits.[19] The military policy of Kaiser Wilhelm II had succeeded in unifying the multitude of small and medium high-precision mechanical industries[20] with the naval and heavy industry. Having survived the war and the confiscation by the Entente, the industrial apparatus re-emerged at this point in its full heterogeneity. Exportation was the only outlet for factories able to survive and labor-productivity was the only immediate material resource. To accept an alliance with this type of capital, without attempting a radical transformation, meant that the party and the union would lose control over very large sectors of the class, and not only over the "professionalized" labor sectors already on the way to extinction and thus susceptible to council ideology.[21]

Given the impossibility of re-establishing pre-war economic levels and methods,[22] the inability of social democracy and capital to rationalize meant the loss of an historical occasion to experiment with a new field of confrontation and struggle. The respective classes, through a forced coexistence, had acquired a higher reciprocal consciousness and, at the same time, a general vision of economic and social processes with their relative political and institutional *forms*. New meanings and locations had developed for economic categories such as reconversion, planning, money, credit, rent, etc.,

18. Stinnes' empire would collapse in 1924 following Schacht's ruthless deflationary policy. Unable to deal with inflation, in the years 1920-1923 German capital was carried away by the flux.

19. For an analysis of war credits as the determining cause of inflation in Germany, see John M. Keynes, *The Economic Consequences of the Peace* (New York, 1920), pp. 187-208; and Joseph A. Schumpeter, *Business Cycles* (New York, 1939), Vol. II, p. 719.

20. Cf. Sergio Bologna, "Class Composition and the Theory of the Party at the Origin of the Workers' Councils Movement," *Telos*, 13 (Fall, 1972), pp. 3-27.

21. It may be proper to ask whether this thesis of "professionalism" in Cacciari is not a new reformulation of the old thesis of "labor aristocracy." This is, in fact, the expression used by Perulli in a criticism of the "council ideology" altogether similar to Cacciari's. Cf. Paolo Perulli, "Note sui Delegati," *Contropiano*, 2 (1970), p. 366.

22. Wissel, who was the stoutest defender of the parallelism rationalization-socialization, was also a victim of this illusion. This is how Rosenberg summarized his "singular monetary theory": "Wissel stressed that he was not disposed toward a socialization whereby 'today I give the entrepreneur a means of payment whose low value, as we hope, in three, five, or ten years will be doubled or tripled.' Thus, he really believed that the devaluation of the Mark was merely a transitory matter and that in the space of a few years the paper Mark would gain parity with the gold Mark. So little did he understand the German economic situation after the last war." Cf. *Storia della Repubblica di Weimar, op.cit.*, pp. 35-36.

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However, reduced to a mere sociology of the empirical (as in the doctrinaire version of the Second International), the critique of political economy was not only unable to produce a science of politics and a subsequent revolutionary organizing project, but could not even renovate the old political economy.[23]

The elections of June 1920 clearly registered this general political and even *historical impasse* within the labor movement: From 11,509,000 votes in January 1919, the SPD went to 6,104,000, while the USPD rose from 2,317,000 to 5,047,000 votes. The two parties were now almost equal. At this point, the concept of socialization, rejected by the SPD, was appropriated and reexamined by the theoreticians and the militants of the workers' councils, as well as by leading representatives of the old social democracy such as Max Adler who had trouble identifying with the choices made by their party.

2. Socialization and Councils

In this historical-political context, two phases of the council movement can be distinguished: the first from the November 1918 revolution to February 1920, and the second one ending with the defeat of the labor uprising of 1923 which marked the movement's collapse.[24]

These phases were accompanied by two movements in the theoretical reflection on the theme of the councils. This is clear in the writings of two major intellectuals of the middle European labor movement: Karl Korsch and Max Adler. Despite the different evaluations of the October revolution, Korsch's and Adler's strategic models and political-theoretical proposals appeared at first as "critical revolutionary variations" of the "Leninist and bolshevik conception" rather than as alternatives to it.[25] Actually, both were exponents of the left current of the socialist movement from 1919-1920: Korsch as the "organic intellectual" of the council movement wing led by members of the Berlin USPD such as Däumic and Müller; Adler as the leading theoretician of the left-wing of Austrian social democracy. [26]

Korsch and Adler both examine two aspects of socialization: the political-organizational aspect (the problem of the organs of socialization) and the theoretical-political aspect (the relation between mass movement and direction; the constitution of the mass movement as the historical subject; the dialectic of the class movement and institutions; and the problem of the state).

Korsch's writings on socialization (1919-1920)[27] express both the tragic greatness and the fatal limitations of the movement. Strongly influenced by

23. The situation is different in the Soviet Union, where the debate concerning accumulation and industrialization presents moments of original departures in the critique of political economy. Cf. N. Bucharin, E. Preobashenski, *L'Accumulazione Socialista,* ed. by Lisa Foa (Rome, 1969). Cf. also Rita Di Leo, *Operai e Sistema Sovietico* (Rome, 1970).

24. Cf. von Oertzen, *op.cit.*; Torwin, *op.cit.*

25. Cf. Umberto Cerroni, *Teoria Politica e Socialismo* (Rome, 1973), pp. 75ff.

26. Norbert Leser, *Zwischen Reformismus und Bolschevismus. Der Austromarxismus als Theorie und Praxis* (Vienna, 1968), pp. 511-559.

27. Karl Korsch, "What Is Socialization?" in *New German Critique,* 6 (Fall, 1975), pp.

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the theme of industrial democracy (which, in many respects, connects him with Bernstein) and by the anarcho-syndicalist ideology of direct action, Korsch poses the council system and its intrinsically liberatory connotations as the only alternative to the mere administrative management of power as theorized and practiced by the social democrats. The only practical instruments for the realization of this alternative are the councils whose functions must include the opposite requirements of central planning and democratic self-management of the enterprise. This synthesis is expressed by Korsch with the formula of "industrial autonomy": "Industrial autonomy exists when in every industry ('industry' is used here in the broad sense of any planned activity including agriculture), the representatives of the workers participating in production step in as executives controlling the production process, in place of the previous private owner or controlling manager. At the same time the limitations already forced upon capitalist private ownership of the means of production by state 'social policy' are further developed to become an effective public property of the whole."[28] In the contradictoriness of the Korschian discourse, it would be unjust either to exalt the (presumed) adjustment to the practical needs of the movement or to condemn the "radical-utopian" aspect (to use Rosenberg's famous expression), i.e., the anti-bureaucratic and anti-statist imprint. In its specific historical context, Korsch's council theme was an unsuccessful theoretical attempt to overcome the movement's practical impasse. Although his model is no longer viable, his writings expressed the dramatic complexity of the problem of the relation between ideology and class struggle, theory and politics. Following the dislocation of the revolutionary strategy from the state-political domain to economics ("industrial autonomy"), the concept of the double nature and function of the councils, which would immediately overcome the hiatus between politics and economics and the couple party-union (typical of the socialdemocratic tradition), ended up as a pragmatic-unionist restriction of the theme of socialization.[29] This does not mean that Korsch's analysis was not relevant. In fact, some of his points remain fundamental, such as the new identity of socialization and nationalization,[30] and the necessity to generalize the council system by transcending the corporative-entrepreneurial limitations imposed by the socialdemocratic leadership. Yet, Korsch's attempts to define the concrete outcomes of his proposals never went beyond outlining a mediation (which, translated into political terms, sounds like a compromise) between "control from above" by an undefined "collectivity" and "control

60-81. On this topic, see the works of Gian Enrico Rusconi: "Karl Korsch e la Strategia Consigliare-Sindicale," in *Problemi del Socialismo*, XV (July-August, 1969), pp. 767-777; "La Problematica dei Consigli in Karl Korsch," *Annali Feltrinelli*, XV (Milan, 1974), pp. 1197-1230 (part of this article has been translated into English as "Introduction to 'What Is Socialization?' " in *New German Critique*, 6 [Fall, 1975], pp. 48-59), and "Korsch's Political Development," *Telos*, 27 (Spring, 1976), pp. 61-78.

28. Korsch, "What Is Socialization?" *op.cit.*, p. 75.

29. This reduction indicates an even more serious shortcoming if one considers the role that the state was destined to play after the 1929 crisis.

30. Korsch, "What Is Socialization?" *op.cit.*, p. 70.

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from below," by those directly participating in production. This formal solution, which was characterized by the "bad" utopianism typical of the juridical ideology in which Korsch's intellectual formation had its roots, was a result of an oversimplified view of the complex relation between state and civil society. In this sense, the immediacy of the anti-state position was a mirror reflection, on the ideological level, of a non-materialist conception of revolutionary politics, and, therefore, of a still reductivist and partial reception of the theme of "constitution." The obfuscation of the process of the working class' self-constitution into a "class for itself" led Korsch to underemphasize the specific weight of that "objective factor which is subjectivity,"[31] and to avoid the problem of the forms of its emergence from the articulated complex of the historical present.

Just as his anti-statist position was the other side of the absence of a Marxist concept of the state, the undifferentiated unity of politics and economics in the council reflected the avoidance of the problem of constitution as the specific problem of the materialist analysis of the forms of consciousness and of the (subsequent) scientific foundation of the field of politics. Thus, his strategic conception of 1919-1920 ended up expressing a theoretical antinomy of European Marxism and the political backwardness of the labor movement as a whole.

Unlike Korsch, Max Adler seemed to catch the nexus relative to the political outcome of the "council strategy." He was the only one who attempted to thematize the relation between councils and the state. Even more than Korsch and despite the repeated critiques of the "bolshevik model," Adler was the interlocutor of Leninism.[32] His awareness of the complexity of this relation made Adler wary of the *immediate* resolution of the problem of the revolution suggested by the slogan: "All power to the councils." Such a slogan could resolve the problems of the strategy for gaining power only by presupposing as already accomplished a process which was only beginning and which could be brought to completion only by the conscious and organized intervention of subjectivity: socialization. The mere radicalization of the economic and self-managerial moment actually moved in a direction opposed to socialization. In his important pamphlet of 1919 on *Demokratie und Rätesystem*, Adler wrote that: "there is a risk that the system of workers' councils can cease to be the instrument for the overturning of

31. On this, see Rudolf zur Lippe, "Objektiver Faktor Subjektivität," in *Kursbuch*, 35 (April, 1974), pp. 1-35. For Korsch's intellectual formation, see Michael Buckmiller, "Marxismus als Realität. Zur Rekonstruktion der theoretischen und politischen Entwicklung Karl Korschs," in *Jahrbuch Arbeiterbewegung*, Vol. 1, ed. Claudio Pozzoli (Frankfurt am Main, 1973), pp. 15-85. For a criticism of Korsch's positions, see Oskar Negt, "Theory, Empiricism and Class Struggle: On the Problem of Constitution in Korsch," *Telos*, 26 (Winter, 1975-76), pp. 120-142.

32. Cf. Max Adler, "Wladimir Ilyitsch Lenin," in *Der Kampf*, XVII (1924), pp. 81-89 and, later, the discussion with T. Dan over the Soviet Union, "Zur Diskussion über Sowjetrussland," in *Der Kampf*, XXV (1932), pp. 215-224 and 301-311. Cf. also his pamphlet *Linkssozialismus. Notwendige Betrachtungen über Reformismus und revolutionären Sozialismus* (Karlsbad, 1933); now reprinted in *Austromarxismus*, ed. Hans-Jürgen Sandkühler and Rafael de la Vega (Frankfurt am Main and Vienna, 1970), pp. 206-260.

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capitalist society and turns into an institution for the defense of the interests of this very same society."[33] In order for the system of councils to become a "*true organism of socialization*," it needed to critically confront the theme of the state and institutions. It had to accept the political-strategic challenge of Leninism, which Kautsky had rejected with doctrinaire disdain.

Adler grasped the political problematic of the revolution in Europe: the dialectic between mass movement and institutions. This relation had, as its point of departure and goal, a process of socialization which, managed by the councils, came to constitute the continuity between the *before* and *after* of the gaining of power: an element of continuity substantiated, in turn, by a progressive development of proletarian consciousness in a socialist and revolutionary sense. Yet, when it came to indicating the practical means to meet this need, Adler proposed a compromise as formal as that of Korsch. On the level of the democratic-institutional framework, he proposed a combinnation of councils and National Assembly and, on the level of socialization and mass politicization, "revolutionary socialist propaganda,"[34] which would overcome labor corporativism as the presupposition of a "real collective will": "This, however, presupposes that all immediate economic interests (whose defense is usually at the center of party parliamentary struggles), each of which is engaged in deriving the maximum profit from the bourgeois state apparatus, are clearly relegated to the background behind the *common interest of social transformation* which can lead to the overcoming of the present conditions of state and society, i.e., beyond class divisions."[35] Thus, both Korsch and Adler were confronted with a dichotomy between the analytic level of material labor struggles (and of corresponding autonomous organizational forms) and the level of the political-theoretical perspective and general strategy. In Korsch this dichotomy obtained in the hiatus (and subsequent juxtaposition) between the economic level of self-management and the anti-state political outcome, and in Adler in the gap between the "sociological" (empirical-economic) analysis of the concrete historical forms of the class struggle (both in relation to the problem of the state and in relation to the peasant question), on the one hand, and universalist-transcendental solutions on the other.[36] Thus, both lacked a hinge to connect the analytic

33. Max Adler, *Demokratie und Rätesystem* (Vienna, 1919), p. 76.
34. *Ibid.*, p. 85.
35. *Ibid.*, p. 91. On this, see Cerroni, *op.cit.*, pp. 80-83.
36. As we have seen, unlike other contemporary theoreticians, Adler is aware of the latent risks of the council system if the terms of its political outcome are not defined. Thus, it cannot be said that the blind alleys in which he runs are the natural result of a naïve or altogether idealistic conception of organizations. These blind alleys, which should be analyzed in the context of Adler's philosophical discourse, have meta-theoretical roots which limit and condition the use of certain categories. The fact that a theoretical-practical oscillation remains, which is evident in the use of the concepts of politics and organization, must be related to a more or less conscious influence of Lassalle's organizational model which is juxtaposed to the "rational kernel" constituted by the need for a materialist deduction of forms of consciousness and by the intrtroduction of the theme of subjectivity. The concept of class self-activity consequently tends to become frozen into an abstract postulate and, symmetrically, politics evaporates into the mere ethical-transcendental dimension (proletarian universalism, humanism, etc.).

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with the dialectical-organizational component of the account: the analysis of the nexus of production and class struggle which could allow the deduction, on both the historical and theoretical level, of the genesis of the "forms of consciousness" from the structural (and, for the individuals of which the class is composed, also experiential) context defined by the social relations of production.[37] Adler approached the problem of constitution more than Korsch not only because he posed the problem of the state in complex problematic terms (by advancing against doctrinaire underpinnings of the structure-superstructure dichotomy, the notion of "sociological unity of state and society"),[38] but also because he connected the concept of the councils to the concept of "the socialization of consciousness."

This leads to the question of neo-Kantianism in the European labor movement and the various ways in which neo-Kantian themes have been appropriated and utilized within the context of social democracy's internal political battles. Not even the more intelligent approaches to this problem have avoided the dangers of a reductive schematism ultimately resulting from the assumptions of a certain political and historiographic tradition. In this sense, the criticisms brought against the council movement are not meant to resolve all of its complexity and wealth, but rather, are meant to stimulate specific analyses, even on the ideological level, of the details and internal differentiations.

Cacciari has pointed out how in the left socialist Kurt Eisner (the famous hero of the Bavarian revolution, killed in February 1919), the defense of the councils was related to his interpretation of neo-Kantian ideology at the beginning of the century.[39] Actually, on the ideological level, Wilhelminian *Lebensphilosophie* within the debate of the labor movement underlines not only Eisner's neo-Kantian discourse (and that of other intellectuals such as Vorländer and Max Adler as well), but also Friedrich Adler's Machism, and certain sociological elaborations of Robert Michels and the development of Luxemburgian critiques of the principles of social democracy. Neo-Kantian socialism saw itself as the potential saviour of the totality of human experience from capitalist fragmentation and alienation.[40] But despite this location of

37. On the relation between the constitutive process of class consciousness and of experience, see the historical and sociological analysis by Michael Vester, *Die Entstehung des Proletariats als Lernprozess. Zur Soziologie und Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung* (Frankfurt am Main, 1970). On the same theme, see Oskar Negt and Alexander Kluge, *Oeffentlichkeit und Erfahrung. Zur Organisationsanalyse von bürgerlicher und proletarischer Oeffentlichkeit* (Frankfurt am Main, 1972).

38. Max Adler, *Die Staatsauffassung des Marxismus* (Vienna, 1922), pp. 29ff. For Adler, base and superstructure—that scholastic and schematic Marxism has held rigidly distinct—are actually united "in the same identical character and, more precisely, in a spiritual character." *Ibid.*, p. 88. On Adler's concept of the state, see H. Sultan, *Gesellschaft und Staat bei Karl Marx und Friedrich Engels* (Jena, 1922), pp. 100ff.

39. Cacciari, *op.cit.*, p. 38. Cacciari refers to Kurt Eisner's work on Kant (1904), now reprinted in *Die Halbe macht den Räten* (Cologne, 1969). On the problem of neo-Kantianism in the middle-European labor movement, see Aldo Zanardo, "Aspetti del Socialismo Neo-Kantiano in Germania," in *Filosofia e Socialismo* (Rome, 1974).

40. Cacciari, *op.cit.*, pp. 38-39: "Besides leading to socialdemocratic empiricism, Marx also leads back to the Kantian transcendental project. The idealist myth of social democracy as a

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the cultural sources of the ideology of socialism as *Sollen*, Cacciari reaches no pertinent conclusions. The problem cannot be resolved by an *a posteriori* emphasis on the subjective and theoretical backwardness undoubtedly present in the left socialist and communist components of the council movement, of which the neo-Kantian ideology was the philosophical source. This ideology did not arise as an ideal-typical expression of social democracy, but rather as the effect and reaction to this crisis—a political and "spiritual" crisis of the party which arose long before World War I in the Bernstein debate. Bernstein's introduction of Kantianism as the antibody into the structure of the SPD was a political operation (dictated by the objective need to adjust the general conception and party's work-style to ongoing capitalist transformations) whose actual meaning is difficult to grasp if one merely seeks to liquidate that antibody as an altogether "bourgeois" element. In Cacciari (and in those holding similar positions), commonplaces of Third International historiography are recycled and pose as a tradition, as opposed to our alleged political false consciousness.

The political meaning of the anti-determinist battle has been lost in Stalinist and post-Stalinist historiography. The attribution of anti-reformist connotations to the "subjectivist-activist" reception of Marxism was not peculiar to theoreticians who in the 1920s lined up decisively on the side of the Bolsheviks, such as Lukács and Korsch, but also to militant intellectuals who, although critical of Leninism and of the October Revolution, tried to find a strategic alternative to the involution of social democracy, able to produce not merely an insurrectional outcome, but a "revolutionary" one[41] which would regain *in its integrity* the unitary potential of struggle present in the European working class. Thus, even the struggle against "revisionism" and its "anti-materialist ideology" cannot be dogmatically understood as a struggle between a "correct line" (Marxist-Leninist) and left or right deviationist tendencies both opportunistic and-or extremist.[42] Understood in terms of its political class roots, and measured in terms of the real 1920 level of struggle, this "orthodoxy" was nothing more than one of the many elements in the

'tactic' arises from this context, even if it will become 'official' only within the left-wing of the Third International. But this is also the source of Marxism as the 'cultural tradition'—*als Philosophie*—Marxism as ethical norm meant to regain the Kantian and Enlightenment *ratio* in order to realize it on the historical plane: i.e., Marxism as historicism, *Individualität* which was still formal in Kant (and in liberal ideology) becomes *Humanität* in Marx and in the socialist idea. Socialism is the *community* of subject—the redemption of the great utopia of 'classical German philosophy' from its bourgeois interpretation. The first act of this *Humanitätsideal*, the first subject of its historical course is the working class... Socialism speaks only the language of the *totality* of its goal. This concept of *totality*—of Marxism as ideology of the totality against specialization and bureaucratization of the bourgeois sciences, *against* socialdemocratic 'politics' will become increasingly more central in the elaboration of left-communism up to the Lukács of *History and Class Consciousness* where it finds definitive systematization."

41. An excellent account of this is to be found in O. Jenssen, "Von der Revolte zur Massenorganisation," in *Die Organisation in Klassenkampf. Die Probleme der politischen der Arbeiterklasse* (Berlin and Britz, 1931), pp. 9-30.

42. This trivial and sterile interpretation is recycled in the "Introduction" by Sandkühler and de la Vega to *Austromarxismus, op.cit.*

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complex theoretical and political framework behind the events of the European labor movement. Furthermore, this is an element that appeared only in the late phase of the Weimar Republic, during the phase of the "Bolshevization" of the German Communist Party, which was *subsequent* to the theoretical and orgnization disintegration of the movement. In other words, the "Bolshevization" took place in Europe not on the wave of attack, but in the defensive retreat and practical defeat of labor struggles.[43]

In this context, it is relevant to point out parallels between certain philosophical themes of Max Adler's Austro-Marxism and Lukács: the neo-Kantian dichotomy between necessity (*Müssen*) and duty (*Sollen*)—capitalist objectivity in the ethical-transcendental ideal of socialism—corresponded in Lukács to the contraposition between the quantitative objectivity of the world of commodities (reification) and the subversive explosion of the qualitative dimension (class consciousness: subjectivity which is both of labor and of humanity).[44] If in the neo-Kantian Austro-Marxists the immanence of the relation was altogether absent, in Lukács it was simply *posited*—advanced as a need—but not *resolved*: the negative dialectic from which class consciousness emerges has a purely declaratory immanence since Lukács failed to ground it in the *specificity of the object*, i.e., he failed to explain its genesis starting from the ("historically specified") terrain of the social relations of production and from the determinate levels of class composition. To break the ultimately technistic vision of the "world of commodities" as mere quantity, to catch the qualitative-dialectical element inherent in it as an abstract expression of a determinate relation of production means to lay the groundwork for a welding of the analysis of capitalist objectivity and the genesis of subjectivity, between the critique of the economy and the theory of class organization.

3. Party, Union and Councils

The historical process of the constitution of the proletariat as a "class for itself" had already experienced the temporary co-existence of a mass party and a vanguard one (the Bolshevik experience), but the presence of two mass parties (SPD and USPD) represented an absolutely new situation. If "the real center of the capitalist initiative was in the connection between the new organization of labor, the socialization program and the institutional order,"[45] it had already largely failed in the spring of 1920. The collapse of

43. Cf. Hermann Weber, *Die Wandlung des deutschen Kommunismus. Die Stalinisierung der KPD in der Weimarer Republik* (Frankfurt am Main, 1969). See also Otto Flechtheim, *Die KPD in der Weimarer Republik* (Frankfurt am Main, 1969), pp. 248ff; and, edited with comments by Hermann Weber, *Der deutsche Kommunismus. Dokumente 1915-1945* (Cologne, 1963).

44. See Manfredo Tafuri, "Austromarxismo e Città. 'Das Rote Wien'," in *Contropiano*, 2 (1971), pp. 261-264. On Lukács, see Peter Ludz's introduction to *Schriften zur Ideologie und Politik* (Darmstadt and Neuwied, 1973), especially pp. xxiff (on the relation between neo-Kantianism and syndicalism in the young Lukacs' conception of political ethics), in addition to Rudi Dutschke, *Versuch, Lenin auf die Füsse zu Stellen* (Berlin, 1974), pp. 144-153, and 240-246.

45. Cacciari, *op.cit.*, p. 20.

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the socialization program[46] and the failure of institutional stabilization (necessitating union mobilization against a series of military putsches) led to the reemergence of the problem of the restructuring of labor and the related questions of political organization. In practice, the union had shown itself more adept in the defense of the constitution than in the control of the planning of labor within financially shaky factories. This was to be expected, considering that the "free unions" tied to the General German Union Association (ADGB) were structured and divided by categories already obsolete in 1913.[47] Thus, in the left-wing of the USPD and KPD, the theory of the councils reappeared as the only project able to provide a positive political outcome to the plan of the restructuring of class composition, not within an already given productive process (the socialdemocratic project), but within a developmental model to be defined along with the workers' political gains.

According to Däumig, the leading theoretician of this project, the class could control the key point of labor productivity. The workers' council, however, would also have had to take over those roles that the union was no longer able to fulfill: the contracting of wages and the redefinition of functions and categories. Organizationally subdivided into economic and political councils, the workers' councils had to transform into class unity and political mobility the professional de-qualification necessary for a reordering of the economy—a reordering, of course, not based on principles of planning from above, but measured in terms of the needs of the 'community': "Naturally, by socialization I do not mean a monopolization or the creation of a 'constitutional factory,' as some are suggesting to the workers. Experiments of this type have already been made many times, but how have they ended up for the workers?"[48] It was not the factory that had to adjust to the state's laws, but the state which had to accept the workers' self-organized power.[49] Only the council system was able to bring about the unification of the whole proletariat and to initiate the phase of transition to socialism with direct mass participation.[50] "I have always claimed that the revolution also disperses party boundaries... that is to say that here it is not the question of the party that has to be considered first of all; what is important is to show with facts that we want to energetically realize socialism... The slower we do this, the earlier capitalism sinks its roots and large numbers of workers not politically

46. Cf. Ritter and Miller, *op.cit.*, pp. 282-302.

47. This is the basis for the council theorists' project of "revolutionizing" the union structure.

48. E. Däumig, "Die Rätesystem" (speech delivered to the USPD Congress, March 4, 1919), in *Theorie und Praxis der Arbeiterräte* (Berlin, 1969), p. 22.

49. *Ibid.*, pp. 21-24: "We must involve in the council system all the discontent of the masses against the parliamentary system... If the Weimar authorities intend to grant themselves a life-long appointment, let them do it. In fact, in so doing they serve our cause very well... Kautsky claims that the councils have their justification only during the transition period and that is all! But doesn't Kautsky himself claim that the revolution is a long process of transition?"

50. *Ibid.*, p. 26: "I am not adamant about the expression 'council system'; it is the only means to move closer as rapidly as possible to socialism and, furthermore, also for realizing it fully and conserving it."

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active slowly become used once again to the old capitalist organisms. Proletarians have no wish to wait so long... In this way, proletarians become confused, even more lost in their desperation and are carried into undertakings none of us approve of."[51] Däumig's hypothesis of a class recomposition within the industrial gains more credence when we recall that the period between the January Berlin insurrection and the proclamation of the "Munich Soviet Republic" (March 1919) was full of strikes, street demonstratins, and insurrectional attempts, followed by the Army's harsh repression in Bremen, Düsseldorf, Westphalia, Brunswick, Halle, etc. It was not a matter of "revolutionary gymnastics," as was claimed by the German Communist Workers' Party (KAPD) leaders (along with the left-wing of the KPD), but rather of a liquidation of the most revolutionary workers who extended their action beyond the factory gates.[52] Thus, socialization and councils represented the base of a new organizational process within which the party and the union progressively tended to change their functions in a constantly evolving political-economic structure.

R. Müller, defined by the Spartacists as "the most mystical of the council theoreticians,"[53] drew a lucid parallel between socialization and the council system: in the same way that the councils introduced the first phase of the communist society while they still had not created communism (still relying on bourgeois juridical norms), so socialization was not yet socialism and much less communism: "Socialization means depriving capitalist society of economic power; but this is possible only by means of a political struggle."[54] There is a determinate moment in the development of productive forces when it is decisive for the working class to politically manage the process. The workers' council must then politically anticipate a social form which does not yet exist at the economic level (communism), where socialization can, at most, substitute a production organized for the satisfaction of the needs of consumers (represented in the district councils) in place of the anarchy of capitalist production.

Schematic thought and Proudhonian naïveté broadly compromised Müller's argument. Yet, a conception of workers' councils emerged which did not "subordinate the class to the productive process."[55] The workers' council appeared as the general political organism of a phase of transition characterized by the political-subjective organization of the proletariat. Proletarian consciousness transcended awareness of being the object of exploitation and understood itself as the protagonist of a concrete process in which the power relation between capital and labor was being decisively

51. *Ibid.*, p. 21.
52. *Ibid.*, p. 26.
53. This is how E. Ludwig had defined it in the KPD Congress of April, 1920.
54. R. Müller, "Das Rätesystem in Deutschland," *Theorie und Praxis der Arbeiterräte, op.cit.*, p. 10.
55. The question of "Proudhonism" and "productivism" in the council strategy had been strongly debated even in Italy in the columns of *Ordine Nuovo*. Cf. the polemic between Gramsci and Tasca in *Ordine Nuovo*, June 5, 1920, p. 26; June 12, 1920, pp. 39-40; June 19, 1920, pp. 47-48; July 3, 1920, pp. 63-64.

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shifted in favor of the latter. Economics was no longer seen as a set of objective laws that the economic operator mechanically applied, but as a social relation—historically changeable, and therefore able to be politically controlled—between the struggling classes. Thus, the historical reason for Müller's schematically anti-parliamentary position, so close to Korsch's anti-statism, becomes understandable. The contrast with Haase (the leader of the USPD) concerning a possible co-existence between councils and parliament was not purely political, but was generated by different theoretical presuppositions and by the conviction that the parliamentary juridical system and capitalist production were inextricably bound together —just as tightly, if not more so, than socialization was bound to the representative council system. "A socialization applied from above, as was attempted during the period of the socialization commission, does nothing but preserve the capitalist mode of production. In the best of cases, next to the owner of the means of production, the state itself appears as a beneficiary of labor power, and both divide the surplus value created by labor."[56] In Müller's "pure" theory of the councils, party and union tend to disappear as a class institutions belonging to a socio-economic formation now becoming extinct.[57] As in Korsch, however, the problematic feature of Müller's argument was that it resulted in a political impasse. Since the organizations of the labor movement were burdened with an economistic and subaltern practice (from time to time transfigured from a formalistic and rarefied concept of "politics" understood as a mere parliamentary schematism or interbureaucratic tacticism), the need for a revolutionary-political praxis was initially expressed in the rejection of official "politics" and in the rigid polarization of theoretical attention upon autonomous working class organizations, which were extrapolated and disconnected from the whole texture of social relations of production to which they logically and historically belonged. Thus, these expressions of the theory of the councils were a step further than the conceptual framework of the Second International, but still considerably short of the needs of the movement as a whole.

On the other hand, the communist component of the movement had no clearer understanding of political and organizational problems. The external articulation between party, union, and councils proposed by the Spartacist E. Ludwig to the IVth Congress of the KPD (April 14-15, 1920) on the eve of the unification with the USPD,[58] which was meant as a theoretically correct

56. Müller, *op.cit.*, p. 10.

57. *Ibid.*, p. 5: "When, in July 1916, 55,000 Berlin workers suddenly went on strike, not in order to better their economic position, but for political reasons, bourgeois society, and even more, the leaders of social democracy and of unions, were absolutely unable to understand this unheard of state of affairs which completely overturned the experiences of the labor movement... Here arose the first attempts for a third organization, that of workers' councils. The large factories constituted the nerve of the movement. This brief exposition of their development shows us that the council idea is not a specifically Russian phenomenon and that rather it has been articulated as a new organizational form of the working class from the very development of economic and political relations."

58. E. Ludwig, "Die Entwicklung der Arbeiterräte," speech delivered to the IV KPD Congress April 14-15, 1920, in *Die Internationale*, II:23 (June 1, 1920), pp. 38-60.

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synthesis of Luxemburgian thought and of Bolshevik experiences, was only a worried anticipation of the heterogeneity and contradictions of the future party. An easier target was found in the AAU (General Labor Unions), founded by the KAPD, which were attacked as organisms "born in the heads of Proudhonist petty-bourgeois intellectuals; small, utopian, sectarian organisms whose perspectives would, at best, lead to the form of worker capitalism."[59] Rather than analyzing the social and political reasons which had led to the birth of these "minority" experiences, Ludwig preferred to stick with an abstract and schematic concept of "politics" and "organization," involving in his critique even the USPD theorists of the councils.[60] Subsequently, the "ideology" of the workers' councils was criticized in terms of the ideology of a nascent Marxism-Leninism.[61] Lenin's complex strategy for gaining power and for the Soviet political direction of the phase of transition, was able to generate only a very over-drawn argument in Germany.

1920 German reality was much more complex than Ludwig's sterile line which could carry the majority within the party only at the price of continual breaks or of brusque shifts in political direction.[62] The documents, articles, declarations, and appeals of isolated politicians or of the groups that left the party reflect the peculiar absence of an alternative political line in the face of an awareness of the general backwardness and overall political needs of the movement.

Typical of this was the case of Paul Levi, a complex political personality who, at the beginning of the 1920s, outlined an analysis of the German political situation which was a logical and political antecedent to his pamphlet *Unser Weg: Wider den Putschismus* (this marked his leaving the Communist Party and the Third International in April 1921). According to Levi, the November Revolution had not been the victim of any "betrayal" on the part of the socialdemocratic leaders for the simple reason that the latter had done nothing but follow the policy of servility with respect to the military apparatus, which had begun much earlier than August 4, 1914.[63] "In the

59. *Ibid.*

60. *Ibid.* "The debate around the councils has engaged at the same time both mystic-romantics and nit-picking scholastics; their fortunes have coincided with the period of decadence of those very councils. Däumig's and Müller's revolutionary factory organizations are typical examples of council scholasticism and, furthermore, are grounded upon too restricted a base. If they are able to have some economic import, they altogether fail at the political level. Müller seeks to transform unions from craft associations into associations based on different branches of industry: this does not at all mean revolutionizing the unions. The true revolutionizing consists in their shifting from the ideology of labor community to that of class struggle."

61. *Ibid.* "The councils do not exclude the parties and the union; rather, they (and not parliament) are the ideal locus within which the discussion concerning parties must unfold. The moment in which the majority in favor of 'council dictatorship' will be gained in them, the councils will change from struggling organs into organs of power of the proletarian state."

62. In February of 1921, the 51 members of the Executive Committee, with a majority of 28 to 23, eliminated from the central committee Levi, Zetkin, Däumig, Hoffman, and Brass. They were substituted with Brandler, Thalheimer, Frölich and Stoecker.

63. Paul Levi, "Die politische Lage in Deutschland," *op. cit.*, pp. 118-119: "In March 1919 it was Noske who... filled houses of correction, prisons and military fortresses as no military dog had ever dared."

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November Revolution the majority of the proletariat... has been satisfied to play again the role that it has always played in bourgeois revolutions: the role of the moving force that does not pursue its own ends."[64] Thus, not only the bourgeoisie, but also social democracy was unable to cut its ties with the Junkers.[65] The alliance between social democracy and bourgeoisie was not able to constitute an efficient and functioning capitalist state: a bitter realization full of implications hard to swallow for all the organizations of the German proletariat whose unity had not been broken by the "betrayal" of the socialdemocratic leaders, but rather by military defeat: "What is the source of the internal division of the class movement? The war has not reached all the strata of the proletariat equally. It has not only spared individuals of all social extraction, but even entire proletarian strata. It has been a happy conjuncture not only for the capitalists, but also for many proletarians. Entire categories of workers were exempted from military service and employed according to their specialization; they were protected against unemployment by the enormous development of war production and against hunger by extremely high wages... Hindenburg and Ludendorf knew their trade well."[66] This was not an updated version of the Marxist-Leninist theory of the "labor aristocracy," which in a few years would gain wide acceptance in the Third International and which, in Stalin's politics, would function as the alibi justifying all defeats, but rather of a non-moralistic and non-ideological analysis of a singular historical relation: the concomitant growth of the working class and of German military industry, of which the war had represented the last link.

Hugo Preuss was as deluded as the Spartacists. Preuss thought he had founded the bourgeois state which the Spartacists believed themselves to be

64. *Ibid.*, p. 116: "What came out of the November Revolution was not at all a bourgeois republic... Even the bourgeois republic is impossible without the certainty of victory, without the full power and the will to hegemony of the rising class;" p. 117: "Erzberger, Scheidemann and others are old acquaintances, serfs, and shoe-shiners of the old masters; parliament has not succeeded in transforming these shoe-shiners...into true statesmen."

65. "In the same way that the profoundly German tradition of the *Machtstaat* has turned out to be the most fragile among all political institutions of modern capital, the *bête noir* of reactionary Junkers turns out to be the road most open to the development of a certain type of democratic labor movement. Without Bismarck there may never have been German social democracy, in its classical form." Mario Tronti, "Workers and Capital," *Telos*, 14 (Winter, 1972), p. 31. What is relevant here is not so much the fact that the structure and the organizational model of the Prussian military state had a direct influence even upon the apparatus of the socialdemocratic party, but that the latter shared with other political parties the general depoliticization and authoritarian technization toward which they were pushed by the "semi-absolutist" Bismarckian state since it kept them away from every specifically political question and all governmental responsibilities. This is why there was a bureaucratic technicism and economism which vitiated, to the point of bastardization, the socialdemocratic concept of "politics": "If in their practical politics, the social democrats limited themselves essentially to the representation of interests, this corresponded to the general tendency of the German empire toward the 'economicization' of parties." Erich Matthias, "Kautsky und der Kautskyanismus. Die Funktion der Ideologie in der deutschen Sozialdemokratie vor dem ersten Weltkrieg," in *Marxismusstudien*, second series (Tübingen, 1957), p. 197. What this shows is how well economism goes with a general and abstract concept of politics.

66. Levi, *op.cit.*, pp. 119-120.

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fighting. Preuss counted on the family of international capital while the Spartacists waited for the socialdemocratic masses to be at disillusioned at last. But "the conditions of the armistice were clearly against pacifism... The Treaty of Versailles should have put an end to all the chatter by Kautsky and his friends."[67] The great bourgeois democracies (notwithstanding Keynes' plea in favor of Germany)[68] promised only unemployment and misery to the German proletariat. Yet, despite the failure of the socialdemocratic-bourgeois republic, Levi also exposed the hopelessness of Spartacist delusions concerning the reunification of the working class in its own ranks.[69] However, he could not renounce the "great idea" of a single revolutionary labor party. In the face of the exasperated subjectivism of party comrades, the "exemplary actions" of those who had already left the party in order to found a new one, and the practical and ideal disintegration of the movement, Levi sought to pick up Luxemburg's argument in order to permit the re-emergence of the revolutionary patterns latent in the catastrophic interdependence of crisis and workers' spontaneity: "apparently favorable economic circumstances"—the increase of exportations caused by the devaluation of the Mark—"hid from the proletariat the collapse of capitalism and its historical task: communism."[70] However, the days of capitalism were over: "the crisis has erupted in Germany"[71] and the system of exploitation was forced to show to the proletariat its unveiled face.

Levi's essay offers no positive alternative. His belabored theoretical synthesis reflected an uneasiness widespread within the movement which had hitherto been expressed in the complex nexus of splits (and fusions) of the various labor parties: from the Heidelberg split of the KPD (which had given rise to the birth of the KAPD, while the strictly Spartacist line of Luxemburgian vintage regrouped under Paul Levi's direction), to the split of the USPD in the Halle Congress which saw the left majority, guided by Däumig, declare its adherence to the Third International and its decision to unite with the Spartakusbund. From this split, in December 1920, there arose the United Communist Party (VKPD) which, under the direction of Levi and Däumig, seemed to have opened a new political perspective able to positively resolve the labor movement's identity crisis. Once again, however, the timing of political organization did not correspond to the class movement. The new party expressed only the need and not the *rooting* of a revolutionary mass party. The party was not born as an anticipating science, but as the "owl of Minerva," late wisdom reflecting on the recent defeats rather than towards the urgent tasks of the immediate future. The organization came too late (as Rosenberg put it), when organizational voluntarism was no longer able to

67. *Ibid.*, p. 117.
68. Keynes, *op.cit.*, pp. 113-225.
69. Levi, *op.cit.*, p. 122: "Some comrades, noticing that the great masses of the proletariat were very backward with respect to the movement, did all they could, even the impossible, to explain this phenomenon whose true causes they failed to grasp."
70. *Ibid.*, p. 120.
71. *Ibid.*, p. 123.

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regain the positions that the working class had lost in the frontal clashes during the years of insurrection.

Following Levi's article concerning the German political situation (November 1920) and his pamphlet *Unser Weg* (April 1921), a series of crucial events ensued: the failure of the "open letter" policy,[72] the clash with Radek,[73] his purge from the Central Committee along with Däumig and Zetkin,[74] and the "March action." In his account of the workers' councils, Ludwig had contrasted the type of council organization that Däumig and Müller sought to create in Berlin to the positive model of the "revolutionary councils" of Chemnitz, in Thuringa, and of all the Halle-Mansfield district of Saxony which were controlled by the Communist Party. This was the only zone in Germany where the workers' councils had challenged the Kapp putsch, which led to the demilitarization of the district. Only there had the workers' councils become a territorial reality outside the factories.[75] In this battlefield the new party Central Committee (Brandler, Thalheimer, Stoeker, Frölich), politically close to Radek and Bela Kun, decided to implement the "theory of the offensive."[76]

What was involved was taking advantage of a tense situation, provoked by a new attempt on the part of the state authority in Saxony to apply in the Halle-Mansfield district the law calling for the disarmament of civilians (which had already been enforced in all the other districts of central Germany) in order to remilitarize the zone. Similar attempts had been met by strikes and protests which had involved a large strata of the population and thus generalized the struggle's political objectives. The spark which was supposed to put all of Germany on fire, the intervention of the party as the armed sector of the class, turned out to be an unexpected boost to the state's attempt to reoccupy the zone.[77] The "insurrectional" activity of the communist groups had been so insignificant that, after the disastrous retreat of March 31, only the technical side of the operation was criticized and not the general political problem: the total lack of homogeneity between the workers' councils and the party. This was a sad outcome for those who had conceived of the "March action" and of the "theory of the offensive" as the way to overcome the barrier between factory and social struggles, economic and political action.[78] Ludwig's obtuse

72. On January 7, 1921, the center of the KPD sent an open letter to all labor organizations (SPD, USPD, KAPD and the unions), which outlined some objectives requiring common action. On the Communist International's policy of the open letter, see M. Hajek, *Storia dell'Internazionale Comunista (1921-1935)* (Rome, 1972), pp. 10-18.

73. The dissention arose from the Livorno split of 1921. Levi was against throwing Serrati out of the Third International—so much so that Radek defined him as the "German Serrati."

74. Hajek, *op.cit.*, pp. 14-15.

75. Cf. Hans Manfred Bock, *Syndikalismus und Linkskommunismus von 1918-1923* (Meisenheim am Glan, 1969), pp. 295-308.

76. Hajek, *op.cit.*, pp. 12-18.

77. The zone was militarily re-occupied March 28, 1921. There were about 40 deaths and thousands of arrests. Cf. E. Rutigliano, *Linkskommunismus e Rivoluzione in Occidente* (Bari, 1974), pp. 48-53.

78. When they heard shooting, the workers did not know whether it was the Army or Max Hölz's gangs—with whom, anyway, relations were not very good. To avoid equivocation, they locked themselves in the factories. See Bock, *op.cit.*, pp. 308-318.

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and sectarian analysis, which only a year earlier had praised the "revolutionary consciousness" of the workers' councils in Thuringa and Saxony in contraposition to Däumig's and Müller's Berlin "economic councils," thus met an embarrassing historical rejection. Facts had shown the impossibility of measuring the revolutionary timing by means of the ideological notions of "class" and "party," thus clearly indicating the gap between insurrectional immediacy and the complex form of politics. The need for a general alternative strategy able to socialize the labor struggles by directing them towards the crucial point in the relation between crisis and institutions contrasted sharply with the "March action's" schematic attempt to reverse an ideological concept of the working class into the party's immediate action.[79]

Aside from these critical presuppositions, Levi's pamphlet followed closely the earlier writing of 1920 with the obvious difference that the hopes placed in the VKPD were no longer present. In the 1920 article Levi had emphasized that at the root of the miraculous class unity of the pre-war German proletariat lay Germany's militarist politics—i.e., the Prussian state which, from the beginning of the century, had become the great propulsion of the whole productive apparatus. The workers' councils had believed that they could preserve the unity by substituting Wilhelm II and his generals with the old socialdemocratic party. After that final unitary gesture, the proletariat had disintegrated into conflicting organizational experiences, each of which pretended, however, to express the needs of the whole class. If in "Die politische Lage in Deutschland," Levi still believed in the capitalist crisis as the *deus ex machina* able to spontaneously bring about the reunification of the proletariat, in the pamphlet against putschism, the unifying element was located in the "German national question."[80] Levi reconized the Bolsheviks' succes in intertwining the workers' revolutionary project with broad national questions such as the peasant problem. In the same way, the German Communist Party should have been able to make the working class the moving force behind the resolution of the great national questions that the war and the Treaty of Versailles had raised. Agitation and the political use of these problems could not be left to the Junkers and to the right. The nationalist Bolsheviks Laufenberg and Wolfheim were in error since they believed that they could solve the national (and international) problems of the new Germany through summit agreements (perhaps with reactionary generals eager to approach the Soviet Union out of hate for the Entente).[81] Instead, it was necessary to make the German people understand that the alliance with the USSR was supported by the VKPD, not out of deference to the Komintern (of which the party was a section), but because of the vital economic and

79. Georg Lukács, in "Opportunism and Putschism," *Political Writings, 1919-1929* (London, 1972), p. 72, characterizes putschism as the tendency to "overrate the importance of organization."

80. Paul Levi, "Unser Weg. Wider den Putschismus," in *Zwischen Spartakus und Sozialdemokratie* (Frankfurt am Main, 1969), pp. 44-94.

81. Cf. Eyck, *op.cit.*, p. 250.

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political importance for the defense of national autonomy.[82] The projects of the political recomposition of the proletariat into a party and the reconstitution of a new national identity had to proceed simultaneously; otherwise they would clash with tragic results for the working class.[83] In emphasizing the "national question" and the unquestioned need that the working class rise to the level of political protagonist of the nation's life, Levi had dropped the argument concerning the crisis and the way to confront the class struggle in a situation of institutional precariousness. The level of politics was thus rendered "autonomous," but only in the negative sense of its extrapolation from the terrain of production and from the moment of direct self-organization of the producers. The theme of general political organization (the party) and of the "national path" was thus aborted precisely because it isolated the whole issue of the councils and of socialization: i.e., the working class' political mission was hypostatized to the level of a generality which avoided the *specific* task of recomposing the different sections of the productive forces, thus catching the political level within the objective dimension of the (social) relations of production. In spite of its level of complexity, Levi's position displayed theoretical and political shortcomings associated with his polemical aims. Of course, the Communist Party's putschism was evident, even independently of the "March action," in the inability to establish ties and alliances with other social groups; the working class and its party operated in total isolation. Yet, beyond the heated polemics, Levi and the putschists had something in common: the attempt to reorganize, to foster the political growth of the working class and to generalize its struggles, without connecting this action to the specificity of the productive process, of factory realities, of factory councils (*Betriebsräte*), which, despite their factory limitations, their "productivism" and their "labor ideology," contained levels of compactness and class consciousness found neither in Levi's sketch of the "national path to socialism" nor in Bela Kun's "theory of the offensive."

4. Labor Contract, Crisis and Organization

The most serious charges brought against the councils movement and their theoreticians are: labor ideology, overconcern with factories, and Proudhonism. Probably Marx would have reproached them for not having been Proudhonists to the end. This is no paradox, for either there is the objective possibility during a revolutionary process to abolish labor as a commodity (but this would eliminate the transitional phase) or it must be possible to transform labor into a general equivalent to all commodities. Marx did not accuse Proudhon of being a utopian, but of confusing the progressive socialization of capital with socialism.[84] The progressive transformation of money into gold into money-labor, i.e., in a fundamental

82. Levi, "Unser Weg..." *op.cit.*, pp. 51-52.

83. This is what happened, as is shown by Paul Levi's tragic end, who killed himself in 1930 when the rise of National Socialism seemed inevitable.

84. In 1850, Proudhon wrote to his friend Darimon: "The moment has come to show the

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element of mediation between cost of labor-power and value of social labor, cannot be found written in the pages of the history of economics but it is traceable in the vacillating events of power relations between the two struggling classes. It is an obligatory path that capital undertakes in the history of its development only when it has full political control over working class movements and ideological-institutional hegemony over the laboring masses. Money, then, as the fetishized expression of the *domination of the form*, tends to become—in relation to the emergence of the state's controlling functions—the unchallenged and authoritarian arbiter in the exchange between capital and labor. Only then does the exchange between money and wage-labor tend to become total, i.e., the hegemony of the form carries out an uncoupling within the process of "real abstraction" (which is expressed in the dichotomy between juridical abstraction and real subsumption). On the one hand, the producers are transformed into "citizens" (whereby the specificity of class is dissolved in general equality), while on the other, capital transforms all citizens into producers, into receivers of income measured in terms of performed social labor.[85] Control and command over labor (understood not only in the factory context, but as general social labor) becomes the determining element and the only guarantor of monetary stability. The community of producers and consumers, so desired by Müller and Däumig, could have a concrete meaning only by anticipating and placing this very general scheme under the *political control* of the working class. It has been operating from the New Deal until today under the sign of the unchallenged domination of capital expressed on the institutional level in the form of the "authoritarian state."

In the period between 1921 and 1923 in Germany, the council movement was often at the point of carrying out this reversal. To focus on the parallel control of money and labor by connecting the two—keeping in mind, at the same time, the complex socio-political and economic institutional interconnections—during the period of the disintegration of the Mark, would not have meant to shift the movement toward Proudhon, but to anticipate Keynes,[86] i.e., to anticipate the capitalist counter-attack. But in order to do so, it would have been indispensable to emphasize practically the moment of general social direction of the process, by avoiding that separation between the "political" and the "social" which turned out to be the real obstacle to the realization of an actual primacy of politics within the labor movement.

As already indicated, Ludwig had attacked the plan for "revolutionizing" the unions as proposed by the council theoreticians, by reiterating the respective tasks of the two organizations: the unions were to protect the workers within the domain of a given relation of production and represent the

bourgeoisie what there is for it in socialist ideas. Socialism from the bourgeois viewpoint: this is what must be done at this point." Cf. Umberto Cerroni's introduction to P.J. Proudhon, *Che Cos'è la Proprietà?* (Bari, 1967), p. xvi.

85. Karl Marx, *Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen Oekonomie* (Berlin, 1953), p. 65.

86. On the relation between Keynes' and Proudhon's conception, see Dudley Dillard, "Keynes and Proudhon," *Journal of Economic History* (May, 1942).

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proletarians in their particular interests—subdivided according to the different trades and "professions"—and could lead, with their action, only to the extreme boundaries of the sphere of capital's domination. The councils, on the other hand, were the organs of a proletarian counterpower which already moved toward the abolition of capitalism and the construction of the new society.[87] The question posed by Däumig and Müller, however, was much more pertinent to the specific practical and organizational problems of the German revolution. No matter how vaguely, they warned that, with the intensification of the capitalist crisis, subjectivity emerged as the determining factor for revolutionary growth. Adequately interpreted, this could transform itself into political ability, on the part of the councils, to question the unions' prerogative to regulate the power relations between capital and labor through wages. In other words, it was a matter of exploding the deliberations of the June, 1919 Nuremberg Union Congress, which continued to be one of the cornerstones in the precarious equilibrium of power in the young republic. The labor contract was one of the determining points of power and mediation between workers' hegemony in the factories and the almost total domination of capitalist forces over the territory—a domination rendered possible by the control that these forces exercised over financial mechanisms which were still able to control the disposition and the pocketbooks of an altogether disintegrated middle class.

On the eve of the 1923 crisis, Karl Korsch started with the fundamental concepts of labor organization and labor contract in order to make the theoretical and organizational leap from the control of factories to the hegemony over the territory (once both the socialdemocratic "path to power" as well as the putschist shortcut had proven impractical). In the 1922 writings on labor legislation for factory councils, the theory of the councils seemed to cut the last ties with the liberal-radical tradition still present in the 1919-1920 writings. Yet, this did not diminish but rather intensified Korsch's anti-statism underlying his council-union project. The Rousseauian freedoms within the factory gates betrayed the class reality from which they had historically arisen. A typical example of this was labor freedom; precisely the application of this freedom (scabbing) ran counter to the general class interests since it produced a lowering of wages. Thus, to reject this "freedom" became imperative for class solidarity. It was in the interests of the class that the constitution did not enter the factory. The "free" labor contract meant that the worker forfeited his own freedom in exchange for wages.[88] Thus, the

87. Ludwig's form anticipated the resolutions of the II Congress of the Communist International concerning the union movement and the factory committees. Cf. *II Congresso del l'Internazionale Comunista* (Rome, 1970), pp. 51-63.

88. Thus, in his *Arbeitsrecht für Betriebsräte (1922)* (Frankfurt am Main and Vienna, 1968), p. 32, Karl Korsch wrote: "At the end of the fourth chapter of the first volume of *Capital*, Marx has masterfully described the change in scene that takes place in front of our own eyes when from the context of 'economic traffic' (in Marxist terms: 'from the sphere of simple circulation or of the exchange of commodities') we pass to the shop, to the factory or into the other enterprises within which must ultimately take place real 'production' or the creation of commodities; here the relations among the participants are no longer in any way regulated according to the idea of freedom, equality, justice and have instead a completely different aspect."

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extension of "industrial democracy" made sense only if the workers were able to place at the center of their struggle the labor contract upon which the very system of capitalist production was based. Industrial democracy and labor contract opposed each other within the factory; as long as the juridical-bourgeois form of the free labor contract persisted, the councils were limited to co-managing a determinate form of exploitation. The labor contract is the dike between the working class ghettoized in the factory and civil society. The very representation of the proletariat's general material interests within the crisis implied, for Korsch, the breaking of that dike—the break down of constitutional legality sanctioned by Weimar.[89] With respect to the new tasks of managing the process of transition, the predominant form of union organization, the "professional association," appeared inadequate to the needs of proletarian class organization. The union needed to be "revolutionized" from a "professional association" into an "industrial association" which accepted the worker not on the basis of his "professional" qualifications, but rather on the basis of his exclusively belonging to a specific factory or industrial outfit. This transformation would also profoundly change the relations between unions and councils: "The factory council now no longer appears as a pure and simple 'auxiliary organ' of the unions in their struggle for the defense of the living conditions of the 'sellers of labor' within the existing capitalist class society but, rather, as the 'advanced position' with which the unions gain a foothold in the enterprises and subsequently also in the branches of industry which, although today still in the class enemy's hands, must be taken away from him through revolutionary struggle and placed under the *control* and ultimately also under the exclusive *administration* of the working class organized both economically and politically."[90] Thus, for Korsch it was a matter of generating a new "social contract" to replace the labor contract, starting this time not from the constitutional apex of the state, but from the cellular organization in the factory. This time, too (as often during his troubled political and theoretical development) he barely missed central points for the resolution of the passage from political theory to organizational practice. His brilliant empiricism brought him to the threshold of decisive problems of which he understood the importance without having the methodological key needed to solve them. The insistence on the strategic nature of the factory dimension (historically understandable when one considers the concern with politics from above implicit in

89. *Ibid.*, pp. 95-97: "[in Wilhelminian Germany] the reactionary entrepreneur was disposed to deal with 'his' labor committee, while he drastically refused dealing with the union leader from 'outside of the enterprise'... Thus, until we move away from the particular meaning that the direct forms of the right to labor co-participation assume from the viewpoint of the immediate revolutionary process, up to that moment we must recognize as fully justified the unions' efforts to rigidly subsume the 'factory councils' as simple 'auxiliary organs' of the union struggle... Only when one thinks about the particular meaning of the councils as control organs over production in a decisive phase of struggles for power between the capitalist and the proletarian class, and sees them as responsible centers of the future socialized economy, will this way of seeing things be overturned."

90. *Ibid.*, p. 97.

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social democracy) led him to lose sight of the socially totalizing character of the *domination of the form*, the complex structure of the *juridical abstraction*, which, far from being independent of the fetishism of commodities, expresses and at the same time hides and mystifies the real connections of the state to the general process of reproduction. Consequently Korsch's synthesis of Rousseau's "social contract" with the Marxian concept of "civil society" could only produce the theory of value and that of the crisis.

Thus, in the 1923 socio-economic crisis, Korsch's council theory relegated the problem of the state and politics (which tends to take on a central position in the transitional phase) to a mere "appearance,"[91] while the Communist Party entered the cyclone's eye with similar internal divisions,[92] the same confusions concerning intentions and the same tactical and strategic unpreparedness with which it had undertaken the 1921 "March action." Yet, from May to November of 1923, the council movement had succeeded in accomplishing even more than the most optimistic of its theoreticians had expected in the midst of the crisis; it had succeeded in displacing the union leadership in the organization of large strikes.[93] The situation of generalized social crisis had immediate repercussions for the labor movement.[94]

Within the union, a revolution took place which was much more unsettling and radical than anything proposed by the council theoreticians. Inflation, which annulled the value of union contributions, deprived the organization of all assistential and retributive capacities. Furthermore, it deprived the union of all contractual power: the wage contracts worked out with the employers became meaningless within a few days because of the accelerating speed of money devaluation. The dismembering of the unions and the paralysis of the SPD ensued.

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91. Korsch, *Arbeitsrecht...*, *op.cit.*, p. 39: "The struggles between the bourgeois and the proletarian class now *only apparently* have as their object state control (and control of the remaining higher spheres of social life); in substance they have as their object the control of the *economy*, i.e., the organization of labor."

92. Brandler's leadership was strongly resisted by the left opposition in the party, composed of Thälmann, Fischer and Maslow. Cf. Hajek, *op.cit.*, pp. 65-73.

93. Rosenberg writes that: "In the history of modern Germany there has never been a moment so appropriate for a socialist revolution as in the summer of 1923. In the vortex of the devaluation all traditional notions of order, property and legality disappeared, and no one could blame socialists or republicans for the terrible situation which had developed after the Ruhr occupation... Not only did the working class, on the whole, feel ever more clearly that this state of affairs was intolerable and that the whole system would have ended up in terror, but even the middle class, robbed by inflation, was pervaded with revolutionary ferment and desired to settled accounts with capitalist profiteers. Civil servants, including the police which were also victims of inflation, would have hardly exerted much energy in case of a popular movement with truly decisive import against the existing system—and it is highly dubious that the Reichswehr soldiers would have fired on their hungry proletarian comrades in defense of speculators." Rosenberg, *op.cit.*, pp. 143-144.

94. According to Rosenberg: "In the course of 1923 the SPD's strength continually diminshed and the party went through a crisis reminiscent of the 1919 one... The masses moved so sharply toward the Communist Party that, while at the end of 1922 the new USPD still attracted the great majority of German workers, during the following semester the relation had become completely inverted and by the summer of 1923 the KPD undoubtedly had the support of the majority of the German proletariat." *Ibid.*, p. 145.

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The failure of social democracy confirmed its inability to elaborate a class-based political project, and its total dependence on union tactics. What had been the greatest Western labor party began to pay dearly for its own indifference and hostility toward the proletariat's autonomous organizational means. In 1923 the councils again demonstrated their vitality and efficacy after the electoral and putschist failures. The general political strike organized by the councils against the Cuno government[95] represented the movement's acme: the government was forced to resign.

The development of struggles during this period of crises seemed to confirm Korsch's hypothesis of a council attack against the juridical-bourgeois form of the labor contract and the relative equilibrium within the institutional framework.[96] When the submission of labor to capital ended, as in the case of the wage adjustment and the day-by-day contract negotiations, then the crisis of the monetary system tended to become a political crisis of the continuity of the process of realization of surplus value. The old barter system could, for some brief periods, substitute for money in commodity circulation, but there is no form of barter which could substitute for the money-form in the "exchange of equivalents" between capital and labor: the "production of commodities by means of commodities" is fatally interrupted. As Marx wrote in the *Grundrisse*: "the elementary presupposition of bourgeois society is that labor immediately produces exchange-value, i.e., money."[97] The specific product of the capitalist system is value in the form of money. It is precisely the nexus between the money-form and the crisis that challenged the foundation of the entire political-institutional framework of the capitalist system. However, the bourgeois order was re-established, although the real "taking of the Winter Palace" on the part of the German working class had been *objectively* at hand. It would have sufficed to continue to deny to the state any control over the exchange-mechanism between labor and capital, over the rehabilitation of the money form, and thereby over the

95. Cuno's right-center government was followed by Stresemann's, supported by the social democrats. Cf. Rosenberg, *ibid.*, pp. 148ff.

96. This seemed also validated from the other side of the class perspective by Dr. Schacht's hypocritical observation: "in the fall of 1923 the unchecked devaluation of money was at such a point that the whole German social structure threatened to collapse. Desperation had gotten the better of the workers' wives. In vain they attempted, in their shopping, to stay in step with the devaluation of the Mark. The money that the men made through labor disappeared in the hands of the housewives even after the pay was adjusted day by day. It was in these conditions that I was called to put a stop to the devaluation and stabilize money. I did not decline the invitation. I gave up a profitable profession and a secure position." Cf. Hialmar Schacht, *Account Settled* (London, 1949).

97. Marx, *Grundrisse, op.cit.*, p. 137. Here we must avoid the seduction exercised by the apparent immediacy of the money-form, i.e., we must avoid a political revolutionary emphasis concerning the relation money-crisis, which would lead to the illusion of a possible subversive overcoming through the overexpansion of the wage-form. Rather, the monetary morphology is to be related to the general problematic of fetishism—of the *domination of the form* over the social relations of production—which introduces, in a necessarily mediated way, the theme of politics. On the other hand, in the very same page, Marx writes: "in money (exchange value) the individual's objectification is not his as posed in its natural determination, *but his as posed in a social determination* (relation), which is already intrinsic to him."

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(re)productive process. The question of an alternative socio-political direction should have been placed on the agenda in these terms in order to progress through that convulsed phase of transition.

However, as in the 1921 "March action," the German communists sought the Winter Palace not in a mass political alternative but in the grotesque and ruinous Hamburg insurrection[98] which marked the beginning of the recomposition of the state apparatus and with it, of the general capitalist counterattack. At different levels, class movement and party were both explosive integral parts of events whose immanent logic they did not grasp. The economic and political realities provided the stage upon which party and mass movement, every time they seemed to combine and generate a new revolutionary perspective, were brusquely thrown back into the isolation of their respective "domains" and in the fruitlessness of their "ideological oases." Yet, it would be a serious error to take these ideologies as a pure and simple expression of backwardness in terms of which the failure of the German revolution would have to be ultimately explained. Through what has often been incorrectly defined as "labor ideology," German workers expressed their real conditions of existence and their own objective political possibility (in the absence of an alternative mass organization able to connect the "political" to the "social" level) rather than professional stratifications already eliminated by capital's initiative.[99] Of course, "productivism" and "self-management" are terms that today generate understandable ambiguities and suspicions. But it would be inaccurate to attempt to exorcise the dangers of the present through a distorted historical reading of class needs and organizational forms which, in addition to natural contradictions and ideological shortcomings, expressed a will and ability to power which had no precedents in the history of the Western labor movement.[100] In the Germany of the 1920s, "control" and "autonomy" expressed the will of the working class to pass through the realization and planning of the productive process and come out of it reinforced as the hegemonic class with respect to other social groups. The council movement operated within this ambitious perspective. To transform this need into a science of politics and into a theory of organization was an effort as difficult as it was indispensable, not only in terms of the fortunes of the German proletariat but—as Lenin himself pointed out—for the whole international labor movement. The alternative to this project was certainly not "communism as a minimal program," but Stalin's five year plans, the New Deal, and Nazism.[101]

98. On the Hamburg insurrection, see A. Neuberg, *Armed Insurrection* (London, 1970), pp. 81-104.

99. Only after 1924 is capital able to carry out major transformations in class composition. Cf. Arndt, *op.cit.*, pp. 32-38.

100. Cf. Olaf Ihlau, *Die rote Kämpfer. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung in der Weimarer Republik und im Dritten Reich* (Meisenheim am Glan, 1969), pp. 85ff.

101. "With the abandonment of gold currency, a new currency system was gradually formed in Germany, whose essence was designated by the Führer—in an important speech—as labor currency... The simple and readily accessible principle of labor-currency is: money is covered by national production. I can only make as much money as I can produce. But labor-currency

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At this point, a dispassionate and rigorous analysis of the real possibilities that the German labor movement had in that crucial year of 1923 of exercising real political control over labor, money, distribution and income becomes necessary. This, however, would require a detailed examination of documents which cannot be carried out here. Thus, we will limit ourselves to proposing only some of the main elements (already well known) which, within the context of this work, seem to take on a somewhat different meaning from what has been traditionally ascribed to them: (1) compared to the severity of the crisis, the number of unemployed was relatively low: about 600,000 against over 6,000,000 in 1930. Thus, the determining factor in the valorization of commodities was primarily the labor of workers—variable and not fixed capital.[102] (2) In its strategic maneuvers to stabilize the Mark, the central bank re-established order beginning from below: it no longer accepted as currency privately released money.[103] (3) Thus, industrialists, no longer able to trust a centralized power, were increasingly forced to regulate *in loco* the exchange between labor and capital by releasing money coupons which were accepted by stores and public outfits. Money had slipped so low that it risked falling by inertia into workers' hands. (4) The capitalists immediately realized the danger latent in this phenomenon while the labor movement on the whole was unable to understand which levers controlling the social and political framework they could have taken over. Critique of political economy was rigorously banned from any revolutionary project on the part of the party.[104] (5) As for the regulation of the Mark with respect to foreign currency, the central bank followed Hilferding's old formula. It stabilized the Mark with respect to the dollar: 4.2 billion Marks to the dollar. A defeated and rejected country, Germany in this way entered the community of nations with a distinctly capitalist regime, thus showing itself worthy of being saved. The country had resolved in one of the two possible ways its turbulent and troubled "transitional phase."

needs stability as much as does gold currency. It is based on order in the national economy... Evidently, the equilibrium between credit and production, money and commodities, is not the elementary principle of labor-currency." See J. Winschuh, *Costruzione della Nuova Europa* (Florence, 1941), pp. 55-63. But the principle of the Nazi labor-currency was even simpler than Winschuh indicated. May 2, 1933, the "free unions" adhering to the ADGB were dissolved. May 5, Ley, the head of the Labor Front, could announce to the Führer that the National Socialist movement exercised full control over all the labor-power in the Reich. On the working class under Nazism, see K.H. Roth, *Die "andere" Arbeiterbewegung* (Munich, 1974), pp. 101-156.

102. 1922 records the lowest unemployment of the post-war period. In 1923, unemployment rises primarily because of the "passive resistance" carried out in the Ruhr against the occupation troops of the French. Cf. G. Albrecht, *Wörterbuch der Volkswissenschaft*, Vol. I (Jena, 1931), pp. 171-181. Only after 1924 did the progressive expulsion of the workers from the restructured factories begin. Up to 1923, German capital could only intensify the exploitation of labor through a more "rational" use of Taylorism. But Taylorism can only reduce the workers' professionalism—not eliminate it. On the relation between labor councils and Taylorism, see C. Petri, "Il sistema Taylor e i Consigli dei produttori," in *Ordine Nuovo* (October 25, 1919), p. 178.

103. Schacht, *op.cit.*, p. 7.

104. On the successive investments of American capital in Germany after the institution of the Dawes Plan (April, 1924), see Sidney Brooks, *America and Germany 1918-1925* (New York, 1925).

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5. The 'Return to Marx' and the 'Mortal Crisis of Capitalism': From Weimar to the New Deal

When, in 1920-1930 "all the factors for a great popular revolution"[105] reappeared in Germany, the gap between class movement and labor organizations was immense. The tragedy of the labor movement ran its course precisely in these last dramatic years of the Weimar Republic and provides useful indications for social and economic theory. Consider the polemic concerning imperialism and the crash between Fritz Sternberg and Henryk Grossmann, in addition to the latter's methodological contributions meant to reconnect the analysis of the contradictions inherent in capitalist development to the categorical framework at the basis of the critique of political economy. Consider also the works concerning the morphology of the crisis, the Soviet Union and the "planned economy" carried out by economists such as Friedrich Pollock,[106] or the fundamental analyses of social philosophers such as Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno who, in the *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung*, continued the important work carried out for almost two decades by Carl Grünberg with his *Archiv für die Geschichte des Sozialismus und der Arbeiterbewegung*. To simply denounce the effective "separateness" of these works in order to subsequently dismiss them as useless academic exercises, would be not only harsh, but also trivial.[107] The "separateness of these works is not due to their alleged 'academic nature,' but to the general political bankruptcy of the labor movement which, caught in the static schematism brought about by the increasing separation between the SPD and the KPD, had generated an irremediable fracture in the relation between theory and movement, and a subsequent recoiling upon itself of theoretical reflection. It was precisely this situation which led to the high levels of self-reflection in methodology and epistemology.[108]

If the attention of the "council left" had previously focused on self-organization within the productive process, overlooking (as we have seen, for instance, in Korsch) the theoretical analysis of the crisis, the opposite now takes place: the "objective analysis" of economic laws leading to the crisis and to the collapse of the system tends (primarily in the work of the most important economist of the period, Grossmann) to substitute the analysis of the laboring process and the self-management theme implied in it. Yet, this tendency was not a *passive* attitude produced by the stasis (and afterwards, by the definitive defeat) of the movement, i.e., by the "economistic" or "catastrophic" deformation. Rather, it was upheld by a strong methodological awareness.[109] In his main work on the law of accumulation and crash of the capitalist system, Grossmann writes: "The great meaning of Marx's work

105. Rosenberg, *op.cit.*, p. 211.

106. Cf. the essays collected in the anthology *Teoria e Prassi dell'Economia di Piano*, ed. Giacomo Marramao (Bari, 1973).

107. This superficial and hurried position is defended by Sergio Bologna in his introduction to N. Moszkowski, *Per la Critica delle Teorie Moderne delle Crisi* (Turin, 1974), p. v.

108. Cf. Giacomo Marramao, "Political Economy and Critical Theory," *Telos*, 24 (Summer, 1975), pp. 56-80.

109. For Grossmann's most important methodological writings, see his "Die Aenderung des

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consists precisely in the fact that he is able to explain all the phenomena of the capitalist mode of production starting from the law of value;"[110] the "Marxian theory of the crash is...a necessary presupposition for the understanding of the Marxian theory of the crisis, and it is intimately connected to it. The solution to both problems is provided by the Marxian law of accumulation which constitutes the *key idea* of *Capital* and is in turn based on the law of value."[111] The "return to Marx" begun by Luxemburg was based here on a more solid methodological foundation which allowed the general theory of the crisis to avoid the dangers implicit in a revision. Grossmann's two fundamental contributions were: the direct connection of the theory of the crisis to the theory of accumulation and the theory of value, and the definition of the process of categorical abstraction as the "method of isolation." The economic ("objective") exposition of the tendency to the crash was not presented as a pure and simple "reflection" of the real movement, but its abstract representation as the apprehension of successive approximations,[112] on the level of categorical development, of the self-contradictory character of the system.

The dialectical character of Grossmann's method of exposition had been vigorously defended by Paul Mattick in a polemic with Pannekoek concerning the "theory of the crash" and revolutionary subjectivity, carried out in *Rätekorrespondenz*—the theoretical organ of the "council communists." In a nutshell, Pannekoek had essentially advanced two criticisms against Grossmann: an alleged attempt to deduce the end of capitalism "from a purely economic viewpoint" thus conceiving the crash "independently of human intervention,"[113] and a reduction of the class struggle to an "economistic contest." In his clear anti-critique, Mattick pointed out how Pannekoek failed to catch the dialectical character of Grossmann's procedure, precisely because he was himself bound to a restricted (bourgeois) concept of economics. The dialectic inherent in the method of the Marxian critique of political economy does not consist in a simplistic application of the criterion of the "synthesis of opposites" but, rather, in the abstractive isolation of fundamental moments able to define the law of movement of capitalist society. As Mattick noted: "Even for Grossmann there are no 'purely economic' problems; yet this did not prevent him, in his analysis of the law of accumulation, to restrict himself for *methodological reasons* to the definition

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ursprünglichen Aufbauplans des Marxschen *Kapital* und ihre Ursachen," in *Archiv für die Geschichte des Sozialismus und der Arbeiterbewegung*, XIV (1929), pp. 305-338; and "Die Wert-Preis-Transformation bei Marx und das Krisenproblem," *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung*, I (1932), pp. 55-84.

110. Henryk Grossmann, *Das Akkumulation- und Zusammenbruchsgesetz des kapitalistischen Systems* (Leipzig, 1929), p. 608.

111. *Ibid.*, p. 60.

112. Cf. Grossmann, "Die Wert-Preis-Transformation...," *op.cit.*, p. 57, and "Die Aenderung...," *op.cit.*, p. 337.

113. Anton Pannekoek, "Die Zusammenbruchstheorie des Kapitalismus," in *Rätekorrespondenz*, 1 (1934), now reprinted in Korsch, Mattick, Pannekoek, *Zusammenbruchstheorie des Kapitalismus oder revolutionäres Subjekt* (Berlin, 1974), pp. 28 and 20.

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of purely economic presuppositions and of thus coming to *theoretically* apprehend an objective limiting point of the system. The *theoretical cognition* that the capitalist system must, because of its internal contradictions, necessarily run up against the crash *does not at all entail* that the *real crash* is an automatic process, independent of men."[114] The unitary context defined by the interaction of production and reproduction, economy and politics, thus appeared as the unavoidable objective basis of all discussions or projects of revolutionary organization, in addition to being the key to ongoing major processes of capitalist transformation.

These last flashes of the theoretical debate in Weimar Germany became significant *after* the collapse of the German Republic and were actually already projected into a meta-European dimension. They were no longer aimed and, in some sense, functionalized to the movement's organizational problems, but rather confronted the Leviathan-like structures of the American New Deal and of the authoritarian Fascist state. This is the cornerstone of the analyses carried out, in addition to the groups of intellectuals associated with the now famous *Institut für Sozialforschung*, by the Marxist journal *International Marxist Correspondence* (subsequently called *Living Marxism* and then *New Essays*), which under Paul Mattick's direction, coordinated the political work and research of many militants and theoreticians of both the American and European left (including Korsch, Rühle, and Pannekoek).[115] The "objectivism" of the analyses which, after the defeat of the revolution in Europe, were carried out—with more or less conscious methodological relativization—from then on is for us today all the more precious since it was the expression of the recoil, within the very categorical and analytical framework of the theory, of that same oscillation and ambivalence which had brought the labor movement to self-castration even before 1933.

Between the emphasis on the tactical and organizational moment during the movement's offensive phase, and the scientific and theoretical moment (analysis of capitalist development and location of tendencies) following the defeat, there is no live-wire: the relation that was established was not one of unity and continuity but, rather, of reversal. Yet, the connection was there and remained the same even if further distorted and complicated by the corporative ("massified") character of the authoritarian Fascist state: the relation between class struggle and institutions, "councils," and "State." The catastrophe of the German labor movement had dramatically posed the problem of the reconversion of theory and movement, leaving it to succeeding generations more as a spectre—the tragic counterfigure of October—than as a specific historical need to be met with specific political (and theoretical)

114. Paul Mattick, "Zur Marxschen Akkumulation- und Zusammenbruchstheorie," in *Rätekorrespondenz*, 4 (1934), now in Korsch, Mattick, Pannekoek, *op.cit.*, pp. 47-48.

115. On this subject, see Gabriella M. Bonacchi, "Teoria Marxista e Crisi: I Communisti dei Consigli tra *New Deal* e Fascismo," introduction to Karl Korsch, Hans Langerhaus and Paul Mattick, *Capitalismo e Fascismo verso la Guerra*, ed. Gabriella M. Bonacchi and Claudio Pozzoli (Florence, 1976).

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answers. It is not accidental that only today the labor movement has begun to understand this connection, confronted with the gigantic structural transformations of the economy following the 1929 crisis, and has come to assume the specific form of the problem of combining the critique of political economy, the theory of the crisis, and the theory of "constitution" (of class consciousness *and* organization). In focusing their attention on the first two elements of the connection, Grossmann and Mattick had consciously isolated the objective aspect of the economic analysis as an abstract analysis (thus, not as a mere empirical description of the real movement) leaving aside, as a simple corollary, the theoretical problem of class consciousness and organization. If this is to be seen as the historical and political limit of their efforts, it is also illusory to believe that the solution of that problem allows easy short-cuts which can be taken, thus avoiding going through the "icy desert of abstraction."

If theory, methodologically self-grounded and conscious of its own "separateness," is sterile if it does not transfer into the materiality of politics and in the practice of class organization, praxis is altogether counterproductive for the revolutionary cause unless it is "conceptualized" by the theory. The unity of the relation (scientific and analytic, and not blindly activistic and doctrinaire) of theory and praxis ceases to be a general begging of the question and appears in its urgent historical and morphological specificity when confronted by the threatening progression of the crisis. Mattick's reintroduction of the Luxemburgian alternative of "socialism or barbarism,"[116] in addition to expression the catastrophic nature of the class conflict, translates for us today into a series of theoretical and political problems (and tasks) that move from a general reconsideration of the critique of political economy (for an updating of the analysis of capitalist development)[117] to a location of organizational forms conforming to the complexity of the real interaction of economy and politics, class struggle and institutions, and the historical and subjective level of the mass movement, which can be synthesized in the expression: the scientific grounding of politics.

The tragic parabola of the German revolution is an example—still extremely relevant for us—of how the pragmatic reification of the question of organization generates in the class movement a paralyzing fracture which inevitably leads it to become subjugated to capitalist initiative and defeat.

116. Cf. Paul Mattick, *Marx e Keynes* (Bari, 1972), p. 433. Cf. also Michael Lowy, "Il Significato Metodologico della Parola d'Ordine 'Socialismo o Barbarie'," in *Problemi del Socialismo*, XIII:1 (January-February, 1961), pp. 95-104.

117. An important contribution in this direction is F. Cassano, "Note d'Analisi sullo sviluppo capitalistico," in *Critica Marxista*, XI:6 (November-December, 1973). One of the primary tasks of those who do not want to turn this reconsideration of the critique of political economy into a mere philological exercise is, according to Cassano, "to attempt to overcome a relation between theory and class struggle which risks not only offering a limited image of the political meaning of Marx's work, but also ends up by outlining the role of theory in a mutilated and subaltern way according to a relation more reminiscent of speculative reflection than...*anticipation* with regard to the concrete unfolding of the class struggle and its needs." *Ibid.*, p. 21.

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CZECHOSLOVAK WORKERS' COUNCILS (1968-1969)

by Karel Kovanda

The customary approach to the Prague Spring focuses on the struggle between the forces of Novotný's *Ancien régime* (the bureaucracy and the conservatives) and the new forces (the reformers, the liberals, and the progressives). Although on the level of practical politics it might indeed be useful to distinguish simply between "progressives" and "conservatives," this distinction is too superficial for other purposes. On certain important issues, crucial differences emerged within the progressive camp—differences which stemmed from the participants' philosophical predilections if not from their class positions.

There were those who advocated well-controlled, guided reforms of the country's economic and political life—reforms which they expected, implicitly, at least, to be carried out from the top. Both within and without the Communist Party (the KSČ), these were the *technocrats* in the economy and the *liberals* in politics. There were also those who saw the people's mass involvement as an essential condition for carrying out anything more than cosmetic changes in the system. Real changes, they felt, would have to be brought about from below. These are the *radical democrats.*

Both of these groups belonged to what, on the political level, was the "progressive" camp. Both groups had been engaged in a struggle against the old conservative forces. In fact, the differences between the two groups prior to 1968 have to be amplified with the benefit of hindsight to make them clearly apparent. But as the conservative forces lost out politically, particularly in 1968, the differences within the progressive camp became more pronounced. It widened in the course of 1968 and developed even further after the invasion of August of that year. The invasion actually demonstrated the fundamental impossibility of the liberal-technocratic alternative. In the crunch, the choice became clar: absorption into an international bureaucracy, or popular radical democracy with mass involvement. Liberal and technocratic positions, representing some "middle way," gradually melted away and their advocates converted to one or the other camp. In the end, by the summer of 1969, those remaining liberals and technocrats had come full circle: they joined forces with the victorious bureaucracy, their erstwhile enemy, against radical democracy, their erstwhile ally.

The radical democratic camp involved different segments of the population. It was a group that developed rapidly in conjunction with mass participation in politics and which involved segments of the intelligentsia, the student movement, large portions of the working class and labor movement (the ROH), especially in late 1968 and onward, and also many technicians

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and middle-level managers. The main issue on which this group's positions diverged most clearly from the liberal and technocratic positions was the issue of introducing democracy into industry, an arena hitherto removed from political struggles.[1]

In the early sixties, the Czechoslovak economy ground to a halt. In 1962-63 it marked a period of stagnation and even recession, with a decline in the GNP unparalleled in any other European country. This economic setback was the culmination of chronic and recurrent troubles generated by the original wholesale importation of the Soviet model of economic management. The crisis engendered explorations of possible alternatives to this system, frequently described as the system of command planning. A full-fledged economic reform was eventually proposed—a reform generally associated with the name Ota Šik.

This is not the place to discuss the reform proposals in any detail—which, at any rate, has been done elsewhere.[2] Suffice it to say, that one of its main motifs was to increase the role of the market while cutting down the influence of the rigid central plan. The market mechanism was viewed as the only means for maintaining self-regulating economic development. Whatever its shortcomings (which were never really subject to a serious discussion), it was expected to be far superior to command planning—at least in a country of Czechoslovakia's economic standing and conditions.

The basic flaw in command planning was to be found in the uninformed and arbitrary decisions made by the central political and economic bureaucracies. Hitherto, a firm received its production targets (along with a host of other indicators) laid down in the plan drafted at the "center"—i.e., the State Planning Commission and the respective economic ministry. The reform, however, called for the firm to make its own decisions on the basis of its market analysis. The central plan was now to play only an advisory role, with the firm able to operate free of arbitrary political intervention.

Increasing the firm's autonomy and defining its success in its ability to meet the market's needs (rather than in its ability to meet planned targets) would lead to increased responsibility among the management, for their income would depend to a considerable degree on the firm's performance. In fact, material incentives were to be emphasized at every level: even the worker at the bench would be tied economically not only to his or her work, but also to the firm's general performance—though, of course, to a far lesser degree.

Yet, when the reform proposals first discussed the firm as "making decisions," "seeking its best advantage," etc., it was unclear who would

1. The term "radical democrats" is usually applied to intellectuals who sought close contact with the popular masses during a different revolution: that of 1848. Using the same term here suggests a genuine historical continuity with all radical Czech traditions. This suggestion was originally made by Karl Bartošek in his little-read article, "Národ sebekritiky: slovy, nebo činy?" (National Self-Criticism: In Words or Deeds?), *Reportér*, 19 (1968), pp. 7-8.

2. E.g., Galia Golan, *The Czechoslovak Reform Movement* (Cambridge, 1971), pp. 59-93, or Oldřich Kýn, "The Rise and Fall of Economic Reform in Czechoslovakia," *American Economic Review*, 60 (May, 1970), pp. 300-306.

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actually perform this activity, and to whom they would be responsible. The reform proposals offered no clear answer to these questions. In its original drafts, it had dealt with economic policies on a national scale, with the general rules governing relations between the state and individual firms. Problems internal to the firm, such as the distribution of power and authority within it, however, were initially skirted.

This was also the case with regard to the issue of workers' participation in management. "Participation" did exist, but in name only. Over the years, the concept had degenerated into unrecognizable forms and in reality it gave the workers (represented by the highly alienated labor movement, the ROH) precious little voice in the firm's affairs. In 1965, just as the reform started to be implemented, one expert observed with a straight face that participation essentially consisted in "voluntarily and enthusiastically maintaining labor discipline."[3] Or, as an ROH document put it a year later: "One of the main forms of worker participation in management...is the individual worker's effort."[4]

The economic reformers, however, were not very interested in this issue. Dragoslav Slejška, Czechoslovakia's leading industrial sociologist, noted in 1965 that the existing centralist model of the economy could be transcended in two distinct ways: he termed the two alternatives "managerial" and "collectivist." The managerial model, Slejška suggested, would "better solve certain difficult problems of labor discipline, egalitarianism, skill, enterprise, etc.... It would, however, exacerbate problems of...democratic relations among people in production, of the producers' interest in the factory's operations, of status differentiation, and it would also discourage a conscientious attitude toward work and social ownership. In a word—alienation."[5]

While generalizations may be imprecise, one thing still emerges clearly: the design of the economic reform was "managerial" rather than "collectivist." As a rule, reform economists (with one or two notable exceptions) were not concerned with the role of workers as active agents in the organization of production. They discussed worker participation in traditional terms, if at all, and at best had only vague and unspecified ideas about necessary changes. Contradictory sentiments were at play: on the one hand, the workers had the right—on paper, at least, if not in practice—to participate, and thus some symbolic value was at stake. On the other hand, the modest role of the ROH caused it to be perceived as just another outside political authority interfering with managerial prerogatives, and as such, something that the economic reformers were prepared to eliminate.

Others devoted more thought to the workers' role, especially sociologists like Slejška, political scientists, and legal scholars. Social scientists pointed out as early as 1964 that under the proposed economic reform, management decisions would affect all employees, since part of their payment would be

3. Jiří Kovářik, in *Právník*, 6 (1964), p. 549.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 554.
5. *Právník*, 7 (1965), p. 637.

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based on the firm's overall performance. Consequently, "workers should naturally insist that the firm be managed only by well-qualified people who can guarantee prosperity for the firm and fat paychecks as well as good working conditions for the workers."[6]

Various sources inspired this line of thought: among others, the critique of the degenerate form of workers' participation as it had come to exist in the country; recognition of the more efficient way industry had been managed in the early post-war years with a considerable degree of industrial democracy; and the Yugoslav model of self-management, however much it was officially frowned upon. Although the specific proposals which developed out of these concerns are of only historical interest today, the important point remains—i.e., that from the earliest stages of implementing the economic reform, a number of different viewpoints sought to make it more responsive to workers. These were the precursors of the radical democracy of the late sixties.

The implementation of the economic reform progressed in fits and starts. Several hundred firms started operating according to the new rules in 1965, with the entire national economy shifting into the new mode in 1966. The process was difficult and drawn-out. The economists, who had authored the reform, developed a coherent set of proposals which was accepted by the policy makers and bureaucrats only with great reluctance and who sought to blunt, wherever possible, the impact of the reform with various compromises. Ota Šik once despaired that by the time the reform was finally adopted, it contained only about a quarter of his original proposals![7]

At the end of 1967, after two years of gradually and selectively implementing the reform, a number of gains had been made. The central plan had lost its omnipotence. Prices were being gradually decontrolled, and the taxation of firms was now uniform. State subsidies were reduced or withdrawn, with the consequence that a number of poorly operated firms closed down. Finally, inroads began to be made in foreign trade.

But all these changes dealt with macro-economic issues. What was still required was a comprehensive reform dealing with the internal workings of individual firms. This was an uncharted road with few obvious signposts. Among the questions requiring an answer were those dealing with the status of a firm in a reformed market economy; principles of management; problems of ownership; integration within the firm, etc. In mid-1966, a special team of management experts, who were sponsored by the State Commission for Management and Organization (SKŘO) and who differed considerably from the economists who had drafted the rest of the reform, was charged with working on these problems and extending the principles of economic reform to individual firms. The team's conclusions, however, were unacceptable to the country's pre-1968 leadership: for the KSČ to endorse the details of a plan to allow individual firms to make decisions for themselves

6. *Právník*, 6, p. 552.
7. Quoted in Vladimír V. Kusín, *Intellectual Origins of Prague Spring* (Cambridge, 1971), p. 97.

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would have amounted to surrendering a great deal of economic power.

Thus, the SKŘO document had to await a more propitious atmosphere. It was discussed publicly only in 1968,[8] after fundamental political changes had cleared the way for the implementation of economic reform. The importance of the SKŘO document, hitherto virtually ignored by all students of the period, lies in the fact that for the first time it presented a detailed proposal for the workers' role in the firm's management.

The problem of who was to oversee the management of individual firms—if indeed anybody would, for some even argued that the managers themselves knew best—was a major issue of the SKŘO document. In the spring of 1968, it was generally accepted that, because of dismal economic results, the central party and state bureaucracies should forfeit whatever right they had in controlling economic management. It remained an open question, however, to whom the managers of newly autonomous firms would be responsible.

In principle, management is expected to be responsible to owners. The command economy had effectively recognized all property as being state-owned. Discussions concerning the reform led to a distinction between the concepts of *state* ownership and social ownership—i.e., ownership by the entire society. But society—just as the state—is indivisible and it is difficult to directly translate the concept of social ownership into the concept of an organ to which management would be responsible.

There were several possible ways of dealing with this. For example, there appeared a proposal—theoretically very interesting—to create a national elected organ which once again would centralize economic responsibilities, a kind of "economic parliament." In the end, however, it was the concept of *decentralized economic responsibility* that won general approval.

In this vein, the SKŘO document proposed an organ that would act in the firm itself as a kind of "economic legislature" and which would be distinct from management, the "economic executive." This legislative role would be performed by councils. But establishing the general concept of councils as a decision-making organ and fulfilling this function were two quite different things. Two issues stood out most prominently: the council's *powers*, and its *composition*. Early in 1968, these issues separated the technocratic and democratic approaches. Would the councils have only token authority or would they in fact be involved in fundamental decisions? Would they be composed mostly of assorted experts and bureaucrats, with only minority workers' representation, or would workers play a dominant role in their composition? These questions would determine the locus of economic power, the degree to which this power would be wrested away from the bureaucracy, and whether it would go to a new managerial elite or to labor.

The SKŘO document outlined several major themes concerning councils which would recur in all technocratic documents of 1968. It presented several

8. *Hospodářské noviny*, 16 and 17 (April 19 and 26, 1968), supplements.

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alternatives for further discussion. As for the powers of the council, three positions were suggested: the token, the weak, and the strong models. The token model would have given management virtually unlimited powers and maintained close ties between management and the state bureaucracy—ties which economic reformers were trying to cut. In this model, councils were so unimportant as to be meaningless, irrespective of their composition. This model found few advocates even among the SKŘO document's authors, but made an extraordinary comeback a year later, in the final *dénouement* of the councils.

According to the weak model, the councils would have the power to appoint and dismiss the firm's director and possibly other top management personnel; to decide on the distribution of profits (among new investments, remuneration of workers, etc.); to approve the annual balance sheet; and to oversee top management. In this model, the councils were meaningful but still rather limited. Appointing top management personnel was a burning political issue in 1968, but this would have been possible only once in several years. The distribution of profits would be discussed once a year. But even then, the council would most likely follow management's recommendations, for it would have little control over other decisions.

According to the strong model, the council would have all of the above powers, plus the following ones: the determination of long-term policies with respect to finances, commerce, technology, personnel and production, and control over the implementation of these policies; determination of major organizational changes in the firm, such as divestitures and mergers, organizational restructuring, etc.; the allocation of capital investment in new construction and setting of credit limits; the approval of high-risk trade contracts; the determination of changes in the firm's field of activity. These were indeed substantial rights. Their execution would have safeguarded the interests of the entire working community, particularly if the council's composition also favored the workers.

As for the councils' composition, the most popular idea among the SKŘO authors came to be known as "the concept of thirds." According to this, workers would elect one third of all council members. One third would consist of outside experts, from research institutes, universities, etc., and one third would represent the "founder" of the firm, i.e., the state bureaucracy. There was an important difference in opinion as to whether the firm's top management itself should sit on the council *ex officio*, which of course would substantially blur the distinction between the firm's "legislative" and "executive" organs. The "concept of thirds" was in some respects similar to the German system of *Mitbestimmung* (prior to 1976), or to the Polish workers' committees which in 1958 took the teeth out of the earlier workers' councils.

The SKŘO document was definitely not in favor of giving workers any sweeping role in decision making. Workers' influence on management would have amounted to a well-working system of worker participation. This would certainly be an improvement over the previous practices but not nearly

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enough to satisfy the 1968 mood, which was calling for a measure of self-management.

While the SKŘO document can be seen as a major technocratic pronouncement, no other single document outlined the radical democrats' platform in quite so comprehensive a manner. The SKŘO document, and especially its "concept of thirds," was vigorously opposed both by members of the intelligentsia and by sections of workers. In fact, workers came to demand control rights over management. By spring, 1968, this came to include strike threats and occasional work stoppages. Self-management was the common denominator of all this activity.

Members of the press and social scientists became the most articulate advocates of self-management. The labor movement's daily, *Práce*, launched a crusade to promote the concept, demanding the broadest possible powers for workers. The discussion was opened by posing the question in unmistakable terms: "Workers' Councils or Managers?"[9] Subsequently, article after article appeared advocating self-management, along with some opposing the concept in terms that workers must have found highly unpalatable. Prominent among the advocates of self-management were Pavel Ernst, a young economist from Šik's Economic Institute, and Dragoslav Slejška, the industrial sociologist. Elsewhere, Karel Kosík discussed the political positions of workers in society in one of a series of essays entitled "Our Present Crisis."[10] He viewed the establishment of workers' councils as an indispensable condition for reconstituting the working class as a powerful political force in its own right.

The same motif was set into an even broader political context by Robert Kalivoda, a leading historian, who emphasized the necessity to complement forms of indirect democracy that the country was about to restore with forms of direct democracy which "would gradually be transformed into socialist self-government."[11] Workers' councils would be one of the forms direct democracy would assume. Kalivoda was one of the first to connect the country's general pattern of democracy with the political implications of the way in which the economic reform was being implemented.

Ivan Sviták jibed at his fellow intellectuals for having neglected to emphasize, in their public speeches, what civil rights would mean to workers.[12] He himself considered the most important ones to include the right to strike, the right to a strong labor union, and the right for collectives of workers to elect the firm's top management.

In April 1968, the newsweekly *Reportér*, one of the best and most influential periodicals in the country, published an "Open Letter to Czechoslovak Workers."[13] The essence of the letter was an appeal for a workers'

9. *Práce*, April 2, 1968.

10. *Literární listy*, 9 (1968). One of these articles has been translated into English and appears under the title "Our Present Crisis," in *Telos*, 13 (Fall, 1972), pp. 30-33.

11. *Rudé právo*, May 3, 1968; *Literární listy*, 11 (1968).

12. Ivan Sviták, *The Czechoslovak Experiment* (New York, 1971), pp. 68-75.

13. *Reportér*, 19 (1968). Excerpts in Andrew Oxley *et al.*, *Czechoslovakia—The Party and*

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movement toward self-management. A change of personalities in top communist party positions was fine, but it was not enough to guarantee the future progress of the democratization movement. Stopping there would result only in the emergence of a "new bureaucratic oligarchy," albeit a multi-party one. Without concrete workers' actions, the letter continued, even the new freedom of the press would end up as nothing but a "mere ornament of a new, 'more enlightened,' bureaucratic system." Workers' organs of self-management should be speedily elected, "to administer what rightfully belongs to the workers."

At this point, it is worth reviewing what the workers' situation actually was. Hitherto, the economic reform had offered them little in the way of power. It had actually contained the danger of uninhibited managerialism which was further exacerbated by the lack of labor union protection. Workers had had the all-too-frequent experience of management decisions aimed directly *against them—even as the economic reform was being introduced.* Production norms were sometimes stiffened without workers having any say in the decision.[14] Exploitation of women was exceptionally harsh, though this problem might eventually have been mitigated.[15] And, of course, there was the non-negligible issue of closing down unprofitable operations. This was by far not only an economic, but a political, social and human problem. Yet, it had been treated inadequately, thus resulting in bitterness, anxiety and insecurity.[16]

Prior to the reform, the system of economic management had been inadequate, obsolete, and wasteful. But the factory worker knew his or her place in it, had found a way to make ends meet and in the mid-sixties was perhaps starting to enjoy the barest of non-essential comforts. The economic reform would have improved the overall standard of living. But by early 1968, it had still not been introduced consistently. After many years of talk and after more than a year of its functioning on a national scale, the positive impact of the reform on the lives of ordinary people was negligible. On the contrary, retail prices had slightly but perceptibly increased, along with the general level of insecurity. Small wonder that workers adopted a rather skeptical wait-and-see attitude toward the reform.[17]

This was far less than the reform deserved. Its half-hearted implementation was not so much the reformers' fault as that of the political constraints they had to contend with. Workers knew the reform as they experienced it at the

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the People (New York, 1973), pp. 193-196. The letter was drafted by Karel Bartošek, a prominent historian of influential New Left views.

14. For two cases in point, see *Práce*, May 25, 1968, and *Práce*, July 4, 1968.

15. Cf. the shattering reports by Eda Kriseová in *Reportér*, 1 (1968) and in *Literární listy*, 10 (1968), and by Marie Kubátová in *Literární listy*, 19 (1968). For a report on unemployment among Ostrava women, see *Práce*, November 23, 1968.

16. Cf. *Práce*, February 10, 1968, on the consequences of closing a mine near Duchcov, North Bohemia. One third of the miners had to leave the industry, to their tangible economic disadvantage.

17. For a good analysis of these issues see Václav Holešovský, "Czechoslovak Labor Pains," *East Europe*, 17 (May, 1968), pp. 21-26.

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workplace. They knew little—and there was no way of telling them—that what they saw was a mutilated and bastardized form of the original program.

This wait-and-see attitude started to change in the spring of 1968. Especially in Prague, workers came to appreciate the full impact of the changes in the top party echelons—a little later than the well-informed intellectuals did, but just as unmistakably. It is symbolic that the true nature of these changes was first spelled out by the workers' one real friend in the KSČ leadership, Josef Smrkovský, published January, 1968, in *Práce*.[18] That was the beginning of the trickle of news that would soon swell into a flood, but even the trickle was enough for the factories to start stirring.

Workers immediately sought to regain ground lost to the bureaucracy in previous years, and to democratize the labor movement, whose top level, the Central Labor Council (ÚRO) was one of the country's most conservative bodies. In the first few weeks of 1968, ÚRO received some 1,600 resolutions from ROH locals dealing with workers' lost rights, the ROH's undemocratic internal structure, and with ÚRO's reluctance to support Dubček. By March, factory workers had turned into an independent political force. They were not only mobilizing support for the new national leadership and for the country's intelligentsia, but were also staking out claims to a share of control over their own immediate environment—the factories. Through mass meetings, work stoppages and occasional strikes, they forced attention on the concrete issues of controlling the firms. In exemplary actions that evoked tremendous nation-wide interest, workers in Písek, South Bohemia, struck over the issue of merging and divesting (which had a direct and profound impact on profitability and thus on pay), and Doubrava miners in Ostrava, North Moravia, forced the mine director's resignation.[19] These issues had hitherto been the central economic bureaucracy's prerogative, but the radical democrats maintained that workers should have control over them, through the councils.

Actually, the councils were also discussed. By the end of April, preparations to establish them were under way in several places. By this time, the communist party's Action Program had officially endorsed the councils without, however, specifying their nature. The SKŘO document provided the technocrats' concrete proposals while the radical democratic opinion was expressed in early concrete proposals for organizing councils in factories: in particular, those in ČKD (Prague's largest industrial complex), and in Škoda Pilsen (another giant of the heavy machine industry).

The preparatory process was time consuming. The early starters were treading a new path and their efforts to form councils were closely scrutinized by friend and foe alike. Yet, there was no sense of urgency typical of similar processes in Poland and Hungary a dozen years earlier. Instead, there was a

18. *Práce,* January 21, 1968.

19. For events in Pisek, see *Hospodářské noviny*, 16 and 18 (1968), and *Rudé právo*, March 27, 1968. For the events in the Dukla mine, see *Rudé právo*, May 9, 1968. I have found mention of some 30 strikes, work stoppages or threats of strikes during 1968 in the national and some of the regional press.

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feeling of historical responsibility requiring a methodical approach and considerable circumspection.

The ČKD councils proposal, one of the earliest ones published,[20] would have given the councils approximately the same powers outlined in the SKŘO document's "strong" version. It was, however, strongly against the "concept of thirds," and called for the whole council to be elected by the firm's employees. The ČKD proposal went much further in promoting the self-management aspects of the whole council idea. It anticipated a strong role for the workers' assembly (something not even mentioned in the SKŘO document) and proposed self-management organs in the firm's individual factories. Other measures limited tenure on the council to three years and barred immediate re-election in order to prevent the emergence of a cast of "professional council members." The ČKD proposal obviously owed a lot to the Yugoslav experience, especially in its awareness of the dangers of the council becoming alienated from the shop floor. One of its major advocates was a young technician, Rudolf Slánský, Jr., whose father was the most prominent victim of the purge trials of the fifties.

The Škoda Pilsen project[21] also assigned strong powers to the council. A major part of the council was to be elected by the employees, although in other respects it was not quite so concerned with workers' direct involvement in self-management as the ČKD proposal. The main feature in Škoda was the careful enunciation of the "separation of powers": the strict distinction between the council and the executive day-to-day management.

Official government policy toward the councils was ambiguous. Although the communist party had officially endorsed the idea and had engendered a wide discussion in the country, and although the issue of councils was fast becoming a central one for the labor movement, the position of the national government was technocratic. Headed by Oldřich Černík, the government stalled on the development of councils as best it could. The one exception in the government was Ota Šik, who was appointed Deputy Prime Minister in charge of introducing economic reform in April, 1968. The shift in his views concernisng the councils over the Spring is crucial for understanding how many technocratically-leaning people came to see workers' potentialities.

In earlier writings, Šik had not come out strongly in favor of giving workers any significant degree of control, though he realized that they would have to somehow participate in decision-making.[22] However, as the reform came to be implemented, and as he became personally involved in introducing it, he came to appreciate the practical political problems he had to face. The question of the future ideal power arrangement within and around the firm,

20. It appeared in French, with a report on its history by Rudolf Slánský, Jr., in *Autogestion*, 7 (December, 1968), pp. 39-56.

21. *Odbory a společnost*, 5-6 (1968), pp. 106-110.

22. Thus, in 1963 he wrote that "the producers themselves cannot take part in management work with the necessary level of knowledge, and their participation in management is restricted by the relatively long working hours and their rather narrow field of knowledge." Cf. Ota Šik, *Plan and Market under Socialism* (White Plains, N.Y., 1967), p. 120.

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the "target pattern" of the economic reform, so to speak, was one thing: quite another thing was the immediate question which, Šik felt, was the immediate disposal of incompetent managers and ministerial officers who were perhaps the greatest obstacle to implementing the reform, and the least likely to leave of their own volition. The necessary shove had to come from elsewhere.

This is one of the reasons why the concept of a council with a high representation of workers and with key responsibilities over hiring and firing top management personnel appeared attractive even to people who otherwise might be disinclined to endorse the radical democratic alternative of self-management. Whatever its other faults, a council controlled by workers would have the power to oust incompetent managers. With this in mind, Šik's thinking gradually changed during spring, 1968—especially after he took office in the new government, where he ended up as probably the only one really interested in introducing councils, and did not condone his colleagues' stalling. During April and May, pressure mounted for decisive action on the issue of councils. On May 19, Josef Smrkovský appealed in *Rudé právo* for "rapidly establishing democratic organs in factories." On the following day, Šik outlined a detailed blueprint of the immediate tasks for a sound economic policy. In this context, he put forth the most detailed proposal yet concerning the structure and operation of councils.[23]

Šik recognized that there were ideas whereby "a majority of council members would be nominated by central bodies" (the preference of the bureaucrats) along with "certain tendencies toward stimulating capitalism" (the managerial concept). A different path, however, had to be undertaken. Šik proposed the term labor councils for organs standing above the firm's top management. The name stuck.

The powers Šik proposed for the councils were not overwhelming, but only slightly stronger than the "weak model" of the SKŘO document. The important thing, however, was the decisive role of workers in electing the councils, and the councils' power over management personnel decisions—the most controversial issue of spring, 1968.

In the course of two or three months, Šik's position on councils had changed considerably. Originally he had endorsed the "concept of thirds," with minimum worker representation. Now, however, he called for councils whose decisive majority would be elected in the firm. Originally he had envisaged only token powers for councils, but now he would vest them with weak, yet real, power. More importantly, he succeeded in forcing the government's hand. Two weeks after he aired his proposal, the government adopted it with little change in the guidelines for establishing labor councils.[24] Factories had the go-ahead they had been waiting for.

The evolution of Šik's views occurred under the pressure of practical activity, as a reaction to his endeavors to introduce the economic reform into

23. *Rudé právo*, May 22, 1968; excerpts in Oxley, *op.cit.*, pp. 199-201.

24. *Rudé právo*, June 30, 1968. In English in *New Trends in Czechoslovak Economics*, 6 (September, 1968), pp. 55-57.

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real life. It exemplifies a far broader phenomenon: the erosion of liberal and technocratic positions in the course of the Prague Spring. As the months went on, advocates of these positions turned either to radical democracy or drifted back into the fold of the bureaucracy: a process which was tremendously accelerated by the invasion.

In itself, the invasion had a minimal direct impact on the councils. Whatever the reasons for invading, the establishment of councils (which had barely begun) was not one of them. The numerous Soviet press attacks against Czechoslovak developments never once mentioned councils. The invasion has been frequently characterized as a brilliant military success but an amazing political failure: meaning that surprisingly little changed in the country's political life in its immediate aftermath. Of course, political freedoms were trimmed down somewhat, but several key processes continued unimpaired, including the economic reform (and the councils).

If the Prague Spring continued into the fall with relatively little substantial change, however, there was a new awareness of limits. The troops *were* in the country and the Soviet Union was eventually bound to resolve the political impasse. Old bureaucratic forces which prior to the invasion had been almost completely defeated, gained direct encouragement and support. The post-invasion months were a period of direct confrontation between these bureaucratic forces and the popular masses who sided with the radical democrats. No longer was the struggle between "conservatives" and various "progressives": now it was a more clear cut struggle between revolution and counterrevolution. The space for some "middle way," for some reforms short of a revolutionary movement, was rapidly diminishing. In the wake of the invasion, liberal and technocratic reformers were an anachronism. They were caught squarely in the middle: trying to fend off pressures from the bureaucratic forces and the Soviet Union, while implementing the reforms, isolating themselves from the popular, radical democratic support that was essential for their defense. The Prague Spring could continue into the fall only so long as the popular mass involvement lasted.

Consequently, liberal and technocratic positions were eroded all the more. People of this "middle way" increasingly leaned toward either the bureaucratic or the radical democratic position. The "new situation" illuminated the entire Prague Spring with new and penetrating light as having always been in essence a struggle between the bureaucracy and the masses. Those who had believed in "mere" reforms for the people, as a permanent and stable option, were trapped in their own illusions. After the invasion, they had to cast their lot with one side or the other. There was no other way.

Quite a few of the Prague Spring leaders realized this quite early. Some began to temper their criticism of the invasion in an effort to win acceptance by the bureaucratic forces. Some succeeded and eventually became members of the post-Dubček regime. Others were ultimately unsuccessful and lost: try as they may, the bureaucratic forces were not ready to accept them. For others, the invasion provided the shattering experience that irrevocably led

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them to link up with the radical democratic position. This involved their reappraisal of councils. After the invasion, the councils remained as components in the administrative hierarchy of firms; but they were now far more important in their role as guarantors of industrial democracy. After the invasion it became essential to safeguard every single form of democracy that had developed during the Prague Spring. The way to political pluralism was now explicitly barred. Thus, turning factories into strongholds of economic democracy—through the councils—became a first priority. Now, even former liberals and technocrats who joined the radical democrats realized the councils' political importance.

The radical democrats' strong defense of the councils was countered by indifference and neglect on the part of those leaning toward the bureaucrats. The latter included the whole Czechoslovak government, which after the invasion lost some of its members, including Ota Šik. In September, Prime Minister Oldřich Černík stated that the implementation of the economic reform would continue, but stressed with exaggerated caution that "all steps such as the reorganization of firms, their integration, the experimental set-up of labor councils and similar measures, have to be carefully thought through. In particular, these experiments have to be thoroughly evaluated, and their general principles have to be further clarified."[25]

Černík's sudden stress on the councils' "experimental nature" was confusing, and his demand for a "thorough evaluation" was specious. Earlier discussions of councils had unequivocally stressed that their tenure should last for several years, specifically because their long-term economic objectives would not allow earlier overall evaluation of this aspect of their work. There was obviously no way of evaluating a mere handful of councils after a mere few months of existence. Their number was indeed not overwhelming: in September, 1968, only 19 councils were in operation.

The real reasons for attacking the councils' record were elsewhere. The councils' small number would have made them a negligible phenomenon—if, however, many others were not expected to be created shortly. Compared with the 19 councils in existence in September, another 143 were to begin as of October 1, and an additional 117 were scheduled to be in existence by New Year, 1969.[26] What the newly crystallizing bureaucratic forces found ominous were future prospects rather than past practices.

The Government's indifference and neglect gradually changed into active attempts to discourage further councils. In late October, the Government decided "that it is not appropriate to expand this experiment further."[27] This represented the most determined effort to get rid of the councils which were rapidly increasing in number. The move was interpreted as a retrogression from one of the basic principles of the economic reform, and from the KSČ Action Program. In response, labor unions flooded both ÚRO and the

25. *Rudé právo*, September 14, 1968.
26. *Práce*, September 22, 1968.
27. *Rudé právo*, October 25, 1968.

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Government with protest resolutions. Their sentiment was faithfully reflected in *Práce*, the labor movement daily, and in the rest of the radical democratic press. The pressure forced Černík to backtrack and to declare the whole matter a "misunderstanding."[28] Yet, the Government's position was being widely disregarded. After the wave of new councils peaked in September, it abated in October and November, reflecting the Government's ambivalence. In December, however, it picked up again: more councils were created then than in any other month. The tug of war over councils was characteristic of post-invasion politics as a whole.

According to the best available estimates,[29] in January 1969, there were 120 councils in operation. The Industrial Sociology Workshop of the Czech Institution of Technology in Prague, headed by Miloš Bárta, gathered information on 95 of these. Of this sample, 69 were operating in manufacturing industries (38 in machinery, 14 in consumer industry, 7 in foodstuffs, 6 in the chemical industry, and 2 each in energy and mines), 11 in construction, 6 in locally-controlled small establishments, 4 in agriculture, and one in transportation. Preparatory committees existed at least in an additional 61 firms.[30] New councils were being formed throughout the spring of 1969 and by the end of June, some 300 councils and 150 preparatory committees were reported in existence.[31]

In January, 1969, councils represented over 800,000 people, one sixth of the work force outside agriculture. Their prestige was enhanced by the fact that councils were operating in some of the greatest and most prestigious firms: Škoda Pílsen, NHKG Ironworks in Ostrava, North Moravia, Slovnaft Bratislava, VChZ Chemical Works in Pardubice, East Bohemia, AZNP in Mladá Boleslav, Central Bohemia, producing cars, ČZM Strakonice, South Bohemia, producing motorcycles, etc. Yet even at their best, in January, 1969, the councils were still in their infancy. The few oldest ones had not existed for more than six months. A general picture of councils will therefore deal in greater detail with the preparations, the election and composition of councils, whereas information concerning their concrete activities is spotty.

Data about the *preparatory stage* document how strongly the labor movement identified with the concept of councils. There were initial reservations and uncertainties, but the labor movement's doubts gradually disappeared, especially after the invasion, and the ROH became the prime

28. Cf. *Práce*, December 12, 1968.

29. Unless otherwise stated, the following summary is based on research reported in two important papers by Miloš Bárta: "Podnikové rady pracujících jako společenské hnutí" (The Enterprise Councils of Labor as a Social Movement), in *Odbory a společnost*, 4 (1969), pp. 54-69; and "K pojetí podnikovych rad pracujících" (On the Concept of Enterprise Councils of Labor), in *Politická ekonomie*, 8 (1969), pp. 703-716. The first has appeared in French in *Autogestion et socialisme*, 9-10 (December, 1969), pp. 3-36, while the second has entirely escaped the attention of students of this period, although it is just as important.

30. *Práce*, January 28, 1969.

31. These figures indicate the extent to which the formation of councils was impeded by the post-invasion uncertainties, by the lack of Government support and by delays in enacting the so-called Socialist Enterprise Bill, a key piece of legislation that would have established powers of the councils legally. Cf. *Rudé právo*, July 22, 1970.

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mover in getting councils started—in no less than 86% of all cases. Tasks of the preparatory committee usually included drafting a council statute, as well as its rules of order and election procedures, to monitor the selection of candidates and to actually organize the election—all this, preferably, in constant discussion with the entire working collective.

The council's *statute* outlined its powers. A review of available statutes reveals that all councils reserved the right to decide two fundamental issues: questions of top-management personnel and remuneration, and the firm's "statutory" questions, i.e., its merger with other firms, subdividing of the firm, etc. Ever since councils were discussed for the first time, these issues had been in the forefront of attention, both among theoreticians and, as exemplified by cases of the Dukla mine and the Písek factory, among workers as well.

But, as in most questions concerning the councils, there was considerable variation beyond this common ground. Some statutes limited the council's authority merely to these matters. Other key issues of business administration were to be discussed and assessed by the council but the final decision-making power rested with the firm's director. (This was the councils' "weak model," closely following the June Government Guidelines.) Other statutes gave the council itself the final say over various key questions of business administration (this was the "strong model" of councils, following the example set by Škoda Pílsen). Elections were universally prepared with great care and attention. The concrete arrangements varied, as to whether all workers would elect a full slate of councilmembers or whether there would be "election districts," or some combination of the two, whether there would be run-off elections, etc. All elections, though, were performed by secret ballot. A certain minimum period of employment (three months to a year) was necessary to be able to vote, a measure designed to guarantee at least some acquaintance with the firm's problems. Longer employement in the firm, up to five or even seven years, was necessary to be eligible as a council member. This stipulation evoked some controversy: though it sifted out candidates with limited knowledge of the firm, it was quite disadvantageous to young people.

Candidates could be nominated by the firm's various organs, especially by the ROH local and by the KSČ branch. Greatest care, however, was taken to ensure that candidates could be nominated from the floor, by work teams themselves. When asked about it, 97% of council chairmen believed that in their particular firm this possibility had been "great" or indeed "unrestricted."

The *composition* of the councils gave employees of the firm two-thirds to four-fifths of all seats.[32] Only exceptionally were *all* council members elected from among the firm's employees, and only in one case were they in the minority. The "concept of thirds" had thus been decisively rejected in

32. Stanislav Plíva, "Poznámky k prozatímním statutum podnikových rad pracujících" (Remarks of the Provisional Statutes of Enterprise Councils of Labor), in *Odbory a společnost*, 4 (1969), pp. 70-78. This paper appeared in *Autogestion et socialisme*, 11-12 (March-June, 1970), pp. 99-115. This entire double issue of the journal was devoted to self-management in Czechoslovakia.

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practice. A minority of council members were recruited from outside: representing the ministries, the bank, or offering independent opinions from universities and research institutes. In most cases, these outside members were elected by "regular" council members. A few statues allowed the firm's director to be elected to the council, or even made him a member *ex officio*. This, however, was the exception underlining the general rejection of the technocratic concept that early in the discussion had been rather popular among the SKŘO team's management experts.

What kind of people were elected? Women's representation was distressingly low: they filled less than four percent of the seats. As for age, some 70% of all members were in the bracket of 35-49, considered to be most favorable for leading positions. Slightly over half were KSČ members. Startling, however, was the professional composition of members. Fully 70% of all council members were from the technical staff and middle management. By contrast, blue collar workers occupied slightly under one-quarter of all seats. The balance went to administrative staff. Only exceptionally were blue collar workers in a majority.[33] Consequently, labor councils turned out to have a higher education than the firm's directors: 29% of all council members had a college education whereas in 1966, the percentage for directors was 20%.

The councils' composition indicates several things. There is no doubt but that the candidates' selection and councils' elections were open and free, and that the results hve to be taken at face value. Employees felt that their interests as *co-owners* and as *entrepreneurs* would best be served by electing highly qualified people: white collar workers. The distinction between employees *qua* co-owners and employees *qua* employees is important: for when the latter interests were at stake—in electing ROH officers—workers voted for their own "kind." The readiness of blue collar workers to be represented by the technical intelligentsia provides another indication of how the breach between the two strata (if indeed it ever had been a genuine breach) had healed in the course of 1968. Frequently, the people from the technical staff who got elected were those who had a history of conflict with the bureaucratic management.[34] Finally, this election pattern indicates the high value workers placed on education and skills. Advocates of self-management had frequently argued that there was a fundamental difference between the quality of the working class in Czechoslovakia and in other countries where workers' councils had been introduced, especially in Yugoslavia—a difference based on long industrial traditions and higher educational and cultural standards of Czechoslovak workers. These differences, including a high regard for education, then translated into the above preferences for council candidates.

Whether the high percentage of white collar workers on councils was good

33. Information about the composition of councils is independently corroborated by other research, the results of which were reported in Joseph Jebavy, "Les conceils d'entreprise en Tchécoslovaquie, à la lumière d'une enquête récente," *Revue de l'Est*, 2 (1961), pp. 63-73.

34. Dragoslav Sleljška, "Sociologické předpoklady podnikové samosprávy" (Sociological Conditions of Self-management of Firms), in *Odbory a společnost*, 4 (1969), pp. 25-42.

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or bad, only experience would have shown. The advantage of having a highly-trained council was obvious—especially in a context where the first major problems councils were expected to deal with was to successfully guide the firm through the initial period of operation within market conditions. Nevertheless, some observers were conscious of the possible dangers involved in the councils' skewed composition. For example, Dragoslav Slejška suspected that after the initial period of consolidating the self-management system, persisting differences between blue collar workers and technical staff might emerge as a problem. "Council members from among the technical intelligentsia will not always appreciate the workers' view of these contradictions, and in turn, their own approach will not always be understood by the workers." Slejška expected "attempts to manipulate self-management organs in the technocratic direction," or even in the direction of the bureaucracy.[35] Miloš Bárta, too, saw dangers of technocracy developing—particularly in cases where the council's statute did not deal with the council's responsibility to the firm's whole working collective (a point which had been so strongly emphasized in the proposal of the ČKD in Prague).

Others felt that the need for experts to sit on councils had been altogether exaggerated,[36] and that the preponderance of technicians was only a temporary response to existing poor management. Once the quality of management improved, the attention of councils would shift elsewhere, with a corresponding shift in councils' composition, which would then more closely resemble the composition of the working collective.[37]

The councils' *activities* depended greatly on local conditions, and on the concrete relationship between the council and management: for many of its tasks, the council would depend on management for information, if not for active support, at least in its initial phase of existence. Concrete activities were slow to develop at first. Councils were impatiently waiting for the passage of the Socialist Enterprise Bill which would lend legal weight to their decisions. In December 1968, allegedly only 46 of the 140 councils in existence were involved in any "practical activity."[38]

It is interesting to see what veteran councils considered useful, and presumably what they themselves had been involved in, as revealed in advice these councils offered to newly elected ones. In April 1969, they directed attention especially to the following matters:[39] to get thoroughly acquainted with the firm's existing economic situation and with its recent history; to discuss management's projections of the firm's future development, and to have management submit alternative options if necessary; to weigh the advantages of present organizational ties with other firms, and consider alternatives; to take up the issue of "production agreements" that the firm was to conclude with its respective ministry and which substituted for the

35. *Ibid.*, p. 39.
36. Ivan Halada, a leader of the Metalworkers' Union, in *Odborář*, 23 (1968), p. 8.
37. Rudolf Slánský, Jr., in *Reportér*, 5 (1969), supplement, pp. iv-v.
38. *Práce*, December 6, 1968.
39. Cf. *Odborář*, 9 (1969).

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previously fixed production plan; to delegate representatives to superior economic organs and to the Union of Manufacturers of the particular industry.

Analyzing the situation of the firm was perhaps the greatest immediate task of any council, along with working out a sober prognosis of the firm's future. The very act of investigating the managerial structure frequently revealed glaring inadequacies. Pavel Ernst, a leading council advocate, observed that "frequently, councils unearthed major defects in management standards, such as desperately inadequate coordination among the firm's various branches, lack of long-term thinking, consequences of capricious capital-investment decisions made by directors, etc."[40] Personnel decisions were high on the economic reformers' list and the first thing attended to, e.g., in Škoda Pilsen. In the majority of cases, however, councils apparently confirmed present management in office. According to one report, only six directors' posts were filled by competitive selection.[41]

As with many other activities, on this issue, too, councils were waiting for passage of the Socialist Enterprise Bill. This key piece of legislation would have given legal protection to their work and legitimized their existence. The Bill was the third major document to have emerged from technocratically-oriented quarters during 1968 that dealt with councils. The first was the SKŘO document and the second the June Government Guidelines for founding councils. Under Šik's influence, the Government Guidelines were on several points more in line with the spirit of self-management than the SKŘO document. This trend, away from the technocratic and closer to the radical democratic view, progressed one more step in the Socialist Enterprise Bill which would have further increased employees' representation on the council, and the councils' power.[42]

Important aspects of the Bill came under the criticism of radical democrats and especially of already existing councils (which in January 1969 met in Pilsen for a tremendously important national conference). On the whole, however, the Bill was acceptable to them, and its passage was deemed essential for the councils' further existence. It was scheduled to be enacted in March 1969, when it met with unexpected opposition. In January 1969, Czechoslovakia became a federative republic composed of two members—the Czech and the Slovak republics, both of which had their own government. In February, the Czech Government bared its own views about councils, and they turned out to be rather shocking.[43] The Czech Government proposed to enact the most explicit technocratic features of the SKŘO document: the "concept of thirds" (giving workers meaningless representation on councils) and the "token model" (giving councils no powers) which had never been taken seriously by anyone.

An astonishing public discussion followed. On the one side stood the Czech

40. *Práce*, December 12, 1968.
41. Jevbavy, "Les conceils d'entreprise," p. 70.
42. The full text of the draft bill was never published but its important features can be reconstructed from the discussion it engendered. Especially helpful is an analysis in *Práce*, February 12, 1969.
43. *Práce*, February 22, 1969.

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Government, joined by the Slovak Government and by many in the economic bureaucracy. On the other side, defending the Socialist Enterprise Bill as drafted, was the united labor movement and the radical democrats. The federal Czechoslovak Government and the national KSČ leadership stood on the sidelines. After several weeks of public debate, the labor movement's opposition proved to be decisive and the Czech Government lost out.

The victory for the labor movement was a formidable one. The Bill had been the subject of an unprecedented public discussion. Never in recent memory had a piece of legislation been discussed with such intensity. There was only one problem—which revealed the victory of the radical democrats to have been a Pyrrhic one: the problem of time. During the raging controversy, the passage of the Bill had fallen helplessly behind schedule. The first quarter of 1969 had come and gone and there still was no sight of the Bill on the floor of the legislature. Meanwhile, other developments had been taking place in the country. Assorted bureaucratic, conservative, neo-Stalinist forces were becoming more and more active. Tension in the country mounted. And in April, just as the labor movement had sealed its victory over the Czech Government, the bureaucracy won the major battle over radical democrats: Alexander Dubček was ousted as the First Secretary of the KSČ.

The ascent of Gustáv Husák as the new KSČ leader was coupled with a determined attempt to consummate the invasion on the political level, many months after the invasion itself had taken place. All achievements of the Prague Spring were eventually to be liquidated. Different methods were used in different areas. The most outspoken radical democratic voices of periodicals and some organizations were shut up outright. In other organizations, an internal *coup* was engineered. Councils were not the first to be attacked: indeed, for a while, lip service continued to be paid to the necessity of passing the Socialist Enterprise Bill. They continued to exist for several more months in a state of uncomfortable limbo. There was no longer any real intention of passing the Bill.

Killing the Bill, for which the Czech Government's technocratic opposition was largely responsible, concluded the transition of what remained of the technocratic forces from the progressive camp, where they had started in the early sixties, to the conservative camp. It bears emphasizing that the Socialist Enterprise Bill had been one of the Prague Spring's measures that had been virtually safe from Soviet criticism. Even if the country's post-invasion leadership were ready to appease the Soviets in every possible way, there still had been no *outside* reason to clamp down on the councils. The *internal* logic of the technocratic position and its political consequences did, however, make it inevitable. With no publicity, no legitimate means of communication among themselves, and no power, there was little the councils could do in the new counterrevolutionary atmosphere. In summer, 1970, they were banned altogether by the Czech Ministry of Industry.

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BEYOND CLASS: THE DECLINE OF INDUSTRIAL LABOR AND LEISURE

by John Alt

One of the great social and cultural transformations of the twentieth century is the historical shift from the primacy of labor to that of consumption—the mediation of social relations and consciousness by consumer goods. This relatively recent phenomenon eclipses the class experience of wage-labor and raises commodity fetishism to a new form of domination: from extensive exploitation and misery (wage-labor), to reduced work time (leisure) and increased material comforts (consumerism). Integrated by increased leisure and higher wages, modern employees are culturally and politically dislodged from the world of work and from a class experience in the traditional Marxian sense. Concerned primarily with the immediate gratifications of familial intimacy and consumerism, they come to tolerate the exploitation of labor and even political authoritarianism so long as the system sustains a rising standard of living. Given its centrality in the reproduction of the economy, the culture of daily existence, and political legitimation, consumerism has become the major form of domination and reification.[1]

The following will attempt to trace the passage from the primacy of labor in daily life under competitive capitalism to the consumerism under monopoly capitalism. The focus in the first section is the daily class experience of the early industrial working class. Due to the dominant influence of labor on social relations and consciousness, this class experience can be identified as that of occupational communities. The formation of such occupational communities among the early working class represented a historically unique configuration of labor and leisure characteristic of the competitive phase of capitalism. The concept of occupational community specifies the relation between working class leisure and community life, as well as that between labor and capitalist ownership. That is, leisure served the social reproduction of the working class, which gave them the capacity to labor, but it also created the internal social solidarity necessary for affirmative class action. Thus, the crisis character of early capitalism was not just economic, but also political, due to working class struggles for a better way of life. In an important sense, the trends associated with the transition from crisis-ridden, competitive capitalism to integrated, monopoly capitalism

1. This interpretation is grounded in the critical theory of Western Marxism, primarily Georg Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness* (London, 1971), Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, *The Dialectic of Enlightenment* (New York, 1972), Herbert Marcuse, *One Dimensional Man* (Boston, 1964), Alain Touraine, *The Post-Industrial Society* (New York, 1971), and André Gorz, *Strategy for Labor* (Boston, 1967).

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involved the repressive destruction of occupational community among the industrial working class. The purpose of this descriptive analysis is to locate the eclipse of the primacy of labor in daily life and explore its implications for radical political theory.

In the second section, I analyze the relevance of Taylorism in simultaneously undermining the occupational community's foundations and providing the economic and ideological infrastructure for privatization and consumerism. In other words, for consumerism to displace class experience, a distinct material and cultural infrastructure had to replace that of the occupational community and its primary group leisure associations. While Taylorism appears here as the major process transforming daily life, there were equally important social and ideological movements which were moments of the broader societal transformation (capital expansion and hegemony) also working to undermine traditional working class associations and to create the infrastructure of consumerism. "Suburbanism," for instance, further isolated the worker by removing him from the daily world of labor to a world of privatized familial intimacy mediated by domestic and recreational consumer goods. Thus, suburbanism dislodged the family from the primary groups of the occupational community, and changed the family's relation to the outside world: from labor reproduction and emotional privacy to consumerism. The modern family's relative social isolation mirrors Taylorism's isolation of the worker with both processes contributing to and reinforcing an infrastructure of consumerism.

Finally, I will review the situation of the new technical and professional workers—the so-called new working class—which has been suggested as the potential constituency of a new form of occupational community. But the techniques of mass production and Taylorism have equally affected the conditions of their labor, thus inhibiting the development of different forms of social relations and consciousness. The contradictions which plague the new working class are mitigated, as they are for other strata of the working class, by the affluence and comfort of consumerism.

Early Industrial Capitalism and the Labor Fetishization of Daily Life

Unlike industrial capitalism, labor and production in pre-capitalist societies were neither treated as commodities nor as autonomous institutions. Domination existed, to be sure, but it was not rooted in productive relations. Typically, material production and labor played minor roles in the social organization and were generally subordinate to, and integral expressions of, the ascribed roles and responsibilities of social communities. The economy and labor were embedded in the social institutions of kinship, religion, and polity.[2] For instance, the *social labor* of the feudal craftsman—mason,

2. George Dalton, ed., *Primitive, Archaic and Modern Economies: Essays of Karl Polanyi* (Boston, 1971), pp. xii-xiii. The thesis that Polanyi pursued in all of his work, particularly to counter the notion that productivity and commodity markets were endemic to human existence, is put by him in the following passage (*ibid.*, p. 65): "Man's economy is, as a rule, submerged in

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weaver, potter, sculptor—determined the type and manner in which goods were produced and exchanged in the feudal commune or guild. That is, the artisan was never an individual producer nor was he the master of his labor or product as is sometimes romantically imagined. While the artisan controlled the process of production, his activities were embedded in and guided by the norms of his social group. The point, well expressed by Baudrillard, is that "the artisan lives his work as a relation of symbolic exchange, abolishing the definition of himself as 'laborer' and the object as 'product' of his labor."[3] In other words, the artisan expressed and produced for the needs of a determinant social community—the guild and the feudal commune—and it was the larger community that determined the form and functions of the products of production. Productivity or labor were never ends in themselves, but means for socially-defined ends.

Industrial capitalism inverted traditional relations where economic production was minimized and considered an outgrowth of social communities. The historical significance of industrial capitalism was that it transformed social relationships into relationships mediated by exchange.[4] Labor and its products thus took the form of commodities: things whose value was defined in monetary terms reflecting market processes and class relations. With a new system of production founded on capital, economic activity subordinated the collectively-defined ends of social communities to the abstract goals of exchange and capital accumulation. Once an integral and typically epiphenomenal moment of culture and social life, labor became a commodity. Community life and leisure were in turn forced to adapt their purpose and form to the requirements of commodity production.

As a consequence, the interrelations, character, and amount of labor and leisure of the laboring classes was dramatically altered.[5] In place of social labor rooted in small communities, dependent upon the natural rhythms of season or tide, and accompanied by large amounts of leisure time, capitalism created wage labor as the central life activity of the new industrial proletariat. Long hours of work, with harsh labor discipline, were required as

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his social relations. The change from this to a society which was, on the contrary, submerged in the economic system was an entirely novel development." See also Jean Baudrillard, *The Mirror of Production* (St. Louis, 1975); Moses I. Finley, *The Ancient Economy* (Berkeley, 1960); Murray Bookchin, *The Limits of the City* (New York, 1974), pp. 36-56; Maurice Dobb, *Studies in the Development of Capitalism* (New York, 1957), pp. 33-82; Edward Shorter, ed., *Work and Community in the West* (New York, 1973); and E.P. Thompson, "Time, Work Discipline, and Industrial Capitalism," *Past and Present*, 38 (1967), pp. 56-97 for similar theses.

3. *The Mirror of Production, op.cit.*, pp. 98-99. A good historical study of the social grounding of labor in the artisanal guild community is Mack Walker, *German Home Towns: Community, State, and General Estate, 1648-1871* (Ithaca, 1971).

4. Two of the best historical accounts of this process are Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation* (Boston, 1957), and E.P. Thompson, *The Making of the English Working Class* (New York, 1963).

5. For historical studies of this process, see the references cited above (note 4); Robert W. Malcolmson, *Popular Recreations in English Society, 1700-1850* (London, 1973), and Herbert Gutman, "Work, Culture, and Society in Industrializing America," *American Historical Review*, 78:3 (June, 1973), pp. 531-588.

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production became geared to the competition of new national and international commodity markets. Notwithstanding both resistance to industrial capitalism and the persistence of traditional cultural activities among the new proletariat,[6] the new mode of industrial production necessitated dramatic changes in daily life as the working class adjusted to factory exigencies and the long work day. Wage-labor, rather than the social community of old, became the organizing structural and cultural principle of daily existence. Common positions in the division of labor, shared experiences and problems on the shop floor, the extensive exploitation of labor resulting in mere subsistence conditions, and common cultural traditions were new historical sources of an industrial class experience which was socially manifested and reproduced in new forms of primary group association and leisure. New communities and cultures were formed and grounded in the relations and milieu of the industrial work environment. In contrast to the social communities of pre-capitalist societies, distinct *occupational communities* emerged in the new industrial cities and towns.[7]

The occupational community of early capitalism and the industrial working class represented an historically unique pattern of labor and leisure where all aspects of daily life were permeated by class contradictions and issues. For the members of an occupational community, a common labor experience meant that associations and problems in the realm of work were reproduced in the realm of leisure. The contradictory function of this occupational leisure was not only to reproduce the labor force, but also to provide the social cohesion and political relations which enabled the worker to fight for a better way of life. In this sense, then, labor came to dominate the life of the industrial working class. The result was that the crisis character of early capitalism was not just economic, but political as well.

In applying this generalization to the American working class, it is important to keep in mind differences between skilled, native-American, and Western European workers, on the one hand, and unskilled, Eastern and Southern European workers on the other.[8] For the English-speaking or

6. On this, see Gutman, "Work, Culture, and Society in Industrializing America," *op.cit.* In America, Gutman has demonstrated that many of the newly-arrived peasant immigrants tenaciously held onto their traditional forms of culture and leisure: the factories in which they were employed often found vacant during the practice of traditional wakes and other ceremonies, for instance.

7. My use of the concept of occupational community as a means of thematizing the daily experience of the early working class draws upon Maurice Stein, *The Eclipse of Community* (New York, 1964); Graeme Salaman, *Community and Occupation* (London, 1974); Shorter, *Work and Community in the West, op.cit.*; and William Kornblum, *Blue Collar Community* (Chicago, 1974). Salaman's general definition of the occupational community (p. 19) is useful: "Members of occupational communities build their lives on their work; their work-friends are their friends outside work and their leisure interests and activities are work-based."

8. The history and composition of America's early industrial working class has been adequately described by Stanley Aronowitz, *False Promises* (New York, 1973), pp. 137-213. Aronowitz has a good discussion of how ethnic workers became stratified, and thus separated on the basis of a hierarchy of skills and occupations. While this process was no doubt important in inhibiting the formation of a unified and national working class movement, it was normally overcome within specific plants and industries in times of strikes and crisis. For substantiation of

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craft workers, labor was not as exploitative as for ethnic, unskilled workers. Thus, initially, leisure performed slightly different functions for skilled workers than it did for unskilled workers. Yet, for both groups, the larger function of leisure was the reproduction of group cohesiveness integrally related to the performance of labor. In the following, I will illustrate this general state of affairs for (1) early skilled workers, (2) early ethnic, unskilled workers, and (3) contemporary settlements of ethnic industrial workers.

(1) Skilled workers in early capitalist enterprises formed a historically unique occupational community—the *craft community* characterized by the autonomy of workmanship within the firm.[9] In this sense, the skilled worker did not fundamentally differ from the pre-capitalist artisan. But, unlike the feudal artisan whose labor was always mediated by the larger guild community, the skilled worker had a more personalized relation to his labor which was mediated by the more socially limited craft association.

Under capitalism, the relative autonomous status of the skilled worker raised the performance of labor as the determinant influence in their lives. Typically, the skilled worker created one whole object, set his own work rhythms, made all his own technical decisions, imposed all shop floor discipline and management, and hired and fired his own helpers. Shop floor relations among apprentice, journeyman, and foreman were autonomous and independent of the ownership of the enterprise. The early skilled worker was strongly identified with his craft, and had a self-image based upon his occupational trade, saw himself as a member of a distinct occupational reference group, and engaged in non-work activities with other members of his craft. The organizational expression of skilled labor—the craft association or union—played an important role in daily life, not only in the *defense* of the worker's slowly eroding position within the capitalist firm, but also in the elaboration of an autonomous culture.

This early skilled worker is best depicted in the Lynds' account of Muncie's craft community in the 1890s.[10] Muncie's skilled workers were native-born, white Americans who worked in iron and glass industries where craft techniques rather than machine technology was the dominant mode of production. Traditionally, the skilled worker made his living through his trade and was protected by powerful craft associations. In the 1890s there were 30 locals of the American Federation of Labor. The craft system entailed skill, shop authority, and social prestige and political influence in the larger town. The skilled craftsman and his apprentices typically derived dignity and status from their occupation, were socially mobile within their trade, and

this latter point, see David Brody, *Labor in Crisis: The Steel Strike of 1919* (Philadelphia, 1965), and Kornblum, *Blue Collar Community, op.cit.*

9. The character of early industrial skilled work and the craft communities are well discussed by Serge Mallet, *Essays on the New Working Class* (St. Louis, 1975); Shorter, *Work and Community in the West, op.cit.*; and Robert S. Lynd and Helen M. Lynd, *Middletown* (New York, 1929).

10. Lynds, *Middletown, op.cit.* Muncie is the actual town in Indiana which the Lynds studied.

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their craft associations were an influential and respected force in community life. Neighborhoods were cohesive in that workers tended to live adjacent to their place of employment, thus each neighborhood or district housed workers of particular plants. Workers walked to their jobs along with workmates and frequently stopped at the neighborhood saloon (in the 1890s there were 40 of them in Muncie with a population of 11,000).

The craft labor system was the organizing principle for community life and leisure. The union and the lodge, in particular, were the most active coordinating organizations in the lives of Muncie's working class families.[11] These included the provisioning of a Workingman's Library with a paid librarian, numerous balls and concerts (with attendance often reaching 1,500), informal social meetings on weekday evenings or Sunday afternoons over a "keg of beer," official union meetings which included literary readings, singing, and dancing, and organized sports contests between various unions. The craft union did not only have a defensive function *vis-à-vis* the capitalist owner, but also had important autonomous social functions in the lives of its members which transcended occupational and economic considerations. In addition to the union, the lodge, and the saloon, the neighborhood was also a focal point for the on-going association of colleagues, friends, and relatives. There were, of course, the traditional pasttimes of leisure with one's family which included talking, reading, singing, and walking, but when a Muncie working class family left the house for a leisure activity it was normally a social function linked to the craft character of the community or to one of the organized associations of the craft system. In summary, psychological gratification accompanied social solidarity generated within an occupational craft community and reproduced by the institutions of daily life.

The Muncie craft community was typical of many limited-production industries dependent on craft skills in the nineteenth century before the advent of mass production, specialized machinery, and Taylorism.[12] These latter processes eventually rendered craft skills unnecessary and ultimately broke up the political power of craft communities.[13] Today it is hard to find any skilled crafts and distinct craft communities where the autonomous

11. As the Lynds reported, "As centers of leisure time the unions ranked among the important social factors in the lives of a large number of workers." *Ibid.* p. 77.

12. For the early skilled steelworkers, see David Brody, *Steelworkers in America* (New York, 1969), pp. 1-95.

13. The undermining and erosion of the craft community with the introduction of the methods of mass production is, of course, the main focus of the Lynds' *Middletown*. In the modern development of capitalism, certain craft occupations and craft communities would persist, such as railroad engineering, longshoremen, printers, and certain construction trades, among some others. But today, most of these traditional crafts have been, or are in the process of being, destroyed by the techniques of advanced and technologized production and processing. Thus, the engineer was destroyed by diesel locomotives, longshoremen by containerized shipping methods, printers by advanced techniques of printing, and construction trades by pre-fabricated materials. For accounts of these four skilled occupations, respectively, see Salaman, *Community and Occupation, op.cit.*, pp. 59-113; William W. Pilcher, *The Portland Longshoremen* (New York, 1972); Seymour M. Lipset, *et al.*, *Union Democracy* (Garden City, 1962); and E.E. LeMasters, *Blue Collar Aristocrats* (Madison, 1975).

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performance of labor is the hallmark of work and social relations.

(2) In contrast to the labor aristocrats, the large unskilled stratum of the early industrial working class faced a different situation in the factories of the era of industrial expansion. Having no skills to market, the unskilled worker was typically confronted with long working hours and low pay. These conditions primarily generated a second variant of the early industrial occupational community—that of the *working class community* characterized by exhausting and exploitative labor conditions, the work-group character of the labor process in early industries, plus the primary group associations of ethnicity and neighborhood.[14] While differing from the craft community in important respects, the working class community shared the determinant influence of the industrial firm, but now as an experience of fetishism and exploitation. It is this class relation, more so than ethnicity, which breeds and reinforces the tight bonds of sociability and mutual aid.

In America, the working class community has its origins in urban ghettos surrounding various industrial plants and in the mill towns which sprung up around steel, textile, and mineral industries. In this economic and ecological environment of early industrialism, the American working class community was defined by common positions within specific factories or industries, a common ethnic culture, and a common geographical district or neighborhood. From the interrelation of these factors within the industrial milieu, the unskilled workers created numerous primary group associations through which they reproduced their labor, celebrated their common heritage, and fought *offensively* for a less exploitative and better way of life. Not initially represented by unions, this industrial stratum reproduced its labor functions and its class solidarity through the lodge and the tavern (or saloon, as it was called in the early days) which were the major associations of everyday life. As they were for the skilled worker, the activities and associations of leisure among the unskilled worker were intimtely tied to the reproduction of labor but, given the harsher environment, lacked much of the cultural autonomy of the former's leisure.

An early 1910 community survey of Homestead, Pennsylvania, a mill town built around the huge steel mill founded by the Carnegie Steel Co., illustrates the character of the traditional working class community in pre-World War I America.[15] In 1910, Homestead contained 25,000 people, consisting

14. This earlier social experience of class has been succinctly described by Lockwood: "Workmates are normally leisure-time companions, often neighbors, and not infrequently kinsmen. The existence of such closely-knit cliques of friends, work-mates, neighbours, and relatives is the hallmark of the traditional working class community. The values expressed through these social networks emphasize mutual aid in everyday life and the obligation to join in the gregarious pattern of leisure..." Cf. David Lockwood, "Sources of Variation in Working Class Images of Society," *Sociological Review*, 14 (1969), p. 251. The rise and decline of the traditional working class community in America has been adequately described by Aronowitz, *False Promises, op.cit.*, and Herbert Gans, *The Urban Villagers* (New York, 1962). For an excellent account of a stable, contemporary working class community, see Kornblum, *Blue Collar Community, op.cit.*, which we will discuss below.

15. Sources used here are Margaret Byington, *Homestead: The Households of a Mill Town*

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primarily of mill workers and their families, and was typical of the new industrial centers developing in the American Midwest. Men of Scotch, Welsh, and German origin represented the early immigration to the steel mills, and along with native American workers, constituted the skilled stratum of the mill labor force. Later immigration begining in the 1880s brought the Slavs—Slovaks and Hungarians from Austria-Hungary—who constituted the unskilled labor force. The two waves of immigration resulted not only in skill and occupational differentiation in the steel mill, but also a social cleavage between them in community life. The English-speaking groups (north and west European and native American) and the Slavs were culturally segregated in church, lodge, and residential area.

The harsh working conditions of the steel mill, long work hours, and low wages established the character and rhythm of life in the mill community. Until the 1920s, all mill workers alternated on a weekly basis between a 10 hour day shift and a 12 hour night shift, a seven day work week, two 24 hour shifts per month, and no vacations of any sort except those imposed by lay-offs and strikes. Weekly wages for unskilled workers ranged between $10 and $15, while those for skilled workers were between $15 and $20. A weekly wage of $15 or below permitted only the purchase of the bare necessities: rent and food. The hot and exhausting conditions of mill work combined with the long working hours typically allowed little in the way of family life and culture. As one steel worker of the era put it: "Home is just the place where I eat and sleep. I live in the mills."[16] One is reminded here of Marx's indignation over the fact that the wage-laborer had only enough leisure in which to perform his "animal functions" necessary for the reproduction of his laboring capacity.[17]

But there were other moments to the steelworker's leisure which were dialectically related to the reproduction of labor. In the free time spaces provided by the evenings of the alternate day shift week, the 24 hours off following the 24 hour shift, absenteeism, and lay-offs and strikes—the worker was the subject of his culture and his leisure activities. The unskilled worker adapted to, and sought to refashion, the conditions of industrial life through the vessel of his national culture within the distinctive working class institutions of the extended home, the lodge or fraternal order, and the saloon.[18] Class experience and cultural heritage mutually interacted within

(The Pittsburgh Survey, New York, 1911); and Thomas Bell, *Out of This Furnace* (Boston, 1941), which is an engrossing novel of three generations of Slavic workers in the Pittsburgh steel mills. Our discussion here will focus on the Slavic workers, but in form and function their leisure did not differ significantly from that of the unskilled English-speaking workers as both groups organized their daily life around the extended home, the lodge, and the saloon for purposes integrally related to industrial employment.

16. Cited by Fitch, *Steel Workers, op.cit.*, p. 201.

17. Karl Marx, *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* (New York, 1964), p. 111.

18. Other focal points for leisure were picnics, usually sponsored by a lodge or church; neighborhood participant sports such as basketball and baseball; the nickelodeon which, for a nickel, offered a few minutes of some stage play, drama, or comedy; skating; and lectures and social gatherings sponsored by a church. These activities took place in the neighborhood and were social rather than private in terms of participation. The only interesting exception was the commercial nickelodeon which could be seen as the forerunner of the radio and later forms of

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these institutional associations of leisure. Thus, there was forged a distinctive working class culture which, while functioning for the reproduction of this class to labor, also generated a cultural autonomy which was valuable for the celebration and enjoyment of life on the one hand (however minimal this was in fact), and the class struggle on the other. An important point here is that this working class culture was autonomous from, and in marked contrast to, that of the middle classes.

The Slavic workers, plus their families, relatives, and itinerant boarders, lived together in large numbers and in very close quarters, usually in tenement houses which would often face and share a common courtyard. It is in the extended home that the primary social bonds of mutuality are first reproduced as they originate out of the conditions of exploitative industrial employment. The extended home and the ecological character of the early tenements fostered extensive social interaction among its members. For one, the homes which occupied a common courtyard used a common water source and shared one toilet facility. During mild weather, the courtyard was typically a focus for discussions between men on shop-floor, political, and cultural topics, and was a place for playing cards, singing, and dancing. The house itself was a major center of social life: "In the evening a group often gathers around the stove gossiping of home days, playing cards, drinking, and playing simple musical instruments. On the Saturday after pay day the household usually clubs together to buy a case of beer which it drinks at home."[19] The home was also the scene of larger festivities during the events of birth, marriage, and death. These gatherings always drew workmates, relatives, old friends, and new neighbors together where "joy and grief and religious ceremony are alike forgotten in a riotous good time."[20]

Unable to belong to the craft unions or English-speaking workingmen's associations, the unskilled ethnic worker formed thousands of social and fraternal orders or lodges for the purpose of mutual aid and protection against the deprivations and hardships of industrial work and urban life. In Homestead, there were 26 Slavic lodges, 22 of which had a total membership of 2,108.[21] Many of the lodges were affiliated with the church, such as St. Stephen's lodge (for men) and St. Catherine's lodge (for women), while others were national ethnic societies, such as the National Croatian Society. These organizations served two immediate purposes: welfare benefits and recreation. The lodges have their roots in the need of the Slavic steelworkers to have some assistance or insurance in time of industrial accident, death, and depression, and were patterned after the lodge functions of those of the English-speaking workers. In effect, they were cooperative insurance organi-

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mass media and other consumer forms of amusement, which offer vicarious experiences for the private individual.

19. Byington, *Homestead, op.cit.*, p. 149. For a similar account of English-speaking workers, see *ibid.*, pp. 110-111.

20. *Ibid.*, p. 150.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 160. The English-speaking workers had 23 lodges with a membership of 3,663. *Ibid.*, p. 113.

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zations (in the modern sense of this term) which provided health benefits, burial sites, pensions, and college scholarships.

Like the extended home, but to a greater degree, the lodge was an institutional infrastructure for the reproduction of comradeship and solidarity necessary to survive and transcend the exigencies of industrial class experience. For instance, the mutual aid function of the lodge was not just restricted to its local members as they often extended their benefits to other working class communities in time of desperation or strike.[22] This ability to provide mutual aid functions, both within the lodge and to other communities, presupposed a social solidarity which was not just created by the institutional fact of the lodge *sui generis*. One of the major functions of the lodges was the organization of social and recreational activities through which this solidarity was constructed and reproduced. As Byington observed: "The meetings themselves, while nominally for business, afford a chance for coming together, while dances and other festivities are held at intervals. Through them the stranger comes quickly into touch with his own people."[23] The biggest social event of the lodge was the Saturday night ball which typically involved dancing, drinking, and singing, into the early hours of Sunday morning (even though that was another working day).

The class character of leisure and its function in the social reproduction of primary group ties is further evident in the role of the industrial saloon. In Homestead there were about 50 saloons. In the four mill towns surrounding Pittsburgh—Homestead, Braddock, Duquesne, and McKeesport—there were a total of 214 saloons.[24] The great popularity of the saloon among industrial workmen can be interpreted as a social need for fellowship, recuperation, and relaxation. Saloon drinking was a social occasion, having its roots in European peasant culture, but adapted to industrial life for the purpose of relieving the strain and fatigue of factory work in the company of one's peers: workmates, relatives and neighbors.[25] Extensive drinking or private drinking was not the norm as the men did not possess the means and because drinking *per se* was secondary to the social function of the saloon, which was to provide companionship and fellowship among one's equals. Thus, the saloon can only be understood in relation to the harsh and exploitative conditions of wage-labor. As a distinctive class experience, the saloon, like the extended home and the lodge, provided the social infrastructure for relief from the insecurities and hardships of industrial labor and was also an occasion for the creation and reproduction of social solidarity. While the saloon was a refuge

22. Byington observed that in December, 1907, "within forty-eight hours after the mine explosion at Monogah, West Virginia, one Homestead lodge had voted a contribution for those left destitute. This ready sympathy for suffering and desire to help often find their only expression through the joint effort of these societies." *Ibid.*, p. 115.

23. *Ibid.*, pp. 163-164. Cf. her similar account of the English-speaking lodges, *ibid.*, pp. 114-115.

24. *Ibid.*, p. 112; and Fitch, *The Steel Workers, op.cit.*, p. 228.

25. On this point, cf. Fitch, *The Steel Workers, op.cit.*, pp. 226-227; and Aronowitz, *False Promises, op.cit.* p. 411.

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from the factory, it also afforded the opportunity for discussions of shop floor problems, the long work day, the low wages, political matters, and the like. In this sense, the saloon stood in a contradictory relation to capitalist ownership by generating class recuperation and solidarity.

The process of ethnic settlement around specific industries resulting in a determining relation between labor and leisure, mediated and reproduced through the associations of leisure, defines the historical character of the traditional working class community. For the unskilled ethnic worker, the long hours of toil with meager pay generated a labor-based class culture and consciousness mediated by ethnic heritage. But it was the common need to survive and to take affirmative action against the masters of labor that created the functional need for the primary group associations of everyday life more so than the character of their traditional cultures. The social occasions of the extended home, the lodge, and the saloon were reflections of the working class' need to combat exploitation, and they provided bonds of unity necessary for dealing with the harsh conditions of their lives. The class struggles of this era, such as the violent steel strike of 1919 (in which the Homestead community played a major role), occurred as a result of class exploitation, but were possible and could be sustained only because of the social solidarity created in the associations of daily life.[26] Industrial class struggle presupposed a social form of leisure which was grounded in class experiences and which provided the social bonds necessary for political organization and action.

(3) Further insight into the working class community and the fading era of industrial class relations can be obtained through a consideration of Kornblum's recent study of an ethnic, blue collar community surrounding one of South Chicago's steel mills.[27] Kornblum develops the thesis that the tendency of industrial workers to become fragmented by the factory's division

26. The importance of the relationship between primary group associations of leisure, class solidarity, and class struggle among the Pittsburgh steelworkers is discussed by Brody, *Steelworkers in America, op.cit.*, and his *Labor in Crisis: The Steel Strike of 1919, op.cit.*, and Bell, *Out of This Furnace, op.cit.* For similar accounts of other industrial communities and strikes, cf. Liston Pope, *Millhands and Preachers: A Study of Gastonia* (New Haven, 1942); and Norman Clark, *Milltown* (Seattle, 1970).

27. See Kornblum, *Blue Collar Community, op.cit., passim.* Traditional working class communities, while now non-existent in most American cities and declining in others, are not yet totally extinct, and persist around basic production industries such as steel, coal, lumber, cement, rubber, and glass, particularly in the major (and traditional) industrial cities of the midwest (Chicago-Gary, Detroit, St. Louis, Cleveland, Toledo, Pittsburgh, Buffalo, and eastern New Jersey). Where such industries prevail, the historical tendency for ethnic and unskilled workers to form distinct working class communities in the immediate vicinity of the employing industry is still observable. The lot of the unskilled and semi-skilled worker in these basic production industries has improved since the turn of the century in terms of reduced working time and increased wages, but the basic relation of class exploitation in labor-intensive industries creates a form of community life and leisure which parallels the earlier working class community. Of course, the persistence of working class subcultural traditions and community institutions in these areas is also an important determining variable. Cf. also Pilcher, *The Portland Longshoremen, op.cit.*; Arthur E. Wood, *Hamtramck: A Sociological Study of a Polish-American Community* (New Haven, 1955); Lantz, *People of Coal Town*; and Alvin Gouldner, *Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy* (New York, 1954).

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of labor (different gradations of skill), ethnicity, race, and neighborhood enclaves is counteracted by the need to create broader class unity. That is, in the exploitative environment of industrial labor, groups which are normally segregated by status factors have a need to transcend such status differences in order to reproduce themselves as a class (both for survival and for affirmative action). Thus, Kornblum interprets the internal social dynamics of an industrial community as an on-going tension and negotiation between elements of status (skill, ethnicity, race), and those of class (common interests deriving from a position of wage-labor).

The conditions which make the South Chicago area an industrial working class community are the universal experience of steel mill work among its subgroups, plus the need to unite politically for the defense and advancement of their common interests through the union and the local political machine. Kornblum demonstrates that common work and leisure activities provide the necessary conditions for solidarity in union and political organizations. Thus, the necessary mediations between common class position and class organization are the numerous primary groups formed in the mill, the neighborhood association, the occupational and neighborhood taverns, the street corner gangs, the church committees, and other neighborhood functions of a social and recreational nature. Through the primary group associations of leisure, workers with different backgrounds are able to forge a broader class solidarity which, in turn, enables them to form coalitions in unions and city political organizations.[28] These are essentially the same processes observed in the Homestead steel mill community in the early 1900s. Like much industrial work before the advent of Taylorism (which isolated workers from each other), steel mill labor still necessitates a form of teamwork and intergroup cooperation. The process of steel production requires work teams which rely on face-to-face interaction and which therefore facilitate the construction of primary groups within the mill which are subsequently reproduced on the outside. Thus, the formation of class solidarity begins on the shop floor of the steel mill.[29]

Within Wisconsin Steel's No. 3 mill (a rolling mill), there are three basic work groups: laborers, mill hands, and loaders. The relationship between the foreman and the laborers gives some degree of unity to the latter, but is not

28. See also John Leggett, *Class, Race, and Labor: Working Class Consciousness in Detroit* (New York, 1968), pp. 130-143, where Black auto workers reconstruct class solidarity through block clubs which combine recreational with neighborhood functions. Other studies of popular leisure among dominated laboring classes have also stressed the important solidarity-creating function of leisure. See Malcolmson, *Popular Recreations in English Society, op.cit.*; George Rawick, *From Sundown to Sunup* (Westport, Conn., 1972); C.L.R. James, *Beyond a Boundary* (London, n.d.); Frank Manning, *Black Clubs in Bermuda* (Ithaca, 1971); and Brian Jackson, *Working Class Community* (London, 1968). For instance, Malcolmson (*op.cit.*, p. 84) argues that the social leisure of the English agricultural laborer was a distinct medium for the expression of hostility against the relations of domination which constrained their labor and everyday existence, and functioned to foster a social consciousness and cohesiveness which "served to articulate a vision of the social harmony for which its members wished."

29. Kornblum, *Blue Collar Community, op.cit.*, pp. 36-37.

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sufficient to spill over into after-work leisure. On the other hand, the mill hands and loaders have much greater work responsibilities and thus more opportunities to develop primary group ties that both overcome cleavages based on ethnicity and race, and create social bonds which are sustained outside the plant. Due to the complex operations of the work task and the idiosyncratic nature of the steel production process (which requires that a team, only through time and experience, master the minute details and tricks to steel processing), milling and loading demand internal group cooperation, while the total process of steel production requires that each work-team be accurately coordinated with the efforts of all the other work teams. A steelworker's reputation, both on and off the job, therefore, depends on his ability to successfully coordinate his function within his own team and with that of other work teams.

This formation of occupational primary groups within the mill is then reproduced in the associations of community leisure. The physical structure of the mill neighborhoods with their public places—taverns, stores, meeting halls, churches, stoops and alleys—provide the ecological infrastructure for the construction and reproduction of mill and ethnic primary group ties. Kornblum singles out the tavern as the major neighborhood institution through which class solidarity is reproduced and strengthened.[30] As in most mill and industrial neighborhoods, the tavern is an important center of informal social life, relaxation, and entertainment among adult working people. Given the physical and social limitations of the home, the industrial tavern is the major place where primary bonds formed in the mill can be re-enacted on a daily basis. The industrial tavern, unlike its modern counterpart in the cosmopolitan city and suburban shopping center, has a distinctly peer group character, reflecting shared occupational and social roles.[31] However, Kornblum notes that there is a distinct tendency for the social functions of the tavern to recede in importance. While most steelworkers "stop in" at a tavern on some regular basis, increasingly consumerism—television, better housing in suburban neighborhoods, and the automobile—claim their leisure time and removes them from the occupational culture of the traditional working class tavern.[32]

Nevertheless, in Irondale, adjacent to the Wisconsin Steel plant, there are seventeen taverns and each varies according to the nature of its patronage. The occupational or workingman's tavern, in particular, is a major means by which South Chicago steelworkers reconstruct their occupational class experience. One such tavern is *Mike's* which draws workers from the Wisconsin Steel plant and neighboring industries. The shared events of industrial accidents, layoffs, managerial actions, and strikes are relived and

30. *Ibid.*, pp. 68-83.

31. On this distinction, cf. Sherri Cavan, *Liquor License: An Ethnography of Bar Behavior* (Chicago, 1966), and David Gottlieb, "The Neighborhood Tavern and the Cocktail Lounge: A Study of Class Differences," *American Journal of Sociology*, 62:6 (May, 1957), pp. 559-562.

32. Kornblum, *Blue Collar Community*, *op.cit.*, p. 76.

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relieved at *Mike's*.[33] The tavern is thus instrumental in providing the bonds of solidarity necessary for the socially diverse groups of this South Chicago community to be brought together in unions and the political organizations of the city. Thus, as it was for the early industrial worker, conditions of class and occupation still largely influence the character and function of leisure institutions among certain strata of the remaining industrial working class.

For comparative purposes, it is interesting to note here that as working class affluence increases and class conflict lessens, the culture of the workingman's tavern (where they persist) shifts toward a form of greater cultural autonomy, where industrial and political issues become the exception, not the rule.[34] LeMasters observes that typically, the friendships and common interests developed by these workers are reproduced in one particular tavern where they customarily congregate after work and on the weekends. For these workers, the tavern constitutes an occasion for entering informal social life where the anxieties and constraints of the job and everyday life are suspended in favor of gaiety, excitement, and frivolity, which take such diverse forms as low-key conversations, hunting and fishing yarns, music and dancing (their wives attend on the weekend evenings), practical-joking, and various games (pool, darts, cards, horseshoes, gambling, and shuffleboard). Distinguished by their absence are any conversations regarding work or political issues. Traditional working class forms of leisure, to be sure, had a similar festive character (an autonomous culture as an end in itself), but these were typically overshadowed by the labor reproduction functions of leisure. Thus, this residual workingman's tavern can be considered a transitory form between the traditional industrial tavern and the cosmopolitan, transient cocktail lounge.

Taylorism, Mass Production, and Labor: Toward Consumerism

The early social context where social relations and consciousness were

33. In other words, the tavern recreates the industrial class experience: "Here people perceive their commonality as growing out of years of shared experience in the workplace, and in the neighborhoods. They tend to play down the ethnic differences which separated them at other periods of their lives." *Ibid.*, p. 86. How the tavern provides similar functions for the Black working class of Bermuda is described in Manning's excellent *Black Clubs in Bermuda, op.cit.*; and for the English worker, see Jackson, *Working Class Community, op.cit.*, and Otto Norman, "The Sociology of the Betting Shop," *British Journal of Sociology*, 19:1 (March, 1968), pp. 17-33. We should also add here that, traditionally, the workingman's tavern was the site for strike headquarters where striking workers met to discuss strategies, change picketing shifts, and receive meals. See Walter H. Uphoff, *Kohler on Strike* (Boston, 1966), p. 146. Having grown up in Sheboygan, Wisconsin, where most of the Kohler strikers lived, I remember distinctly this important role of the tavern in the lives and struggles of Kohler's workers. The Sheboygan community, still dominated by mass production, consumer goods industries (e.g., the Kohler Co.) and a traditional, ethnic-based working class, has retained the tavern as a major center of community social life. But, as is the case of South Chicago's steelworkers, the tavern is increasingly giving way to family-style camping and the home television as predominant forms of leisure.

34. Cf. LeMasters, *Blue Collar Aristocrats, op.cit.*, particularly pp. 125-146. In this study of a working class community. LeMasters observes among a group of skilled construction workers that the primary function of the tavern is sociability and fun as ends in themselves relatively unrelated to outside consequences.

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largely mediated by the conditions of working class experience has been largely superseded by a socially-private existence mediated by consumerism. This transformation is historically rooted in the economic and political crisis character of competitive capitalism. The exploitative nature of labor and the drastic fluctuations of the competitive market were the dominant forces which forged the working class into active political struggle. It must be recalled that the years 1877-1937 (the era of competitive capitalism in America) witnessed the most widespread and violent labor-capital struggles in the history of capitalism.[35] From the underground violence of the Molly Maguires to the open warfare to Homestead to the great sit-down strike at General Motors, the working class was pitted against the masters of industry. From the populist socialism of the early Knights of Labor to the moderate progressivism of the AFL to the communism of the CIO, the political and ideological thrust of the labor movement constituted a direct challenge to capitalist ownership.[36]

It was in this context of crisis that capitalism began to refashion the conditions of labor, lay the basis for stable economic growth, and utilize the state for purposes of creating a new social hegemony. The New Deal is the pivotal moment of this transformation which brought an end to the era of competitive capitalism and ushered in the phase of monopoly capitalism with its new forms of social and political integration.[37] In the intervening years, the problems of entrepreneurial capitalism have been largely overcome by corporate monopolization, Keynesian state policies, a streamlined and repressive corporate state centered in the executive branch, the Taylorization of labor, mass consumerism and its legitimating ideology of "personal freedom" and "progress," new technologies and industries, new forms of transportation and communication, suburbanization, and so on. The combined result of these processes is the cultural devaluation of the role of labor as the determinant of class experience and the subsequent valuation of consumerism as a major mechanism for shaping consciousness and reproducing capitalist hegemony. Taylorism exemplifies the economic and political functions of the transformation: as it undermined the foundations of the working class community, it simultaneously laid the infrastructure for consumerism. Taylorism thus contributed considerably towards a more complete control over the *social* production process and towards the realization of both greater profits and decreased class conflict in the post-competitive capitalist era.

In the more limited production and crisis ridden industries of the early era,

35. For solid documentation, see Jeremy Brecher, *Strike!* (San Francisco, 1972), and Sidney Lens, *The Labor Wars* (Garden City, 1974).

36. On the leftist character of the labor movement, see John Laslett, *Labor and the Left* (New York, 1970); and Lens, *The Labor Wars, op.cit.*

37. On the relationship between the New Deal and the working class, see Mario Tronti, "Workers and Capital," *Telos*, 14 (Winter, 1972), pp. 25-62. The major shortcoming of Tronti's excellent account, however, is his complete disregard for the cultural dimension—which leads him to conclusions dramatically opposed to those of the present study.

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the occupational community placed constraints on capital's drive to increase productivity and repress class conflicts in both its shop floor and leisure associations. As part of the broader movement for economic expansion and political hegemony, industrial capitalists hired engineers and social scientists —under the ideological cover of rationality, science, and efficiency—to reorganize the traditional operations and social relations of the shop floor, devise new methods of production, and establish new hierarchies of managerial authority and control. These industrial changes, which can be subsumed under the name of "Taylorism," had as one of their intended effects the break up of indigenous occupational communities among industrial workmen.[38]

Taylorism was integral to the transition from the competitive and limited-production period of capitalism to its monopoly and mass production period. The vastly expanded production of consumer goods under increased corporate monopolization necessitated changes in the organization and performance of labor. First and foremost, this required that management break up the traditional work process and replace it with efficient and specialized machine processes, such as the assembly line, and assume total authority over the organization and performance of labor. The challenge, as Taylor put it, was for management to gather in "all the great mass of traditional knowledge, which in the past has been in the heads of the workman, and in the physical skill and knack of the workman, which he has acquired through years of experience."[39] Taylor therefore initiated the strategy whereby personal control and initiative was displaced from the skilled worker and unskilled work teams to a specialized managerial hierarchy, while craft skills were given over to specialized machine operations. Hierarchical forms of bureaucratic authority emerged in which all power and control were lodged in the higher ranks and were accompanied by an ideology that only managers could make decisions regarding the organization and operation of the labor process.

The mass production assembly-line typifies the Taylorist strategy.[40] Mass

38. Cf. Frederick W. Taylor, *The Principles of Scientific Management* (New York, 1967). Fine interpretations of Taylorism, from which I draw, are Reinhold Bendix, *Work and Authority in Industry* (New York, 1963); Aronowitz, *False Promises*, *op.cit.*, pp. 137-213; Harry Braverman, *Labor and Monopoly Capital* (New York, 1974), pp. 85-138; Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis, "Class Power and Alienated Labor," *Monthly Review*, 26:10 (March, 1975), pp. 9-25; and Bradley Rudin, "Industrial Betterment and Scientific Management as Social Control, 1890-1920," *Berkeley Journal of Sociology*, 17 (1972-73), pp. 59-77. An important qualification here is that Taylorism wasn't exactly a new approach to industrial organization; more accurately, it accelerated and organized into a specific movement and ideology tendencies inherent in industrial capitalism as a relationship between classes.

39. Quoted by Bendix, *Work and Authority in Industry, op.cit.*, p. 278.,

40. This whole process has been described by Braverman, *Labor and Monopoly Capital, op.cit.*; Mallet, *Essays on the New Working Class, op.cit.*, pp. 17-47; and Alain Touraine, "An Historical Theory in the Evolution of Industrial Skills," *Modern Technology and Civilization,* ed. Charles R. Walker (New York, 1962), pp. 425-437. For concrete studies of this process, see the Lynds' *Middletown, op.cit.*, pp. 21-92; Alain Touraine, "The End of the Road for the Skilled Worker: Automaking at Renault," *Work and Community in the West*, ed. Shorter, *op.cit.*, pp. 80-100; and Robert Blauner, *Alienation and Freedom* (Chicago, 1964).

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production transformed the skill structure of most industries as the importance of craft workers and work-teams declined while the importance of semi-skilled workers increased. The latter did not work in teams or groups but were assigned specialized functions along a machine process which isolated workers and their tasks from each other. That is, the worker's traditional knowledge and control over the production process was displaced, fragmented and then reified in a parcellized machine process in relation to which the workman functioned as a mere tender. This new labor process not only permitted a swifter work pace and lower production costs (i.e., greater profits), but it also broke up the occupational cultures which were once prominent in earlier forms of industrial organization. The skilled and unskilled primary work group, with its labor knowledge and control, diminished in American industry as it was replaced by isolated workers who performed under the precise directives of a Taylorized, machine-dominated production process. Corresponding to the transformation of craft and team labor into that of isolated, semiskilled forms, was the emergence of a new managerial and supervisory stratum whose functions were to organize and direct the discreet operations of a machine-tending labor force.

The industrial reorganization signified by Taylorism was largely accepted by American workers, because of promises and pay-offs for wage increases, premium benefits, and reduced labor time. The increase in productivity realized through Taylorism allowed the industrialist to share in the increased surplus, however disproportionate that share may have been. If skill, work autonomy, and occupational comradeship were important to American workers (and we have no reason to assume that they were not!), it was nonetheless also true that the crises and hardships imposed by an unstable and exploitative economy generated a hypersensitivity to scarcity and a social need for economic security and material comfort. This cultural infrastructure, created during the early period of capitalist expansion, facilitated the entry of American workers into the new priorities and plans of mass production-oriented, monopoly capitalism.

Put differently, the problem of legitimating industrial reorganization was solved through a new social practice and ideology structured around the pursuit of money, material comfort, and a higher standard of living through consumerism.[41] Mass consumption, as the necessary otherness of Taylorized mass production, was itself offered as the ultimate justification for the rationalization of labor.[42] The new life styles were of a middle class

41. The best source for this observation is the Lynds' *Middletown, op.cit.*; and Stein, *The Eclipse of Community, op.cit.*, which is a fine and methodologically unique interpretation of this universal process as it was worked out in concrete American communities in the twentieth century; Leo Lowenthal, "The Triumph of Mass Idols," *Literature, Popular Culture and Society* (Palo Alto, 1968), pp. 109-140; and C. Wright Mills, *White Collar* (New York, 1951), pp. 215-286.

42. Stein, in his analysis of this transformation, puts it this way: "Mass production and mass consumption appear as interrelated phases in a recurrent cycle so that motivation to perform roles demanded by the former is maintained by providing access to goods which are prerequisites for desired life styles." *Eclipse of Community, op.cit.*, p. 51.

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character: social privatization (symbolizing freedom), consumerism, occupational mobility, and an increasing standard of living. The traditional institutions of the industrial occupational community—the occupational peer group, the extended home, the lodge, the tavern—lost their *raison d'être* with the spreading of cultural Taylorism. For instance, people would still attend taverns (now called bars or lounges), but normally as strangers or couples seeking privacy, entertainment, or transient relationships and not as occupational peers reproducing their relationship to the world of work.[43]

Aside from the skilled workers (who lost much more than they gained), the mass of unskilled industrial workers did not disparage over this tendency, since reduced work time and a higher standard of living were no doubt seen as improvements over the hardships which previously beset the occupational community. Moreover, through consumerism the worker was able to shed his fetishized status as wage-laborer and to partake in the private comforts and privileges of Veblen's leisure class. The political significance of these developments is that, while consumerism represents a new mode of class hegemony and legitimation, it is popularly perceived as mobility and increased freedom.

In addition to higher wages and consumerism, reduced work time was one of Taylorism's "pay-offs" and a necessary condition for the consumption of the shoddy goods provided by mass production. During the period 1850 to the First World War, the hours worked per week ranged between 55 and 80 (depending on industry and occupation). In the modern period following the Second World War, the average hours worked per week by all employees has hovered around 40.[44] It is no coincidence that the big drop in the work week—from a maximum of 80 hours to an average of 40—occurred between the two world wars. This is precisely the period of the transition from competitive to monopoly capitalism, from limited production to planned mass production, from the occupational communities of the early industrial working class to the consumer leisure of the mass industrial laborer. And as industrial output has increased since the Second World War, other gains have been made in free time, including longer vacations and more holidays. The current standard vacation period for most employees is two weeks with pay, while many have up to three and sometimes four week vacations after 15 years of service in some industries (auto, steel) and government institutions.[45] In summary, one estimate of the total gain in free time since the 1870s is around 800 hours annually, roughly one month out of twelve.[46]

These transformations also shifted the function of working class labor

43. See Cavan, *Liquor License, op.cit.* Cavan covered a good many San Francisco bars and observed an anonymity and transiency among most of the clientele.

44. Geoffrey H. Moore and Janice N. Hedges, "Trends in Labor and Leisure," *Monthly Labor Review* (February, 1971), p. 4; and Grazia, *Of Time, Work, and Leisure* (New York, 1964), p. 63.

45. Richard Kraus, *Recreation and Leisure in Modern Society* (New York, 1971), p. 310. There are now six paid holidays which fall on Fridays or Mondays, thus giving six extended three-day weekends.

46. Moore and Hedges, "Trends in Labor and Leisure," *op.cit.*, p. 6.

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organizations.[47] As the composition of the industrial labor force changed from craft and unskilled workers to semiskilled workers, the craft associations, the lodges and the primary groups of the occupational community gave way to the highly-bureaucratized, mass industrial union (the CIO, and later, the AFL-CIO), which itself came to play an instrumental role in the further integration of workers into the new consumer priorities and political hegemony of corporate capitalism. The post-war pattern of union-corporate relations, with the assistance of federal law, have stabilized and cemented the positions of big business and big labor. Relinquishing traditional issues of shop floor control and repressing or eliminating leftist leaders, most mass unions have come to define their objectives in terms of quantitative increases in material benefits. This union organization complemented, rather than conflicted with, the corporations' own goals. Other measures were undertaken to stabilize the new mutual interest of capital and labor: long-term contracts assure the corporations of known wage costs which facilitate long-range planning, while unions benefit through short-range economic security which facilitates their own domestic plans for saving, credit-buying, and consumption; the extensive use of grievance procedures and arbitration protects firms against unauthorized strikes and work stoppages, while arbitration procedures guarantee the formal resolution of differences through compromise and negotiation within the national consensus.

The culmination, then, of these trends is the work-place atomization of the worker and the cultural devaluation of work as a source of values, social relations, and intrinsic satisfactions.[48] Occupational communities, which sought to defend and ameliorate the conditions of early industrial employment, were undermined by the atomization of the worker at the work-place, higher wages, consumerism, and reduced work time. Labor ceased to have a determinant influence on the experience of daily life and gave way to the private gratifications of family life and consumerism. The

47. See Tronti, "Workers and Capital," *op.cit.*; and Lens, *The Labor Wars, op.cit.*

48. Our theme of social atomization at the workplace must, however, be qualified in two senses: (1) Numerous observations indicate on-going attempts to recreate primary group relations and play forms on the shop floor: see Bill Watson, "Counterplanning on the Shop Floor," *Radical America*, 5:3 (May-June, 1971), pp. 77-85; Lloyd Street, "Game Forms in the Factory Group," *Berkeley Journal of Sociology*, 4 (Summer, 1958), pp. 44-55; and Donald F. Roy, "Banana Time: Job Satisfaction and Informal Interaction," *The Social Dimensions of Work*, ed. Clifton Bryant (New York, 1972), pp. 374-389. (2) The "human relations" approach of Elton Mayo has attempted to reintroduce new forms of primary group relations. In the 1930s and 1940s, following the introduction of Taylorism, it came to be realized that Taylorist rationalization had reached its maximum in raising productivity. From his Hawthorne experiments at the South Chicago Western Electric plant, Mayo and his associates discovered that primary group relations and external attention raised the production of the experimental groups. The practical lesson for management was clear: reintroduce primary group relations, but not, however, between workers, just between management and workers. Practically, this meant that management should socialize more with the workers, pat them on the back, be their friends and equals, stress cooperative team relations, offer counseling and guidance services, and the like. See Elton Mayo, *The Social Problem of Industrial Civilization* (Cambridge, 1945); and Daniel Bell's good commentary, "Work and its Discontents: The Cult of Efficiency in America," *The End of Ideology* (New York, 1965), pp. 227-274.

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worker, while more reified than before because of Taylorism, tolerated and was even "satisfied" with his work so long as it provided the money to enjoy a new "middle class" way of life outside the work place during the newly-gained leisure time.[49]

Thus, it is misleading to interpret workers' satisfaction with their Taylorized jobs as an indication of nonalienation, for they have come to symbolically define their satisfaction in terms of monetary rather than occupational freedom and the enjoyment of consumerism rather than labor.[50]

The point is that the class experience of work no longer contributes to the constitution of most employees' consciousness as it did for the early industrial, pre-Taylorized worker. With respect to leisure, work has lost its former centrality and fetishization and what employees do in their free time is generally unrelated to the nature of their employment. One of the great cultural transformations of the twentieth century is the disappearance of traditional forms of industrial working class leisure and the emergence of socially-privatized leisure related to the products of the consumer industries.[51] This transformation began in the 1920s and 1930s and is only

49. Studies on the meaning of work among modern employees bear out these assertions. In Dubin's classic article on industrial worker's central life interests, he describes how work is evaluated only in terms of income with no opportunity for deriving satisfaction either from the performance of skill or the comradeship of primary work groups. For Dubin's industrial workers, central life interests were located in a home-centered life and high levels of material consumption. Tausky similarly reports that the worker's relationship to his labor is via income, and not as a class experience in a social sense, which can also be characterized as reflecting a "consumer role" orientation. See Robert Dubin, "Industrial Worker's World," *Mass Leisure*, ed. Eric Larrabbee and Rolf Meyersohn (New York, 1958), pp. 215-228; Curt Tausky, "Meanings of Work among Blue Collar Men," *Pacific Sociological Review*, 12:1 (Spring, 1969), pp. 49-55; Robert S. Weiss and Robert L. Kahn, "Definitions of Work and Occupation," *Social Problems*, 8:2 (Fall, 1960), pp. 142-151; David C. Thorns, "Work and its Definition," *Sociological Review*, 19:4 (November, 1971), pp. 543-555; John H. Goldthorpe, *et al.*, *The Affluent Worker in the Class Structure* (London, 1969); and Joseph Harry, "Work and Leisure: Situational Attitudes," *Pacific Sociological Review*, 14:3 (July, 1971), pp. 301-309. Other types of sources and data include actual studies of the work place, e.g., Ed George and Jeff Paul, "Work in America: The Rubber Factory," *Radical America*, 6:2 (March-April, 1972), pp. 108-120; community studies, e.g., Bennett Berger, *Working Class Suburb* (Berkeley, 1968); and oral reportage, e.g., Studs Terkel, *Working* (New York, 1974). The contemporary sources for the substantiation of this theme are endless and this listing is only suggestive rather than comprehensive.

50. This point is underscored by Elinor Langer in her participant observation of work relations and meanings among the women employees of the New York Phone Company. As she puts it: "What the pressures of food, shelter, education, or medical costs contribute to their need to work I cannot tell, but it seems to me the women are largely trapped by their love of objects. What they think they need in order to survive and what they endure in order to attain it is astonishing. . . . I think that the household appliances play a real role in the women's family lives: helping them to run their homes smoothly and in keeping with a (to them) necessary image of inefficiency and elegance. As for the clothes and the wigs, I think they are a kind of tax, a tribute exacted by the social pressures of the work-place. For the preservation of their own egos against each other and against the system, they had to feel confident of their appearance on each and every day. Outside work they needed it too: to keep up, to keep their men, not to fall behind." "The Women of the Phone Company," New England Free Press reprint, originally published in *The New York Review of Books* 14: 5 & 6 (March 12 & 26, 1970).

51. In Alain Touraine's words, "Whether it is material or non-material culture, socio-economic groups tend to define themselves more and more by their degree of participation

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now reaching its completion. For instance, in the 1930s, Lundberg concluded from his survey of the leisure activities of suburban Westchester County, New York, that "Leisure and recreation are indeed to a large extent coming to be regarded as commodities to be purchased rather than as experiences to be lived."[52] While this applied more to the middle class and skilled workers than to the larger stratum of unskilled workers, it indicates the beginnings of a trend which would eventually encompass the entire working class, once their traditional occupational communities had broken up and they had the financial means and time to participate in the new national consumer culture.

Today, family-grounded consumer forms of leisure have become predominant:[53] mass media viewing, vacations, camping, sports, outdoor recreation, and the like, are no longer a function of a class experience of work but are instead programmed by diverse and aggressive businesses whose primary aim is to successfully market their products. The eclipse of class experience also reintegrates the employee around new forms of exchange generally perceived as private, existential freedom and material comfort. The political result of this transformation is a qualitative change in the cultural character of the working class and an obsolescence of traditional conceptions of class consciousness. Since the 1930s, working class politics have been contained within specific institutional and ideological frameworks which organize class behavior around capital's priorities:[54] the workers' pursuit of higher income and consumerism is but the reflection of capital's own drive towards expansion and political hegemony. Thus, it comes as no surprise that since the 1930s, "revolts against work" have primarily dealt with monetary and status issues, such as adequate security and income which allows the

in the activities and products of the culture, and less and less by possession of a subculture different from others. Social roles and cultural roles are more and mor separate: categories like neighbor, skilled worker, native of a particular region, no longer explain the television viewer, the reader of the mass circulated paper, the automobile owner." *The Post-Industrial Society, op.cit.*, pp. 196-197.

52. George Lundberg, Mirra Komarovsky, and Mary A. McInerny, *Leisure: A Suburban Study* (New York, 1934), p. 85.

53. Most studies of employees and their leisure, as well as everyday observation, bear out this assertion. See, for example, A.W. Bacon, "Leisure and the Alienated Worker: A Critical Reassessment of Three Radical Theories of Work and Leisure," *Journal of Leisure Research*, 7:3 (1975), pp. 179-190; Herbert Gans, *The Levittowners* (New York, 1967); Bennett Berger, *Working-Class Suburb*, *op.cit.*; Charles Anderson and Milton Gordon, "The Blue-Collar Worker at Leisure," *Blue-Collar World*, ed. Arthur B. Shostak and William Gomberg (Engelwood Cliffs, 1964), pp. 407-416; Peter Etzkorn, "Leisure and Camping: The Social Meaning of a Form of Public Recreation," *Sociology and Social Research*, 49 (October, 1964), pp. 76-89; and Thomas W. Martin and Kenneth J. Berry, "Competitive Sport in Post-Industrial Society: The Case of the Motocross Racer," *Journal of Popular Culture* (Summer, 1974), pp. 107-120.

54. A good account of this qualitative transformation in the labor movement is Lens, *The Labor Wars, op.cit.*, pp. 376-400. A related, and politically significant, trend is that as workers' occupational and working class communities declined with industrial Taylorism and corporate monopolization, cultural associations and primary group leisure among the capitalist-managerial class have increased. On the latter, see G. William Domhoff, *The Bohemian Grove and Other Retreats* (New York, 1974).

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desired life styles of non-work freedom and consumerism, rather than the control over production or the quality of work relationships. With consumerism constituting the new integrating and cohesive ideology of advanced capitalist society, it is no wonder that labor issues and industrial democracy, not to speak of socialism, have ceased to be determinant influences on modern consciousness and culture.

The New Working Class

A final process affecting labor and our theme, which emerges from the on-going rationalization of modern production, is the increase in importance of skilled, college-trained, technical and professional workers. This occurs through the use and further development of technology and scientific knowledge as productive forces and the greater need for administrative coordination and management. The growth of a technical and professional labor stratum has given birth to various theories which claim that these workers constitute a new revolutionary class in advanced capitalist societies.[55]

In Mallet's version of the "new working class," a new occupational stratum of skilled workers is created by automated productive processes in the advanced energy industries and tele-communications. The cost of labor power is no longer an important factor in capital accumulation because investment is concentrated in machine-intensive production, such as automation, which is capable of yielding surplus value greater than that of labor power. The new working class in these advanced industries is composed of skilled technicians, engineers, and scientists. In contrast to the semiskilled workers of mass production industries, the new workers are better educated, have a broad, holistic understanding of the production process, and perform supervisory and maintenance functions. Their labor power consists primarily in the application of scientific and technical knowledge rather than physical energy or force. Also, the automated and continuous-process technological environments necessitate team operations, and a greater interdependence among technical workers. Finally, Mallet observes that the new technology, the new work skills, and the new social interdependence among workers leads to the formation of a new type of labor organization, one which is based in the firm or enterprise rather than the occupation, and tends to focus its interests on questions of work quality, the performance of the firm, and control over production.

55. The industrial and political theory of a new working class has its origins in distinct, perhaps unique, industrial and political trends in France: see Serge Mallet, *Essays on the New Working Class, op. cit.*, and his "The Class Struggle: Death and Transfiguration at Caltex," *Work and Community in the West, op. cit.*, pp. 122-138; and Alain Touraine, "An Historical Theory in the Evolution of Industrial Skills," *op. cit.*, and his *The May Movement* (New York, 1971). In America, the theory has assumed a different version, paying less attention to technical industrial workers (the French focus primarily) and much more to students and educated labor generally, and professional public service workers particularly. For American versions, see Richard Flacks, "Young Intelligentsia in Revolt," *Transaction*, 7:8 (June, 1970), pp. 47-55. For a more direct evaluation of the French version in the American context, see Stanley Aronowitz, "Does the United States Have a New Working Class?" *The Revival of American Socialism*, ed. George Fisher (New York, 1971), pp. 188-216.

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The major theme in Mallet's theory, on which pivot new Marxian theories of change, is the assertion that, due to the high degree of technical competence, work is revived as a central life interest in the worker's consciousness. In addition, a new "shop floor" contradiction emerges, not around issues of exploitation, but around the conflict between the new workers' expertise and the superfluous authority of managerial elites. Often argued as a solution to the crisis of Marxism, the theory of the new working class revives the idea of class and work-place contradictions as the central locus of potential radicalization.

In America, it is clear that, on the whole, and in contrast to semiskilled workers in mass production industries, technical and professional workers do have a greater interest in work *per se*.[56] But most American research indicates that these workers do not tend, on the whole, to form distinct occupational communities nor does the new labor contradiction necessarily come into open conflict with the authority of the bureaucratic hierarchies. The evidence further suggests that technical and professional workers have generally accepted the dominant cultural norms whereby the appropriate domain for self-realization and satisfaction lies in extra-work activities and consumerism rather than occupation. For them, as for the mass industrial worker, an occupation is perceived as a means for private freedom and desired consumer life styles outside of work.

The revival of work as a new interest, plus the team-work character of some technical and professional work organizations, has contradictory tendencies for the formation of occupational communities. In the case of Blauner's chemical workers in continuous flow industries, the principle of community formation is less that of occupation than it is an identification with the company or organization (a finding similar to Mallet's).[57] Unlike the skilled craft worker of olden days who developed his community along corporatist lines of craft, the new scientific and technical worker in automated and continuous-flow industries tends to identify with the firm in question. This is due to the nature of the work which generally consists more of supervisory and maintenance functions than the application of some particular skill. But while a community of sorts is formed within the organization, Blauner gave no indication that this either resulted in some form of association or union, or that it influenced leisure.

However, research on other advanced work settings—such as aerospace, research and development laboratories, and the like—indicates that the work of technical and professional employees is much more bureaucratized and

56. See Blauner, *Alienation and Freedom, op.cit.*, pp. 124-165; and Louis H. Orzack, "Work as a Central Life Interest of Professionals," *Social Problems*, 7:2 (Fall 1959), pp. 125-132. For contradictory evidence, see Terkel, *Working, op.cit.*

57. Blauner, *Alienation and Freedom, op.cit.*, p. 155. Blauner's results, however, while applicable to the chemical industry he studied, were found not to be as generalizable to other continuous-flow industries in the study by Gerald I. Susman, "Process Design, Automation, and Worker Alienation," *Industrial Relations*, 11:1 (February, 1972), pp. 34-45.

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organized around Taylorist principles.[58] An important point is that in America, perhaps in contrast to France, the majority of technicians and professionals (engineers and scientists) tend to be employed by large, production-oriented corporations rather than in continuous-flow industries, due in large part to the needs for research and development in both consumer goods and military hardware markets. In these corporate organizations, the scientist or engineer, for instance, finds it difficult to operate in a "free" professional manner.[59] Further, the above research bears out that, while the scientific worker may give an occasional paper to a professional society (but only if cleared by his employers so as to protect trade secrets) or attend an occasional professional meeting, on the whole he or she tends to compartmentalize the work experience from personal and community activities. American colleges and universities play a significant role in this form of socialization. While the university may once have been the place for socialization into the values and expectations of occupational competence and autonomy, increasingly it emphasizes mechanized skills, conformity to authority, and the derivation of satisfaction through extra-occupational status and consumerism.[60] Finally, American scientists and engineers in the productive sector have generally rejected any form of unionism (with some exceptions) to advance either occupational or company interests, and appear to be content with the privileges which separate them from blue collar production workers. Their privileged status in the firm (high salaries and realistic chances for managerial promotion), notwithstanding periodic layoffs, tend to mute the perception of conflict or enable them to at least tolerate it in their Taylorized jobs.

As for the professional public service workers, the tendencies—with some exceptions—are generally the same as those for their counterparts in corporate firms. On the whole, the organizational setting of the administrator, the teacher, the social worker, and the like, is highly bureaucratized with specialization and work isolation the norm.[61] Insofar as the contradiction

58. See, for instance, George Miller, "Professionals in Bureaucracy: Alienation Among Industrial Scientists and Engineers," *American Sociological Review* 32:5 (October, 1967), pp. 755-768.

59. Howton reports that the scientific research worker finds it difficult to establish satisfying and potentially helpful work relationships and becomes increasingly estranged from the work itself. As a result, he turns to organizational politics, personal withdrawal, or resignation (i.e., quitting) as means of coping with the situation. William F. Howton, "Assignment and Interpersonal Relations in a Research Organization," *Administrative Science Quarterly* 7:4 (March, 1963), pp. 502-520. Perrucci and Gerstl have gone so far as to label American engineers a "profession without community" on the basis of their research of industry-employed engineers. Robert Perrucci and Joel Gerstl, *Profession Without Community: Engineers in American Society* (New York, 1969).

60. On the status and consumer socializing tendency of the schools and colleges, see Ivan Illich, "Schooling: The Ritual of Progress," *In the Marketplace: Consumerism in America*, ed. Ramparts Magazine with Frank Browning (New York, 1972), pp. 229-245.

61. Professional public service work is governed, not on the basis of professional authority and knowledge, but on the basis of the authority of administrative hierarchies which is as subject to the pressures of efficiency, "production," and cost-accounting as their corporate counterparts. The case of the social worker is typical: located on a low level of power the social worker is

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between professionalism and managerial authority, as well as traditional labor-capital issues, generate any political organization, they tend to take the form of either industrial unions (as in the American Federation of Teachers) around monetary and working condition issues, or client advocacy for reform of the servicing organization.[62] In these cases, the performance of an occupation is revived as an interest, but typically deals with the conditions necessary for that performance (wages and job security), like that of the semiskilled industrial worker, or with the conditions necessary for adequate services for their clients. The latter issue tends to be more in line with new working class theories, but has evidenced distinct political limitations in America. That is, client advocacy, through strikes or other collective measures, has not begun to come to grips with the real center of power in America: the interdependency between corporations and the state.

The teacher rebellion of the last decade, for instance, is a revolt against their dependent status in the schools and poor educational delivery systems (in addition to salary issues), and has often demanded participation in school policy-making to determine the conditions of work, the nature and quality of educational programs, and fiscal matters. However, no teacher strike or organization in America has come anywhere close to linking the problems of educational workers to the larger processes and priorities of the corporate state. Teachers, as well as other active public service professionals, have not analyzed the problems of their organizations in terms of the expansion and capital requirements of corporate development as mediated by the government, and its relation to the fiscal crisis of governmental or public service organizations. And as if to give credence to the dominant social tendency which values money higher than work, at the end of negotiated strikes, the majority of teachers are willing to settle for higher salaries, better working conditions, job security, and perhaps an advisory function in the policy process.

In other words, as in the case of the mass industrial worker, the professional worker tends to submit to dominant cultural norms which view occupation as only instrumental to private and consumer ends. Why should the technical and professional worker struggle against the "new working class" contradictions of the work place when the entire structure and culture of America is

responsible to an ascending hierarchy which tends to manipulate the professional worker for the preservation of the status quo. While this kind of professional job may allow greater physical movement and sociability among work cohorts, there is little room for innovation and responsibility and little evidence for the formation of distinct occupational cultures. While work may be more intrinsically satisfying than it is for the mass industrial worker, it nonetheless does not tend to become an end in itself in terms of organizational or after-work activities. See, for instance, Mark Abrahamson, ed., *The Professional in the Organization* (Chicago, 1967); Abraham S. Blumberg, "The Practice of Law as Confidence Game: Organizational Cooptation of a Profession," *Law and Society Review*, 1:2 (June, 1967), pp. 15-40; and Harry Wasserman, "The Professional Social Worker in a Bureaucracy," *Social Work*, 16:1 (January, 1971), pp. 89-96.

62. See Stephen Cole, *The Unionization of Teachers: A Case Study of the UFT* (New York, 1970); and Joel Gerstl and Glenn Jacobs, *Professions for the People: The Politics of Skill* (Cambridge, 1974).

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organized around the theme that it is for the sake of money and consumption that one sells labor power? And, as a final critical point, we may add that the American technical and professional worker lacks the cultural institutions of the occupational community through which it could forge a larger unity on both the local and national level. One conclusion from our analysis of the early industrial working class is that the leap from objective contradictions to political action is never automatic: it must be mediated by the reproduction of primary group ties in various associational forms in the free space of leisure. But the organization of the American employee's leisure around private consumption inhibits the development of a cultural infrastructure necessary for broad political action.

In conclusion, the transition to monopoly capitalist society tends to shift the source of social relations, culture, and ideology from a class culture of work to a mass culture of consumerism. American society is neither entering a "post-industrial stage" nor becoming a "society of leisure," but rather, the dialectic of modern capitalist development reintegrates individuals around new forms of commodity exchange and fetishism. This trend is facilitated by the fragmentation of traditional bonds of social interdependence (those of class). In cultural terms, this trend has been interpreted as a shift from a daily class experience, rooted in occupational communities and functionally related to the labor fetishism of early capitalism, to a relative social privatization of daily existence rooted in the family and mediated by a mass consumer culture provided by corporate institutions. Through this process, the working class has lost its culture-defining character as wage labor: the dialectical reproduction of their labor in the free space of unreified leisure. The world of class, and all that it meant in terms of labor experience, leisure, and political action, has been eclipsed.

Thus, if we are to understand and critically relate to modern American employees in terms of the dominant processes which shape their social relations, consciousness, and ideological legitimation, we must look at what occurs in consumer relations and in a privatized leisure and familial existence more so than in labor relations. The public's political response, then, to the crisis of contemporary capitalism (however that is thematized) cannot be understood as a class response in the traditional sense. The problems of recession, inflation, and the beginnings of a trend to cut back on consumer goods production, for instance, will be confronted in terms of consumer deprivation rather than labor fetishism. It is as a private consumer and intimate family member that the present crisis is experienced, not as a problem of labor exploitation. If there is to be a political response, then, to the crisis, it will be either to defend what has been gained or to transcend the entanglements of the modern commodity fetishism. With the crisis most directly affecting domestic consumerism, the basis for a new cultural and political dialectic may be emerging, thus paving the way for the possibilities of new forms of ideological discourse and action. In these new forms, however, traditional theories of class will play no significant role.

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SOCIOLOGY OF MUSIC: ADORNO AND BEYOND

by W. V. Blomster

> "All music—even that which in terms of style is the most highly individualistic—is indisputably vested with a collective content: every single sound says 'we'."[1]

The forthcoming publication of Adorno's *Sociology of Music* in English constitutes a significant event.[2] It further indicates that the time has come to comment on the present state of the sociology of music. This is necessitated by the continuing German monopoly and almost total indifference in the United States. Since Adorno dominated this branch of sociology for three and one-half decades, it is appropriate to ask, half a dozen years after his death, whether there are any new directions in musico-sociological thought.[3]

*Since the completion of this manuscript, three significant new publications have appeared: Vladimir Karbusicky, *Empirische Musiksoziologie* (Wiesbaden, 1975); Wolfgang Martin Stroh. *Zur Soziologie der elektronischen Musik* (Berg-Zurich, 1975); and Martin Elste. *Verzeichnis deutschsprachiger Musiksoziologie 1848-1973* (Hamburg, 1975). A bibliography in two volumes.

1. Theodor W. Adorno, "Ideen zur Musiksoziologie," in *Klangfiguren* (Berlin and Frankfurt, 1959), p. 23.

2. Seabury Press originally announced publication in 1975, but apparently March 1976 has been set as the date for the appearance of the book. Readers will no doubt approach this study with divergent amounts of background knowledge. For basic information and orientation, the following references are offered: Jameson's chapter on Adorno in *Marxism and Form: Twentieth Century Dialectical Theories of Literature* (Princeton, 1971) is particularly concise and coherent; Weitzman's article, "An Introduction to Adorno's Music and Social Criticism," in *Music and Letters* 52:3 (July, 1971), pp. 287-298, offers a basic evaluation of Adorno's work within sociology of music; Fehér's essay, "Negative Philosophy of Music—Positive Results," *New German Critique* 4 (Winter, 1975), pp. 99-111, is significant in its consideration of Adorno and Lukács and, further, because it provides the perspective of the non-musician on music; Robert Craft's review, "A Bell for Adorno," in *Prejudices in Disguise* (New York, 1974), pp. 91-102, of the English translation of Adorno's *Philosophy of Modern Music* is an honest effort to make practical sense of this book, although Craft's superficial cleverness is at times more disturbing than Adorno's depth; and, finally, for a thorough scholarly footing in the aesthetics of the Frankfurt School, Martin Jay's book, *The Dialectical Imagination: A History of the Frankfurt School and the Institute of Social Research 1923-1950* (Boston, 1973), is indispensable.

3. Adorno's accomplishment is recognized even by those who are critical of him. Cf. Tibor Kneif, "Gegenwartsfragen der Musiksoziologie," in *Acta Musicologica* 5:38 (1966), p. 109, who writes: "The critical illumination of present-day musical life is the goal of almost all of Adorno's works. Their significance for sociology of music is enhanced by the fact that they demonstrate the methods of sociology of music applied to the state of affairs of a given time, permitting this state to manifest itself as the necessary course of dialectical thought." Elsewhere, Kneif reaches the following conclusion: "The high official regard enjoyed by the sociology of music goes back to Adorno's influence." Cf. Kneif, "Der Gegenstand musiksoziologischer Erkenntnis," *Texte zur Musiksoziologie* (henceforth cited as *Texte*), Tibor Kneif, ed., with a foreword by Carl Dahlhaus (Cologne, 1975), p. 77. Cf. also Hans-Klaus Jungheinrich, "Musik und Realismus—Einige

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Since Arnold Schoenberg is of major importance in the musical thought of Adorno, it is tempting to comment on the present state of the sociology of music by allusion to Schoenberg's major work, the fragmentary opera *Moses and Aaron*: the field has been blessed with intelligent and dedicated leadership, motivated by an often visionary view, but entrance into the Promised Land has not yet been gained. Indeed, at the present moment, disillusionment with the discipline and the disarray of thought within it question the very fertility of this land which remains strangely barren dispite the intense intellectual irrigation it has enjoyed for more than half a century.

The account offered here is essentially descriptive; the central focus on Adorno and his work in the sociology of music offers continuity in the face of the confusion and lack of agreement—even on such basic questions as subject matter and methodology—which presently characterize the field. Following introductory remarks concerned with a definition of sociology of music and commentary on the American attitude towards it, the genesis of Adorno's work in the field is outlined. Subsequent sections deal with specific problems with which sociology of music is concerned: the ambiguity of art which is particularly pronounced in music; the relation of form and content; and the relationship between music and society in terms of conditioning and reflection. Brief commentary is offered on the foundation provided for future work in the sociology of music by Max Weber and on the efforts of the two major figures of the current senior generation of sociologists concerned with music, Kurt Blaukopf and Alphons Silbermann. Two twentieth-century composers whose work remains largely unknown today are currently the subject of great interest among the younger generation of sociologists of music: Hanns Eisler and Joseph Mattias Hauer; the basis for the present positive evaluation of their efforts is defined in the penultimate section of this study. Following a review of the particularly negative criticism of Adorno's work by Konrad Boehmer, an energetic young writer concerned with every genre of musical expression, the investigation concludes with speculation on future developments in the sociology of music.

This study is designed essentially as a *Forschungsbericht*, offering within its scope as detailed a picture of the sociology of music at the present moment as possible. A large amount of material is included in the notes for those who might wish to pursue particular aspects of this field further. I do not attempt to offer a sociology of music which might be called my own, nor do I take issue with the many voices which address themselves to the subject in the pages which follow. I view this presentation rather as a loosely constructed dialogue between Adorno and other major figures in musico-sociological thought, which would grow less coherent through the superimposition of such an additional dimension.

Aspekte bei Hanns Eisler" in *Musik zwischen Engagement und Kunst* (henceforth cited as *Engagement*), (Vienna, 1972), p. 72, where he states that to Adorno "we undoubtedly owe more insights into the artistic-sociological aspects of reality than to all the others who have reflected upon music in the twentieth century."

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Although the problem of a Marxist perspective upon the relation between music and society is explicitly present at several junctures in this study and implicitly involved at numerous other points, this is not an attempt to study sociology of music in its relation to Marxism. Nor is the question of Adorno's indebtedness to Marxist aesthetics and thought posed here; it has rather been my wish to respect Adorno's own desire to be viewed as himself, resisting vehemently and often bitterly the attempts to assign him and his work to a given category.

The Sociology of Music and American Sociology

It is necessary to indicate at the outset why the sociology of music remains to this day essentially a German science.[4] First of all, music has always played a dominant role in German life, be that within the refined realm of thinkers and writers, or in the sheer quantity of music produced and consumed in the German-speaking countries. Secondly, as Etzkorn has pointed out, the practice of sociology differs significantly between Europe and America: "The history of sociology in North America is more recent and tends to be distinct from earlier European traditions. . . . As far as the main trends of sociological research are concerned, far less emphasis on speculation on a grand scale is found in North American sociology than in the European tradition, and studies in the sociology of music are no different."[5]

4. The most comprehensive musical reference work in English, *Grove's Dictionary of Music and Musicians*, offers no entry under "sociology of music." The somewhat more modern *Harvard Dictionary of Music* devotes four columns to the subject—a significant amount for a one-volume work—but it is the bibliography which is revealing. Of the thirty-two items listed, twenty-three are either in German or translations of German texts. The non-German items include A.R. Oliver's *The Encyclopedists as Critics of Music* and A. Lost's *Musicians' Guild and Union,* along with A. Loesser's *Men, Women, and Pianos*—a delightful, but hardly profound, work. These titles underscore the necessity of a distinction between sociology of music and social history of music, in which category these three books more properly belong. *Music and Society* found early use as a title in this country in 1938. Opinion of Elie Siegmeister's slender volume by that title (New York, 1938) is mixed. Silbermann, in his *Sociology of Music,* trans. Corbert Stewart (London, 1963), p. 55, calls the book "promising" in its attempt to prove that music—like all other manifestation of spiritual and artistic activity—is influenced by the tensions and circumstances of society."

5. K. Peter Etzkorn, "On Music, Social Structure and Sociology," in *International Review of Aesthetics and the Sociology of Music* (henceforth cited as *IRASM*) 6:1 (1975), p. 45. Etzkorn's introduction to *Music and Society: The Later Writings of Paul Honigsheim* (New York, 1963) is the finest account on sociology of music which I have encountered in English. The present study is offered as a counterpart to this introduction. J. Allan Seegle also pointed out an essential difference between American and German sociology: "The large issues and questions—those requiring comparative historical evidence drawn from all cultures and epochs—interested Honigsheim most. In his view, most American sociologists knew nothing of history and were excessively preoccupied with statistics. . . . Paul Honigsheim joined the staff of the Department of Sociology at Michigan State University in 1938 at a time when applied interests were dominant. Most of the staff members at that time were rural sociologists with appointments in the Agricultural Experiment Station, or were interested in social work." *Music and Society,* p. vii. Honigsheim, who matured in the aura of Max Weber's Heidelberg, would have been a breath of fresh air in this environment. (It sould also be recalled that Honigsheim, upon fleeing from Cologne, was for a time in charge of the Paris branch of the Institute of Social Research.) Tibor Kneif, today's leading sociologist of music, put it as follows: "Non-German literature offers hardly anything worthy of note on methodological questions in sociology of music. In spite of the considerable activity of American and French sociologists in other fields, it seems that sociology

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The lack of interest in the sociology of music in the United States is tinged by irony in view of the very active years spent by Adorno in this country during and after the war. He engaged in officially-sponsored research on radio on the East Coast, wrote his book on film music with Hanns Eisler in Hollywood, and completed the manuscript of his most significant musical work, *The Philosophy of Modern Music* in California. This would seem sufficient for an intellectual passport into American thought. According to Jameson, however, the thought of Adorno and the Frankfurt School as a whole is alien to "the nondialectical Anglo-American tradition" and to "that mixture of political liberalism, empiricism, and logical positivism which we know as Anglo-American philosophy and which is hostile at all points to the type of thinking...found in Adorno."[6]

Given the largely unsystematic nature of the sociology of music, an effort must be made at this point to offer a preliminary definition of the discipline. Reduced to the simplest possible formulation, sociology of music is the study of the interrelation of music and society. According to Kneif, who can be seen as the major figure in the field at the present time, "in the last few years the total field of sociology of music has expanded and become internally differentiated to such a degree that it grows increasingly beyond the grasp of a single person. Therefore, the success of sociology of music will no doubt increase when the exchange of methods, the formulation of the most pressing themes and the coordination of individual investigations proceed from one central point. Musicology and sociology might then remain in constant communication with each other, rather than only at occasional points."[7]

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of music has not as yet even entered into their field of vision. In both countries the extra-scientific prerequisites of musico-sociological reflection are absent. Totally conservative public taste, determined by the satiated middle class audience and the lagging consciousness of the present on the part of composers—avant gardists such as Boulez are for all practical purposes part of German musical life—prevent the current tensions between creator and listener in the growing abyss between social and artistic development from rising fully to a level of consciousness. In such an idyllic and peaceful cultural climate sociology of music is either disfigured by the label 'imported goods,' which finds no demand on the local market—in the 1930's and 1940's emigrants were forced to recognize how little response there was to their work, based upon German musical life, in the United States—...or else sociological questioning, should it originate on native soil, degenerations into vague reflection of a belletristric nature upon every possible perspective of music and music-making." Kneif, "Gegenwartsfragen," *op. cit.*, p. 89.

6. Jameson, *op. cit.*, pp. x, xii.

7. Kneif, "Gegenwartsfragen," *op. cit.*, p. 117. Agreement concerning this "one central point" is, however, not within the present field of vision. Consequently, it is necessary to accept Kneif's definition of the current scope and composition of the field: "It is composed of all those statements brought together in the name of sociology of music." Cf. his *Musiksoziologie* (Cologne, 1975), p. 14. Even this definition results in ambiguity, for, according to Kneif, many people have made significant contributions to the field in ignorance of its existence, while others have proclaimed themselves practitioners of sociology of music with no proper understanding of its nature. The latter violation has been particularly common during the bull market in matters sociological throughout the past decade. Kneif further indicates the largely subjective nature of this discipline and its consequent attraction to a particular intellectual orientation: "Since sociology of music is a timely theory of music, it is a matter of interpretation and combination; it is a matter of personally-colored conceptions, in contrast to the mere disclosure of facts. It is always an individual achievement; therefore, individuals of a synthetic turn of mind are attracted to it." In "Gegenwartsfragen," *op. cit.*, p. 117.

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Since there is no agreement on this central point, it may be useful to provide an indication of several perspectives on it. Kneif suggests that "the goal of the sociology of music is the understanding of musical formations out of the social situation of a given time."[8] Blaukopf, in a somewhat broader view, finds that "the sociology of music attempts to understand the production and reproduction of music in relation to the historical processes of development of human society."[9] This insistence on the historical dimension is primary in the eyes of many. Concern for structure is emphasized by Serauky: "The sociology of music...must try to make a particular style of music comprehensible out of the social and cultural structure of an age and define its social prerequisites and significance."[10]

The time has come for a general concern with sociology of music in the United States. The "cultural boom" of recent years saw musical organizations flourish throughout a country which had hitherto experienced no greater blessing of the Muses than Lawrence Welk on television every Saturday evening. Yet, within a few years, the over-running cup seems to have been drained. Today, the nation's oldest and most distinguished orchestras have begun to consume their endowments and labor problems threaten the very existence of its major opera company. Yet, the average dormitory room is cluttered with costly components and a casette player has become almost as essential to automobiles as anti-freeze. Muzak envelops the supermarket shopper in sound—the word "music" is intentionally avoided—and loudspeakers carry it into the parking lot outside as well. Music confronts the populace everywhere; perhaps the listener's confrontation with it must become active.

The Genesis of Adorno's Musico-Sociological Thought

One of Adorno's first major works is the essay "On the Social Position of Music," published in 1932 in the very first volume of the *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung*.[11] This essay is significant in that it prefigures the later

8. *Ibid.*, p. 97.

9. Kurt Blaukopf, *Musiksoziologie: Eine Einführung in die Grundbegriffe mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der Tonsysteme* (Niederteufen, 1972), p. 8.

10. Walter Serauky, "Wesen und Aufgaben der Musiksoziologie," in *Texte*, p. 43.

11. Theodor W. Adorno, "Zur gesellschaftlichen Lage der Musik," *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung* 1 (1932), pp. 103-124 and pp. 356-378. In his commentary on the selection of the material contained in his anthology of readings in sociology of music, Kneif indicates that the inclusion of Adorno's "Ideas on the Sociology of Music" was a second choice: "To be sure, the more comprehensive essay...of 1932 is equally characteristic for Adorno's manner of thought, and, because of the remoteness of its place of original publication, would have been preferred here. ... Permission was not given, however, in harmony with the intentions of the deceased, who was relentlessly critical of it." Cf. *Texte, op. cit.*, p. 6. In a footnote to his own *Sociology of Music*, Adorno indicates the reason for his own critical attitude: "The shortcoming of this essay was that it totally identified the concept of musical production with the hegemony of the economic sphere of production without consideration of the degree to which that which is called musical production postulates social production and is, in turn, equally dependent upon it, while, at the same time, setting itself apart from it. This alone has resulted in the author's decision not to republish that treatise, the outline of a detailed sociology of music." Cf. Theodor W. Adorno, *Einleitung in die Musiksoziologie: Zwölf theoretische Vorlesungen*, enlarged edition

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Philosophy of Modern Music in many essential ways—including the dialectical juxtaposition of Schoenberg and Stravinsky on which the *Philosophy* is built—and contains further perspectives on music which Adorno later rejected. Of interest is Adorno's affection for Kurt Weill, the composer of *The Three Penny Opera*, a work still of revolutionary freshness in 1932. The essay would have provided an excellent introduction to the entire *Philosophy*.

Sziborsky recalls Adorno's own comment in his essay collection, *Stichworte*, that his *Philosophy of Modern Music* remains valid for all his later pronouncements on the subject, and "...for the *Introduction to the Sociology of Music* as well." Similarly, according to Adorno, the *Philosophy* is to be understood "as an extended appendix to the *Dialectic of the Enlightenment*," written with Max Horkheimer in 1947. The *Philosophy* and the *Dialectic* together, Sziborsky concludes, "occupy a central position within Adorno's philosophy; they communicate certain basic insights which are modified and supplemented, but, by and large, are never surpassed."[12]

At the outset of the *Sociology*, Adorno refers his reader to the earlier brief essay, "Ideas on a Sociology of Music," first published in 1958,[13] stating that in it he had "developed the principles of the sociology of music without separating them from questions of content; and it is precisely this that remains specific for his method and still binding for his approach to the sociology of music."[14] Adorno further refers to the brief treatise, "Theses on the Sociology of Art," published after the *Sociology* in 1965, stating that it forms an appropriate supplement to the book, for in it he takes issue with the wide-spread methodological disagreement within the field.[15]

in *Rowohlts deutsche Enzyklopädie* (Frankfurt, 1968), p. 235. At an earlier juncture in the *Sociology*, Adorno speaks less harshly of the work, calling it "the first major design of a sociology of music," and emphasizing its origin on the very eve of the advent of National Socialism, the essential character of which he had discerned in his early analysis of the music of Stravinsky. *Ibid.*, p. 75. Although the reason given above for Adorno's later rejection of this essay might seem exaggerated, it does contain a maxim stressed by the more perceptive minds at work on musico-sociological matters today: the processes in operation in the economic and artistic realms demonstrate certain similarities; they are, however, not identical. Sociology of music has suffered from simplistic analogies drawn between the two realms. The 1932 essay is missing from the volume on the sociology of music in the supposedly definitive edition of Adorno's *Gesammelte Schriften*, ed. by Rolf Tiedemann (Frankfurt, 1973). A further aspect of the 1932 essay which I should like to stress is the fact that Max Weber's *Rational and Social Foundations of Music*—although written in 1911—had been in print for only a decade at the time of Adorno's publication. This emphasizes the pioneering spirit of a man who at that time had not yet reached thirty years of age. Anyone wishing to do full justice to Adorno's sociology of music will have to deal with this work.

12. Lucia Sziborsky, "Das Problem des Verstehens und der Begriff der 'Adäquanz' bei Th. W. Adorno," in *Musik und Verstehen*, ed. by Peter Faltin and Hans-Peter Reinecke (Cologne, 1973), p. 289. (This volume is an anthology of essays which bring music under the focus of semiotics.) The actual content, in contrast to methodology, of Adorno's sociology of music, in the eyes of Gertrud Berger, lies in those essays collected in 1956 in the volume *Dissonanzen* (Göttingen). The historical-dialectical goal of these earlier essays is then defined and developed in the *Sociology* itself. Cf. Berger, "Die historische Dimension im musikphilosophischen Denken von Andreas Liess und Th. W. Adorno," in *IRMAS* 2:1 (1971), pp. 5-35.

13. In *Klangfiguren*, *op. cit.*

14. *Einleitung in die Musiksoziologie*, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 7.

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Adorno himself was adamant on regarding philosophy as a necessary component of a meaningful sociology of music.[16] He was particularly disturbed by what he viewed as "Silbermann's elimination of the philosophic dimension" from the field, pointing out: "Sociology originated in philosophy; it needs it yet today. If it is not to become a totally non-conceptual enterprise, it needs the type of reflection and speculation which originated in philosophy."[17] In 1932, Adorno delivered a challenge to music which remains valid today: "Music must become cognition."[18] Yet, although Adorno was ever on guard against efforts to employ music as the vehicle for an ideology, it is possible that his own musico-sociological thought tends strongly in that direction.

Focht has recently offered a summary outline of the development of Adorno's concept of music, according to which a full circle is manifested. In his earliest work, Adorno understood music as the reflection of social discrepancies; this was followed by a period in which he viewed music as cognition and subsequently as 'expression" or even "language." In a third phase music became "a spiritual entity sui generis;" in his final years he returned to his original attitude towards it.[19]

16. The most widely-accepted view is that Adorno's work embodies a modern manifestation of the Hegelian dialectic. Cf. Otto Karl Werckmeister, "Der Kunstwerk als Negation: Zur Kunsttheorie Theodor W. Adornos," in *Die neue Linke nach Adorno*, ed. Wilfried F. Schoeller (Munich, 1969), pp. 91-117. However, Gertrud Berger, analyzing the historical dimension of Adorno's work in the philosophy of music, insists that the essential orientation is outspokenly Kantian (*op. cit.*, p. 8). Ronald Weitzman points out that Adorno, while in Oxford from 1934 to 1937, worked intensely on the phenomenology of Husserl, developing simultaneously his perspective concerning social aspects of music. Weitzman continues: "The fruits of this work have always been implicit in his musical writings, and should be fully acknowledged before attempts at possible invalidation by his potential critics" (*op. cit.*, p. 287). Weitzman could have strengthened his argument by recalling that Adorno had completed his doctoral dissertation on Husserl in 1924; consequently his work on phenomenology profited from a foundation developed a decade earlier. Astonishing in comparison with these assertions is Kneif's statement that the basis of Adorno's musicological thought is to be found in the third book of Schopenhauer's major work. *The World as Will and Idea*. The meaning of Kneif's statement will emerge in the following discussion of Adorno's relation to nineteenth century Romanticism. Views concerning this aspect of his work are divided. Oppens states that "its relation to philosophy and the applied knowledge of the world and of history makes Adorno's musical criticism one of the major creative accomplishments of the post-World War Two period." Cf. Kurt Oppens, "Zu den musikalischen Schriften Theodor W. Adornos," in *Ueber Theodor W. Adorno* (Frankfurt, 1969), p. 9. Oppens further defines the essence of this criticism in its expressed desire for change: "This new knowledge does not want to remain by itself like a painting hung in a museum; it wants to re-form the world. Adorno's work contains didactic, but also provocative and revolutionary elements, like the new music itself. This change is in the name of an advanced humanism, the concept of man having become of age."

17. Theodor W. Adorno, "Thesen über Kunsttheorie," *Ohne Leitbild: Parva Aesthetica* (Frankfurt, 1967), p. 101.

18. Kneif has stated, on the one hand, that "a true philosophizing, i.e., a controlled thinking about music which can be carried through with the aid of logical evidence and making use of sociological insights. . . is the only timely form of a philosophy of music." Cf. "Der Gegenstand musiksoziologischer Erkenntnis," *op.cit.*, p. 79. In direct reference to Adorno, on the other hand, he singles out the author's own criticism of the "resentment-listener" from the *Sociology* and concludes that it can be directed against Adorno himself: "In his case, everything is linked to *Weltanschauung* and consequently distorted." Cf. *Musiksoziologie*, *op. cit.*, p. 106. This does not mean, obviously, that Kneif rejects philosophy as part of sociology of music, but rather that he questions the manner in which Adorno designed his own thought structure.

19. Ivan Focht, "Adornos gnoselogistische Einstellung zur Musik," in *IRASM* 5:2 (1974), pp. 265-276.

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The Present State of Sociology of Music

What is the present state of sociology of music? Where does the discipline stand today in relation to its most clearly definable beginnings in the work of Max Weber over half a century ago? To what degree has it fulfilled the expectations placed in it at the time of its inception? The first factor to be stressed is that this branch of sociology was not viewed originally as a new and independent discipline.[20] In approaching the field today it is essential to bear in mind that, in offering an introduction to the sociology of music in 1962, Adorno felt an introduction was all that could be offered at that point in the history of sociology of music: the discipline still stood on the threshold of its development and an introduction to it could offer little more than an indication of its potential future.

The late 1960's witnessed wide-spread involvement in sociology when in the eyes of the New Left in both Europe and America the work of art was found to be valid only insofar as it fulfilled a social function and allowed a social interpretation. For many, the hour for the maturation and meaningful exercise of a sociology of music seemed at hand. For a time the aura of a vogue surrounded it. Inquiring into what factors beyond obvious political motives explained this great popularity, Dahlhaus found them largely in negative experiences and prejudices: the modern weariness with history, distrust of tradition, the disgust with a work-immanent interpretation of art, and suspicion concerning the experimental psychology of music. Consequently, involvement in sociology of music was seen primarily as a criticism of other competing disciplines, rejecting their claims to penetrate music in its historical, psychological or aesthetic essence. Sociology alone was seen in a position to comprehend the totality of music.[21]

20. Kurt Blaukopf, who completed the text of his book which employs the term as a title for the first time in 1938, referred to it as a "science of transitional character:" "We have characterized sociology of music as a 'transitional' science, the independent existence of which will have come to an end once its demands have been met by musicology within its own field. It will by no means be sufficient, however, simply to append to musicology a 'sociological chapter.' It is rather a matter of penetrating the total endeavor of music history with an historical and sociological spirit. Consequently, the sociology of music does no more than to establish a relation which already exists." Cf. *Musiksoziologie, op. cit.*, p. 13. Looking back upon this statement from the vantage point of 1971, he sees that sociology of music is "now an independent science with its own specific methods of research and presentation" (*ibid.*, p. 6. Only now, however, is an attempt being made to come to terms with the essential concepts of the discipline. Hans Mersmann spoke of sociology of music in the 1930's as an "auxiliary discipline"—"eine Hilfswissenschaft." Cf. his "Soziologie als Hilfswissenschaft der Musikgeschichte," in *Texte, op. cit.*, p. 52. And Adorno, as late of 1958, called the field "one of the many hyphenating sociologies"—"Bindestrichsoziologien." Cf. his "Ideen zur Musiksoziologie," *op. cit.*, p. 9. Kneif, in the early 1970's, viewed the endeavor as "a science of crisis" in the light of events in the 1960's. Cf. his *Musiksoziologie, op. cit.*, p. 17. It may be justified to ask whether sociology of music has yet been given a chance to take root and develop along the lines of anything resembling a normal pattern of growth, which may be its only hope.

21. Cf. *Texte, op. cit.*, p. 1. Gerhard Albersheim also cautioned that this sudden popularity had done more harm than good to sociology of music. He had viewed the field primarily as "a panacea for a musicology which had either stagnated or become irrelevant...and for the indisputably sick practical music industry...," but continued to emphasize that the time had now come to avoid an overestimation of its significance, to clarify its own postulates and to determine for what specific fields it is to be considered responsible." Cf. his "Reflexionen über

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In the 1962 lectures which constitute his *Sociology*, Adorno struck a note which was to find strong resonance following the general disillusionment of the end of that decade: "Today, musico-sociological cognition remains unsatisfactory. On the one hand, it branches off into largely unproductive scientific endeavors, and, on the other, into matters which to a very large degree are unproven. Wherever it sheds a bit of light, it only touches on mere analogies."[22] Kneif conveys similar feelings in evaluating Adorno's position from the perspective of the 1970's: "The dreams of a speculative sociology of music which called itself dialectical have been dreamed to an end. They were from the very beginning the speculation of a single individual and no one else following the death of Theodor W. Adorno...will repeat them; no amount of empirical diligence will ever be able to locate them in reality."[23] Additional factors which complicate work in sociology of music today are defined by Kneif: "Today the sociology of music is luxury of an increasingly small number of people. While all over the world poverty and hunger prevail, it takes the form of a hot-house luxury of an elite in a few counties." Furthermore, "no direct participation of sociology of music in politics can ever be expected."[24]

Music: The Art of Ambiguity and the Ambiguity of Art

To understand music in relation to society requires a concept of music which makes it the basis for such an interaction. At the same time, sociology of music becomes simplistic and superficial if it ignores the dangers and

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Musikwissenschaft und Soziologie," in *IRASM* 1:2 (1970), p. 200. Even before the flower children of the 1960s had burst into full blossom, Kneif perceived in the sociology of music "a silence resulting from attempts to apply methods used in literature and the plastic or graphic arts to music and further from the failure of the efforts of recent decades to design and clarify the possibilities, methods, and goals of sociology of music." Cf. "Gegenwartsfragen," *op. cit.*, p. 72. Kneif was irritated that *Musik in Geschichte und Gegenwart*, the major German reference work on music, found it possible to speak without hesitation of *Musikästhetik, Musikerziehung, Musikkritik, Musikpsychologie,* and *Musikwissenschaft*—the German terms for the aesthetics, pedagogy, criticism, psychology within the confines of music and of musicology—through the compilation of compound nouns, while "sociology of music"—*Soziologie der Musik*—could appear only volumes later as a somewhat embarrassing postscript, indicating that "even among musicologists it is not an established expression" (*ibid.*, p. 73).

22. *Einleitung, op. cit.*, p. 208. In a similar vein, Carl Dahlhaus lamented in 1975 that "sociology of music at times resembles a promise, for the keeping of which one has been kept waiting all too long." Thus, "sociology of music must mute the hopes placed in it if total disappointment is to be avoided. On the other hand, the field owes its prestige to these hopes and it cannot easily abandon them while admitting its weaknesses and limitation without degenerating to a peripheral auxiliary science of music hsitory or music aesthetics." Cf. *Texte., op. cit.*, p. 1.

23. Cf. Kneif, "Musiksoziologie," in *Einführung in die systematische Musikwissenschaft*, ed. Carl Dahlhaus (Cologne, 1971), p. 172. In a recent letter to me, Kneif expanded upon those aspects of Adorno's work which he finds responsible for its shortcomings: "Although the expectations placed in this field just a few years ago have by no means been fulfilled, I nevertheless believe that it is still worthwhile to deal with it—particularly if details of music history are investigated from a sociological perspective. Adorno's ingenius ideas stood in part at a great distance from historical reality, and this is one of the reasons that a certain disenchantment with—indeed, even skepticism towards—the field is to be observed in West Germany today" (August 30, 1975).

24. Kneif, *Musiksoziologie, op.cit.*, pp. 9-10.

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limitations of such an interpretation. For that reason, it is necessary to consider the nature of music along with its expressive potential and inherent possibilities for distortion.

Schering long ago pointed out that music, of all the arts, "has developed the most binding social force." This power can be attributed to the sensual qualities of music and its easy association with the word in vocal composition, so often the basis of collective experience in church services, the military and in national anthems. Through its high state of spiritualization, music is able to unify whole masses of people. It can, according to Schering, further serve as a bridge to a transcendent spiritual world beyond the here-and-now.[25]

What others see as ambiguity, Silbermann considers the fundamentally dialectical nature of music, without which it would be a matter of total indifference to sociologists—indeed, perhaps to everyone: "For the musical experience is... not only a flight from social struggles, but at the same time an embodiment of those struggles. It is useless to balk at this paradox; for if there were no dialectic, no ambiguity in music, then the musical experience would reach just that stage of uniformity and vulgarity so often predicted by misanthropic observers of culture, but which, from the very nature of musical experience, cannot come about."[26] These various doubts seem to reinforce

25. Arnold Schering, "Musik," in *Handwörterbuch der Soziologie*, ed. Alfred Vierkandt, (Stuttgart, 1931), p. 394. Kneif emphasizes that there is "no form of human existence without music," in "Musiksoziologie," *op. cit.*, p. 176. He is seconded by the anthropologist Tomislav Volek, who stresses that there is no human society without music: "Musical activity is among the basic needs of man; ...the human being as a species can be defined through his musical activity." Cf. his "Einige Bemerkungen zum Thema Musik und Politik vom anthropologischen Gesichtspunkt," in *Ueber Musik und Politik* (henceforth cited as *MuP*), ed. Rudolf Stephan (Mainz, 1971), p. 96. Volek credits music with the ability to accomplish the humanization of mankind. Etzkorn adds that "more recently, partly under the influence of Lévi-Strauss and the work of ethnomusicologists, there has been an increase in the recognition of the centrality of music in the lives of all peoples and times." Cf. Etzkorn, *op. cit.*, p. 38. According to Engel, music permits the "cognition of social postulates" more clearly than do the plastic and graphic arts, "because of the role of the active interpretor who in performances engages in the process of mediation directly." Cf. Hans Engel, "Soziologie der Musik," in *Die Musik in Geschichte und Gegenwart*, Vol. 12 (Kassel, 1965), p. 949. In almost the same breath, however, Engel warns that social and economic concepts developed and applied in other areas are of dubious validity in the aesthetic sphere, for their application to spiritual processes "conceals the fact that a work of art is always a matter of 'invention,' it is a thoroughly creative act. Materialist economic thought has rooted itself so deeply in language that even professional sociologists are no longer troubled by speaking of artistic production." *Ibid.*, p. 950. Similarly, Gerhard Albersheim asks "to what degree, if at all, sociology of music can be applied to music as a work or as aesthetic experience, or whether it must not primarily restrict itself to the practical side of music in the sense of performance, profession, business, etc." *Op cit.*, p. 201. (Such restriction, it must be warned, forces the sociology of music sharply in the direction of the social history of music once again.) Albersheim feels that the conviction that music can communicate a specific aesthetic meaning is the result of a politicization of the sociology of music through neo-Marxism. He concludes that sociology of music should rather give way to a sociology of the misuse of music, the goal of which would be the battle against the use of music for non-musical purposes—a frequent occurence in twentieth century political life. *Ibid.*, p. 201.

26. Silbermann, *Sociology of Music*, *op. cit.*, p. 197. This ambiguous quality is viewed with less enthusiasm by Kneif, who states that the freedom of expression within music is praiseworthy only if it can be assumed that something is communicated by it. "This—the assertion made by music—is," according to Grillparzer, "never noticed by the censor." Grillparzer is quoted as having said to Beethoven: "Musicians are of no concern to the censors. If they only knew what is

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Schoenberg's conclusion that "music has no more to do with society than a game of chess."[27]

Such doubts about subject matter have led sociologists of music to be highly critical of Adorno and his efforts to offer a sociological deciphering of music. Thus, Boehmer argues that "Adorno's occupation with musical questions has something paradoxical about it.... The object thereof stands in double contradiction to Critical Theory. Music cannot be treated seriously by the sociologist, because it must deny itself any hopes of socially realizing whatever intentions it contains. For the same reason, music cannot be an adequate object for Critical Theory of the Frankfurt variety, because its very existence, its obvious affirmative gesture—even in the most estranged works of Schoenberg—resists the dream of total failure as which one might view Adorno's negative utopia."[28]

The dilemma of the subject matter of sociology is felt with increasing intensity in work with music. If attention is restricted only to music's external life, the result is social history—or perhaps cultural history; therefore, the sociologist turns to the work of art itself, where he is threatened by the insecurity of his approach: "Sociological knowledge does not further the spiritual penetration of a musical creation, but only enriches the store of historical anecdotes which has grown around it."[29] The complexities of this dilemma are compounded by the changing role of music in modern life, coupled with disagreement among sociologists regarding the realms of musical expression and experience which can be validly observed. A general feeling among younger writers is that all music—and particularly rock—must be included, while Adorno—for whom all but classical music traditionally defined remained the object of critical scorn—insisted that "light music was safeguarded in many ways from the reach of cognition."[30]

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on your mind when you are engaged in composing!" Cf. Tibor Kneif, "Aesthetischer Anspruch und Ideologiegehalt im musikalischem Kunstwerk," in *MuP*, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

27. Quoted in Kneif, *Musiksoziologie, op. cit.*, p. 112. In the mid-1950's, H.H. Stuckenschmidt, the dean of modern German musicology, affirmed this view: "In looking at the balance of thirty-five years of sociological consideration of music, we find but one thing on the credit side: the recognition that music has no purpose beyond its own beautiful and useless existence." Quoted in Silbermann, *Sociology, op. cit.*, p. 9.

28. Konrad Boehmer, "Adorno, Musik, Gesellschaft," in *Texte, op. cit.*, p. 227. Similarly, Dahlhaus feels that the claim of sociology of music to valid social decoding of its subject matter is "both equivocal and questionable." Cf. Carl Dahlhaus, "Thesen über engagierte Musik," in *Engagement, op. cit.*, p. 11. He concludes that "that revolution of music and the music of revolution" have arrived at a state of mutual contradiction, the resolution of which cannot be foreseen (*ibid.*, p. 12).

29. Kneif, *Musiksoziologie, op.cit.*, p. 112. At another point, Kneif states: "Music alone allows us no conclusions regarding the social conditions which lay at its base.... Because of its non-conceptual nature, music indicates only the world of the listener at a given time" (*ibid.*, p. 83). He concludes with an admonition for all those who work in the field: "While truth in the form of conceptual cognition cannot be repeated often enough, there is nothing more tedious than incessantly repeated truth in musical form" (*ibid.*, p. 80).

30. Adorno, "Zur gesellschaftlichen Lage der Musik, *op. cit.*, p. 371. Since, in his interpretation, popular music must necessarily dwell upon the lowest common denominator for its universal appeal, it cannot possibly fulfill a significant social function. Cf. *Einleitung, op. cit.*, p. 44. For him, Mozart's *Magic Flute* (1791) represented the last valid synthesis of popular and serious music (*ibid.*, p. 31). Adorno's distaste for such a vast region of music is undoubtedly

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Regarding the metamorphosis of the function of music in life, almost all sociologists of music agree concerning the consequences of the progressive secularization of art in the modern world. On the one hand, there is the positive liberation of music from cult functions, making way for the development of the autonomous work of art in the bourgeois age; on the other hand, this autonomy has resulted in the isolation and alienation of both art and artist from society within which music has become largely a matter of passive experience, no longer providing anything of the Jungian *participation mystique* of an earlier age: "For the great mass of humanity, music has become an art for passive enjoyment, excluding any deeper spiritual participation. For today music has long ceased to be music to be played, but has become only music to be heard—a finished product, delivered by radio or through records. Even music in the concert hall has assumed this perfected commercial character. Here the aesthetic aura still prevails, attuning the listener to pure pleasure and causing him to demand nothing but pleasure. The listener does not want that element in music which is a confrontation with his age. It is not that he intentionally evades this confrontation; rather he seeks it visually or conceptually and not along the secretive, mediated course of music."[31]

At an early juncture in his development, the composer-hero of Mann's *Doctor Faustus* voices the conviction that "music is ambiguity as a system." This pronouncement comes to mind repeatedly while working with the often vague and contradictory concepts and formulations encountered in sociology of music. Thus the question is constantly reintroduced: Why should sociologists interested in cultural phenomena and their social ramifications turn to music at all? Would it not be better to direct attention to more tangible and concrete forms of artistic expression involving verbal or visual faculties? Speaking of the various fields "in which our own universe is duplicated," Jameson observes that "illustrations derived from the history of the visual arts or from the development of mathematics are thus more useful for our purposes than the more representational modes of literature or philosophy. For in dialectical treatments of the latter, there tends to take place a kind of slippage from form into content which cannot but blur the methodological points to be made."[32] If "slippage" of this type occurs within the realm of verbal expression, how much greater must the danger of obscurity be within what Mann has called "the inarticulate language of tones?"

In specific reference to Adorno, Jay explains his interest in music in a manner generally acceptable to all those of musico-sociological inclination: "Adorno's sensitivity to dialectical mediation was most clearly demonstrated

strongly personal and subjective. He does raise one point of objective validity, however, stressing in 1932 that the modern world no longer knows a *Volk* whose songs and games could be taken up and sublimated by art. Cf. "Zur gesellschaftlichen Lage," *op.cit.*, p. 373.

31. Blaukopf, "Musiksoziologie," in *Texte, op.cit.*, p. 153. This view supports Boehmer's feeling that "a true reconciliation of the separated musical spheres is unthinkable without far-reaching changes in the social structure itself." Cf. Boehmer, *op.cit.*, pp. 236-237.

32. Jameson, *op.cit.*, p. 11.

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in the studies of music.... To Adorno, polyphonic music, the least representational of aeshtetic modes, was perhaps best suited for the expression of that imageless 'other' that Critical Theory refused to define positively. In addition, the complexities of its mediations—composer, performer, instrument, technical reproduction—made music a particularly rich field for the play of the dialectical imagination. Originating in the rhythms and rituals of eveyday life, music had long since transcended its purely functional role. It was thus both tied to material conditions and above them, responsive to changes in social realities and yet more than merely their reflection."[33] This emphasis on the origins of music in ritual and its earlier cult function stresses again what is undoubtedly the single most significant socio-historical perspective in the development of music. In those centuries following the Middle Ages, generally characterized by enlightenment, liberation and rationalization, religion lost its hold on man, resulting in the growing secularization of art culminating in Beethoven at the beginning of the bourgeois age. This explains why Beethoven and his music exercised such a particular fascination upon Adorno. Jay summarizes this process in the introductory pages of his book: "So it is that Western music at the very outset marks itself off from the culture as a whole, reconstitutes itself as a self-contained and autonomous sphere at a distance from the everyday social life of the period and developing, as it were, parallel to it. Not only does music thereby acquire an internal history of its own, but it also begins to duplicate on a smaller scale all the structures and levels of the social and economic macrocosm itself, and displays its own internal dialectic, its own producers and consumers, its own infrastructure."[34] Here is the basis of a modern sociology of music *in nuce*: it is an independent realm, but its course is parallel to the society with which it lives in a peculiar inter-relation while nonetheless remaining isolated and alienated from it. At the same time, in its structure—not in any philosophical or metaphysical message or content—it duplicates the organization of this society.

Although Adorno nowhere makes a summary statement upon the nature of music as he understands it, he was highly aware of the indicated ambiguous elements. This awareness did not prevent him from occassionally flippant pronouncements, such as: "The dynamic quality of music and of society at the time of Beethoven is of one meaning."[35] This statement is further elaborated in his *Sociology*: "Whoever listens to Beethoven without hearing anything of the revolutionary bourgeoisie, the echo of its slogans, the cry for their realization, the demand for that particular totality, understands

33. Jay, *op.cit.*, p. 182.
34. *Ibid.*, p. 14.
35. Theodor W. Adorno, *Stichworte: Kritische Modelle 2* (Frankfurt, 1969), p. 238. Obviously, such a statement can be made and defended. Equally justifiable, however, is Gottwald's exclamation: "Beethoven's Ninth Symphony prefigures a better world, it is not just a reflection of the early nineteenth century." Cf. Clytus Gottwald, "Politische Tendenzen der geistlichen Musik," in *MuP, op.cit.*, p. 43. Which of the two views is correct? Has Beethoven's music duplicated the world in which he lived through the dynamic forces contained in his work, or are these forces a rejection of that world in favor of a Utopian vision of the future?

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Beethoven just as little as one who is unable to follow the purely musical content of his compositions, their inner history, by means of which the themes are treated in them."[36] Yet, elsewhere, Adorno admits to the ambiguity of music in a manner which would seem to permit serious questioning of this: "The affirmative moment of all art—and particularly of music—is heir to that old magic: the sound from which every musical composition sets forth contains a certain amount of Utopia, but, at the same time, it expresses the deceptive conviction that this Utopia is already here."[37] Even in his very positive attitude towards Schoenberg, Adorno finds traces of this same dubious quality of music: "Totality, atomization and the untransparently subjective act of combining opposites...are the characteristics of the most modern music. It is difficult to judge, however, whether the negative quality of this music expresses the negative element in society, thereby transcending it, or whether this music, unconsciously caught up in the spell of this society, merely imitates it. In the final analysis the two possibilities are not to be clearly separated."[38]

Thus, there are suggestions that music might be viewed as the aesthetic duplication of society, a reflection thereof, an imitation of it, an echo of the world from which it springs, or—in a seeming about-face—its negation and living contradiction. For the possibility of a Marxist solution to the problem the question will be reintroduced later. At this point, it is of interest to ask whether this perspective is in any way reflected—paralleled, imitated, or even echoed—in the particular style and structure of Adorno's thought. First of all, it must be stressed that Adorno was quite conscious of the fact that it was not possible to overcome the ambiguities involved in distilling social significance from music by employing the methods used in the verbal and visual arts: "Again and again the defensive objection is raised against sociology of music that the nature of music—its pure being-in-itself—is totally unrelated to social conditions. This attitude is supported by the fact that it is not possible to put one's finger on the socially factual matter of music, as can be done, for example, in the novel of the nineteenth century."[39]

Adorno's answer to this problem is that sociology of music must learn from sociology of art which—in non-musical matters—long ago realized that it must concern itself with the "interpretation of processes, rather than restricting itself to tangible contents."[40] Among such processes, the historical development of musical material and changing compositional techniques would no doubt stand in positions of primary importance.

It is possible to define "material" as the "raw stuff" out of which the

36. *Einleitung, op.cit.*, p. 73.
37. *Stichworte, op.cit.*, p. 240. Silbermann's sensitive ear was well aware of this dilemma; he summarizes: "In certain works, Beethoven can be read by some people as the expression of bourgeois man, by others as the expression of the anti-bourgeois world—of a socialist-revolutionary society." Cf. Alphons Silbermann, "Die Ziele der Musiksoziologie," in *Texte, op.cit.*, p. 243.
38. *Einleitung, op.cit.*, p. 193.
39. *Ibid.*, p. 168.
40. *Ibid.*

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composer creates his work through compositional techniques.[41] In his early study on Adorno's musical thought—written before the *Sociology* appeared—Oppens felt that Adorno himself had been ambiguous in his use of the term "material." Consequently, Oppens asks: "What is musical material really? In Adorno the concept sways between chords understood in isolation (the diminished seventh chord) and matters of technique (chromatic passing notes in the salon music of the nineteenth century). We do not believe that single combinations of tones and sounds constitute material: it is rather the manner in which they are employed."[42] Perhaps a better approach than to ask "what" material is, would be to inquire into the proper or improper employment of material and what consequences this has for musico-sociological thought.[43]

41. While this view is unforgivably simplistic, it is perhaps as precise as can be found without risk of total and chaotic disagreement. The most detailed definition that I have found is from Günter Mayer in a footnote to his essay "On the Dialectic of Material," whose very title indicates the face of Janus looking over the shoulder of the writer: "Generally speaking, a category of musical material designates 'the tones and their relationship to each other,' i.e., certain material acoustic events, perceptible through the senses, which as pre-formed components of the given relational structure of tonal systems achieve the function of artistic signs in the resonant work. Above all, four basic parameters are distinguished in this regard: (1) those of tone or sound (with noise as the counter pole); (2) pitch, duration, volume and timbre; further (3) their development in the horizontal dimension of material (melody, metro-rhythm, and tempo); and (4) in the vertical dimension of material (harmony, phrase, and structure of the composition). Musical material in the broader sense of artistic language includes the entire scale of various compositional techniques, through which acoustic relationships of syntactic character, specifically of musical contextual meanings, are organized. These extend from the techniques of sound production through the techniques of the formulation of characteristic structures on the individual level up to those of their development, combination and formulation into a larger differentiated constellation." Cf. "Zur Dialektik des musikalischen Materials," in *Texte, op.cit.*, p. 221. Etzkorn provides a more operational definition: "Music can be mistreated if its laws are not obeyed by man and if the composer forges the musical material according to his own whim. These laws are accessible to man; they can be understood. Thus the analyst is able to judge man's manipulation of music as either conforming to the musical laws, or as disregarding them. If society does not obey these laws and rejects music that conforms to them, then the fault lies in society and not in music: society will have to be reformed." Etzkorn, *op.cit.*, p. 22. The significance of Etzkorn's statement, in which he comments upon Adorno, lies in the conviction that a natural law lies at the basis of this material and that this law demands respect not only within the realm of production, but within that of reception as well.

42. Oppens, *op. cit.*, p. 20. According to Sziborsky, Adorno's musical material is not " 'natural material' in the sense of something tangibly material, possessed of 'inherently ontological law,' but rather an objective spiritual material, continually changing within the historical process, possessed of its own 'immanent laws of movement'." Cf. Sziborsky, *op. cit.*, p. 297. Blaukopf, *op. cit.*, p. 140, in speaking of material, mentions tonal systems—always central to his thought—and even musical instruments, components which are subject to change in the course of history through the influence of social factors. For Kneif, on the other hand, tonal material—and the restrictive force of the adjective must be observed—is "the inventory of tones upon which a music is based." Cf. *Musiksoziologie, op. cit.*, p. 47. In the midst of this total frustration, a natural reaction was to turn to Kurt Oppens, a truly humanistic musicologist who—it might be added—tuned the New York piano of the dissonant Adorno for a time. In response to a request for a definition of material, Oppens wrote: "What 'musical material' is depends completely upon the analytical context within which the term is used. In speaking of motifs, tones are meant; in the case of themes, the reference is to motifs; if the subject is form, material consists of themes. Rhythmic stereotypes and similar things can be designated as material—everything which the composer employs as such. The term is highly expadable; for example, even the folksong, or such a highly undefinable thing as the folksong-tone can be a matter of material." (In a letter to me, December 2, 1975).

43. Particularly interesting is Jameson's emphasis on the absolute necessity of progress in the development of material—a conviction repeatedly encountered in Adorno as well. Thus, James

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In fact, in his *Philosophy*, Adorno claimed that "the altercation of the composer with his material is the same as an altercation with society to the extent that it finds expression in his work...."[44] This confirms that the sociological dimension of music is not to be sought in its tangible material.

Adorno: The Stylistic Relationship of Form and Content

Inconclusive as the above considerations on the nature of music are, they lead Adorno's readers to suspect that the complications and difficulties of his style might somehow reflect the complexity of his subject matter, and, indeed, that this style might well be a conscious attempt to fuse form and content as indicated by Jay. To what degree might Adorno's own manner of expression be a manifestation of his own particularly profound methodology of musical sociology? As Oppens has pointed out, "in Adorno's words, Hegel stood before the impossibility 'of developing totally that which stood before his eyes, that is to say, of bringing the force of the entirety into unity with the force of the individual at every level.' Adorno does the opposite. The totality, which cannot be made static, has a tendency to dissolve; as compensation, the individual sentence or at least the field created by a group of sentences has the power and breadth of an entire book. Basically, one can speak about a work by Adorno just as little as one can summarize the contents of a library. Adorno's sentences combine, resulting in an atonal music of thought."[45] The parallel drawn between Adorno's verbal style and Schoenberg's development of atonality is striking.

According to Jay, "defiance of society includes the defiance of its language." Thus, he comes to a conclusion similar to Oppens' concerning a

writes that: "The evolution of musical sound may therefore initially be understood against the background of the aging of musical effects in general, which have as it were their own inner life, know their moment of maturation, and suffer debility and ultimately a kind of natural death. The common triad, for instance, struck the ear of its earliest listeners with an intensity which it will never again possess; and for us such sounds, which were originally heard in the context of a polyphonic system and as the triumph of tonal harmony over it, are henceforth nothing but insipid consonance in a world in which the cause of harmony has long since been won and its initial audacities long since become commonplace.... Thus the Wagnerian diminished seventh at its inception expressed unresolved pain and sexual longing, the yearning for ultimate release as well as the refusal to be reabsorbed into bland order; yet having grown familiar and tolerable over the years, it now stands as a mere period sign of feeling or emotiveness, as a manner rather than a concrete experience of negation." *Op. cit.*, pp. 20-21.

44. Theodor W. Adorno, *Philosophy of Modern Music*, trans. Anne G. Mitchell and W. V. Blomster (New York, 1973), pp. 33-34. Silbermann, in an Adornoesque analysis of a Stravinsky septet, altogether rejects this idea. Cf. his "Die Ziele der Musiksoziologie," *op. cit.*, p. 247. But perhaps we should follow Lissa's admonition that "the acoustic material of music is precisely as indifferent to matters of social class as is language to literature." Quoted in Kneif, *Musiksoziologie, op. cit.*, p. 60.

45. Oppens, *op. cit.*, p. 14. James modifies this view through his conviction that it is precisely the impossibility of reaching the totality in the Hegelian sense which resulted in Adorno's main formal problem: How to write chapters of a whole in a sorely fragmented world? Under such conditions, Jameson concludes, only the unsystematic thought of Adorno could remain true to the spirit of Hegel: "In this sense, Adorno's thought is profoundly Hegelian, thinking its motifs through in a generally Hegelian spirit, facing thereby its principal formal problem: How to write chapters of a phenomenology when there is no longer any possibility of a whole? How to analyze the part as a part when the whole is not only no longer visible but even inconceivable... What language to use to describe an alienated language...?" Cf. Jameson, *op.cit.*, p. 50.

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possible stylistic relation between Adorno and Schoenberg: "The difficulties that resulted for the average reader were thus less the product of caprice or inarticulateness than a direct challenge to the reader to respond with commensurable seriousness. Adorno himself indicated his purpose indirectly when he wrote of Schoenberg's music: 'He requires the listener spontaneously to compose its inner movement and demands of him not mere contemplation but praxis'."[46]

Adorno's Sociology of Music: Basic Concepts

Adorno's work draws its unique sense of relevance and imediacy from his concern with the musical life of his day.[47] Reification in music led Adorno to believe that the established concept of the work of art as a totality defined within hermetic boundaries is no longer valid. In order to be meaningful once again, music would have to become the vehicle of cognition. Today, music too often serves negatively as a defense mechanism against paranoia, persecution and alienation. All too often, music is abused as a means of manipulation—a practice Adorno bemoaned in the Eastern bloc, where music serves to neutralize resistance and criticism, rather than to support them. According to Adorno, musico-sociological thought cannot deal with the work of an individual composer—for interest lies not in one man's

46. Jay, *op. cit.*, p. 176. Jay's and Oppens' positions are obviously valid, yet they do not rule out an opposing view. Thus, in 1966, Kneif noted: "Adorno's diction is intentionally artistic, at times even directly emotional, which makes it difficult for the reader to gain a critical distance in his relation to the object under discussion, or even to penetrate through to the object itself. For that reason the reader again and again experiences embarrassment if he tries to give a summary of one of Adorno's publications: the intensity thereof is lost and the dialectical course of argument dissolves into clever paradoxes. And so it is in his argumentation: it corresponds to the essayistic origins of Adorno's treatises; they make no claim to present a factual state of affairs in scientific-objective justness without subjective engagement. Rather, in order to progress aesthetically, only a few features of this factual basis are chosen, those which are particularly suited to the development of a subjective idea. Consequently, arbitrariness is inherent in the method of presentation and what results cannot be viewed as exhaustive analysis." Kneif, "Gegenwartsfragen," *op. cit.*, p. 87. Later Kneif developed this view to even more reserved conclusions: "In that paradox, according to which music contains a type of critical social theory, a second complimentary paradox is involved: the theoretical definition of truth—even of the musico-sociological variety—should not simply double factual matter in consciousness, but should proceed freely, along lines similar to the effect which radiates from the work of art. Beginning with his carefully chiseled language and continuing all the way down to the titles given his works, Adorno's musico-sociological writing conceals the intention of radiating the aura of a work of art—or at least of a surrogate thereof. These publications bear the titles of musical compositions: impromptus, moments musicaux and quasi una fantasia; this final volume of essays begins with 'Improvisations' and ends with a 'Finale.' Adorno thus has created a worthy counterpart of 'empirical sociology of music without music:' he has made music out of sociology." Cf. Kneif, *Musiksoziologie, op. cit.*, p. 95.

47. Two quotations from the 1932 essay, "Zur gesellschaftlichen Lage der Musik," *op. cit.*, pp. 103 and 404, show this very clearly: "Whenever music is heard today, it underscores in the most distinct manner possible the contradictions and ruptures which scar present-day society; at the same time, music is isolated from this society through the deepest fissure of all. This society, in turn, has produced these ruptures and fissures without being able to absorb more than the remains and ruins of music." "Reification has taken music away from man and left him only the illusion of its meaning; music has lost its social footing.... This must be the point of departure for every observation on the social position of music.... Music is now conscious of its own reification and its own isolation."

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individual consciousness but in the function of music within society as a whole.[48]

Basic to Adorno's work in the sociology of music is his delineation of the three interrelated musical realms of production, reproduction and reception. Although the confrontation between music and society takes places within each one, it is in the sphere of reproduction—the performance and interpretation of music—that conflict is most clearly perceptible. It is here that music most clearly functions as the basis of mediation in a manner with which no other form of artistic expression can be compared. As Adorno himself stressed: "The true problem of the sociology of music is that of mediation."[49] Thus, Adorno was never fully comfortable discussing the intellectual content of music; for, although it might not be possible to say "what the objective content of a late Beethoven quartet is, it is obvious that it is different from that of a hit song."[50]

The negative dialectic encountered throughout Adorno's cultural criticism is essential in his work with music. "Music gains its content of social truth primarily through opposition, through the abrogation of its social contract."[51] A valid music speaks out against that which is false within the

48. Kneif also insists that the sociologist must maintain a bird's eye perspective on music. Adorno's many essays upon individual works—such as the treatise on Beethoven's *Missa Solemnis* included in this issue of *Telos*—do not contradict this conviction. Clearly, in cases such as this, the individual work is always considered within the much larger context of a social totality. Thus, Adorno was able to avoid the difficulty which has resulted in vague generalizations and superficial comparisons in the work of lesser intellects. Work now in progress on Hanns Eisler and Joseph Matthias Hauer is a further positive indication of related treatment of the individual. On this problem, Kneif comments: "The social interpretation of the individual work results in charlantanism, unless it establishes in the work a general characteristic of style or genre making the isolated work only the subject of investigation—not its subject... Sociology works with phenomena en masse and with concepts en masse; consequently, it must work with collective concepts such as genre, epoch, style, class and tendency. The concern is always with the sociological position of factual musical matter, never with the musical matter itself." Cf. *Musiksoziologie. op. cit.*, p. 21. This approach reveals what Adorno calls "the manifestation of collective energy behind the individual work." *Einleitung, op. cit.*, p. 191.

49. Adorno, "Ideen zur Musiksoziologie," *op. cit.*, p. 13.

50. Adorno, "Thesen über Kunstsoziologie," *op.cit.*, p. 98. This is why Adorno concluded that a discussion of content in music must necessarily restrict itself to elements of form, style, and compositional technique: "The interpretation of musical content is decided in the inner construction of works, which in turn determines the experience of them." *Einleitung, op.cit.*, p. 15. It is to be stressed, however, that precisely these factors within the work of art are seen by Adorno—and many others—as the imprint of society. According to Kneif: "The content of music—aside from matters of form—is read into it; it involves the ideas and associations of a group of people. Consequently, it is limited to a given time, which explains the frequent contradiction between content and form." *Musiksoziologie, op.cit.*, p. 22. Consequently, "a piece of music would have exactly that social content which is derived from it by that group of people under investigation." *Ibid.*, pp. 22-23. The only true understanding of music lies in the comprehension of the intention upon which the composer based his work and whether this can be deduced solely from the composition itself is debatable. To base the interpretation of a particular work upon the reaction of an audience to it, entails that the position of the listener toward a work of music is preconditioned by the social content of his own life. *Ibid.*, p. 84. Consequently, whatever content is defined in terms of audience reaction or participation will be subject to continual revision. Kneif also objects to attempts to decipher the content of a musical work through analogy with other works of art, a method particularly favored by Marxist-Leninists. *Ibid.*, p. 27.

51. Adorno, *Einleitung, op.cit.*, p. 238. The act of negation must not, however, assume the form of ideology: "Music is not ideology per se, but ideological only insofar as it is false

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world in which it is heard. Here, however, Adorno adds that "a correct consciousness is not possible in a false world and even the social reaction to music stands under the spell of a false consciousness."[52] There is always the danger that even music which is strongest in negation will be heard as the music of affirmation, demonstrating its inherent weakness which permits it to serve as a tool of manipulation. At any rate, Adorno's conclusion remains that that the sociology of music is always social criticism though the artistic realm.[53]

Conditioning and Reflection

The major nemesis at the roots of a sociology of music involves the two-way street seen by the sociologist connecting art and society. Art is conditioned by society and will, consequently, reflect the particular structure of this society. From a Marxist perspective, this involves the conviction—by no means undisputed among the Marxists—[54] that, similar to philosophical, legal and religious views and institutions, music in its physical dimension is part of the superstructure, but in its essence it defines the basis upon which society is founded. One of the problems in such an interpretation of the relation between base and superstructure is that manifestations of the base continue to exist in the superstructure once the base has changed.

Kneif has pointed out the confusion which can result from a simple thesis on the relation between music and society. He offers three possibilities: (1) music is socially conditioned; (2) music is the expression of society; and (3) music reflects social conditions. But, he states, "none of the three is a theory and each statement has two mutually exclusive meanings." Thus, he concludes that any claim of a causal relation between music and society cannot be validated sufficiently to permit the derivation of musico-sociological theory from it.[55] Kneif, in the final analysis, rejects not only the possibility of music as the vehicle for negative dialectic, but further denies the very application of Critical Theory to aesthetics: "If music is viewed as an analogy to social theory (and such theory is, according to Adorno, necessarily criticism of society), this has far-reaching consequences for a sociology of music. This

consciousness. Accordingly, the sociology of music would find its port of entry into the fissures and ruptures of that which takes place musically as long as these cracks are not only the subjective insufficiency of a single composer." *Ibid.*, p. 73.

52. *Ibid.*, p. 29. A final set of basic concepts—actually a subdivision of production—is the "forces of productivity" and the "conditions of production," two factors usually found in a state of conflict. Adorno defines the conditions of production as "the economic and ideological conditions woven into every tone of music and the reaction to it,...including the musical mentality and the taste of the listener." *Ibid.*, p. 234.

53. Kneif, on the other hand, denies that there is such a thing as critical music in the positive sense envisioned by Adorno: "Critical music exists at best as bad music, offering a negative indication of its origins." Cf. his "Aesthetischer Anspruch," *op.cit.*, p. 81.

54. Compare Anatoly Lunacharski's remark of 1927: "Marxist theory and the history of art have completely rejected—and I might hope, buried as well—the view that music, like all art in general, simply reflects like a mirror what takes place in the base, i.e., in the economy." Cf. *Texte, op.cit.*, p. 107.

55. Along similar lines, Silbermann claims that "the material of music...cannot be understood simply as a reflection of social states and events, but rather represents mental phenomena, having no existence whatever apart from a perceiving mind." Cf. his *Sociology, op.cit.*, p. 143.

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sociology is therby transformed from an organ of cognition—no matter how highly questionable this might be in itself—into a battlefield of ideas which push toward a change in existing society either through reformation or revolution. Under the pressure of a system to which Critical Theory unadmittedly pays obeisance, the fatal dialectic comes to pass that musico-sociological methods become increasingly uncritical.... With the question whether society is reflected in music as a totality one hovers above the abyss of empty meaning. This question can be answered neither empirically nor logically."[56]

The sociology of music in West Germany has paid little attention to musical life in the Socialist countries—often to the chagrin of the younger generation of sociologists. The anachronistic "ideal of music listening" prevalent in Eastern Europe largely justifies this neglect. According to Adorno, the practices of composition endorsed in those countries in the name of an official Communist, supposedly socialist-realist, music, have produced something which "compares with the Romantic music of capitalist countries in the late nineteenth century."[57]

Although Marxism is evoked as the official sanction of socialist realism, as Kneif points out, Marxism has not been a highly productive force in the development of sociology of music. This aesthetic is related to, but not identical with, such a sociology: "No useful basis for musico-sociological work is offered in the Marxist worldview, which is frequently associeted with sociology in a rather simplistic fashion in order to accept or to deny sociology, according to personal prejudice and an ideology not yet digested. The hypothesis of Marx, once so revolutionary in its effect, namely, that it is not human consciousness which conditions social being, but rather the reverse, that social being determines consciousness, can at present—properly understood—be of such intelligible validity that it is almost trivial and, at any rate, totally vacuous for the formation of musico-sociological concepts. Marx formulates his thesis in such a general manner that it stands above all real and artistic contrasts of 'bourgeois' and 'socialist'."[58]

56. Kneif, *Musiksoziologie, op.cit.*, pp. 95-96. Dahlhaus comes to similar conclusions: "The possibilities of a negative or a critical music are narrowly restricted, both aesthetically and from the standpoint of compositional technique. Firstly, through parody, music can offer a polemic against the tradition out of which it arises or by which—even through negation—it is nourished. Secondly, by means of text or scenic event, music can contradict the text to which it is joined. To be sure, as the song technique of Brecht demonstrates, it is more likely that the text will cancel out the content of the music, or show it to be alienated, than that the music will succeed in criticizing the text. Thirdly, music can turn against itself, against its form of existence as concert music and against the attitude of world- and self-forgetful contemplation, which, since the late eighteenth century has been upheld as the ideal of music listening." Cf. "Thesen über engagierte Musik," *Engagement, op.cit.*, p. 10.

57. Adorno, *Einleitung, op.cit.*, p. 65.

58. Kneif, "Der Gegenstand musiksoziologischer Erkenntnis," *op.cit.*, p. 65. Although Kneif willingly admits the debt of sociology of music to Marxist thought, he takes great care to avoid equating the two developments: "Since the middle of the nineteenth century the socialist movement has been of help in the establishment of perspectives on the social conditioning of art. It has also furthered the emergence of the sociology of music—indeed, only through the influence of this movement has it been made possible. Nonetheless, the sociology of music is by no means merely the socialist observation of music. The thought developed by historical materialism—

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Pillars of the Sociology of Music: Weber, Blaukopf and Silbermann

The following outline of the work of Weber, Blaukopf and Silbermann is not intended to provide an historical account of the development of the sociology of music,[59] but rather is concerned with several of the basic ideas of these three men which remain viable today. Currently, Silbermann and Blaukopf, born in 1907 and 1914 respectively, are—both in terms of age and contribution—the senior scholars in this field. Both Blaukopf and Honigsheim have been directly influenced, in turn, by Weber's work in music.[60]

Weber's main contribution is the effort to trace the influence of social factors within the creative core and technical basis of music itself, beyond the external phenomena of musical life. Weber's point of departure was the dynamic quality of modern Western music as a reflection of the most fundamental characteristic of Western man per se—a view which Adorno was to elaborate, particularly through his interest in Beethoven: "In Western music the drama of the experience of Western man is re-enacted. Practically, his music is addressed to the simultaneous requirements of expression and reason."[61]

The dichotomy between the rational and expressive capabilities of music led Weber to fear that Western music has achieved maximum rationality within the limits of expressive possibility. The date of Weber's work is ironic: 1911, precisely when Arnold Schoenberg, in Vienna, was preparing the final steps from the atonality of his compositions of 1907-1908 to his first exercises in the twelve-tone method of composition. Schoenberg's effort was to provide music once again with a discipline and an order to counter the chaotic expressive excesses of late Romanticism. Weber was probably unaware of Schoenberg and his music. had he been exposed to his compositions, however, chances are that he would have found them of little interest.[62]

Blaukopf's *Sociology of Music* is one of the few publications in this field

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insofar as it is a matter of scientific hypotheses and not of dogma—is one possible variety of bourgeois interpretation of history and society and is in no way a curiosity of socialist thought patterns. It is to be recalled that sociology in Eastern countries was for some time looked down upon as a bourgeois science." *Musiksoziologie, op.cit.*, pp. 11-12.

59. Cf. Etzkorn's more detailed account in his "Introduction" to Honigsheim, *Music and Society, op.cit.*, which provides an excellent historical perspective.

60. Weber's contribution to the sociology of music is still the subject of disagreement. Writing as late as 1958, Adorno called Weber's essay "the most comprehensive and exacting outline of a sociology of music to date." Cf. "Ideen zur Musiksoziologie," *op.cit.*, p. 16. This is directly contradicted by Engel, who denies that Weber's work belongs within the sociology of music, pointing out that the very subtitle, "On the Sociology of Music," was not Weber's own, but was added by the editor, Theodor Kroyer. According to Engel, Blaukopf was thus misguided by Weber. Cf. Engel, "Soziologie der Musik," *op.cit.*, p. 964.

61. Cf. Max Weber, *The Rational and Social Foundations of Music,* trans. Don Martindale, Johannes Riedel and Gertrude Neuwirth, ed. Don Martindale and Johannes Riedel (Carbondale, Ill., 1958), p. xxvi.

62. Honigsheim recalls that Mannheim, where he frequently attended concerts with Max Weber, was the scene of some activity in modern music: "Newer composers such as Schoenberg began to attract attention and were occasionally played in Mannheim, but so far as I can remember these people were not mentioned at the Webers' in my presence." Cf. his *On Max Weber,* trans. Joan Rytina (East Lansing, 1968), p. 85.

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which demands extensive musical knowledge. Yet, the essential thesis is clear: "The sociology of tonal systems forms the basis of every sociology of music."[63] What makes Blaukopf's work particularly interesting today is the Marxist influence on his thought. In fact, his book opens with the quote: "It is not social consciousness which determines social being, but rather social being which determines social consciousness." For him, the major task of a sociology of music is the comprehension of "the production and reproduction of music in relation to the historical development of human society," since he sees a close "relation between the aesthetic state of affairs and the state of economic, social, and political matters."[64]

Blaukopf's conception is by no means of the simplistic nature often encountered in the aesthetics of socialist realism. Although it might appear that—poarticularly in his concern for the theories of Joseph Yasser and Georgi Plekhanov—Blaukopf has tried too hard to superimpose on music an already-defined system, a careful reading of his work shows that he employs such a system as a heuristic device to penetrate musical phenomena. According to him, "it is seldom possible to show a *direct* influence of the economic sphere upon music. . . . The relation between the structure of music and the structure of society lies deeper than generally assumed." Thus, sociology of music should work intuitively to "establish a relation in thought which already exists in reality."[65]

Along with Weber, Blaukopf also feels that music, caught within the confines of an exhausted and yet restrictive traditional tonality, might find itself near the end of a dead-end street. Twentieth century composition has reached the limits of its tonal system: these limits can only be transcended by a radical transformation. Of course, Blaukopf is familiar with Schoenberg's method of composition, but finds it to be no answer to the current problem. He sees atonality as at best "the expression of the contradiction between the fixed tonal system and the differentiation of tonal consciousness." Aside from Schoenberg's employment of it, he sees the equal temperment of the twelve-tone scale as an obstruction to musical progress. Thus, a major task of

63. Kurt Blaukopf, *Musiksoziolcgie, op.cit.*, p. 91. Blaukopf readily acknowledges his indebtedness to Weber (*ibid.*, p. 5) and claims that Weber's fragment "was a first, clear indication of the necessity of sociological synthesis, frequently demanded of specialized fields, often attempted, but hardly yet accomplished." (Cf. "Musiksoziologie," *op.cit.*, p. 141.) It was Weber who had "underscored the primacy of the acoustic contradictions" within music as the basis of his concern, indicating that "musical material is not only a matter of natural law, but also of social compromise." *Ibid.*, p. 142.

64. Blaukopf, *Musiksoziologie, op.cit.*, pp. 8-10. Of course, Kneif has doubts regarding the validity of this point of departure for a sociology of music: "In the musico-sociological conception of Kurt Blaukopf the tonal system as the material substratum of music has actually assumed primacy over aspects of technical manipulation, such as that of stylistically relevant formulation. Therewith the historical image of the *Communist Manifesto* celebrates its entrance into the history of music." Cf. Kneif, *Musiksoziologie, op.cit.*, p. 44.

65. Blaukopf, *Musiksoziologie, op.cit.*, p. 13. Kneif, however, feels that Blaukopf has missed the mark in his desire to probe the depths of music, going beyond the aesthetic threshold and reaching a point where his concern "with acoustic material is not actually a concern with music as an art of tonal associations and relations" but rather with acoustical phenomena per se. Cf. Kneif, *Musiksoziologie, op.cit.*, p. 45.

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sociology of music should be "the critical destruction of the fetishism which evaluates all music of past epochs according to the conventions of our 'equal temperment of the twelve-tone scale'."[66] Consequently, he sees the compositional method known as "twelve-tone technique" as "the expression of a protest—an impotent protest, to be sure—against the constraint of the existing tonal system."[67]

Blaukopf is concerned with reform and carries out his analysis in the name of a better future—not simply as an end in itself: "The role music plays in a particular society—i.e., its social function—opens its inner technical and aesthetic development to very definite possibilities, at the same time establishing very exact boundaries within this development.[68] This leads to the visionary conclusion that the sociology of music will allow the planning of musical devlopments in the future—a thesis which Silbermann also develops.

Since Silbermann's *Sociology of Music* is available in English, only a brief sketch of his work need be included. He is the major representative of an empirical sociology of music and his influence during his tenure at the University of Cologne has been of such magnitude that "one may speak of a Cologne school in the sociology of music."[69] As the title of the opening chapter of his book, "How does one approach music?" indicates, Silbermann reveals that he is concerned with musical phenomena largely from the perspective of the listener, rather than from that of the composer. Because of this, his work is a happy balance to Adorno's.[70] Furthermore, unlike many others in the field, Silbermann allows for a pluralism of methods, which frees his work from dogmatism. Like Weber, he feels that the sociologist's work must be "value-free."[71]

Silbermann's empiricist approach is based on what he labels "the musical experience:" "Music can only be grasped in the moment of contact between artist and listener, the moment when the musical work, so to speak, proceeds outward, when it not only contributes to the evolution of life or creates new values, but produces a meaningful moment: the moment which is the musical experience for society."[72]

66. Blaukopf, *Musiksoziologie, op.cit.*, p. 13.
67. Blaukopf, "Musiksoziologie," *op.cit.*, p. 152.
68. Blaukopf, *Musiksoziologie, op.cit.*, p. 16.
69. Cf. Etzkorn, "Introduction" to Honigsheim, *op.cit.*, p. 28.
70. As Kurt Oppens has commented, Adorno's "philosophy is one of composing, rather than of music." *Op.cit.*, p. 18. Silbermann and Adorno were personally on good terms and Adorno vehemently denied any personal prejudice against an empirical sociology of music. Cf. his "Thesen über Kunstsoziologie," *op.cit.*, p. 95.
71. Thus, he writes that: "When, in the course of this study, we examine the structural elements of the musical world, we shall not be doing this in terms of 'good' or 'bad,' but according to the degree of functional effectiveness in a specific social context." Cf. his *Sociology, op.cit.*, p. 14. "Value judgments," he states conclusively, "are not the concern of the sociology of music." *Ibid.*, p. 180.
72. *Ibid.*, p. 74. This view, however, throws Silbermann's empirical sociology open to criticism. Silbermann's "experience" is far too personal and individual of a phenomenon and, as Adorno objects: "Silbermann's experience is too manifold a phenomenon; it can't be confirmed." Cf. "Thesen über Kunstsoziologie," *op.cit.*, p. 96. According to Adorno, what Silbermann seeks as experience can be studied only in terms of a culminative effect.

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According to Silbermann, the ultimate goal of the sociology of music is the planning of a meaningful function of music in the future. This gives his work an enviable optimism: "I am convinced that the musico-sociological approach to music will make music available to a much more widespread audience."[73] Like Blaukopf, he feels that the sociology of music can help rescue music from its current state of stagnation: "If he employs the sociology of music together with musical history, e.g., for the purposes of socio-musical planning, the sociologist of music is on the right road. But if he uses them as a means of prophesying the complete dissolution, the slow death or the rapid re-growth of a culture, then he is abandoning the role of sociologist for that of prophet—and, one might add, as often as not degenerating into a mere windbag in the process."[74] No names are mentioned, but one wonders whether Silbermann does not have Adorno in mind.

Silbermann later contrasts his attitude towards planning with the more revolutionary approach of other schools. With characteristic restraint, his approach "seeks gradually to persuade musical society into adapting itself to new factors in life, without endangering anything which is cherished by groups and individuals, and at the same time to protect it from the worst things that could happen in musical life. Without subjecting either music itself or individual tastes to withering sarcasms, without any form of violence, they wish to throw overboard what is demonstrably evil and to attain what is demonstrably the best."[75] In his positive evaluation of mankind and its potential for progress, Silbermann sees the concert audience looking to music for direction: "Instead of acting according to prescribed behavior...," the public is involved during the consumption of the musical experience "in an effort to reach some kind of action; it is, in other words, compelled to create its own behavioral action."[76] The audience is thus revealed as the fertile field for planning.

Joseph Mathias Hauer (1881-1959)

A composer whose significance for the sociology of music has been emphasized recently by Zobl is the "other" developer of the technique of

73. Silbermann, *Sociology, op.cit.*, p. 111.

74. *Ibid.*, p. 35. Kneif objects to the entire concept of a relation between sociology of music and planning: "The connection to the future is simply not there.... Sociology of music is at every juncture a form of self-sufficient cognition and, as such, according to the individual case it is subject to justification or suspicion." The larger pattern seen by Silbermann is simply not there. See Kneif, *Musiksoziologie, op.cit.*, p. 31.

75. Silbermann, *ibid.*, p. 200.

76. *Ibid.*, p. 194. Similarly, Dahlhaus focuses upon "the musical event," defined as "the complex of composition, interpretation and reception," which is related to Silbermann's experience of music. This is obviously far more comprehensive than Silbermann's experience, which is restricted largely to the listener. Dahlhaus specifies that the musical event, in contrast to a political event, "is not restricted to a single moment in time; it is rather able to outlast the 'event' of its origin and of its first performance." Cf. *Texte, op.cit.*, p. 2. Properly understood as an interaction of composition, interpretation and reception, Dahlhaus' "musical event" leads to the conclusion that in terms of work and text, music is not an object. This view underscores the importance of the historical perspective within the sociology of music and the fact that the work of art at its reception is an ever-changing phenomenon.

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composition with twelve tones, the almost totally unknown Viennese composer Joseph Mathias Hauer. Although Zobl totally rejects Adorno's musico-sociological thought, he is very familiar with that which he rejects. Thus, while Adorno exploited the dialectical method in his juxtaposition of Schoenberg and Stravinsky, Zobl focuses upon the contrasting worlds of Hauer and Schoenberg. His conclusions are as sharp as Adorno's, but in this case, it is Schoenberg who emerges as the "bad guy" of modern music. According to Zobl, "those bourgeois disciplines concerned with art—the most obvious expression of prevailing social consciousness in art—work with the following simple tricks: on the one hand, they attempt to describe the development of the arts as obeying dark, immanent laws of material; on the other hand, when this process reveals itself as too manipulative, imaginary artistic revolutions are made responsible for huge changes in the treatment of the material. This should give rise to the impression that the changes which are not permitted to take place in the base of capitalist society take place in the superstructure."[77] Thus, Zobl sees Schoenberg as a major participant in this act of aesthetic and social deception: "Schoenberg tried to hinder the complete collapse of bourgeois aesthetics. A consequent emancipation of musical material, which in a short time would have called for extensive changes in conditions of production was thereby frustrated." Hauer, on the other hand, pursued the course designed by the system of composition with twelve-tones to its end, i.e., "to the very end of bourgeois art."

Referring to the political upheaval in Germany following the first war, Zobl argues that "a victory of the working classes in Germany would have doubtlessly liquidated Schoenberg's musical reforms along with the rest of the superstructure."[78] In Adorno and his followers Zobl sees only an "abstract-humanistic lamentation" which will do little to improve an already unacceptable situation. Thus, the totality of Adorno's musico-sociological work and the basic theses of the *Philosophy of Modern Music* are considered as nothing but "a blind apology for the Schoenbergian twelve-tone theory." In this, he is supported by Boehmer who claims that "within a social totality, regressive in every aspect, Schoenberg's music furthered the emancipation of musical material. Schoenberg's musical progress has, however, remained totally without resonance in society, and this society has fallen into a state of decay marked by total lack of historical consciousness. Under these conditions, music could do nothing but hibernate; it was thrown into the ocean like a message in a bottle. How and when it will be washed up onto the shores of a society, the structure of which will agree with that anticipated in

77. Wilhelm Zobl, "Kritik der westlichen Avantgarde und ihrer ökonomischen Widersprüche—ausgehend von Hanns Eislers Ueberlegungen," *Engagement*, p. 81.

78. Zobl, "Josef Mathias Hauer," *Materialien zur Musiksoziologie* (henceforth cited as *Materialien*: Vienna and Munich, 1972), p. 41. In his criticism of the continuing bourgeois basis of modern music, Zobl quotes Tucholsky's claim that, "because of bad weather, the German revolution took place in music." Following Eisler's demand for a dialectic of music as "an investigation of the contradictory development of musical material in socially conditioned musical styles," Zobl seeks to apply this untried approach to Hauer's work within the twelve-tone technique.

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music, cannot be anticipated. It remains a vague hope, or—in the case of Adorno—left in the hands of a noble pessimism."[79]

Hanns Eisler (1898-1962)

Among the names currently popular in sociology of music, Eisler is clearly the most relevant figure for both the theory and practice of music; his compositions are counterpointed by continuing essayistic production. The irony of the interest in Eisler is that—aside from the national anthem of the German Democratic Republic, which is now an embarrassment to the citizens of that country because of the text by Joahnnes R. Becher—a performance of a work by the composer is a rare event anywhere. Eisler's importance lies in his combined musical and verbal effort, which sympathetic scholarship sees co-existing in a state of total harmony.[80]

In comparing Eisler with Adorno, Mayer, the editor of Eisler's collected works, traces the distinction between the two men to fundamentally opposing views on musical material. For Eisler, "it is not sufficient. . . merely to practice the sociology of music; it would have to be supplemented through the application of the materialist dialectic to the contradictory development of musical material. The emergence and the dying out, the exhaustion and renewal of musical material in socially conditioned musical styles with their alternating functions would need to be investigated in a 'dialectic of music,' if we are not to fall into a simplistic, vulgar-materialist sociologizing." Contraposed to this "orthodox" view stands "Adorno's Hegelianization" which Eisler himself characterized, with Bert Brecht, as a "Frank-futurist" exercise in the contemplation of pseudo-Marxism: "They would like to be more intelligent than bourgeois theoreticians, but they don't want to fight them.

79. Quoted by Zobl, *ibid.*, p. 47. Boehmer plays here on Adorno's own metaphor. In *Philosophy of Modern Music, op.cit.*, p. 113, Adorno sees the new music of the Viennese School as a "message in a bottle."

80. In May, 1948, less than a year after Eisler's semi-voluntary departure from the U.S. where he had worked in Hollywood in close association with Adorno, Eisler delivered a lecture at the Second International Congress of Composers and Music Critics in Prague entitled "Basic Social Questions in Modern Music." The essay, a brief work of simple beauty and earthy conviction, was published the same year in East Berlin. Two quotations from this lecture are sufficient to indicate the humble person Eisler was at that moment. He refrains from the abstract formulations so frequently disturbing and frustrating in the writings of other Germans: "Of all the arts music is the most distant from the world of practical things. And, consequently, music lends itself most easily to obscurantism and to use as a means of intoxication. Reputedly, music releases feelings. How this takes place has never been terribly clear. Music, at any rate, appears as the abstract opposition to the desolation and monotony of everyday life. The greater the desolation, the more profound the isolation, the sweeter the music becomes." Cf. Hanns Eisler, "Gesellschaftliche Grundfragen der modernen Musik," *Aufbau* 4:7 (1948), p. 551. And: "When Schoenberg, for example, concludes in his *Theory of Harmony* that art must necessarily express truth, one must ask, what truth. Is it a matter of insight into the social position of music, or is reference made to the development of musical material as an abstraction? When Schoenberg speaks of beauty in art, he means a new beauty in art, towards which the artist must strive honestly and truthfully. But this new beauty in art appears in his thought abstractly, as a striving for new nuances, new stimuli and sensations. This is all highly reminiscent of Expressionism before World War I, the circle of the 'Blue Rider,' Kandinsky, Kokoschka, and Franz Mark." *Ibid.*, p. 553.

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They are the chosen pupils of decline."[81]

For Eisler, Marxist theory and practical politics formed an inseparable unity; consequently, the dialectic as he practiced it is theoretically critical, but simultaneously engaged in socio-political revolution. Thus, according to Mayer, Eisler had a much finer perception of the dynamic nature of musical material than Adorno. For Eisler, musical material is never static, but always caught up in an uninterrupted historical process of development. In his analysis of Eisler's specific works, Stephan finds that the composer has fulfilled the only valid demand of the modern work of art: "It stands isolated, obligated only to the historical moment in which it came into being, to which it replies in definite negation, and the definite negation of which it accomplishes. The only criterion which would be adequate could be found in answering the question whether this definite negation actually is accomplished."[82] A similarly enthusiastic admiration of Eisler comes from Zobl, who also contrasts him to Adorno. Adorno's "fantasies on music," as Zobl labels them, "have only the function of imposing a lyric differentiation on the traditional melanges of positivism and inwardness, thus making them all the more marketable."[83] For Zobl, the only alternative to the false relation in which most people stand today to music is in Eisler's theory and praxis: "The central significance of Eisler in the present situation lies in his insight that there is no such thing as an autonomous development of musical material; the historical movement of this material does not apathetically follow an imaginary musical logic, but is rather the result of a dialectical confrontation of the composer with his environment."[84] It is necessary to keep

81. Eisler is quoted in Günter Mayer, "Zur Dialektik des musikalischen Materials," in *Texte, op.cit.*, pp. 203 and 204. According to Mayer, "the volatization of materialism modifies the dialectic in Adorno's case. Thus he fetishizes 'petrified' bourgeois society, losing the objective potential and realities of a better one totally from view. All the rest is impotent utopia, highly questionable from other perspectives as well." *Ibid.* Little affection seems to have remained between Eisler and Adorno after their return to Europe. Adorno, as noted, found no reason to concern himself with musical matters in the "Zone." Although no name is mentioned, it would seem that Eisler has Adorno clearly in mind when he speaks of "analyses of twelve-tone works in which the most tedious artsy-craftiness is often sweetened up with a shot of Kierkegaard." Eisler, *op.cit.*, p. 555. Mayer finds that the dialectic in Adorno's hands became conservative, "a dialectic of stagnation," the radical defiance of compromise feigned by Adorno gambled away every practical negation both in theory and practice. In Mayer, *op.cit.*, p. 204. Similarly, Hans-Klaus Jungheinrich, who finds Eisler today a more relevant figure for the West than for the East, claims that "Eisler's aesthetic and musico-sociological ideas are based on the relation between music and reality—that is to say, on the dialectical mediation of both in a compositional practice which might be designated as realistic." *Op.cit.*, p. 69.

82. Rudolf Stephen, "Kleine Beiträge zur Eisler-Kritik," in *Engagement, op.cit.*, p. 56. Such a positive evaluation of Eisler is possible since, according to Stephan, in the modern age the relation between art and reality has changed completely. Thus, the class aesthetics of German Idealism, the central concept of which is "beauty," are no longer validly applicable. Unmediated reality has now broken into the artistic sphere and "the times in which works of art were structures of unmediated observation, seemingly reposing within themselves, are past." *Ibid.*, p. 53. The modern work of art—or of anti-art, as the case may be—insists upon being understood as an answer to a precisely defined historical situation. *Ibid.*, p. 55.

83. Wilhelm Zobl, "Alternative zur spätbürgerlichen Kunstproduktion? Zum Werk Hanns Eislers," in *Materialien, op.cit.*, p. 57.

84. *Ibid.* Once more, the concept of musical material emerges as central. Eisler himself elucidated the problematic relation between musical material and compositional practices: "If

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the two dialectical confrontations in which the composer engages firmly in mind: on the one hand, with "his environment"—that is, with society—and on the other, through his employment of compositional techniques, with the very material of music. Obviously, there is particular concern here for the composer laboring under a capitalistic system. This results in Eisler's major question: "How can a music which employs the most progressive technical development be brought into harmony with progressive social processes?"[85] Eisler realized that the creation of a truly new music would be an irrelevant achievement as long as no new audience were cultivated for it.[86] For this reason, among others, Eisler himself joined the labor movement early in his career.

Zobl concludes that: "It is hard to imagine how present musical life would look, if, after the war, in that zero hour of German music, Eisler's maxims and not Adorno's bourgeois attitudes had been heeded."[87] Accordingly, Eisler's principles would also have had a decisive influence upon the interpretation and reception of older music by drastically changing the nature of modern concert life, whereby, according to Eisler, the concert-goer "checks his brain along with his hat" before exposing himself to the musical experience.[88]

At least one critical voice dissents from this generally positive evaluation of Eisler's efforts. Although Kolleritsch finds Eisler as a theoretician infinitely preferable to Adorno since Eisler realized that the only meaningful revolution had to take place in the political realm and not just in the arts, he cannot endorse Eisler's compositional achievements: "A double failure must be diagnosed. First, he did not realize artistically the task thich he had assigned himself theoretically. Since the corresponding measure of a critical musical consciousness was evidently lacking in him, or the aesthetic force to carry it through, he escaped into the realm of traditional musical expression.... The music of the engaged composer remains the expression of a state of consciousness which from its own perspective it had set out to change."[89]

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everything is not deceptive, music today has reached a phase in which material and compositional technique have grown unbelievably far apart in the sense that material stands in a relatively indifferent relationship to the technique of composition. The manner of composition has grown so consequent that it is no longer restricted to being the consequence of its own material. Composition is now able to subjugate every material to itself." Quoted in Reinhold Brinkmann, "Kompositorische Massnahmen Eislers," in *MuP, op.cit.*, p. 18.

85. Zobl, *op.cit.*, p. 59.

86. This is why, for Brinkmann, the fundamental distinction between Eisler and Schoenberg's Viennese School lies in their respective attitude towards sonata form. Whereas the Viennese trio—Schoenberg, Berg and Webern—"can only be understood from the perspective of that which is generally called the principle of the sonata, Eisler is rather inclined in his own composition of sonata movements to their negation or nullification." Cf. Brinkmann, *op.cit.*, p. 18. Boehmer comes to a similar conclusion: "Eisler's music is perhaps much less authentic than that of Schoenberg; it has the advantage, however, that it runs the risk of total abrogation of the traditional musico-sociological point of view, a risk to which Schoenberg's music is never exposed." *Op.cit.*, p. 235.

87. Zobl, *op.cit.*, p. 57.

88. *Ibid.*, p. 61.

89. Kolleritsch, *Engagement, op.cit.*, p. 97.

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Adorno: Ad personam

In an age when psychological interpretations of almost all phenomena are irresistable, it is astonishing that so few questions have been asked about the man Adorno and the degree to which his own psychological constitution might have conditioned—indeed, limited—his work in music. Although this may seem at best a peripheral concern within this study, several observations demand inclusion here. In view of Adorno's conviction that certain of Schoenberg's essential works were actually "case studies" and considering the effort of the Frankfurt School to synthesize Marx and Freud, such thoughts seem inevitable. In fact, there are moments of uneasiness in working with Adorno when one finds in his position the imprint of that "authoritarian personality" which he himself fought so vehemently. His efforts to serve the cause of the Enlightenment might have closed his perspective to significant aspects of what he studied.[90]

Little remains to be said upon Adorno's elitism and snobbishness; precisely in his work in music, however, it is felt that a greater humility might have vastly increased his effectiveness.[91] There is further the question whether, if all music were approached with the total seriousness demanded by Adorno, music would not cease to fulfill its recreational role. Adorno had criticized Silbermann for his "elimination of the philosophical dimension" in his sociology.[92] Adorno himself, however, often carries his philosophical bent too far: "Adorno refuses to admit that one misses the point of music or demands too much of it, when one equates it with a system of philosophical or sociological hypotheses."[93] What the reader essentially confronts in Adorno are his own personal associations, or a consciousness caught up in ideology, precisely that against which Adorno campaigned so intensely. The result, Kneif concludes, is that "one ends up shooting at real sparrows with abstract cannons."[94]

90. Thus, Weitzman writes: "Adorno's failure to sympathize, to an even limited degree, with Schoenberg's religious nature reveals his own conflict; and his blind spots could eventually prove detrimental to important aspects of his thesis, for his commentaries on religious phenomena are in truth second-rate and unoriginal. His squeamishness, apparent at the very hint, let alone mention, of the term 'spiritual,' contains malice and cynicism, but hardly the trenchancy one must cower before when men of greater poetic and philosophic gifts have challenged the norms of religion.... Thus the criticism he makes about Schoenberg's religiosity could better serve as a criticism of Adorno himself—in an inverted sense. He finds it necessary to see God—or rather his hatred of, or rejection of, God—and society's blind reverence and fear of God—as his weapon to clear the air." *Op.cit.*, pp. 296-297. One wonders whether it might not be possible to apply to Adorno Rieff's account of Freud, particularly of Freud's fascination with Cromwell: "The affinity for militant puritanism, not uncommon among secular Jewish intellectuals, indicates a certain preferred character type, starched with independence and cerebral rectitude rather than with a particular belief or doctrine." Cf. *Sigmund Freud, The Mind of a Moralist* (New York, 1961), p. 284.

91. Kneif, for example, notes in Adorno the ease with which "credulity of the uninitiated can be ruthlessly exploited by the 'expert'." Cf. Tibor Kneif, "Ideen zu einer dualistischen Musikästhetik," in *IRASM* 1:1 (1970), p. 16. Others, in commenting upon Adorno's concept of the "adequate listener" have concluded that, in Adorno's eyes, the only fully adequate listener to music would be, indeed, Mr. Adorno himself.

92. Adorno, "Thesen über Kunstsoziologie," *op.cit.*, p. 101.

93. Kneif, *Musiksoziologie*, *op.cit.*, p. 107.

94. *Ibid.* In his analysis of Adorno, Kneif relates his work to that of the earlist German critics

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The most outspoken—indeed, even bitter—critic of Adorno is Konrad Boehmer (born in 1941), who in many respects represents the German New Left's rejection of Adorno in the late 1960s. According to Boehmer, Adorno's concept of art was outspokenly pre-Marxist and totally bourgeois. Although Adorno repeatedly stated that works of art—no matter how mediated—are found in material conditions, Boehmer finds that Adorno's bourgeois desire that this might some day be shown to be false obstructed any creative development of this perspective. Adorno's total rootedness in bourgeois life—and particularly in the music of the eighteenth up to the early twentieth centuries—prevented his development of an adequate critical approach: "No matter what the object of Adorno's sociology of music is, it is measured against the music of the bourgeois epoch, a music whose eminent political function was to withdraw once and for all from any type of political subordination into a position of autonomy where it might fully develop and differentiate."[95]

Boehmer claims that Adorno has not rigorously analyzed the relation between music and society and "has contributed to further reification and isolation of the spirit—the most negative accomplishment of the Frankfurt School."[96] Although Adorno has accomplished a great deal in his analysis of the conditions of production, he has never asked the fundamental question: What has produced these conditions? This question would shed light on the class-character of music, no matter how much the musical products themselves might deny it.[97] This is not merely a party-line polemic, for Boehmer is aware that "socialist" countries in Eastern Europe have not succeeded in producing a music which fulfills the demands of their own made in the past to develop "an unreflective affirmative music." Thus, Boehmer concludes, "Adorno's sociology of music never succeeded in transcending its own postulates—those of bourgeois music, in the criticism of which it engaged but upon which it remained dependent, since it never drew the consequences of its criticism. This criticism rather closed itself off from those conclusions hermetically. Following Adorno's death, sociology of music must ask itself

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of music, E.T.A. Hoffmann and Jean-Paul Richter, who claimed that musical criticism, to be worthy of the intention and niveau of its object, had to transform itself into a work of art as well. Kneif concludes: "Adorno's spiritual posture is disguised Romanticism and the irritation in his voice is derived from his realization that Romanticism today is viewed with distrust." Despite Adorno's own contention that he was in no way hostile to empirical orientation in sociology, Kneif finds his "sovereign neglect of empirical reality astonishing and contradictory, resulting in a cerebral poetry, the culinary preparation of which floods the reader with sensual pleasures." Cf. Kneif, *ibid.*

95. Boehmer, *op.cit.*, p. 227. By dwelling so narrowly upon the musical aspects of the bourgeoisie, Adorno failed to come to terms with social reality in his own age and with the social foundation of its art: "That precisely those authentic artistic expressions of the bourgeoisie are built upon the economic exploitation of the lower classes which made possible the free spiritual production of the bourgeoisie, from which the proletariat was simultaneously excluded, should be reflected by sociology of music as its *primum bene datur*, if this sociology is not to prostitute itself as the apology of an art of domination, thus becoming one-sided in the worst possible sense." *Ibid.*, p. 229.

96. Boehmer, *op.cit.*, pp. 231-232.

97. *Ibid.*, p. 232.

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what it really wants to do. It must confront the problem of a politically relevant relation of theory and praxis anew—not only theoretically, but practically as well, if it is not to fall back into Adorno's theoretical fatalism. It must realize that human beings are not to be made into ominous musical subjects, but rather into social objects. Every consequent sociology of music must fight its way through to this point of view, if it is to become aware of its own isolation. *Sociology of music after Adorno must see through itself as ideology. Le roi est mort, vive la République.*"[98]

Whither the Sociology of Music?

This investigation began by evoking the image of the Promised Land, entrance into which has not yet been gained. Unfortunately, all of the dissonant observations included here lead to no harmonious conclusion. My own desire to offer a polyphonic picture of the sociology of music has resulted in chaos and cacophony, for only thus does the current state of the discipline allow presentation. The future direction of the discipline will, it seems to me, be conditioned largely by the work of Adorno and Kneif, precisely because of their disagreement on certain major issues. Adorno's central position in the field has certainly been revealed here beyond dispute; Kneif's *Sociology of Music* is in many ways an anti-sociology of music which takes issue with the entire field. It is Kneif who has thought most deeply in musico-sociological matters since Adorno's death and close attention must be paid to his future work. Sociology of music will continue, even if there is no indication that the "central point" from which it should proceed, according to Kneif, will soon be reached. Adorno said that "the future of sociology of music depends upon the refinement and reflection of musical-analytical methods themselves;"[99] although agreement on these methods remains a distant goal, current work in the field shows far less vagueness and generalization. It is possible, therefore, to feel that the process of refinement has begun.

The question concerning the future of the discipline in the United States remains altogether unanswered. It is probably the sociologist rather than the musicologist who must respond. Perhaps sociological problems of the hour will remain so demanding that concern for such a cerebral field will remain here the "bourgeois luxury" of which Kneif has spoken.

To many, this study will seem harsh in its criticism of Adorno, but, I assume, his work is of such strength and solidity that it can withstand even the sharpest attack. When I recently went back to his *Sociology of Music* after several years, the encounter was surprisingly pleasant. Perhaps this book is Adorno's major legacy—a major document of his last decade speaking directly and passionately to a young audience. There is in it perhaps something of the spirit of Jakob Burckhardt who felt so keenly the transitory nature of the cultural heritage which was his life and to the preservation of which he devoted such affectionate energy. It is this subjective aspect of his

98. *Ibid.*, p. 237.
99. Adorno, "Ideen zur Musiksoziologie," *op.cit.*, p. 13.

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work which causes me to join Oppens in calling "Adorno's musical criticism one of the major creative accomplishments of the period since World War II."[100]

Silbermann, distinguished among all the men included here by his obviously humanistic orientation, offers a challenge to the sociologist of music with which I should like to conclude: "Only if, through no matter what process, freedom were to be lost and human dignity destroyed, would progress of all kinds mean not further development, but a new barbarism—in which music would hardly be at home. 'Preserve culture!' —Since the beginning of the machine age, this has been the cry of all those who fear the dehumanization of mankind and are concerned for his culture. They place culture, in fact, in a defensive position; and, despite all their good intentions, do not succeed in elevating culture, ethics and the arts of mankind into the desired dominating position above politics and technology. The reason for this is that they set out from the position that it is humanity and the work of art which must be defended and saved, thus forgetting the fact that it is, quite simply, man who must be saved."[101]

100. Oppens, *op.cit.*, p. 9.
101. Silbermann, *Sociology, op.cit.*, pp. 206-207.

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ALIENATED MASTERPIECE: THE *MISSA SOLEMNIS* (1959)

by Theodor W. Adorno

Neutralization of culture—the words have the ring of a philosophical concept. They posit as a more or less general reflection that intellectual constructs have forfeited their intrinsic meanings because they have lost any possible relation to social praxis and have become that which aesthetics retrospectively claims they are—objects of pure observation, of mere contemplation. As such they ultimately lose even their own aesthetic import; their aesthetic truth content disappears along with their tension *vis-à-vis* reality. They become cultural goods, exhibited in a secular pantheon in which contradictions, works which would tend to destroy each other, find a deceptively peaceful realm of co-existence, e.g., Kant and Nietzsche, Bismarck and Marx, Clemens Brentano and Büchner. This wax museum of great men finally admits its own disconsolateness in the innumerable ignored pictures of each museum and in the editions of the classics in miserly locked up bookcases. But no matter how widespread the consciousness of all this has meantime become, it is still as difficult as ever to grasp this phenomenon in its entirety, at least if one ignores the fashion of biographical writing which reserves a niche for this queen and that microbe hunter. For there is no superfluous work of Rubens in which at least the cognoscenti would not admire the incarnate value and no house poet of the Cotta Firm in whose work there are no non-contemporarily successful verses awaiting resurrection. Every now and then, however, it is possible to name a work in which the neutralization of culture has expressed itself most strikingly; a work, in fact, which in addition is also famous, which occupies an uncontested place in the repertoire even while it remains enigmatically incomprehensible; and one which, whatever else it may conceal, offers no justification for the admiration accorded it. No less a work than Beethoven's *Missa Solemnis* belongs in this category. To speak seriously of this work can mean nothing less than, in Brecht's terms, to alienate it; to break through the aura of irrelevant worship which protectively surrounds it and thereby perhaps to contribute something to an authentic aesthetic experience of it beyond the paralysing respect of the academic sphere. This attempt necessarily requires criticism as its medium. Qualities which have been assigned without any thought by traditional consciousness to the *Missa Solemnis* must be tested in order to prepare for a recognition of its content, a recognition which to this day is still missing. This

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effort is not one of debunking, of tearing down recognized greatness for the sake of tearing something down. The disillusioning gesture which pulls down from the heights the very thing it attacks is by that very act subservient to the substance of that which it pulls down. Instead, criticism with regard to a work of such demand and with regard to the total *oeuvre* of Beethoven, can only be a means of penetrating the work. It is the fulfillment of a duty *vis-à-vis* the work and not a means of gaining malicious satisfaction from knowing that once again there is one less great work in the world. It is necessary to point this out, because neutralized culture makes certain that the names of the authors are taboo while the constructs themselves are no longer perceived in their original contents. Rather they are merely consumed as socially acceptable works. Rage is immediately provoked whenever reflection about the work threatens to touch the authority of the author.

This situation must be anticipated whenever one prepares to say something heretical about a composer of the highest authority, one whose power is comparable only to the philosophy of Hegel and is still undiminished at a time when the historical preconditions of his work are irrevocably lost. But Beethoven's power of humanity and of demythologization demands by its very existence the destruction of mythical taboos. There is, of course, among musicians an underground tradition of critical reserve about the *Missa*. They have also long known that Handel is no Bach and that the actual compositional qualities of Gluck are questionable. Only fear of established public opinion made them keep their own opinions to themselves. So too they have known that there is something peculiar about the *Missa Solemnis*. Little truly penetrating has been written about it. Most of what has been written makes general pronouncements of awe about an immortal *chef d'oeuvre*, and it is easy to note the embarrassment of these writers which prevents them from stating wherein this supposed greatness actually lies. The neutralization of the *Missa* to cultural produce is reflected in such writings, but it is not overcome. Hermann Kretzschmar, who comes from a generation of music historians which had not yet cast off the experiences of the 19th century, expressed the most significant admiration for this work. According to his writing the earliest performances of the work, before its official acceptance into Valhalla, made no lasting impression. He sees the chief difficulty in the *Gloria* and *Credo* and supports his view with reference to the large number of short musical images which require the listener to organize them into a unity. Kretzschmar has at least named one of the alienating symptoms which the *Missa* exhibits. On the other hand, he has overlooked the manner in which this symptom is connected to the essence of the composition and has, therefore, expressed the erroneous opinion that the resultant musical difficulties could be overcome by the use of an enclosure of these short sections by powerful major themes in both the long movements. But this is as little the case as asserting, for example, that the listener comprehends the *Missa* as soon as he has present in mind the preceding parts in concentrated form in accordance with the

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principle of comprehending the great symphonic movements of Beethoven. The listener then, supposedly follows in this manner the creation of unity from diversity. This unity itself is of a completely different type from the productive power of fantasy in the *Eroica* and in the *Ninth Symphony*. It is not a crime to doubt that his unity is so obviously comprehendable.

Indeed, the historical fate of this work is an alienating factor. It could only be performed twice during Beethoven's lifetime; once, but in incomplete form, in Vienna in 1824, together with the *Ninth Symphony*, and a second time that same year in Petersburg in complete form. Up to the beginning of the 1860s, it was performed only occassionally. It was more than 30 years after the composer's death that it achieved its current standing. The difficulties of interpretation—above all in the treatment of the vocal parts, and not, in most sections any particular musical complexities—are not sufficient reason for this late discovery. Contrary to legend, the last quartets, which are in many ways far more expounded and far more demanding, found from the outset a respectable reception. But Beethoven had lent his own authority directly on behalf of the *Missa* in a manner decidedly different from his usual custom. He designated it "*l'oeuvre le plus accompli*," his most successful work, when he offered it for subscription, and he wrote over the *Kyrie* the words "from the heart—may it go to hearts," a confession the like of which one may search for in vain in all the other printed editions of Beethoven's works. It is not possible to treat his own attitude to his work either lightly or to accept it blindly. The tone of that remark is conjuring, as if Beethoven had sensed something of the incomprehensible, reserved, and enigmatic quality of the *Missa* and had tried through the force of his will (as that force of will had ever stamped the content of his music) to force the work externally upon those whom it did not of its own power compel. This would hardly be conceivable if the work did not itself contain a secret quality which Beethoven believed justified him in influencing the history of this work. But when it had eventually established itself it was much aided by what had become in the meantime the unassailable prestige of the composer. His major sacred work was vouchsafed as a sister work the same admiration accorded to the *Ninth Symphony* without anyone daring to ask questions which might merely reveal the lack of depth of the questioner, as in the fairy tale of the emperor's new clothes.

The *Missa* would never have attained to an unquestioned place in the repetoire if it had caused a drastic shock, like *Tristan*, by its difficulty. But that is not the case. If one ignores the occasionally unusual demands made on the singing voice, a demand the work shares with the *Ninth Symphony*, the work may be seen to contain little that exceeds the circumference of traditional musical language. Very large parts are homophonous and even the fugues and fugati fit without difficulty into the thorough-bass pattern. The progressions of the harmonic intervals and with them the surface context, are seldom if ever problematic. The *Missa Solemnis* was composed far less against prevailing compositional traditions than are the quartets and

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variations, the five late sonatas and the Bagatelle cycli. The *Missa* is distinguished more by certain archaicizing moments of harmony—church modes—rather than by the advanced compositional daring of the great quartet fugue (opus 133). Not only did Beethoven always keep a stricter separation among the compositional genres than one suspects, but he also incorporated in them temporally different stages of his *oeuvre*. If the symphonies are in many respects simpler than the major works of the chamber music because of or despite the richer resources of the orchestra, the *Ninth Symphony* is clearly different and returns retrospectively to the classical symphonies of Beethoven without the sharp edges of the last quartets. In his late period the composer did not, as one might think, blindly follow the dictates of his inner ear, nor did he forcibly estrange himself from the sensual aspect of his work. Instead, he disposed sovereignly over all the possibilities which had grown up in the history of his composing. Desensualization was but one of these possibilities. The *Missa* shares with the last quartets an occasional abruptness, i.e., the lack of transitions. Otherwise there are few similarities. Altogether it reveals a sensuous aspect quite opposed to the intellectualized late style, an inclination to splendidness and tonal monumentality which usually is lacking in that late style. This aspect is incorporated technically in the process which in the *Ninth Symphony* is restricted to brief moments of ecstasy, doubling the parts through brasses, above all horns, which carry the melody. The frequently powerful octaves are related to this aspect as well, coupled with harmonic bass effects of the type contained in the well known "Die Himmel rühmen des Ewigen Ehre" and decisively in the passage "Ihr stürzt neider" in the *Ninth Symphony*, later important in Bruckner. Clearly it is to no small extent these sensuous high points, an inclination to the tonally overwhelming, which gave the *Missa* its authority and helped its audiences over their own lack of understanding.

The real difficulty is greater than any of these. It is one of content, of the meaning of the music. It can perhaps be best formulated by asking whether someone ignorant of the work would recognize the *Missa*, apart from certain sections, as a work of Beethoven. If one played it to those who had never heard any part of it and had them guess who the composer was, one could expect some surprises. As little as the so-called imprint (*Handscrift*) of a composer forms a central criterion, its absence nevertheless reveals all the more that something isn't quite right. If one searches among Beethoven's other works of church music, one encounters this absence of the Beethoven imprint again. It is significant how difficult it is even to dredge up his *Christ on the Mount of Olives* or the by no means early *C Major Mass*, opus 86. The latter could, by contrast to the *Missa*, scarcely be attributed to Beethoven even in separate sections or phrases. Its indescribably calm "Kyrie" would seem at most to indicate a weak Mendelsohn. But throughout this work there are sections which reappear in the much more demandingly formed and more splendidly planned *Missa*. These include the dissolution into often short,

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hardly symphonically integrated parts, a lack of decisive thematic inspirations which otherwise characterize each work of Beethoven, and a lack of discharging dynamic developments. The *C Major Mass* reads as if Beethoven had decided only with difficulty to feel his way into what was for him a strange genre. It is as if his humanism rebelled against the heteronomy of the traditional liturgical text and as if his composition of this text surrendered to a routine which cost it all its genius. In order to get to the enigma of the *Missa* at all it will be necessary to call to mind this moment of his early church music. In the *Missa*, of course, it becomes a problem against which he struggles, wearing out his strength, but it helps in identifying something of the conjuring nature of the work. The problem cannot be separated from the paradox of Beethoven composing a mass at all. If one could understand fully why he did it, one would certainly be able to understand the *Missa*.

It is customary to assert that the *Missa* far exceeds the traditional form of the mass and to accord it the entire wealth of the secular compositions. Even in the music volume of the Fischer Lexicon recently edited by Rudolf Stephan, which otherwise does away with many conventional platitudes, the piece is credited with being an "extraordinarily artistic thematic work." In so far as one can talk about such work in the *Missa* at all, it utilizes a method of kaleidoscopic mixing and supplementary combinations exceptional in Beethoven. The motifs do not change with the dynamic pull of the composition—it has no such pull—but rather constantly reappear in changing light though they are always identical. The idea of exploded form may apply to the extenal dimensions at best, and Beethoven doubtless considered this idea when he contemplated concert performance. But the *Missa* does not at all break out of the pre-planned objectivity of the model through any subjective dynamic, nor does it create the totality in symphonic spirit out of itself. On the contrary, the consequent denial of all this removes the *Missa* from any direct connection with Beethoven's other works, with the exception of his previously mentioned earlier church music. The internal construction of this music, its fever, is radically different from everything which distinguishes Beethoven's style. It is itself archaic. The form is not achieved through developing variations from basic motifs, but arises largely from sections imitative in themselves, similar to the method of the Dutch composers around the middle of the 15th century, and it is uncertain how well Beethoven knew their work. The formal organization of the whole work is not that of a process developing through its own impetus—it is not dialectical—but seeks accomplishment by a balance of the individual sections, of the movements, ultimately through contrapuntal enclosure. All the estranging characteristics can be seen in this light. The fact that Beethoven did not use his own type of themes in the *Missa*—who after all can sing a passage from it the way one can sing a passage from any one of the symphonies or from *Fidelio*—can be explained by the exclusion of the organizational principle. It is only wherever a presented theme is developed

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and has, therefore, to be recognizable in its subsequent development, that it needs plastic form. Such an idea was foreign to the *Missa* as well as to medieval music. One need only compare the Bach "Kyrie" with that of Beethoven. In Bach's fugue there is an incomparably memorable melody which suggests the image of humanity as a procession dragging itself along while bowed down under the heaviest of burdens. In Beethoven's work there are complexes almost without melodic profile which delineate the harmony and avoid expression with a gesture of monumentality. This comparison leads to a real paradox. According to the current if questionable view, Bach, in recapitulating the objective-closed musical world of the Middle Ages, had brought the fugue to its pure and authentic form even if he was not the creator of this musical form. The fugue was as much his product as he was the product of its spirit. He stood in a direct relationship to the fugue. For that reason many of his fugue themes, with the possible exception of his speculative late works, have a kind of freshness and spontaneity about them comparable only to the cantabile-like inspirations of the subjective composers. At the historic moment of Beethoven's creativity, however, that form of musical organization, the reflection of which Bach still regarded as an *a priori* of his compositions, was no longer valid. With it disappeared a harmony of the musical subject and the musical forms which had permitted something akin to naivete in Schiller's sense of the word. The objectivity of the musical forms with which Beethoven worked in the *Missa* is mediated and problematic—an object of reflection.The first part of the "Kyrie" includes Beethoven's own standpoint of subjective-harmonious being. But since this standpoint is also immediately pushed into the horizon of sacred objectivity, it takes on a mediated character as well, separated from the composed spontaneity—it is stylised. For that reason the smooth harmonious opening section of the *Missa* is more remote and less eloquent than the contrapuntal learnedness of Bach. That is particularly true of the actual fugues and fugati themes of the *Missa*. They have a peculiar character of quotation as if they had been built according to models. One could speak of compositional topics analogous to the wide spread literary custom in antiquity, or of the treatment of music according to latent patterns through which the objective demand is strengthened. That is very likely responsible for the peculiar incomprehensibility, for the withdrawness from any primary completion, which is characteristic of these fugue themes and is then also encountered in their further development in the work. The first fugal section of the *Missa*, the "Christe eleison" in B minor, is an example of this and at the same time demonstrates the work's archaicizing tone.

In point of fact, the work stands removed both from all subjective dynamics as well as from expression. The "Credo" hurries over the Crucifixus—in Bach this is one of the expressive high points—marking it, however, with a very striking rhythm. Only at the "Et sepultus est," at the end of the Passion itself, does the section reach an expressive concentration in thoughts about the

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frailty of the human being, however, and not about the Passion of Christ. But that pathos cannot be attributed to the contrast of the following "Et resurrexit" which, at an analogous point in Bach, reaches toward the extreme of that emotion. Only one section, one which has also become the most famous of the work, is an exception to this, and that is the "Benedictus," the chief melody of which suspends stylization. The prelude to this section is a piece of intensely deep harmonious proportions having an equivalent only in the *Twentieth Diabelli Variation*. But the "Benedictus" melody itself, rightly praised as inspired, resembles the variation theme of the E-flat major quartet, opus 127. The entire "Benedictus" reminds one of that custom attributed to certain artists in the late Middle Ages—those who are said to have included their own portraits somewhere on their tabernacles for the host so that they would not be forgotten. But even the "Benedictus" remains true to the color of the entire work. It is divided into sections by intonations, like the other sections, and the polyphony always paraphrases the chords figuratively. That in turn is the result of the planned thematic looseness of the compositional process. It permits the themes to be treated imitatively yet to be conceived harmoniously in keeping with the basic homophonous consciousness of Beethoven and his era. The process of archaicizing was to respect the limits of Beethoven's musical experience. The great exception is the "Et vitam venturi" of the *Credo* in which Paul Becker correctly saw the nucleus of the entire work. It is a polyphonically fully developed fugue, in certain details, particularly in harmonic twists, it is related to the finale of the *Hammerklavier Sonata*, leading into a grand development. Therefore, it is also quite explicit melodically and heightened to an extreme by its intensity and power. This piece—perhaps the only one which is entitled to the epithet "explosive"—is the most difficult one in terms of complexity and performance, but together with the "Benedictus" is the simplest by virtue of the directness of the effect.

It is no accident that the transcendental moment of the *Missa Solemnis* does not refer to the mystical content of transubstantiation but to the hope of eternal life for humanity. The enigma of the *Missa Solemnis* is the tie between an archaic methodology mercilessly sacrificing all Beethoven's conquests and human tone which appears to mock precisely this archaic tone. That enigma—the combination of the idea of the human with a mysterious articulation-shyness—can perhaps be deciphered by assuming that there is in the *Missa* a tangible taboo which determines its reception—a taboo about the negativity of existence, derived from Beethoven's despairing will to survive. The *Missa* is expressive wherever it addresses or literally conjurs up salvation. It usually cuts off that expression wherever evil and death dominate in the text of the mass, and precisely through this suppression the *Missa* demonstrates the gradually dawning superior power of the negative; despair and yet anxiety of having that despair become manifest. The "Dona nobis pacem" assumes in a certain sense the burden of the "Crucifixus." The expressive potential is accordingly held back. The dissonant parts are only rarely the

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bearers of this expression (e.g., in the "Sanctus" before the Allegro opening of the "Pleni sunt coeli"). The expression clings much more often to the archaic portions, to the church modal gradations, to the awe about the past, as if the suffering were to be thrown back into the transitory realm. Not the modern but the ancient is expressive in the *Missa*. The human idea asserts itself in this work, as it did in the works of the later Goethe, only by virtue of convulsive, mythic denial of the mythical abyss. It calls upon positive religion for help whenever the lonely subject no longer trusted that it could of itself, as pure human essence, dispel the forward surging chaos of conquered and protesting nature. The recourse to mention of Beethoven's subjective piety as an explanation of the fact that the composer, emancipated to the extreme and self reliant, tended toward traditional form, is as unsatisfying as the opposite extreme found in the academic sphere. There the explanation for this which is offered claims that his religiosity in this work, which subjects itself with zealous discipline to the liturgical purpose, extends beyond dogma to a kind of universal religiosity. The claim, therefore, is made that his is a mass for Unitarians. But confessions or announcements of subjective piety in relation to Christology have been repressed by the work. In the section where the liturgy dictates unavoidably the "I believe," Beethoven, according to Steuermann's astonishing observation, betrayed the opposite of such certainty by having the fugue theme repeat the word Credo as if the isolated man had to assure himself and others of his actual belief by this frequent repetition. The religiosity of the *Missa*, if one can speak unconditionally of such a thing, is neither that of one secure in belief nor that of a world religion of such an idealistic nature that it would require no effort of its adherent to believe in it. Expressed in more modern terms, it is a matter for Beethoven of whether ontology, the objective intellectual organization of existence, is still possible. It is a question of the musical salvation of such ontology in the realm of subjectivism and the return to the liturgy is intended to effect this salvation in a manner paralleled only in Kant's evocation of the ideas of God, Freedom, and Immortality. In its aesthetic form the work asks what and how one may sing of the absolute without deceit, and because of this, there occurs that compression which alienates it and causes it to approach incomprehensibility. This is so perhaps because the question which it asks itself refuses even musically the valid answer. The subject then remains exiled in its finiteness. The objective cosmos can no longer be imgined as an obligatory construct. Thus the *Missa* balances on point of ineffectivity which approaches nothingness.

Its humanistic aspect is defined by the plenitude of chords in the "Kyrie" and extends to the construction of the concluding section, the "Agnus Dei," which prefigures the "Dona nobis pacem," the plea for inner and outer peace. Beethoven superscribed the section with the equivalent German words, and the piece once more breaks out expressively after the threat of war allegorically presented by drums and trumpets. Already at the "Et homo factus est," the

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music begins to warm as if breathed upon. But these are the exceptions. Most of the time, despite stylization, the work procedes in tone and style back toward something unexpressed, undefined. This aspect, resulting from the mutually contradictory forces in the work, is perhaps the one which interferes most with its comprehension. Having been conceived in a flat and undynamic manner, the *Missa* is not arranged according to pre-classical "terraces." In fact, it often erases even the slightest contours. Short inserts frequently do not converge into the whole nor do they stand on their own; rather they rely upon their proportions to other parts. The style is contrary to the spirit of the sonata and yet not as much traditionally ecclesiastical as secular in a rudimentary ecclesiastical language dredged up from memory. The relationship to this language is as chaotic as it is to Beethoven's own style. It is distantly analogous to the position of the *Eighth Symphony* with regard to Haydn and Mozart. Except in the Et-vitam-venturi fugue, even the fugue sections are not genuinely polyphonic but are also in no measure homophonously melodious in the manner of the 19th century. While the category of totality, which in Beethoven's works is always the major one, results in other works from the internal development of the individual parts, it is retained in the *Missa* only at the price of a kind of leveling. The omnipresent stylization principle no longer tolerates anything which is truly unique and whittles the character of the work down to the level of the scholastic. These motifs and themes resist being named. The lack of dialectical contrasts which are replaced by the mere opposition of closed phrases weakens at times the totality. That is particularly obvious in conclusions of movements. Because no direction is traversed, because no individual resistance has been overcome, the trace of the accidental is carried over to the entire work itself, and the phrases, which no longer terminate in a specific goal prescribed by the thrust of the particular, frequently end exhausted; they cease without achieving the security of a conclusion. Despite an external manifestation of powerfulness, all this nevertheless causes a feeling of indirectness to prevail, a feeling which is at an equal distance both from a liturgical connection and from compositional fantasy. It rather brings about that enigmatic quality which at times, as in the brief allegro and presto sections of the "Agnus," borders on the absurd.

After all that has been written above, it might appear that the *Missa*, characterized in all its uniqueness, could now be understood. But the dark quality of the work, perceived as such, does not brighten without further analysis. To understand that one does not understand is the first step toward understanding but is not understanding itself. The above mentioned characteristics of the work can be confirmed by listening to it, and the attention which is concentrated on those characteristics may prevent a disoriented listening, but by themselves they do not allow the ear spontaeously to perceive a musical purpose or meaning in the *Missa*. If it exists at all, such a meaning lies precisely in the resistance to such spontaneity. This much at

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least is certain: the alienating aspects of the work do not disappear in the presence of the comfortable formula which asserts that the autonomous fantasy of the composer chose a heteronomous form removed from his will and fantasy, and that the specific development of his music had thereby been hindered. For it would seem apparent that Beethoven did not try in the *Missa* to legitimize himself in a genre not familiar to him as well as in his "actual" works. This kind of legitimation has been attempted before in the history of music. But in Beethoven's case, there was an attempt not to overburden that unfamiliar genre. Instead, each measure of the work as well as the length of the process of composition—unusual for Beethoven—shows the most insistent effort on the composer's part. But the effort is not, as in his other works, directed at the accomplishment of the subjective intention, but rather at its exclusion. The *Missa Solemnis* is a work of such exclusion, of permanent renunciation. It is already to be counted among those efforts of the later bourgeois spirit which no longer hope to conceive and form in any concrete manner the universally human, but which strive instead to accomplish this end through abstraction, through the process of exclusion of the accidental by means of maintaining a firm grasp on a universal which had gone astray in the reconciliation with the particular. The metaphysical truth in this work becomes a residue, as in Kantian philosophy the contentless simplicity of the pure "I think." This residual nature of truth, the rejection of the permeation of the particular, condemns the *Missa Solemnis* not merely to being enigmatic, but stamps it in a highest sense with the mark of impotence. It is the impotence not merely of the mightiest composer but of an historical position of the intellect which, of whatever it dares write here, can speak no longer or not yet.

But what compelled Bethoven, that immeasurably deep human being in whom the power of subjective creation rose to the hubris of the human being as the creator to the opposite of all this, to self-limitation? It was certainly not the psychology of this man who could traverse at one and the same time the composition of the *Missa* and the composition of works entirely its opposite. It was rather a pressure in the thing itself, which Beethoven, resisting to be sure to the last, obeyed and obeyed with all his energy. Here we find something common to both the *Missa* and to the last quartets in their intellectual structuring. They share a common avoidance. The musical experience of the late Beethoven must have become mistrustful of the unity of subjectivity and objectivity, the roundness of symphonic successes, the totality emerging from the movement of all the parts; in short, of everything that gave authenticity up to now to the works of his middle period. He exposed the classical as classicizing. He rejected the affirmative, that which uncritically endorsed Being in the idea of the classically symphonic. He rejected that trait which Georgiades in his article on the finale of the *Jupiter Symphony* called ceremonial. He must have felt the untruth in the highest demand of classical music, that untruth which asserts that the essence of the contradictory motion

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of all the parts which disappears in that essence is itself the positive, the affirmative. At this moment he transcended the bourgeois spirit whose highest musical manifestation was his own work. Something in his own genius, the deepest part of it, refused to reconcile in a single image what is not reconciled. Musically this may have become concretized in a vague sensitivity toward a filigree structure and developmental principle. It is related to the hostility which developed poetic sensibility had early seized upon in Germany toward dramatic complexity and intrigue. It is a sublimely plebeian hostility, inimical to all that is aristocratic and it was Beethoven who for the first time imbued German music with this feeling. Intrigue in the theater had always had something foolish about it. Its activity seemed to emanate from above, from the author and his idea, and was never motivated from below, from out of the characters themselves. The activity of the thematic work may have sounded to Beethoven's inner ear like the machinations of the courtiers in Schiller's plays, of costumed wives and broken jewel cases, and stolen letters. There is something realistic, in a true meaning of that word, in Beethoven which is not satisfied with conflicts so obviously contrived, with manipulated antitheses which all classicism creates and which are supposed to transcend all details but which instead are thrust upon those details as if by decree. Marks of this arbitrariness can be found in the decisive phrases of the developments in even the *Ninth Symphony*. The late Beethoven's demand for truth rejects the illusory appearance of the unity of subjective and objective, a concept practically at one with the classicist idea. A polarization results. Unity transcends into the fragmentary. In the last quartets this takes place by means of the rough, unmediated juxtaposition of callow aphoristic motifs and polyphonic complexes. The gap between both becomes obvious and makes the impossibility of aesthetic harmony into the aesthetic content of the work; makes failure in a highest sense a measure of success. In its way even the *Missa* sacrifices the idea of synthesis. But in so far as it refuses the subject, the listener, entry or access to the music and the subject or listener is no longer secure in the objectivity of the form and cannot produce this form unbroken out of himself, it is prepared now to pay for its human universality by having the individual soul be silent, perhaps already submissive. *That*, and not the concession to ecclesiastical tradition or the will to please Archduke Rudolf, his pupil, may lead to an explanation of the *Missa Solemnis*. The autonomous subject, that subject which otherwise cannot know itself capable of objectivity, secedes from freedom to heteronomy. Pseudo-morphosis to an alienated form, at one with the expression of alienation itself, is supposed to accomplish what otherwise would be incapable of accomplishment. The composer experiments with strict style because formal bourgeois freedom is not sufficient as a stylization principle. The composition unremittingly controls whatever is to be filled out by the subject under such externally dictated stylization principles. Not only is each motion which opposes this principle subjected to rigorous criticism, but each more concrete version of

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the objectivity itself, which degrades it to romantic fiction, is also so criticized, and either as a skeleton, real, tangible, or concrete it nonetheless disappears into that fiction. This dual criticism, a kind of permanent selection process, imposes upon the *Missa* its remote outline character. It brings the work despite its full resonance into such a rigorous contradiction to sensuous appearance as in the ascetic last quartets. The aesthetically fragile in the *Missa Solemnis*, the denial of conspicuous organization in favor of an almost cuttingly strict question as to what is at all still possible, corresponds in its deceptively closed surface to the open fractures which the last quartets demonstrate. The tendency to an archaicization which here is still tempered, is shared by the *Missa* with the late style of almost all great composers from Bach to Schoenberg. They have all, as exponents of the bourgeois spirit, reached the limits of that spirit without, however, in the bourgeois world ever being able to climb beyond it on their own. All of them had to dredge up the past in the anguish of the present as sacrifices to the future. Whether this sacrifice was fruitful in Beethoven's case, whether the essence of that which was left out is really the cipher of a realized cosmos, or whether as in the later attempts to reconstruct objectivity, the *Missa* already failed, all this can be judged only if historical-philosophical reflection on the structure of the work were to penetrate even into the innermost compositional cells. The fact that today, after the developmental principle has been driven to its historical conclusion and has lost its meaningfulness, composing sees itself obliged to segmentation of parts, to articulations restricted by fields without any thought given to the methodology of the *Missa*'s composition, encourages us to take Beethoven's plea in the greatest of his works for more than merely a plea.

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ECOLOGY OF SCIENTIFIC CONSCIOUSNESS

by Stephen S. Bernow and Paul D. Raskin

Any inquiry into the origins and character of science and its place in human activity based on a thorough-going materialism must confront a fascinating dilemma. For a in a framework which avoids the intractable problems involved in maintaining a spirit-matter dualism by assuming a single natural reality with only internal relations, scientific consciousness is at once a constituent part and historical product of the very natural processes it addresses. Since humanity is a part of nature, and further, that which nature has become and is becoming, a satisfactory understanding of nature must rest upon self-understanding. But self-understanding itself develops as part of the historical process, and has always, however implicitly, been an important mediating factor in human knowledge of extra-human reality; it is both a progressive result of and moving force in that historical process. An adequate solution to the problem of situating scientific activity within the natural processes science reflects upon would not then leave that activity and its results intact or fixed and final after mutual adjustment. Rather, a particular phase in the development of that activity would be superseded and the basis for a new phase laid. Self-reflection is both the ontological capstone of natural history and epistemological core of human history.

This is the context which motivates the present project: to explore the place and status of scientific knowledge with respect both to natural and human-natural history. In addressing this problem we accept the underlying *working* premises of science itself: that the universe is material and accessible to our understanding. This framework, along with the very fact of the historical emergence and developmental character of scientific consciousness forms our point of departure. We offer a perspective based upon the notion of emergent, ecological levels in nature as an alternative to contemporary attempts to characterize science in such terms as Kuhn's paradigms, Lakatos' research programs, Popper's falsifiability, and (even) Habermas' instrumental action.[1] These approaches, in addition to abstracting science from its wider social matrix, continue the legacy of the radical separation of subject and object which is itself an historical phase in the development of science and its self-understanding. Although this separation provided a powerful orientation in the development of scientific thought—it was, indeed,

1. For a discussion and debate among the first three mentioned as well as further references to the literature, see *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge*, I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave, eds. (Cambridge, 1970). An attempt at situating these philosophical debates (and the philosophers) within the context of the progressive industrialization and politicization of science in advanced capitalist society can be found in T. Ferguson, "The Political Economy of Knowledge," *Telos*, 15 (Spring, 1973), pp. 124-137, and in J. Habermas, *Knowledge and Human Interests*, trans. J. Shapiro (Boston, 1973).

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the characteristic difference between Greek natural philosophy and the mythopoetic thought of earlier civilizations[2]—a reunification of subject and object is a necessary requisite for understanding science as nature becoming conscious of itself.

Previous attempts at a materialist analysis of the place of consciousness in nature often solved the mind-nature problem by reducing ideas to a mechanical or epiphenomenal relationship to what is taken to be an underlying material structure.[3] Alternatively, varieties of dualism have attracted those who wish to avoid this apparent deflation of human creativity and essence. But neither reductionism nor dualism is satisfying or necessary. The assumption of a reductionist materialism, commonly taken to be a result of natural science, is an unnecessary and inconsistent basis for understanding the concrete discoveries of the sciences. The full diversity of scientific insight can best be synthesized by an ontology consisting of qualitative levels of organization and modes of development of matter, each encompassing the properties of sublevels while possessing new properties which cannot, *even in principle*, be understood by the science appropriate to the sublevels.[4]

Scientific consciousness is a developing property of matter in human history, which itself emerged as part of a qualitatively new phase of natural history. Within the frameowrk developed here, science must reflect its historical epoch in its subject matter, its metaphysical presuppositions, its methodology, and its embedded values. As a constituent sublevel within a quasi-stable totality which we may call society, science is a determinate feature of that totality, simultaneously expressing the whole and mediating in its continued existence or reproduction. We must identify the science of an epoch, not simply by an objectified body of "facts," theories, methodologies, or results, but also by the intellectual (and thereby social) *process* by which these objectifications are produced and realized.

Just as an ecological system has dominant characteristics and processes within which the subsystems are mutually constituted and to which they must conform, so too do societies develop as modes of organization of interacting subsystems. And just as changes in the subsystems within a particular ecology

2. See H. and H.A. Frankfort, "Myth and Reality" and "The Emancipation of Thought and Myth," in H. Frankfort *et al., Before Philosophy* (New York, 1949). In a certain sense, myth remains a central feature of science. G. De Santilland and H. Von Dechend, *Hamlet's Mill* (London, 1970), p. vi, goes so far as to call Einstein's general theory a "panmathematical myth." The essential features of myth remain those involving analogy, homology, perception, and codification of similar differences and different similarities. See M. Godolier, "Myth and History," *New Left Review*, 69 (Sept.-Oct., 1971), pp. 93-112.

3. An historically important example of this approach has come to be called 'vulgar Marxism.' A recent, critical treatment of this perspective can be found in B. Ollman, *Alienation: Marx's Conception of Man in Capitalist Society* (Cambridge, 1971), pp. 6ff. Two recent fads have lent renewed popularity to the idea (sic) of reducing mind. The first, chimpomorphism, tries to understand humans in terms of the behavior of lower species as "naked apes." The second (IBMism?) seeks to reproduce the essentially human in sufficiently large computers. For further discussion, see S. Rose, *The Conscious Brain* (New York, 1973), pp. 13-14, 275-290.

4. This is the sense in which we understand the putative "transition from quantity to quality."

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can bring the entire ecology to crisis, so too can internal developments bring a social totality to crisis. It is in this sense of the coherence of science along with other subsystems, development, crisis and renewed coherence at qualitatively new modes of *self-maintenance and development*, that we speak of the ecology of scientific consciousness.

Conventional scientific wisdom has posed a serious challenge to social theorists in the critical tradition who view the unfolding potential for purposive, self-formative activity to be the essentially human characteristic. For the admiration (if not veneration) achieved by science through the last three hundred years of successful practice has led to a wide and uncritical acceptance of the metaphysics underlying its revolutionary program. At the very period in human history when the creative powers of the species were so dramatically revealed and developed, when humans were beginning to place themselves at the center of their own development, the new metaphysics appeared to deny the possibility of such a process. Human beings were removed from the center of a finite, meaningful, qualitatively intelligible universe. The universe was now understood to be an infinity of atoms in an infinite void; change appeared as purely quantitative re-location through motion governed by inexorable laws. Humanity, far from being at the center, was reduced to a subaggregate to those particles (Hobbes) or to a subaggregate with a soul (in Cartesian dualism). Where indeed can human praxis be situated in a universe which, we are told, is explainable ultimately in terms of a denumberable number of entities and forces whose states develop deterministically and are fully described by initial conditions and the 'laws of nature?'[5]

Thus far the attempts to deal with this question, with very few exceptions, fall in two categories—reductionist or dualist. The reductionist accepts the claim to universality of the metaphysics of modern science and consequently sees humans, ultimately, as complex machines. This viewpoint is, in its various forms, the dominant paradigm for the social sciences today. For example, in modern psychology, the poles of radical behaviorism and varieties of preformationalism (such as genetic reductionism) treat the human subject as an isolated, nondeliberative object of external forces at one pole and internal forces at the other. The social sciences, in their attempt to adapt the models and methodologies of the natural sciences, have sought exhaustive explanation for human behavior in terms of quantitative variables and their lawful (in the sense of physics) relationships. The limitations of such approaches become clear when it is realized that the methodological analogy can only be fully successful if the deeper structures of the two

5. Nor does quantum physics give an answer (despite considerable philosophical meanderings on 'indeterminacy' and free-will) for here the *state* is still determined; only the associated physical predictions are problematic. Though quantum mechanics, through recourse to the algebra of Hilbert spaces, wave-particle duality, etc., was a powerful operational response to difficulties encountered in applying the pre-quantum reductionist metaphysics to the atomic level, it has as little to do with the notion of human praxis as does classical Laplacian determinism.

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systems—physical and human—are homologous. In trying to impose the methodological premises (and prejudices) of physics, the social scientists, in their quest for valid explanation and scientific legitimacy, are tacitly committing themselves to an ahistorical and reductionist view of humanity and, therefore, nature as a whole.

In the reductionist model, change is not in the form of the qualitative emergence of new properties in nature's evolution but rather the merely quantitative extension and rearrangement of large numbers of subsystems. The difficulty in accounting adequately for change of this universally materialist though reductionist approach is most dramatically displayed by the inability of reductionism to account for itself. The possibility of the system reflecting on itself (in this case, the reductionist himself) is not understandable in a metaphysics which denies the emergence of new totalities with fundamentally new properties.[6]

The varieties of dualism (which share with reductionism an uncritical acceptance of the metaphysical paradigm of the sciences as it applies to extra-human reality) beg the question of the place of mind in nature by speaking of the irreducibly human without accounting for it. Thus, Sartre can speak of a 'practico-inert' nature transformed into a humanized nature by a dialectic of social praxis in which the subject and object are radically (ontologically, and not merely methodologically) distinct. Furthermore, in Habermasian critical theory, a dialectical view of human reality can coexist with an uncritical view of positivist science. It is no surprise, then, that its program for liberation came to be based on the "ruins of ontology"[7] rather than its resurrection and transformation.

For dualism, the dialectic, rather than surpassing the subject-object distinction through the mutual constitution of subjectivity and objectivity within a single developing process, is often reduced to interaction between two forms of being whose essential natures are given. If the huam species is, then, simultaneously both subject and object of its own activity, one might well ask how such a process emerged out of a nature whose essence is taken to be simple location of objects? We must look within extrahuman nature for parallel or analogous processes, which would locate praxis and subjectivity on an ascending scale of modes of material organiztion and development.[8] We can extend Marx's insight that "the anatomy of man is the key to the anatomy of the ape"[9] to the methodological principle that the character of human development (and scientific development within it) is the key to the character of natural processes as such.

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6. One response has been the positivist elimination of consciousness from the vocabulary of meaningful discourse. The inability of positivism to account for itself is, no doubt, a crucial step in its refusal to try.

7. J. Habermas, *op.cit.* p. 317.

8. Gramsci's question of Lukács is prescient in this regard: "if human history should be conceived also as the history of science. . . how can the dialectic be separated from nature?" *The Modern Prince and Other Writings* (New York, 1967), p. 109.

9. Mentioned in L. Goldmann, *Immanuel Kant* (London, 1971), p. 14.

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To begin to articulate a view which embraces both the self-evident successes of science and notion of humanity as a *natural* though unique process, one must question the historically derived metaphysical premises of modern science itself: that (extra-human) nature is understandable in terms of ultimate and elementary constituents, basic interactions, and universal laws of kinematic and dynamic behavior. This premise is unnecessarily restrictive—the results of science in its actual theoretical and experimental practice by no means require it. Like so many other values, ideas, and philosophical notions, the roots of this metaphysics are best found, not in the nature studied, but in the social nature of those engaged in study; i.e., in the ideological imperatives of the bourgeois epoch which gave birth to modern science.[10]

What then is a minimal statement of a materialist ontology which embraces both the self-formative character of humanity and the empirical results of the ntural sciences? *All* of the empirically supported results of science (as opposed to its metaphysical claims) are consistent with and synthesized by the notion of emergent levels in nature.[11] In this view, matter has historically developed from one level of complexity and characteristic mode of existence to another. Each level—be it "elementary" particles, nuclei, atoms, molecules, macromolecules, simple organisms, complex species, ecological systems, human societies—exists in a quasi-stable state whose internal features are governed by mainly quantitative processes defined by the structure imposed by the dominant properties of the level. The state is quasi-stable since, although it can exist for long periods of time relative to the time required for its qualitative transformation, it will ultimately be transformed, due to definite external and internal interactions, into another level (or part of such level) of the organization of matter.

Each discipline of the natural sciences addresses only one of these islands of quasi-stability in nature. The disciplines take a cross sectional view of what must be seen as a continuous process of nature and can go far in spelling out the properties and 'laws' involved at that level. The situation is analogous to

10. The socio-economic and ideological conditioners of the Newtonian synthesis were first discussed in B. Hessen's seminal essay in *Science at the Crossroads* (London, 1931). The essay "The Social and Economic Foundations of Newton's Principia" has recently been published separately with an introduction by Robert Cohen (New York, 1971). For more recent discussions of the general problem, see W. Leiss, *The Domination of Nature* (New York, 1972), especially chapters 5 and 6; P. Piccone, "Towards a Socio-historical Interpretation of the Scientific Revolution," *Telos*, 1 (Spring 1968), pp. 16-26.

11. A number of authors have addressed aspects of this problem. The notions of *organization* and *development* of matter are taken by J. Piaget, *Biology and Knowledge* (Chicago, 1974), and J. Needaham, *Order and Life* (Cambridge, Mass., 1936), to be central to biological and cognitive pheomea and have suggested extendig these concepts to micro-physical and socio-historical phenomena. David Bohm, *Causality and Chance in Modern Physics* (Philadelphia, 1971), ad J.P. Vigier, "Dialectics and Natural Science," in George Novack, ed., *Existentialism vs. Marxism* (New York, 1966), have discussed levels of organization of matter and their qualitative emergence at the microphysical level. See also the articles by Hans Freistadt, "Dialectical Materialism: A Friendly Interpretation," *Philosophy of Science*, 23 (April, 1956), pp. 97-110, and "A Further Discussion," *Philosophy of Science*, 24 (January, 1957), pp. 25-49.

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attempting to understand a motion picture by doing a detailed study of each frame individually. Though it is true that *something* can be learned and, furthermore, that photography was an historic precondition to cinematography, a full comprehension of the film is not possible on that basis alone. However, the science that abstracts parts of whole processes and then gives them independent ontological status, is falling prey to, in Whitehead's apt phrase, the "fallacy of misplaced concreteness."[12]

The dialectical model of nature presented here implies that the properties of any system or subsystem cannot be exhaustively specified since the system's behavior is within and therefore codetermined by its qualitatively developing physical context. That the whole is greater than the sum of its parts is understood here in the dual sense that physical properties emerge as levels do and that the constituent parts (partially knowable by their behavior at other levels) are transformed by the whole in which they reside. Discovery of ultimate laws for describing nature, the goal of reductionist science, is not possible if the potential properties and behavior of physical, biological, and social entities are only partially actualized at each emergent level, and if these levels themselves display new non-reducible properties.

To make this concrete, consider the bedrock of the reductionist system, elementary particles. The behavior of elementary particles is characteristically studied by scattering experiments which examine the behavior of particles (such as probable angle of deflection) when they are made to collide with each other at various energies. In other words, one gains at least phenomenological[13] results on the interactions of these entities. Nuclei are thought to be systems consisting of combinations of two kinds of these particles called protons and neutrons (the word nucleon is used to signify both). Generations of skilled nuclear physicists working with the best equipment that government granting agencies could supply have, in the tradition of the reductionist metaphysics, tried to describe nuclear properties in terms of those properties of nucleons found when they interact pair-wise as in the scattering experiments. The results of decades of research reinforce the emergent level theory of nature, for though much light is shed on various aspects of nuclei by considering them to be mere conglomerations of unchanged nucleons, nuclear physics has had to evolve its own array of

12. See, e.g., *Science and the Modern World* (New York, 1967), p. 58. Whitehead's philosophy has a number of parallels with the notion of qualitative emergence expounded here, particularly the focus on process and totality ("organism"). However, where we view the process of cognition as itself an evolving constituent within a material reality, Whitehead's objects of reality ("actual entities") are inseparable from actual levels of mentation ("prehension"). See *Process and Reality* (New York, 1930), pp. 27ff. An apparent subjective idealism is avoided through the introduction of an objective but unknowable God as an ultimate principle of "unconditioned actuality of conceptual feeling at the base of things" (p. 522). The immanent urge of a divine ordering becomes the framework for locating the philosophic project and the philosopher while, in our view, both are situated in enveloping and developing modes of organization in the social ecology.

13. Phenomenology in the language of contemporary physics refers to the classification and description of experimental results with no attempt at theoretical explanation. This practice owes nothing to the work of Husserl or Merleau-Ponty.

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theories, models, and calculational devices which are appropriate only to the study of the nuclear level.

The basic theoretical strategy in nuclear physics has been to develop various schema to describe 'collective' phenomena, each scheme accounting for a class of experimental results. These schema, involving models of the nucleus as a whole along with appropriate calculational tools, are not derived from the properties of the constituent nucleons gleaned from exhaustive experiments on their *pairwise* behavior. We identify theories of collective phenomena explicitly (as the nuclear physicist does tacitly) with properties of the emergent nuclear state of matter, different aspects of which are actualized in concrete interactions within various laborabory settings. The various attempts to develop models of the nucleus and the inevitable introduction of collective or holistic concepts are described in introductory surveys of the field such as the recent one by L.R.B. Elton where he notes, "Our knowledge of nuclear phenomena has increased immeasurably in the last decade; the same cannot be said of our understanding of them in terms of fundamental concepts."[14]

But the situation is worse yet for those who would view all questions concerning nature as ultimately complex physics problems. Particle accelerators have, since World War II, been producing a seemingly endless number of new particles with each claimed to be in some sense elementary. Much of the work in high energy theoretical physics has been involved with finding workable classification schemes—a kind of taxonomy for the zoo of new particles. Undeterred, physicists have looked for the 'real' basic objects of which even these inconceivably small particles are constituted.[15] Only dogmatic reductionist faith or perhaps a trained incapacity to question implicit philosophical assumptions would lead one to believe that the rich variety of hierarchical systems found even in physics, such as particles and subparticles, nuclei, atoms, solid state, plasma, etc., could be collapsed one day into as yet undiscovered basic, irreducible constituents and interactions. If these are construed as more than merely methodological hierarchies, the actual transitions between them along with the emergence of definite new physical properties can become the subject of concrete research projects.[16]

14. L.R.B. Elton, *Introductory Nuclear Theory* (New York, 1966). p. 288.

15. The recent simultaneous discovery of the psi particles which fall outside of previous classification schemes, and some surprising new reactions of previously discovered particles and resonances, have popularized still another theoretical scheme involving a new particle with a new property which physicists call "charm" (a name which indicates both the capacity of theorists for self-mockery and the state of the art of 'elementary' particle physics). A nontechnical summary of some of the main features of the current situation, which changes almost daily with new 'discoveries' of anomalous particles, can be found in Sidney Drell's article "Electron-Positron Annihilation and the New Particles" in *Scientific American*, 232:6 (June, 1975), pp. 50-62. Though this is not the place for a full analysis of the connection between a fragmented view of nature and a dehumanized view of politics which admits only technical 'solutions,' it is worth noting that Drell and many other leading particle physicists were and are active in the elite Jason division of the Institute for Defense Analysis which initiated and helped design the automated battlefield concept during the war in Southeast Asia.

16. Clearly the descriptions of such processes would have to utilize a mathematics which goes beyond describing systems in terms of quantitative and continuous relationships between basic

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The capacity of the theory of emergent levels of nature to provide a powerful basis for understanding the results of scientific investigations is not confined to the physical sciences. In biology as well, with the complex interplay between macromolecular, chemical, cellular, and physiological levels found in the analysis of organisms, the theory of levels cogently integrates the wide spectrum of subbranches which are at once interconnected and not reducible.[17] Of particular interest in refining a scientific overview of nature which includes (but does not reduce) humanity and, specifically, scientific consciousness itself, are those areas of investigation which are concerned directly with developmental processes. Here we will confine ourselves to some brief remarks about ontogenesis of individual organisms and the origin of life and the cultural and social history of human societies.[18]

The level of the organization of matter achieved through the evolutionary process is realized in the species-specific ontogenetic development of individual organisms. In the case of humans, the development of consciousness in each individual raises philosophic and scientific problems complementary and parallel to those associated with the origin of consciousness in the species as a whole. Embryologists speak of several periods of epigenesis. Each is characterized by a mode of development (regenerative, differentiative, functional) which itself is in dynamic equilibrium. In other words, the overall pattern of development is maintained through functional subsystems which are both determinate and determining attributes of the developing organism. Thus, the organism forms through a network of interactions which progressively differentiates functions and structures in the context of emergent stages of development of the embryonic totality. In short, the embryologists have organized their observations in a way which fits the pattern of part-whole dialectic and emergent levels which has been previously described.

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variables. A possible direction is suggested by the work of Rene Thom, *Structural Stability and Morphogenesis* (Reading, Mass., 1974), which includes a description of ruptures in mathematical continuity (or "catastrophes") which could be an analogue to quantitative, continuous physical processes leading to qualitative, discontinuous transitions from one level to another. Cf. D. Bohm, "Quantum Theory as an Indication of a New Order in Physics," *Foundations of Physics*, I:4 (1971), pp. 359-380 and 3:2 (1973), pp. 139-168.

17. Although investigations of specific biological substructures have tended to isolate them, both spatially from surrounding biological functions and forms and temporally from their role in the process of the organism's activity, Paul Weiss, an eminent biologist, was able to give the following overview: "At each level of descent, we recognize entitites comparable to relay stations sufficiently well defined to be described in their own terms (e.g., organs, cells, organelles, macromolecules; or brain functions, as expressed in concepts, thoughts, sentences, words, symbols), but whose methodical behavior on that level cannot be ascribed to any fixity of regularities in the behavior of the units of the next lower order; just as knowing purely the properties of those intermediary 'relay' entities would not permit us to describe by sheer additive reconstruction the behavioral features of their next superordinate level in precise and specific terms." Weiss' insight that there are levels of organization with unique properties in biological systems is an amplification and reconfirmation of the view of nature we have already developed in discussing non-living physical systems. Cf. "The Living System: Determinism Stratified," in A. Koestler and J.R. Smythies, eds., *Beyond Reductionism* (London, 1969), p. 15.

18. Physical developmental theories—cosmogony, stellar physics, geology—are important elucidations both of material development of the Universe and the meta-analysis presented here.

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In the area of cognitive development, psychologists are far from speaking with a single voice. Though the dominant paradigm (at least in the United States) is the reductionist tradition of associationist psychology and behaviorism, the work of Piaget[19] and his school offers an attractive alternative which extends the embryological approach. In this approach the individual child assimilates data within sensory-motor—cognitive structures which are, at various points in development, qualitatively transformed into a superior basis for further assimilation. Thus, we have development within a mode of development (assimilation to a schema) and, as this activity deepens and broadens the organism's interactions with its environment, a crisis for that mode and the development of a superior mode of development (accomodation) which preserves characteristics of the earlier mode as subsumed features of the earlier mode as subsumed features of a new schema. Thus, Piaget's advance with respect to the insights of Gestalt psychology (Köhler, Wertheimer) is the introduction of a 'moving gestalt' (schema of action) in which not merely perception but practical manipulation of the environment (sensory-motor and cognitive) is central. In the language being used in this essay, one would describe the process in terms of the child passing from a given level of interactive quasi-stability to a more complex level of organization of matter—in this case, the developing human brain.

Another particularly dramatic example of qualitative emergence in nature is the process through which life emerged on earth. Much of the outline of the breakthrough theories of the 1920s has been filled in by subsequent investigation, and many of the probable mechanisms for the formation of the early links in the development of life have been demonstrated under controlled laboratory conditions. There is by now a fairly clear understanding of the pattern of development which led to the transcendence of the non-living states of matter.[20] The development of increasingly ordered (negentropic) proto-life forms occurred in tandem with wider changes in the ecological setting. We must speak of the co-evolution of life and its environment, involving a succession of ecological levels, each characterized by definite, interlinked patterns of energy transfer, chemical and mineral cycles, and biological processes. At key junctures, life entities, by the very success of their development, undermine the environmental patterns which first gave them birth and sustained them; ecological crises and the necessity to reestablish the mode of existence at a higher level of organization were characteristic of the development of life from the beginning.[21] The pattern of mutual transformation of the environment and life-form, which goes back to the inception of

19. Piaget summarizes his work in several places: *Biology and Knowledge, op.cit.*; *Principles of Genetic Epistemology* (New York, 1972); and *The Origins of Intelligence in Children* (New York, 1963).

20. For a highly readable, nontechnical treatment, see John Keosian, *Origin of Life* (New York, 1968). A careful technical summary is contained in George Wald's article in *The Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, 52 (1964), p. 595.

21. Perhaps the earliest ecological crisis which called into question the future existence of life on this planet occurred with the earliest of coherent life-like forms (Oparin's coecervates). They

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life, is analogous to praxis at the level of human social evolution. Though lower species cannot act in a creatively purposive way, they do self-form to the degree their activity transforms the environment to which they must adapt. The modern theory of evolutionary adaptation transcends the limits of simple Lamarkianism or traditional Darwinism with its emphasis on random internal mutations.[22] It must come to grips with, among other things, the part-whole dialectic in the form it takes here.

Evolution, then, is characterized by transformations of ecological totalities which redefine the complex network of living species as well as the non-living environment. The 'balance of nature' has never existed; only an ascending series of temporary, equilibrium points with definite dynamic patterns of order and organization. Nature as a whole emerges along with its sublevels. Consciousness arises as a product of the biological and social development of humanity. Within the present framework, it can be understood as a property of matter which emerges at a particularly complex level of organization of matter, but through strictly natural processes as do the properties of the other levels as sketched earlier. The origin of uniquely human characteristics, then, need not be either denied, ignored or attributed to supernatural intervention. Rather it is but the most difficult question for a broadened science whcih focuses on emergent processes throughout nature in addition to its traditional concerns.[23]

The new *social* species of humanity emerges historically as succeeding levels of the organization of matter: i.e., new modes of social reproduction and development. If a critical utilization of science has allowed us to situate human societies on the ascending scle of emergent levels within nature, we can now, in turn, gain some insight into scientific consciousness as it develops within these social ecologies.

The results of science and the emergence of scientific consciousness itself are best understood in the framework of embedded levels of organization and development in nature, each level containing but surpassing the lower levels both synchronically and diachronically. Scientific revolution as described in Kuhn's schema[24] —the transition from a normal science to a crisis or impasse,

developed in an anaerobic atmosphere a metabolism based on heterotrophic reproduction (i.e., they were parasitical on the amino acids produced at a limited rate in their environment). The progressive depletion of the organic nutrients in the 'primordial soup' signaled a dead-end in the absence of qualitatively changed patterns of ecological interaction. The solution was the co-development of both photosynthesizing autotrophs along with rudimentary forms of respiring organisms in an increasingly oxygen-rich environment, and a new basis for development, crisis, and further development.

22. See, e.g., C.H. Waddington, "The Theory of Evolution Today," in *Beyond Reductionism*, *op.cit.*, pp. 357-374.

23. The parameters for such an analysis in the case of the emergence of consciousness are well known. They lie in the mutually constituting development of advancing somatic capabilities and cultural activities. The interlinked features of that process can be illustrated as follows: "increase in brain size — gain in intricacy of neuronal organization — rise in complexity of nervous functions — ever more diversified and complicated behavior responses — progressively amplified and advanced cultural manifestations." Taken from P. Tobias, *The Brain in Hominid Evolution* (New York, 1971).

24. T. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago, 1962).

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and the creation of a new paradigm to resolve the crisis and govern a new period of normal science—bears the characteristic form of both ecological succession and cognitive development. Indeed, it is closely allied with the former insofar as scientific consciousness develops as a moment within ecological movement at the socio-historical phase of natural history. Here we must depart from Kuhn and the microsociological method which rules out questions of 'external' influence on science. In the ecological framework, scientific paradigms are generated and maintained under the characteristic intellectual and material conditions of particular modes of social development.

The character of natural processes which we have described—activity and change within a mode of development which generates a crisis as well as the means to confront and resolve that crisis on a *new basis* (i.e., the emergence of a new mode of development)—appears to characterize the general features of human societies and their history. In this perspective, first developed by Marx, social history is a process of social reproduction within definite forms of social organization and activity. Development within such a *mode of production* involves production of the material, technical, organizational and human requisites of the *social labor process* (i.e., the transformation of and exchange with nature through the *forces of production* and the development of the forces of production through transformations of nature). Simultaneously, development involves the intersubjective and institutional basis for the social labor process (i.e., the reproduction of characteristic class relations, ideologies, political and economic forms, and values through exchanges and communication between human individuals through the *relations of production*). A mode of production is a structure or totality within social history which, despite substantial quantitative and qualitative internal changes, remains invariant with respect to the form the social labor process takes. Crisis and transition to a new mode of production are the results of sustained development within the preceding mode.

Science, as a social activity within a historically developing mode of production, is linked to it as part of the interpenetrating systems of forces and relations of technological and cultural production. With this perspective, the valuable but limited insights of historians (microsocial or internalist) and philosophers of science can be preserved even as they are transcended.[25] Science can then be seen as the contemplative activity of an elite sociological subgroup intensified by an occasional genius, but rather as connected (in its sources, results, and omissions) to the practical life, the values, and the very existence of the society in which it is produced. For instance, the metaphysical presuppositions which underlay the science of a social epoch do not have to be seen as inexplicable givens. They can be understood as intimately linked to

25. A fascinating personal account of an attempt to obtain a wider perspective from within the history of science profession can be found in R. Young, "The Historiographic and Ideological Context of the Nineteenth-Century Debate on Man's Place in Nature," in *Changing Perspectives in the History of Science*, M. Teich and R. Young, eds. (London, 1973), pp. 344-438.

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human self-understanding within that society. And this self-understanding is itelf both an expression of an intersubjective basis for the concrete social-material reality that is produced and reproduced daily. Insofar as social behavior informed by such self-understanding can be sustained, the social-material reality is validated. When extra-human reality is interpreted consistently with human social reality, nature can be invoked in the name of the good society to identify prevailing or nascent social relations as natural relations.[26]

Beyond providing a framework for analyzing the texture of science within the whole-cloth of its social matrix, we can begin to lay a basis for giving a dynamic account of the timing, sources, and character of scientific revolutions, for they are intimately connected to the wider development of modes of social development. The gestalt-shifts in scientific thought which inexplicably govern Kuhn's scientific revolutions can be seen to arise from definite social groups and individuals within social-historical conditions which render such a shift possible, legitimate, or even necessary. The production of scientific knowledge is mediated by *both* the requirements for the instrumental control of nature through social labor *and* the epistemological and institutional preconditions for this activity within intersubjective processes upon which the characteristic social relations, self-understanding, and values place their stamp. The character of scientific activity—its broad theoretical paradigms and its choice of research problems—is connected with the values and practical concerns of the wider society in which a hegemonic class and its ideology prevails.[27] The ecological approach provides a framework to understand the interrelated psychological and social basis of the conservatism of paradigm-governed behavior on the one hand, and the choice of options for paradigm shifts (rule breaking) on the other hand. The general crisis conditions in which the prevailing ideology or self-understanding no longer provide a basis for maintaining a meaningful or secure existence could be expected to give rise to intellectual ferment sufficient to allow for broad paradigm shifts. Under these conditions, new or peripheral social groups and their ideologies can provide a renewed basis for social existence, self-understanding, and scientific consciousness. The acceptance of a novel approach to nature depends upon the ability of the social system to sustain such transformations of thought.

For example, the broad stages of Greek science can be closely associated

26. Carl Becker in *The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth-Century Philosophers* (New Haven, 1932), pp. 33ff., describes how Newtonian 'laws of nature' were taken as the standard for a rational social order. Though Becker does not argue that this standard was itself derived from social activity and values, his allusion to Aristotle's naturalistic justification for Athenian slavery does suggest this interpretation. From our standpoint, the mimesis of emulating the cosmic order by a rational human order involves a mutual adjustment of self-conception, social reality and conceptions of nature. For example, the reproduction of feudal society was mediated by hierarchical structures and concepts resonant in church, society and nature.

27. An attempt at a typological survey of frameworks of knowledge in terms of particular groups, social classes and global societies is offered in G. Gurvitch, *The Social Framework of Knowledge* (New York, 1971).

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with the various phases of Greek social life.[28] In Ionia, an explanatory framework based upon the notion of an underlying material substrate made a return to entirely dramatic or mytho-poetic conceptions "unthinkable." The particular form that their science took arose from the character of Ionian social life and material practice. The cosmos conception derives from the political notion of a self-regulated, well ordered community, and the naturalism from the interest in productive techniques on the part of the Ionian natural philosophers who were often at once inventors, political leaders, and men of commerce. Later, idealist formulations flourished within the slavery-based class structure of Athenian Greece which isolated natural philosophy from material practice. The shift from an emphasis on the production of things to their consumption is paralleled by the subordination of material and efficient cause to formal and final cause. Still later, the precocious Copernicanism of Aristarchus was rejected by priests, philosophers, and scientists as well; the reappearance of heliocentrism would have to wait more than a millenium. Then, under more favorable social conditions, it was accepted—but not without a struggle.

A brief examination of the important case of the Scientific Revolution and the contours of its socio-historical setting will serve as a further illustration of the social ecology of science. The work begun by B. Hessen[29] and elaborated and extended by R. Merton[30] has shown that the technical requirements of the commerce and manufacture of a rising English bourgeoisie were strong shaping forces in the classic 17th century scientific upsurge. Merton, Mason, and Hill[31] have demonstrated the connections between this new class, the new science, and puritanism in both the attainment of ideological and philosophical coherence and in the value placed upon practical, creative activity. The science of 17th century England was, in short, mediated by technical and ideological factors in an emergent socio-economic context. But this case itself is situated within a broader social-ecological transformation—the transition from feudalism to capitalism in Europe between the 14th and 18th centuries.

The transformation arose out of a series of combined material, political, intellectual, religious, and demographic crisis. An old order, which had slowly but successfully developed within a coherent social framework, was falling apart partially due to an inability to absorb its own successes such as improvements in agriculture, population growth, discovery of the New World, and the growth of commerce. It is within this context that a new uni-

28. See B. Farrington, *Greek Science* (Baltimore, 1949).

29. *Op.cit.*

30. *Science, Technology and Society in Seventeenth-Century England* (1938: reprinted New York, 1970).

31. See, respectively, Merton, *ibid.*, Chapters IV, V, and VI; S. Mason, "Science and Religion in 17th Century England," *Past and Present*, 3 (1953), pp. 28-44; and C. Hill, *The Century of Revolution* (New York, 1966). See also the ongoing debate in *Past and Present* which commenced with H.F. Kearney, "Puritanism, Capitalism and the Scientific Revolution," *Past and Present*, 28 (1964), pp. 81-101. Recently, Theodore Brown has argued that the new empirical data can be naturally incorporated into a modified version of Hill's framework: invited paper, AAAS annual meeting, February 20, 1976.

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versalizing practice emerged as the hegemonic basis for the resolution of the crisis and further development. The transformation of European society through the Renaissance, Reformation, Scientific and Bourgeois Revolutions, can be understood as a single interconnected centuries-long process which took place with shifts in tempo, location, and the relative "weights" in its social components.

The classic case of scientific revolution (as well as the embryonic stage of the Scientific Revolution)—the replacement of the Ptolemaic system by the Copernican system—can most fully be understood within this larger process. The collapse of the Ptolemaic system was more a part of the general collapse of feudal society, values and world view than a failure on scientific grounds alone. The "immense irony" of Copernicus' work was that upon completion, it was neither more accurate nor less cumbersome than the Ptolemaic system.[32] Thus, on purely empirical grounds (within scientific discourse as such) or on immediate technical-practical grounds (navigation-commerce), the emergence and increasing acceptance of the Copernican system cannot be accounted for. Kuhn sees the apparent economy of the Copernican system as largely a "propaganda victory" for the proponents of the new astronomy. If one takes this idea seriously by extending it beyond the scientific community (and thereby beyond the scope of the Kuhnian paradigm) it becomes possible to locate the source and basis for ultimate acceptance of Copernican astronomy in the emerging bourgeois social relations and the associated revolutionary self-understanding. The fact that a new physics (indeed a new metaphysics) was required to support Copernicanism made it part of a much wider conceptual revolution the results of which *retrospectively* established its superiority.[33]

The new universalizing practice of the bourgeoisie was expressed in an ideology which in turn extended and deepened that practice. An underlying reality of unmediated, pairwise interactions of atomistic individuals in a social void, governed by purely quantitative relations, was reaffirmed in economic relations (exchange value and alienated labor), ideology (individualism), and ontology (reductionism). The decentering relativism which characterized the development of perspective in painting, the astronomy of Copernicus and the speculations of Bruno, the unmediated access to God in Protestantism, the exploration of the globe, and the emerging contractual relations of the bourgeoisie, the atomism of Gassendi and Galileo, of Hobbes and Smith, were all expressions of an emerging revolutionary world view rooted in the self-understanding of the bourgeoisie. Further, as Goldmann has pointed out, the associated concepts of *totality,* of a universe (i.e., a

32. T. Kuhn, *The Copernican Revolution* (Cambridge, Mass., 1957), especially pp. 168-171.

33. This is discussed more fully in, e.g., A. Koyré, "Galileo and the Scientific Revolution of the Seventeenth Century," *The Philosophical Review*, 52 (1943), pp. 333-348 and "Galileo and Plato," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 4 (1943), pp. 400-428. See also A. Koyré, *From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe* (Baltimore, 1957) and E.A. Burtt, *The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Science* (London, 1924).

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cosmos or well-ordered whole), and of a human *community* are lost.[34] The *internal structure* of the new science embodies the values of the new social order. In an ecological sense, the new concepts were at once an expression of and vehicle for the further development of social and material forces that were crystallizing in certain centers of Europe as a solution to a continent-wide crisis.[35]

We thus begin to see the interconnections between knowledge, truth and value as they develop within the coherent schema of a mode of production. As with whole ecologies, development within a social mode and its scientific culture simultaneously creates problems which cannot be solved within that mode and provides "in embryo" the means by which those problems can be addressed and resolved from a new standpoint. Thus we have again the process of development, crisis and further development on a new basis. The problem of history, natural and human-natural, is indeed the history of problems successively generated and resolved by the emergence of higher levels of material organization. Scientific consciousness comes to understand this process as it develops within the social-ecological levels of the process itself.

In the textbook rendition, scientific progress is the ongoing interplay between fact and hypothesis, mediated by dispassionate men who, at their best, cast off the anchors of value, socio-economic constraints, and ideology. This can now be reassessed in all its aspects. The ideal of context-free knowledge has been itself strongly context dependent.[36] Additionally, the conditions for the possibility of a knowledge with a high order of universality are to be found within definite forms of social organization, material practice, and self-understanding. As we have argued, the scientific subsystem of fact and theory must be seen as a component of the encompassing social world.

Within this perspective, 'facts' are historical in three interrelated ways. First, the natural world in its physical, biological and social aspects has emerged in a process of successive qualitative as well as quantitative transcendences. Insofar as facts are taken to objectively 'inhere in things,' they need

34. L. Goldmann, *op.cit.*, pp. 21ff.

35. A universalizing practice similar to that of the bourgeoisie (on a lower technical basis—lower even than in Medieval Europe) gave rise to a similar upsurge in the scope and character of scientific theory and experimental activity in a previous epoch. In Ionian Greece, naturalism and scientific method flowered in a commercially oriented socio-economic system in which, for a while, the split between scholars and craftsmen (and theory and practice) receded. The keystone of Ionian natural philosophy and ideology was the universality and naturalism associated with productive processes generally. This basis for their combined scientific, practical, and ethical world view can be sought in the commercial-geographical roots of their civilization.

36. Though the genesis of this viewpoint itself is not central to our focus, it is important to remember that the roots of the emphasis on scientific facticity and 'value-free' theoretical objectivity must be sought within the historical emergence of the bourgeoisie as a class for itself with claims to universality, with the domination of exchange (not use) value, and with the coming of the era of permanent revolution in the means of production. Marx's critique of commodity fetishism in *Capital*, Vol. I (New York, 1974), Chapter IV, attacks the epistemology of sense certainty, the ontology of reductionism, and the associated alienated self-understanding of bourgeois ideology.

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not be seen as timeless 'givens.' The nature of a given entity at any given time includes not only what has been already actualized but, implicitly, its potential properties. New events and contexts redefine the nature of the entity insofar as its potential is further actualized. Second, facts become such to the knowing subject through the practical interaction between the species and the environment in their historic co-formation. Only through its ongoing development and active transformation does 'the world light up to itself.'[37] Third, as is widely recognized by now, empirical observations become 'facts' (and not simply peripheral or contingent events or accidents) only through prior theoretical or pre-theoretical structures of thought within which they are integrated. The view that facts are both selected by the operative theoretical system (or paradigm—a term which is becoming with equal rapidity both empty and popular)[38] and interpreted within that system has been given an elegant formulation recently by Kuhn.[39] The insight of Gestalt psychology that the individual actively integrates perceptions into mental wholes here is extended to understand the origins and basis of scientific consensus. Unfortunately, the coupling between the scientific group (within which the dialectic of normal and revolutionary science is presumed to operate) and the broader social dialectic we have described cannot be brought to the center of analysis within the confines of Kuhn's internalist methodology. Within a paradigm which puts analytic walls around the scientific community (without doubt the dominant paradigm in the philosophy, history, and even sociology of science), questions concerning the timing and character of crises, the choice and sources of revolutionary solutions, the origins and significance of the patterns of social relations within the sciences, the role of the state, etc., can barely be asked, let alone adequately answered.

We wish, then, to extend the insight that scientific paradigms are constituted and transcended historically and psychosocially within the scientific communities by recognizing that the community and the consciousness of its members exist within the wider ecology of social life. This is not to deny that much of the detail work of theory elaboration and application and day-to-day laboratory activity may be understood in terms of the internal logic of normal science. Yet even here the choice of problems and the tempo of research is, in large measure, determined by the political-economic world of funding patterns, hierarchical relations of the scientific community, military strategy, and glamor science (be it cathedrals or moon shots).[40] Most significantly,

37. E. Schroedinger, *Mind and Matter* (Cambridge, 1967), p. 107.

38. For a discussion on the multiplicity of meanings even within the philosophic context, see M. Masterman, "The Nature of a Paradigm," in I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave, eds., *op.cit.*, pp. 59-89.

39. T. Kuhn, *op.cit.*

40. That socialization and consensus are achieved and paradigms maintained by such "external" factors as "publish or perish" and grantsmanship is brutally clear to scientists themselves. On the socio-economic contexts of contemporary science, see, e.g., J. Ravetz, *Scietific Knowledge and its Social Problems* (Oxford, 1971); D.S. Greenberg, *The Politics of Pure Science* (New York, 1967); and H.L. Nieburg, *In the Name of Society* (Chicago, 1966).

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though, it appears that the broader aspects of theory which underlie a given epoch in the history of science must be understood as part of the social totality. These include the accepted ontological framework, the criteria for acceptable solutions and the nature and availability of abstract conceptual tools. The pure interplay between fact and theory advertised in simplistic paeans to science, has its concrete roots in the social dialectic between the activity of labor and the constellations of ideas by which it is interpreted and directed. The empirical problems posed for science and the framework for their solutions arise through the codetermining processes of socially organized transformations of nature, on the one hand, and developing levels of historical consciousness, on the other hand. The form and content of scientific theory is proscribed and informed by the form and content of social interaction.[41]

We may, by so situating science within the historical process, readdress the question of progress in scientific theory and in instrumental technique to which it is linked. The cumulative and progressive character of technique in augmenting human capability to purposively control the environment is self-evident. Though one can argue the question of progress in other areas of social behavior, a clear tendency in human history has been the increased technical mastery of the environment.[42] The history of the progress of technique is the history of practical creativity within the development of the species through determinate forms of social organization and activity. As the universe of socially rooted necessities constantly expands, so too does that of empirical knowledge. Scientific theories, since they must come to grips ultimately with the expanding volume of practical knowledge, must subsume or find ways of coexisting with their historic predecessors. In this sense, at least, there is progress in scientific theory. The notion emphasized in the present work, that scientific consciousness is penetrated by the social matrix in which it exists, does not contradict this cumulative and progressive character of science. Natural processes and, in particular, social life, produce the growing set of problems science must address; the spectrum of *options* for theoretical responses is delimited and defined with the ecology of social life.

But beyond the expanding empirical and instrumental basis of science, what can be said of progress at the theoretic level? Since we see the content of theory linked closely to the changing social totality, the possibility of progressively 'true' theories must be discussed in that context. It is clear that neither pole of the recent debate on progress—radically relativist or methodologically progressivist—provides more than a partial answer.[43] Scientific progress must be linked to the process of human self-understanding

41. The vectors of interaction, of course, themselves develop. For instance, while the surrounding rigid and hierarchical social relations were the major element in selecting out the teleological and ordered science of the Medieval period, science becomes a major force in the development of the mode of production by the nineteenth century. See J.D. Bernal's *Science in History* (Cambridge, Mass., 1971).

42. It is only a tendency in a global and statistical sense. In certain places and times, great technical potential has not permanently entered the mainstream of human culture.

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and self-realization; both occur with the historical development of the modes of production. Conceptual progress has occurred throughout history precisely in those epochs, such as early Greek, Renaissance, European, and industrial capitalist, where the imperatives of the cultural nexus led an emerging contemplative elite to rethink the nature of humanity in more or less materialist terms. Alternatively social systems which have rested on notions concerning the character of humanity received dogmatically from politico-religious doctrines—whether Fascist or feudal—have aborted both the growth of self-knowledge and of science. They impose the particularity of a certain form of human community and its truth upon all of reality whereas the richer attempts at universality have self-consciously attempted to avoid parochial forms of understanding.

Nature, seen as the process of the development of the forms of organization of matter, is certainly not knowable in some final and objectively 'true' way. Yet, it is not ruled out that knowledge of that *process* can be progressively *approached* to the degree the human subject comes to demystify self-understanding, to see humanity itself, and the activity of knowing 'objectively' within that process. Legitimating ideologies of ruling classes, reification of values which serve power, the varieties of master-slave relationships and doctrines, all militate against the social development of increasingly undistorted self-understanding. The struggles for human liberation and for scientific progress, therefore, must be seen as intimately related to both the instrumental and theoretical levels. Indeed, our perspective suggests that we can locate a relationship between the "is" and the "ought" which neither reduces the latter to the former nor radically separates the two. The fundamental process of self-transcendence in nature can be consciously emulated and extended in the further actualization of species power.

We have developed an overview for an understanding of scientific consciousness which locates it within the natural processes it analyzes as a determined and determinant aspect of evolving social life. Such an overview, while continuing itself to evolve, can, it is hoped, be an open-ended framework for refining an integrated treatment of science as a human-natural activity. In particular, a basis is provided for pushing the critique of science beyond the current focus on use-abuse issues. Beyond revealing the class and value penetration of contemporary scientific cognition,[44] the ecological approach is supportive of new research directions attuned to such notions as emergent processes, part-whole dialectic, and science as an integral aspect of human praxis. Such projects, perceived through the practical and theoretical

43. Examples are, respectively, P. Feyerabend, "Against Method: Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge," *Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science*, Vol. IV, pp. 17-130; and K. Popper, *Conjectures and Refutations* (New York, 1962).

44. For example, Paul Forman in his "Weimar Culture, Causality and Quantum Theory, 1918-1927: Adaptation by German Physicists and Mathematicians to a Hostile Intellectual Environment," *Historical Studies in the Physical Sciences*, Vol. 3 (1971), pp. 1-115, demonstrates the coherence of the conceptual underpinnings given quantum theory with the anti-scientific mood spawned in interwar Europe.

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holism of an integrated humanity within an ecology that is purposively addressed, will in turn generate new practical and theoretical problems and powers. The dialectic of changing and knowing reality would continue, but on a new basis in which a new order of universality, self-consciousness and self-formation is realized. In this sense, the connections between scientific knowledge and human progress, between the is and the ought, can be understood. Then might the emergence of an emancipated science in and for an emancipated world be projected to the forefront of human tasks and deliberations.

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NOTES AND COMMENTARY: SYMPOSIUM ON CLASS

by Stanley Aronowitz, Russell Jacoby, Paul Piccone and Trent Schroyer

During the weekend of November 7-9, 1975, the undergraduate student body of Brown University sponsored a conference of the Caucus for a New Political Science on the topic "Socialist Perspectives on Social Change in the United States." This conference was conceived as an effort to renew the organizational life and critical spirit of the Caucus for a New Political Science by reintroducing a theoretical orientation which had been lost sight of in recent years. The success of the conference will be fully appreciated by the impact that its theoretical accomplishments, however modest, will have on future Caucus objectives and the socio-political tendencies it represents. Although the title of the conference may appear very specific, the participants and panel members represented widely ranging political perspectives. As anticipated, those who hold similar political views most frequently disagree on substantive and methodological matters. Yet, the result was a forum where division was ultimately subordinated to common purposes and where, at the very least, new and important perspectives were developed, even if they were not uniformly traditional socialist perspectives.

A complete listing of all panels and symposium members may be found in the Fall 1975 issue of Political Science, *the official bulletin of the American Political Science Association. Publication of additional proceedings from the conference is scheduled for the near future.*

The panel on "Socialist Perspectives on the American Working Class and on the Concept of Class in Marxist Theory," whose full transcript follows, provoked considerable controversy among conference members and others. Panelists included Stanley Aronowitz, Paul Piccone, Trent Schroyer, Russell Jacoby, and Marvin Surkin (moderator).

Morton Schoolman

SURKIN: The title of this panel is "The Concept of Class in Marxist Theory." The first part will deal with the concept of class in Marxist theory in light of critical theory, and the second part will be open to questions and general discussion. Our first speaker will be Paul Piccone, who will talk on "The Status of 'Class' in Marxist Theory."

PICCONE: Since most of the members of this panel agree on the general problem of class in Marxist theory, I will merely outline a concise set of nine theses:

1) In uncritically presupposing a necessary connection between social being and social consciousness, the traditional Marxist notion of class can be historically located as part of the social reality that was qualitatively altered with the displacement of entrepreneurial by monopoly capitalism. The relationship to the means of production as the determining aspect of social being automatically translating itself into social consciousness is theoretically viable *only* up to the age of Fascism, Stalinism, and the New Deal.

2) In the administered society resulting from these developments, the politicization of the division of labor to prevent the translation of social being into social

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consciousness produces (a) the systematic dequalification of the work force and a fragmentation of productive functions; (b) the integration of earlier forms of internal opposition as regulatory mechanisms to displace rapidly disappearing market competition; and (c) the colonialization of consciousness through massive State intervention in everyday life and the explosion of the culture industry.

3) When social consciousness fades as a dependent variable, social being itself can no longer be grounded in its alleged *economic* essence. Thus, culture and politics become two dimensions where social contradictions are managed, generating new political, ideological and economic crises.

4) The obsolescence of the traditional Marxist concept of class does not mean the *elimination* of contradictions—only their relocation. Formally integrated within the system, opposition takes on a character dictated by capitalist cultural hegemony, thus ceasing to express negativity which, socially checkmated, resurfaces within the psychological sphere as neurosis kept in a state of perpetual convalescence by that consumerism on which the system thrives.

5) When social existence is structured by a well-managed consumerism, the tendency is toward universalized *passivity*, i.e., the elimination of even that modicum of subjectivity needed by the system to produce and reproduce itself.

6) Thus, unlike earlier phases of entrepreneurial capitalism when the logic of the system necessitated the obliteration of *all otherness* and *particularity*, with monopoly capitalism the survival of the system hinges precisely on the retention of a minimum of otherness and particularity to provide the system with that negativity without which it cannot regulate itself and further develop.

7) This implies the extension of the historical obsolescence of traditional Marxism to critical theory's own account of the objectification of identity theory. If domination does not necessarily disappear with a mere altering of property relations or with the formal elimination of economic exploitation, any theory of emancipation that remains based on the logic of property relations is also tendentially irrelevant. Thus, Adorno's critique of identity theory no longer adequately captures contemporary social reality.

8) Furthermore, in the stage of monopoly capitalism, the uncritical transposition of the need to salvage otherness during the last phase of entrepreneurial capitalism when it was being systematically annihilated, precipitates orthodox critical theory from the status of a challenge to that of an unwitting support of the system. Thus, whereas orthodox Marxism can be seen as the consciousness of entrepreneurial capitalism, orthodox critical theory turns out to be the consciousness of the *transition* period to monopoly capitalism. Both reverse their role with the passing of their historical moment from one of *opposition* to one of covert *support*.

9) In this context, any traditional account of class can only provide abstract and politically useless classification. The task of radical theory today is to thematize the link between a managed social being and a consequently manipulated social consciousness in order to re-think the mediations necessary for the millenarian shift from social *un*consciousness to self-consciousness. In conclusion, not only is orthodox Marxism bankrupt but so is orthodox critical theory. It is time for radical theory to go beyond traditional critical theory.

SURKIN: Thank you, Paul. Our next speaker is Russell Jacoby, who will talk on "History and Class *Un*consciousness."

JACOBY: Those of you who know Lukács' book *History and Class Consciousness* will

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note that the title of my remarks is "History and Class *Un*consciousness"—an obvious play on the original. The basic thrust of Lukács' book is to show how the bourgeoisie is incapable of class consciousness, and how only the proletariat can gain it. This shows up in a number of questions, such as that of surplus value, crises and the general situation of the bourgeoisie and the proletariat in the commodity structure, which dictate that only the proletariat can pierce the mystifications within which the bourgeois class is imprisoned. Now, over fifty years after Lukács, I think we have to reverse directions and reverse the concepts. Which is to say, the question is not the class consciousness of the proletariat, but its class *un*consciousness. I'll preface that with two observations. One is that if there has been any class consciousness (and I am speaking of the West and the industrialized countries), it has been more proper to the ruling classes than to the proletariat. And the second one, which I will only mention, is that there has been, in fact, little class consciousness in the working class or the proletariat. This means that Lukács' formulations have to be both in emphasis and in concepts reoriented toward the reverse question.

To say that there has been little class consciousness in the industrialized countries in the proletariat does not in any way denigrate the struggles throughout the history of labor. The question is an emphatic notion of class consciousness; i.e., the concept which Lukács developed comprehending the totality of society. In this sense, I think it is fair to say that there is little emphatic class consciousness, but there have been a lot of partial struggles. If anything, American labor history has probably been the bloodiest of any industrialized country. And yet, the end result has not been a socialist presence or a proletarian class consciousness. There has been a lot of liberal and bourgeois social theory dealing with class and class consciousness which would show this; that in fact, even if the workers are willing to be radical within the factory, this doesn't carry over into daily life where they turn out to be good democrats or good laborites or whatever. And in that sense there is no relationship. If I may refer to the book by the moderator, which deals with Detroit and the workers, we get a picture of an industrial proletariat as a shrinking part of the working masses and probably not representative of the entire working class.

The problem, then, is one which Sombart broached in 1906 in a small book entitled *Why Is There No Socialism in the United States?* Sombart divides the factors into economic and political. Politically, he looked at various things—the city machine, two-party politics, a certain kind of love for the Constitution and American government, the frontier, the possibility of social mobility, and so on. Then he looked at the economic questions and showed that the American working class was better paid than its European counterpart. Thus, he concluded that there was no socialism in the United States even though America was the classic capitalist country, even though, unlike many other European countries, it had no feudal remnants, no pre-capitalist class and so on, and in that sense should show the most socialist consciousness. The conclusion, therefore, that the United States would develop a socialist class conscious proletariat is, in fact, provisional. Look at least at some of the writings of Marx on the question of class and class consciousness. Obviously, I can't do that here, but I just want to mention one or two things. I think there is no Althusserian break in Marx's writings. However, one can see that after 1850 there is a shift in his writings from the concern with consciousness and subjectivity to a concern with political economy. Korsch called the first phase Marx's subjective and the second one the objective phase. The question here is not a conceptual reorientation but a shift in emphasis. Why is there this shift? Because, in fact, the proletariat did fail in 1848 and it did look like a new proletariat

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upsurge was premised on a new crisis in the economy. Hence, the last issue of the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* stated: "In view of the general prosperity which now prevails there can be no question of any real revolution, but new revolution will be made possible only as a result of a new crisis. That is just as certain as the coming crisis itself." Marx's subsequent writings are premised on the notion of an imminent economic crisis and therefore on a class conscious proletariat. This is tacit in Marx. And after a hundred years the question is why does this class consciousness fail to emerge. The question for critical theorists is whether this tacit premise that class consciousness will surface if there is a crisis is satisfactory.

Now there is a simple solution which has begun to emerge with Marxist working class elements, which is that Marx neglected the subjective factor. In that sense it was necessary to look at subjectivity, consciousness, and so on, to supplement Marx's system. There is one problem with this. If one tries to explain the absence of class consciousness by the absence of an active proletariat over a long period of time, it becomes a circular argument. One is looking for materialist reasons for the failure of class consciousness. Which is simply to say that there is an absence of class consciousness because it hasn't been attended to by Marxists, or in fact it has been neglected by social democrats. This is inadequate for a materialist analysis. As a growing phenomenon, the absence as well as the presence of class consciousness has to be explained relatively with some sort of materialist factors. In this sense what is necessary is a theory of unconsciousness and an objective theory of class unconsciousness. It is a theory which attempts to look at the social economic situation of the proletariat and determines what, in fact, in terms of classic Marxist theory, went wrong. Now I would be kidding you if I said that this is an entirely novel approach. In different terms, it became very popular at the turn of the century, when it became necessary for Marxists to analyze the problem of reformism and revisionism within the social democratic movement. That is, as an objective phenomenon, why did the proletariat by the turn of the century fail and become at least to a large degree an aspect of the establishment? There are various theories which attempt to explain this: some with which we are very familiar—the theory of the labor aristocracy. There is the theory that the proletariat was betrayed by the leadership (this becomes the Luxemburg theory). There is the theory associated with Michels which deals with how the party or working class organizations are necessarily conservative and, in this sense, they deflect the revolutionary impulse of the proletariat. And finally, there is the so-called orthodox and left-communist position, which is that reformers within the proletariat were the result of temporary prosperity and until this temporary prosperity ended there was nothing for anyone to do.

Now, all these theories of reformism were in fact attempts to understand class unconsciousness—that is, how did class unconsciousness surface in the proletariat as an enduring and real phenomenon. And when we look at these sorts of questions—leadership, organization, or the economy—all of them were in some sense decisively flawed, because they remain locked within a political economy parameter; they forgot to look at decisive mediation elements which were neither completely subjective nor objective. Just to mention some of these things—questions of culture industry, work organization, character structure—all the things which stand between economics and political economy and which become decisive mediating elements. For example, Harry Braverman's book deals with work organization and how capitalist ideology is in fact concretized in work place activities. Here, he begins to look for reasons for a failure in class unconsciousness not simply in the workers' aristocracy, not

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simply in terms of the failure of Marxists to attend to subjectivity in class consciousness but in terms of objective mediating elements. Character structure, work organization or culture provide at least a promising beginning for an understanding of class unconsciousness and not of class consciousness. I will leave that as a list, all of which can be developed in discussion.

SURKIN: Thank you, Russell. Next Stanley Aronowitz will speak.

ARONOWITZ: In the spirit of Paul's and Russell's remarks, I'm going to try and make mine as brief. I think that both of them have set a very provocative framework for the discussion. I want to first indicate some other problems and then try in some way to comment on the problems that they raised. It is a truism of Marxian theory, as Russell's article in *Telos* 23 shows, that without a crisis theory Marxism does not have a revolutionary trajectory. It becomes an ethical ideal; it becomes a way of looking at the world which is not rooted in the foundations of capitalist development—in the accumulation process, to be more specific. I would offer the analogy that without a theory of class the problem of history becomes extraordinarily difficult to resolve. Even though every point that is made about the obsolescence of traditional Marxism and perhaps even the obsolescence of the critical theory variant is true, or at least can be defended, we are still left with the problem of what is an adequate alternative and how do we conceive of history and social change—indeed the category of social time itself—without a class analysis, without a theory of class and without class as the substance of the otherness of which Piccone speaks. The difficulty in conceiving of a society without classes is that ultimately it leads to a rather common sociological position that was widespread in the 1940s an 1950s in the aftermath of World War II and the apparent unconsciousness of the American working class. That theory is fundamentally conservative: it was imported from Europe, where it was developed after the rise of Fascism and the theory of mass society. Without trying to be too provocative in reverse, it really sounds as though Piccone is reviving the theory of mass society, in which what we have is the atomization and fragmentation of the underclasses of society. The organizing principle becomes the class actions of the monopoly capitalists. Now, that may indeed by empirically certain, or it may correspond to certain historical developments, but, on the other hand, where does it leave us? And one can talk about a shift of the location of the crisis from, say, the economic crisis, the breakdown theory, to, say, the ecological crisis or to the cultural contradictions and the contradictions in politics, and I don't necessarily disagree with that. But the question of the motive force has to at least be addressed in a much more sophisticated way than is indicated by the Piccone theses. The motive force cannot be the whole people because what that literally does is eliminate the possibility of organized action. The problem with class, then, I would argue along with Lukács, is a problem that precedes any empirical description. And if the charge be made that it becomes a logical principle, then I would plead guilty. It is the logical principle from the perspective of revolutionary socialism. Certainly not from the perspective of the description of the history of the last hundred years—that is indisputable. But unless one can define the objective possibilities for the revival of class consciousness, then I think we must begin to revise or jettison the notion of revolutionary socialism. Now, I personally am not willing to do that. Therefore, seeking a theory of class continues to be a project which cannot be easily overcome.

Let me make a couple of comments, then, on what some of the problems are. It

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seems to me that one of the most revealing comments that Marx himself made about the problem of class is not contained in any of his theoretical writings but is contained in his historical writings, particularly *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*, written in 1852. There Marx says that the existence of social classes presupposes culture, community, and commuication—in other words, a commonality is required for a class. (He was talking specifically about the impossibility for peasants to constitute a class which could make history, and one of the things he argues is not the dialectic of labor, but the dialectic of culture—the cultural separation of that class from all others.) The difficulty in positing the existence of the American working class is, in part, as Russell has pointed out, not so much the product of the culture industry, but the problem of the formation of the class itself in the industrialization period. That is the period prior to the formation of monopoly capital, or at least concurrent with it. And it would appear that the American working class never had an autonomous culture because it never had a common cultural tradition—a cultural tradition rooted not just in the experience of industrialization (because in my opinion the experience of industrialization does not create culture, it breaks it up), but the pre-industrial experience. The pre-industrial experience would be the experience of the peasant societies from which most of the American working class came. They were not only separated by language and by country, but in each of those peasant experiences there was a profoundly different kind of feudal economy and a profoundly different kind of feudal society. The moment when the American working class is formed is at the same time that we get the development of monopoly capitalism.

So far as the American working class is concerned, then, what Piccone says is probably historically the case, which is that it never even had the entrepreneurial period of gestation in a common culture. And that may account for the peculiarity, the particularlity of our own experience—or at least a part of it, because we do share with Europe and all other industrializing countries, the kind of fragmentation and disruption of skills described by Braverman, Margolin, Kathy Stow, and many others. But that is not what is unique to the American experience. It could even be the case that the formation of character structure in the development of American workers is concomitant with certain features of its social existence and its cultural heterogeneity. Which is to say that there aren't even in this country experiences where, within the socialization of the production process, immense numbers of people are brought into the cities and into large industrial units,—even here there aren't conditions for the self-reflection upon the cooperative work process because of the minute cutting of ethnicity and race. Now, one of the interesting things about the development of ethnicity and race is that, in terms of the development of the American working class as cultural phenomena, ethnicity and race are even more important than work organization. They produce heterogeneous cultural developments yielding a split which is never healed, because by the time capitalism has, to a certain extent, an integrated character where it is able to mobilize these differences within the working class, the split has grown too large.

There is one thing of which I would be very critical in Jacoby's analysis which seems to me to be throwing one point out much too quickly. What Marxism lacks and what makes it really obsolete, it seems to me, in the twentieth century, is a theory of bureaucracy. Now there are attempts in Europe to do that but we have very few people in the United States who are really working on a theory of bureaucracy. It is undoubtedly the case, at least in the history of the American working class movement, in the organization of American workers into unions, and even their socialist organizations, that the development of bureaucracy corresponds in a sense to the

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development of the authoritarian family. There is no doubt that the structure of that bureaucracy has a certain important parallel to patriarchal relations that exist in the authoritarian family. It is a direct carryover. And the throwing up of leadership, as Freud analyzed in *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, that is successfully able to oppress a working class, is to a certain extent connected in the American labor movement with that family development. It is, therefore, of supreme importance that we not only ask the question how is it possible that the American working class hasn't developed socialist consciousness, but that we begin to identify those kinds of cultural contradictions of which Piccone would like to talk, which, in fact, are the specificity of development of the working class.

And now I return to my first comment. I believe two things will emerge in the coming period. The first one is that we are in for a fairly substantial crisis in the material foundations, the economic foundations, of society. It is not a classic crisis of overproduction; that is *not* the kind of crisis I'm talking about. I would suggest that the crisis is one in which the necessity for the reaccumulation of capital in the most productive sectors of society, from the viewpoint of the problem of the rate of profit, has also necessitated severe cutting of those industries, those forms of employment which have been responsible for the social legitimation system at least until 1933. We are witnessing not the disappearance but the disintegration of those fundamental structures of social integration, to be found, I believe, in the enlarged state sector, the arms industry, and certain other things. What is absolutely taking place is that capitalism is in the process of world reorganization. This does not suggest that there is any automatic relationship—and I agree here with Piccone—between social being and social consciousness. The mediations of which Jacoby speaks, that is, how the problem of the creation of a concrete universal out of the working class, the creation of a social force capable of totalizing its own experience and proposing to reorganize society—are not resolved by recounting the character of the economic crisis, a crisis which concerns the contradictions of disaccumulation and accumulation. But, on the other hand, I would reiterate that it is certain that this crisis, notwithstanding the efforts of the organized left, is bound to lead towards a more reactionary direction and postpone the possibility of working class consciousness under present circumstances, because there is no concerted, intellectual effort to comprehend the significance of the mediations. On the contrary, there is a deep anti-cultural, anti-psychological, old-time religion return among the Marxists, revealing that the problem of character structure has reared its ugly head in precisely that moment where the problem is in the sphere of culture and politics. People wish to make the jump toward that economic crisis which I believe only provides the objective possibilities, in the most abstract sense, for socialist revolution or socialist development. They wish to make the jump between that and automatism, that is, an automatic reaction under the leadership of a very well-informed, organizationally profound vanguard. Well that, of course, as everybody should know by now, is sheer and utter horseshit—

SURKIN: We will now hear from Trent Schroyer.

SCHROYER: This is a very strange panel. It is a group of people who certainly don't take the traditional perspective on the notion of class. Yet, in a way, I hear everyone trying to create a new theory that will do the job of the old theory. And what is the task of the old theory? Orthodox theory created an ethos in which there was a messianic hope whereby, somehow, salvation was going to be achieved. And the problem which I

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think we should talk about, is where does this messianic sphere or dimension come into the Marxist tradition? What kind of theory would we need to get out of this kind of eschatology and into another relationship to the problems of class domination? That's what I understand we are talking about. This panel is really talking about the crisis of theory and critical theory as an attempt to restore some of the intentions of a different kind of scientific ideal which really never got a chance because it already, as bourgeois society was forming, suggested that what was necessary was to overcome this type of social form.

Now, as I listen to these people speak, I find that we really don't agree: we are all trying to reformulate what it would mean to create a theory that would do a different kind of thing than bourgeois theory, positivist theory. That is, it would put us in a different relation to our world. It would restore us all to a position of high culture in the sense that the world would be totally meaningful and our action in it would have some kind of relationship to our intentions and we would not be constrained by class contexts on all sides.

The problem now is how did we start with a Marxist theory that got us into this eschatology which we constantly have to fight? One of the ways we can think about this is that liberal capitalism was a very unique figuration in history. There emerged a self-regulating market system which justified itself in terms of the direct relationship between wage labor and capital. Ideologically, the laborers can get their just deserts in the marketplace. It is this unique configuration of components in society which led us to believe that critique really relates to some kind of action in a direct way; because what that really means is that the economy and culture really are understood in terms of the same principle: the principle of exchange. The state really understood its role as a night watchman on the marketplace, while justifying the cultural notion of possessive individualism. Orthodox Marxism upheld that a contradiction in the economy leads directly to a contradiction in the culture which would, in turn, lead directly into a revolutionary situation. That was a very fleeting moment in the development of capitalism. After it passed, the traditional form of the Marxist theory of crisis could really no longer be directly applied; that is, critique did not directly relate to action. As the state intervened in the accumulation process to make it possible for accumulation to continue—for example, the progressive era in the United States—there is a sense in which the economy is no longer totally constituted by exchange and the political ideology is no longer based upon the regulatory ideal of the exchange, but developed new kinds of managerial strategies. Insofar, then, as state intervention really changes the dynamic of capitalist development, this relationship between totalized critique and action was also altered. Nonetheless, organizations that were trying to transform the class experience in capitalist society continue to believe that it did. Thus, the messianic expectations that some kind of organization would be capable of breaking through the contraints.

Our problem today is that we live in a society in which there is very deep state penetration in both capital accumulation and in the social-cultural world. How can we form a theory that will have the same possibility of restoring to us a world that is meaningful and that suggests to us subjective possibilities for action? Is it going to come to us in a traditional theory of class? Obviously not. We've been listening to attempts to describe what kind of theory could possibly do that. In my opinion, the most ambitious attempt to restore a form of crisis theory has been Habermas'. He attempts to show that there is a new contradiction in late capitalism—i.e., the legitimation crisis—which is really sharpened by two dynamics. On the one hand, there is

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the dynamic of capital accumulation which requires state intervention; and, on the other, the dynamic that is created by rationalizing institutions in which people no longer want to participate—that is, what Daniel Bell calls the disjunction of social structure and culture or what Habermas calls the motivation crisis. But these contradictions reflexively intensify the political incapacity to both stabilize the society and justify this control as "democratic." So there is a new crisis in the making—a legitimation crisis.

Well, if that kind of theorizing will do it, fine. Whatever the form of crisis theory that we get, I doubt very much if it will be a material theory of class unconsciousness, because the whole problem is to understand how our subjectivity is *formed* in a material context but not *determined* by that context. There is a sense, then, in which the relationship of the theory to the context in which we're theorizing has to discover the openings for action in a manageable way. So, I think what we're trying to talk about is: can we again achieve a totalization that is capable of this kind of relationship to a context where there are so many constraints—class constraint being a major one—upon consciousness?

QUESTION: Can the working class in the West still be considered an agent of social change? Or, more precisely an agent of revolutionary social change?

PICCONE: Unlike Aronowitz and Schroyer, who think that there is something fundamentally wrong with Marx's original categories, I take Marx's account to be roughly adequate for the 19th century. Because of historical developments, however, those categories have since become obsolete—and one of them is "class." The reason why I don't talk about class is because the way it is articulated in the 19th century in Marx is in direct relation to the means of production. But after World War I, capitalism successfully meets the challenge of proletarian revolution by first of all smashing workers' organizations, and secondly, by rearranging the production process such that consciousness is no longer objectively attainable at the workplace, and thirdly, by massively intervening in the economy and carrying out a cultural offensive through the new modes of communication. It is no longer possible for the working class to obtain revolutionary consciousness through the relationship to the means of production. Consequently, the notion of class which hinges on the possibility of the attainment of this objective consciousness, no longer makes any sense for radical theory precisely because the capitalist class was further able to integrate the opposition provided at the workplace, *as* a regulatory mechanism to substitute for the rapidly disappearing market which in liberal capitalism carried out that function. By the time we get to the New Deal, Fascism, and Stalinism, we find a situation in which *organized* labor is part of the system and its struggles to regulate prices and wages. Critical theory, in fact, came about then as an attempt to update the kind of critical analysis provided by Marxism. Thus, by the time we get to the 1970s, any discussion of class in traditional terms is pure idealism: that category is no longer theoretically relevant. Traditional Marxism or radical theory must stop attempting to come up with a class analysis that can identify the revolutionary agent. That is a kind of revolutionary nostalgia for the good old days of the picket lines of the 1930s, and I don't think it's theoretically very useful. We have to develop a theory which does not rely on a mythical working class, which, because of its direct contact with machinery and oppression, is better able to see the light. That simply is not the case. Today, we confront a situation of bourgeois hegemony in which our very ways of thinking are already instrumentalized to the logic

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of capitalism. Earlier overt repressive mechanisms have been internalized in our very character structure such that the way we express ourselves, the way we relate, automatically reproduces these mechanisms. In the present context, there are two crucial things that need to be done: a) to investigate genuine emancipatory possibilities; and b) to figure out how to translate these possibilities into concrete political projects. Given the totalized nature of bourgeois hegemony, today no one group has privileged access to revolutionary theory and practice because of *objective social being*. What makes us revolutionary is not the fact that we may carry a pipe-wrench in our side, but the will to bring about a qualitatively better world without oppression and suffering.

QUESTION: What specifically in Marx's notion of class is being rejected, and why?

JACOBY: There is no theory of class consciousness in Marx. This leaves us two alternatives. One is that because there is no class consciousness, this says nothing about the existence of classes which could persist with or without class consciousness. But if there is no class consciousness for a long period of time, something *is* wrong with your concept of class. But this is an orthodox concept of class with various positions to it. One could say, for example, that everyone who receives wages at the end of the week is in the working class. Thus, we have the French Communist Party that says 99% of the country is working class. Insofar as that concept of class doesn't account for the problems of class consciousness, it is inadequate. To be sure, I don't have an adequate concept of class to offer in place of it, but I am just suggesting certain kinds of problems which indicate that the orthodox concept of class doesn't explain certain problems which have emerged over the last hundred years. In this sense, the concept has to be reformulated and the ways of saving it, by saying, well, everyone is in the working class except the ruling class, which is 1%, don't actually do the trick.

And in some ways, a concept of class which begins to incorporate the mediations, which begins to include the *objective* elements of how class unconsciousness and class consciousness are formed, is unnecessary. Without that, we couldn't say, "Well, look, this society is without class consciousness, but our theory says that here is the sector of society which, if it should become class conscious, can stop the entire society." Therefore, one discovers that the electrical workers in upstate New York can, in fact, if they become class conscious, bring the entire economy to a halt. This way of locating the revolutionary agent is a phony way of approaching the problem.

SCHROYER: I think that there is a real difference between what Paul is saying and what I'm trying to say. I don't think we can have critical theory or a Marxist crisis theory without the notion of class for a very simple reason: capital, the new social form that came into history when all factors of production were delivered by markets and were commodified. They come together and are mobilized by this new social form in which production is no longer organized for human use, but is constrained by this very capital form. The material production process is distorted into a stimulated exchange value production process. It is in the sense that capital still exists as a moving force in the international capitalist system that we still have the need for the category of class. On the other hand, there is a section in *Capital* I, called "The Fetishism of Commodities," which is an understanding of what happens to human sensibility and perception under the conditions of the lifeworld that is constituted by the capital form. That is, if you will, a class constraint on human sensibility and perception until the human reality cannot be really perceived by human sensibility, but must be perceived via this detour through the heaven of exchange value and its logics. In that

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sense, class remains a notion that helps us understand the distortion of consciousness in a human totality.

Thus, although the historical configuration of constitutive forces creating social change has undergone fundamental changes, in ways that force us to make a broader totalization, nonetheless, we need to still look for the constraints upon those constitutive mechanisms in human society—namely, production, on the one hand and, on the other, the possibility of understanding the world in which subjects are formed. The analysis of this must use the notion of class, even though we may need a more totalizing theory to recognize the constraints that are now placed on these human potentials, so class is relevant.

I have a sense that what Paul is getting into—as he commented to me during the break—is that the real, valid element in the Marxist tradition is seen as its eschatological moment. And I think that this is our difference. I understand the notion of critique to be this documentation, the mapping of the constraints—basically, class constraints—on consciousness (although other types of constraints exist, such as hierarchy, and so forth). You cannot understand critique to be the development of a theory of the active agent in history: that is a kind of elitist Marxism which I think is exactly the element that Lenin developed and that is really more of a problem than a help. Ultimately, it is the *form* of theory that we are talking about. An eschatological Marxism has lost the intention of critique and simply selects the *telos* of revolution. The problem is, if we discipline ourselves to that kind of goal in history, we lost exactly the world in which we might find some other orientation. It is this kind of eschatology which is the deepest problem of Marxism.

JOEL WHITEBOOK (from the audience): Russell rightly pointed out that most of neo-Marxism has been trying to explain why class consciousness hasn't emerged. I'd like to ask: is it ever correct to believe that it would? And whether the search for the missing class consciousness hasn't been informed by a deeper assumption that the working class is the agent of social change? I would suggest that this is the question we should address. It is the political question which the New Left never came to grips with and, as a result, ended up on the rocks. Now, I'd like to make a few comments on that question before turning it over to the panel.

It's really in the first Hegel critique that Marx supposedly deduces the proletariat as the agent of social change. I think you can see the problem emerging here already. There are two criteria here which he says a radical class has to have: first, it has to be strategically located in society so that it can overthrow that society, so that it can effect a transformation in society. That's what I'll call the "strategical" criterion. Second, its particular position, its particular logic, must lead to what we have come to call class consciousness, and which I will call some sort of enlightened critical consciousness. And I think it's very important—I think Russell pointed this out when he was discussing Lukács in his article in *Telos* [10]—that we have an emphatic notion of class consciousness. It can't be conceived of in terms of narrow economic interests. We have to have a notion of class consciousness which is commensurable with full emancipation.

Now, I would argue that Marx, throughout his career—although he kept trying—was never able to show how it was possible for the proletariat to develop that emancipatory class consciousness in the emphatic sense. But the proletariat was clung to as the agent of social change—and it made a lot more sense in his effort to do that—because of its strategic importance. And in a way, most people still cling to it for this reason. Stanley's comment is a case in point: he says that he cannot conceive of any

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other way for a socialist revolution to take place. So with that as a given, then you have to reason backward and find out how class consciousness can emerge. My point—and maybe I will disagree with Stanley here—is that the concept of socialist revolution needs to be rethought, so as not to be shackled with that notion of the working class as the agent of social change. I would contend that most—not most, *every*—argument I've seen which has tried to demonstrate that the proletariat will develop class consciousness in the emphatic sense is contrived and the motivations for this contrivance are this strategic importance.

ARONOWITZ: It is incorrect, obviously, to expect the working class to achieve class consciousness. But that's not the problem I was addressing. There are two ways of understanding the history of capitalism. One way is by ascribing to the banality of the working class leadership the failure of class consciousness. The other way, which is inescapable, is to take a careful look at the concrete history of the working class to discover what was at stake under capitalism. There is a possible argument implied in Volume I, the section on Machinery and Modern Industry, that the notion of class never corresponded to the empirical existence of the working class anyway, and that really the category of fragmentation and the category concomitant to that of hierarchy were far more significant in the actual existence of those who work for wages. Therefore, the first step might be to discover whether, in any sense of the word, the concept of class has ever been more than an *a priori* inference from the lordship-bondage section of Hegel's *Phenomenology*.

In my opinion, that's exactly the case. I think you will find that in the empirical existence of the working class, the structural forms of capitalism have always been more based on the category of fragmentation, secondary to the category of authority, hierarchy, than they have been on any category essentially of class which would allow the working class to develop an existence for itself. The second problem inherent in the first one is that Marxism does not just assume the existence of the working class, but also assumes the class *un*consciousness—the point Russell was making—of the ruling class—which, as Lukács argued, could never achieve a sufficient amount of consciousness to be able to mobilize its resources to prevent the emergence of class consciousness even though that class consciousness is independent in Lukács of any empirical existence.

So here is the other problem. If it is true that hierarchy and domination—that is, authority—is central, and not the relationship to the mode of production, this would indicate, then, that various sectors of workers would have different fates, different life chances, different social trajectories. What follows from that, it seems to me, is that we have to begin to reappraise the way in which capitalism itself developed structure. I am not arguing for the working class, that's not the issue. I am arguing for a theory of class, because in the first place, I ask the question how is history possible without classes and in the second place, how is a revolution possible without a social agent. I agree with Russell that the 99% argument made by the French Communists is really nonsense. But I don't believe that even Gramsci or Korsch advanced the notion of "will" without simultaneously the notion of class and the *generic* notion of party—not party in a Leninist sense, but as political organization. You cannot abstract the notion of organic intellectuals because the organic intellectual in Gramsci depends on a relationship with *someone*. You cannot abstract the notion of historical specificity without a notion of how structure of space and time penetrate each other. Class is the spatial category from which time becomes possible. That's the difficulty. I admit my confusion—I understand that the empirical existence of the class has nothing to do

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with its possibility for consciousness. But at the same time I don't know how one can construct either a model of a revolutionary future or a model of a political present without understanding or having some theory of class.

QUESTION FROM AUDIENCE: First of all, Marx—at least implicitly—and Lenin very explicitly, never expected class consciousness to arise right out of the working class or their struggles. Lenin makes it very clear that there is no automatic relation between crisis and revolution. It should be obvious to anyone familiar with what's going on outside these four walls that we are now in an economic crisis and the American working class has not been waiting for this crisis: in fact, the opposite is the case; workers are only afraid of losing their jobs, and so forth. An economic crisis, then, does not automatically bring about a rise in consciousness. So why do the workers not have class consciousness? Well, I don't think you have to look for some sort of fundamental change in capitalism to find the answer. The answer lies in several factors. One is the question of who leads the working class? Since the period of World War II, the working class in many places was smashed or disarmed (Stalin, Europe). The leadership of unions which then took over simply consolidated the bureaucratic aspects (the Meanys, Woodcocks, and so on) out of which there was the consistent elimination of radicals and a concern only for filling capitalism's needs. Therefore, the question of what class consciousness is: it isn't simply a tacit acknowledgement of the need for socialism, but is an active opposition to every manifestation of capitalism.

The task of a revolutionary party, then, is to go into the unions, takeover their leadership, and oppose the traditional American party system, oppose all racial and sexual discrimination, and be absolutely for the expropriation of private property. That's what we need! [Moaning and groaning from panel and audience.]

PICCONE: That's the question that we needed: there were getting to be too many differences among us, and we could use something to unify us again! [General laughter.]

SURKIN: Well, I'd like to ask something...

UNDERGRADUATES IN AUDIENCE: No, go back to the question. Why don't you answer him? Respond!

PICCONE: Response coming up! How can anybody in 1975 push the views of that incredible piece of shit, *What Is to Be Done?* [Applause from audience.] That in order to make a revolution people need some kind of Leninist saviour to tell them what the story is is one of the most outrageous insults that human beings can be subjected to. As early as 1905, Lenin himself realized this and eventually, in *State and Revolution*, went completely beyond what American Trotskyists and Leninists recycle in 1970. And not only Lenin, but most other mass movements on the left immediately after World War I rejected this as well. Only some kind of petty-bourgeois student picks it up, who wants to take the good class consciousness to the working class and say to them, "Look, you poor bastard, listen to me: I have the blueprint for revolution here and you're going to be saved." Not surprisingly, they don't listen...

ARONOWITZ: There's one thing that's really relevant here. The invocation of a 1902 document, *What Is to Be Done?* and the program of that document, and Lenin's position that the working class by its own efforts could only achieve trade-union

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consciousness, that socialism comes to the working class, as it were, from the outside, is a testament to the difficulty that this panel has been trying to deal with. We, who really in some sense believe in socialism from below, and you, who believe in socialism from above, have a substantial difference. If the working class *by its own efforts* cannot achieve revolutionary consciousness, and is able not only to struggle against every manifestation of its exploitation and oppression, but also to be able to conceive of a qualitative alternative in which it manages its own society—not the society of a state, not the society of a party, but the society of the people who are actually producing and controlling their own institutions—then we don't want your socialism. [Applause.] Your socialism would exchange one set of masters for another, and that has been the experience. If you want to explain the history of the Soviet Union by the perfidy of a couple of party leaders, you must take a look at the history of the Trotskyists during the period from 1917 to 1925. *They were above all* the most ruthless suppressors of the working class movement. [Applause.] The question is serious, because the question implies that what we're trying to grapple with is power. But we're concerned with how to conceive of class consciousness, and whether the theory of class itself is viable, given its difficulty in light of the last 55 to 75 years of our own experience. That's the difficulty, and you did not address it.

MURRAY BOOKCHIN (from the audience): I feel very congenial to certain aspects of Paul's theory. There was a period when the working class seemed to all appearances, and quite legitimately, challenging. It was the one class that was above all denied any possible relief, so to speak, by the bourgeois institutions. The peasants got the land at the end of the French revolution, the proletariat got the factory and with that the 18-hour day, child labor, and everything like that. It was very important that there was this ethnic differentiation—which I'll enlarge, Stanley, to mean not only people of different foreign backgrounds and different colors and so on, but people of different classes, transitional classes, like peasants who came into the towns and played the most revolutionary role through the 19th century. I would add here for everybody's consideration that when you talk about great revolutions, you're talking in most cases of French Revolutions, be they '93 or '71 in Paris; and you're talking there of craftsmen which Marx described as the "old shit" in contrast to the heavy industrialized proletariat of Germany which practically goose-stepped into fascism—very tragically. Similarly Spain (Barcelona); similarly Russia, with a *peasant* working class, and even Trotsky complains about its backwardness. You have now reached a point of such generalization in capitalist crises—ecological crises, economic crises, urban crises, psychological crises, political crises, etc., which entrench delegitimation of virtually all institutions. Is it not conceivable that one can now finally raise "as the agent of social change" that so-called utopian agent that has existed for almost 200 years as a myth almost, but which seems to now have become a reality? And that is literally called *le peuple,* "the people." You have argued, Stanley, that there is no way of organizing this. It has been more organized in terms of rebellion than the working class is in terms of many an institution that it has created in the factory. So much of what you call social struggle today is taking place not only among peasants abroad, discontended middle classes everywhere, but also among workers who are functioning outside the factory. This does not deny the existence of classes: it insists upon their transcendence. That doesn't mean there isn't a ruling class. It means that there is a population already—the oppressed. This was the imagery of the great French Revolution which was, as we know, distorted. This was the imagery of the American Revolution, also distorted. This was also the imagery of the populist movement. Is it

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conceivable now that you have the urban masses, the oppressed, who cut across class lines, who are trying to find their own social forms outside the traditional industrial proletariat—important as that struggle is? But now the workers are becoming part of the people instead of the people dissolving into the workers, which was the traditional Marxian conception and which the French Communist Party rationalizes as 99%. I pose this as an issue. In other words I'm suggesting that the transcendence of the claim that 'the history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggle.' Marx made an amazing statement—all of economic history can be summed up in the contradiction between town and country. What are you going to do with that?

PICCONE: I would like to move that question into a polemic with Schroyer. I propose a concept of Marxism which has been pushed in Europe, by Bloch and others, but which is not that popular in the U.S. Marxism is not the theory of capitalist formation, it isn't something which developed in 1848 with the birth of the *Communist Manifesto*. Marxism is the last step in the secularization of the Judaeo-Christian tradition and, more generally, an attempt to reconstitute the spirit of Western civilization. It embodies a kind of longing of all mankind. This is the eschatological element of Marxism that is fundamental; this is the legacy that I believe is still worth salvaging and which cannot be captured in any of the fossilized theories that have somehow come down to us. We need a theory which captures the eschatology, the emancipatory goal, without hypostatizing any historically-specific (and obsolescent) category of working class, or even class, which becomes an obstacle to the attainment of the theory's goal of emancipation.

BOOKCHIN: I am surprised by the way I could make the statement that I made and that it goes unchallenged. I expected that somebody would rise to the defense of *class*. Marx dissolved people into *class*; and not classes into people, as I've tried to do. That's a fundamental change. In other words, I'm going back to the democratic ideology again just as I'm going back to the commune. The silence leaves me appalled.

JACOBY: The problem is that there are more questions than answers. The task is to escape certain kinds of abstractions. On the one hand, we conclude that the orthodox concept of class is inadequate. On the other hand, the concept of people as it has been used endlessly in 'power to the people' is also a great abstraction in that it is unclear as to whether there is a homogenized concept of people, or still basic differences which will surface at one time or another? In fact, the non-existence of class consciousness doesn't in fact mean that we've surmounted classes. I don't understand what is to be gained by dissolving class into people, because I still see basic structural differences in society. And in that sense, the concept of people as an abstraction can be indiscriminately applied to all sorts of groups.

ARONOWITZ: Let me state my position with regard to Bookchin's formulation of the problem. This is a relatively basic kind of question that I have been working on for two years now: the notion of class ultimately ends up as a definition of the relationships that human beings enter into in the process of producing the means of subsistence and negotiating our mastery or domination of nature. The dialectic of labor, which is the mediation between human beings and nature, is the thing that does not just transform nature to meet human needs, but is for Marx the basis of human beings' self-formation. It is their way in which they define themselves in the world. If one wishes to significantly vitiate the centrality of labor, then the concept of the people may indeed have considerable weight. Habermas states that if it once were the case,

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which anthropological evidence indicates it may not have been, it certainly is not now the case that self-formation takes place entirely through that twin negotiation. Habermas' argument for a theory of communicative competence has a certain weight because what it calls attention to is that which even Marx discusses as being the function of the imagination, the function of thinking in the process of self-formation. So, my problem is that in order to jettison the concept of class, I cannot, because I am an orthodox Marxist in the methodological sense. I cannot jettison the notion of class unless I've learned or can accept a new concept of the fundamental question of human nature. If I am able to do that satisfactorily (and I do *not* think that Habermas has done this), then it may be possible to redevelop a different concept of agency which does not necessarily imply exclusivity. It seems to me what is really involved, Murray—and I think you've done this to your satisfaction—is that we have a considerable amount of work to be done in the attempt to perfect a conjunction of the kinds of questions that Russell was dealing with—namely, the question of psychology and the formation of character structure which I think is implicit in the notion of communication—and the dialectic of labor, which is still a very significant aspect of human development, with the historical process itself (i.e., at this particular junction, maybe it's Piccone's monopoly capital 1920s paradigm—I don't mean this to be precise). We may then have at least the elements, the categories, for the reconstitution of a social theory of revolution. I think, however, that we still have not successfully, despite all our talk, disposed of the Marxian concept of class because we have not yet wrung all the juices from it. For those people who are listening here, I want to reiterate what Jacoby originally said. No one will deny the militancy or the significance of the industrial working class or even the concept of the workers themselves in the social struggle. The question is not whether the category is necessary, *but whether it is sufficient to explain the kind of social consciousness necessary for socialist revolution.*

QUESTION: I don't think that the fact that someone is in academia precludes them from talking to people from another class. What do you think is the role of the theoretician in working with the disadvantaged and the exploited?

PICCONE: What we have here is the classic problem of external mediation which, expressed in a different form, generates the Leninist theory of party with the intellectuals ultimately end up becoming the party elite. The problem here, obviously, is that external mediation leads us to treat others exclusively as objects. *If the subjects do not liberate themselves, then it is not going to happen*—how many times do the members of this panel have to reiterate this point? To the extent that intellectuals present themselves as intellectuals, as outsiders, who have "mind" and who can explicate political problems for the workers as "body," to that extent the problem remains framed in terms of bourgeois categories that in principle cannot overcome that kind of problematic. If consciousness is not spontaneously generated and spontaneously articulated, then socialism is aborted from the beginning. The idea that there are all these kinds of struggles going on in the prisons, in the factories, in the mining industry and the universities—we all know this! We don't live in some kind of fantasy world. Critical theorists don't climb up in the clouds and ignore all of the struggles all of the time. The point is, the logic of advanced capitalism is such that all these issues can receive vindication by the system only to the extent that they are inserted within the logic of capitalist domination—the only vindication that these demands can get are those consistent with the system's logic. I don't suggest that we ignore these demands, but that we begin to conceive of alternatives that are

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qualitatively different, *not* consistent with the logic of instrumentalization, and then translate these into objective possibilities. Right now we don't have that; therefore, all that kind of work, whether we like it or not, feeds into the logic of bourgeois domination. What all these groups eventually attain, if their struggles succeed, is *de facto* corporate status within the U.S. corporate state, so that their demands will be legitimately put forth and more or less satisfied. Thus, all of these struggles can leave as their latent goal the redistribution of the rip-off. One of the classical idiotic and uncritical assumptions of traditional Marxists is that what makes these struggles ultimately revolutionary is that the system will not be able to meet their demands. This is idealistic moonshine not justifiable in terms either of present capitalist possibilities or the historical record.

What critical theory must develop is a perspective which can be translated into a struggle for a qualitatively different state of affairs. All that you are talking about ends up reproducing on a higher level bourgeois repressive relations and patterns of domination.

QUESTION: And all this effort in formulating a critical theory allows you so-called theoreticians to hold these kinds of seminars and to make a living while these groups of people continue to be exploited.

ARONOWITZ: Come off it... In the first place, there is a way in which intellectuals perform significant roles by helping to generate a political culture. One of the points that Paul makes in part in his *Theses* is the tendency of late capitalism toward the depoliticization of masses of people. One of the functions of people who teach in universities, colleges and high schools and various other places in which there is an opportunity to work with working class people or lower middle class people is that we represent the possibility for politicizing one's life. We take our risks in our schools, in our classrooms, we struggle in our sector. We get fired for our politics, we have a hard time getting other jobs. There are those of us who are exceptions in that respect, but these are very few. It seems to me that we have, therefore, two responsibilities. The first is to be the best damn teachers and the most elucidating kind of writers we can be and to begin in some way to establish organic connections with students—in whatever sphere. I know people who are teaching prisoners, who then begin to internalize the necessity for critical thinking and critical politics. The second thing we do—and I think it is undeniably the case—is not to become abstracted from those struggles that are taking place in the state sector—where, right now, some of the most critical issues face our society. I believe that we don't have to go to the farm workers' committees, or to support movements for prisoners, to justify the validity of the enterprise that we are involved in. I think that the implication that politics consists solely in this kind of breast-beating, guilt-producing support movement activity—which is very, very important at elite universities to maintain the liberal character of these institutions—is profoundly *anti-political.* It is a depoliticizing activity although it may indeed in individual cases raise some personal feeling of well-being.

SURKIN: What I understand from Piccone's comments—he might not have meant this, but this is what I take it in part to mean—why should intellectuals interpret somebody's process of organization or struggle, militancy? Why can't they do it themselves? In fact, they will at some point do it for themselves, if they're going to have some social, actual significance. This also refers to the situation that we have here. What I take from Piccone's comments, is that instead of expecting the people sitting

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up here to have a ready-made or saleable analysis of class or class consciousness, what will happen when New York City defaults, and so on, we need to see that, in fact, we must share our experiences and grapple with problems which it seems to be very difficult for this panel of experts to deal with. And that is the fact that we don't have a theory of class which is viable, and there is no agreement upon any one theory of class, so how do we proceed to develop such a theory—if we decide we need it—and then, once we've developed it, how will we relate that to real social processes? And that seems to be historically, as well as right now, a very difficult task for intellectuals, academics, and students as well, to deal with. I hope that they'll see that there is no simple answer, but rather a sense of wanting to continue to discuss that kind of problematic.

QUESTION: This is going to sound dumb, but I came here to try to make sense out of some things. Now, I've reached a level of understanding adequate within the practical and academic world in which I live, but when you speak among yourselves—and you're a very dynamic group of people—I find you really scary, since I don't understand what you're talking about. We have no way of communicating with you from wherever it is in the rest of academia that we are. I feel a lot of energy up here, but I don't know what to do with it. Perhaps you could think of some way to help us get together on some level? Perhaps we could help you, or you could help us, then, come to some sort of an idea about what class is?

SURKIN: There is one problem here, and I think that Trent was very conscious of it when he said that this is a peculiar group, with a number of different languages being spoken here. Maybe Trent will try to respond.

SCHROYER: I hope I can, but I'm afraid I'm going to get even more abstract as I try to be more concrete. I feel just as detached from this discussion as you are for the following reason: I've been persuaded that Piccone is right. Not only has Marxism failed, but critical theory has failed, too. It no longer speaks a voice that can be understood. I understand the real problem to be a little different than some of the other speakers understand it. That is, I really experience this as an example of what Hegel calls the unhappy consciousness; the attempt to understand the human faculty of thinking in relation to action in the way that creates an idealization. Hegel used that, by the way, to explain the Judaeo-Christian tradition which always wanted to seek an elevation to God, but always discovered that the flesh was in the way and could only fall back into a melancholic situation.

What I think we've been experiencing here is a Marxian melancholia that understands thinking in a way that takes us into the dynamic of society to find the subject of change. Thus we find an ideal subject that's going to change the world and then we realize that there's really no way out from that into the world of action, because we really live in a plurality of people where that kind of transition isn't made very easily. That's why theory gets reduced to an instrument; that's why Leninism is possible. That's why, as I listen to this discussion, I really am listening to what I understand to be the demise of reason, even in the tradition which I think continues to try and discover what the notion of reason is—that is, how thinking relates to action in the world. For that reason, as far as I'm concerned, we're still seeking. I've been participating in discussions like this for 15 years and each time we seek the subject that's going to do it, that's going to transcend the domination. The problem is that the mode of thinking is itself alienated from the world and from the ideal of critique, and

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will never really transform the relationship of thinking to action. For example, I find Murray Bookchin's mode of expression to be the practice of emancipation and to be exemplary of the key category of an anarchist tradition: spontaneity. It does not attempt to use theory as an instrument to change the world.

And this is really what I think the discussion is about—not the category of class, but the theory that can express the logic of the development of a world in order to understand that world, on the one hand, and transform our relationship to the world in terms of understanding it better, restoring its meaning, making it possible for us to act in the world, on the other. Of course, that's a very odd philosophical statement. I could go back and try to show that from the beginning of monotheism to the present kind of idealized Marxism there has been a loss of the context of life. Thus, what we really have here is the ongoing struggle that occurred in Rome, when the Judaeo-Christian tradition took over and another tradition, that of Greek thought, was lost.

QUESTION: I never had the problem about worrying about the abstraction or disconnectedness of the intellectual. Because as an intellectual, I've also been on picket lines with farmworkers for the boycott, I've been beaten up by the police, I've organized demonstrations, and I've done other things, with the clear understanding that when I was doing these things I was not engaged in intellectual activity, that was a separate thing, which was often in competition with some intellectual activity, but which also had very real payoffs for my writing. What I'm trying to get at is this: there's a very real critique about intellectuality that is being made here: it's a critique which we have made. That's why I like Aronowitz' statement very much. When we work as intellectuals, we have a commitment to one thing, and that is clarity and directness, a dropping away of intellectual affections and of academic crap, and a moving directly with strength and clarity. Not necessarily simplicity, but clarity...

PICCONE: I want to make a plea for obstruseness here. The problem with clarity is that it speaks the language of reification. What is clear to us is what somehow fits into the consumerist mentality. You want clear ideas, well-packaged, that can be absorbed, taken home to enjoy, as if they were buckets of Kentucky Fried Chicken or the "I Love Lucy" shows. The point is that this is the kind of critique that has been made against critical theory from the very beginning. They said, "Look, you're speaking a language nobody can understand," and critical theorists answered, "Precisely, because we don't want this language to become a part of that reification we are trying to break. Therefore, in order to understand us, you must make an effort, and in making the effort, you begin to overcome reification and alienation." As long as you insist on clarity, you remain in this passive state: you stagnate in the mundane, the commonplace—the kind of alienation that the theory is trying to overcome.

ARONOWITZ: I'd like to comment on this discussion, because I'm much more sympathetic to the point that Paul makes than I am to the point that Trent makes. Let me start by talking about how I teach. I teach by the religious method of the explication of text. At Staten Island Community College people sit down and read and interpret paragraphs. I want to tell you why I do that. What exists in our society is the incapacity of many people to sit with an idea. It's a very traditional method, no students drop out, they sit there and read and *learn* how to read by reading Marx and Freud and all the things that the people up here have read and take for granted. We talk about meaning, and get through sometimes only 4 pages every two weeks. I never lecture. The point is, that critical reason has been lost not because of some obscure

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development but because of the very character of the capitalism in which we live. It doesn't exist for the bourgeoisie, for the workers and certainly not for the academics. We have a responsibility. The responsibility is not to persuade students to do anything else than engage in the same processes, the same kind of fucked-up development that we have had, primarily because it seems to me that what is being lost is first the capacity to go beyond the reified structures, the appearances, and secondly is the capacity for people collectively and individually to have an imagination that allows them to conceive of alternatives or even the possibility thereof. The question of form is not simply a question of tradition; the question of form of teaching and form of learning has in my judgment an awful lot to do about whether it is going to be possible to develop social, much less class, consciousness. And if we find ourselves in our social existence as intellectuals in the classroom as well as at the writing desk, we have a responsibility—a revolutionary responsibility—to conjure the capacity for complexity and intricacy. I think linear thinking is among the plagues of mass culture and we participate in mass culture to a large extent if, for the sake of clarity, we degenerate into dogma; if, for the sake of communication, we degenerate into forms of imagery, popcorn imagery (if I may use an image), and I think we have a serious question about whether intellectuals ought to be thinking considerably more about the problem of pedagogy, an old and despised word. But pedagogy is one of the ways in which we can begin to transform, at least the possibility of transforming, consciousness. I think this is a serious matter, a matter that some time we should be talking about.

QUESTION: I'd like to ask Russell or Stanley if they would care to comment on the resurgence of Stalinism in the politics of the New Left—how do we account for it?

JACOBY: It's a question which cannot be tackled in its entirety here, but I think there are specific variable components to it as well as world wide ones. Some of this has to do with what I call "social amnesia"—particularly within the American left, there is no memory of a left. And in that sense given the short failures of the New Left, there is a reaching back for old doctrines and dogmas which in nearly every other country still persist as some kind of viable tradition, but which in the U.S. are more or less extinct. But people reach back to them anyway. In that sense, it's a kind of social amnesia. To come back to some of these questions, I think it's also within the U.S. the case that there has never been a viable Marxist culture either in or outside of the universities. In that sense it's a reflection and a failure of the relationship between intellectuals and the larger movement which again in any other country there is some kind of relationship, however weak, between Marxist intellectuals and a wider movement. In this country, the Marxist intellectuals have been effectively eliminated before they've emerged. This takes its toll in the political movement which is essentially mindless and which says nothing about the history of the left, Stalin, Lenin, and, aside from reaching for some 'pop' texts, is a product of a certain kind of amnesia and repression. I would draw the conclusion that there is the failure of Marxist culture among intellectuals which is also an aspect of anti-intellectualism. There are aspects of Marxist culture which are difficult; and the command to be able to relate to the needs of the movement at every point is ultimately repressive. There are many aspects of Marx and critical theory which, if not yet related to the movement, *can* be—and that remains essentially an anti-intellectual movement. This, again, does not apply to every movement in the world. One of Lenin's pamphlets is a bundle of various kinds of philosophies related to the immediacy of the mass movement, and there is a certain kind of propaganda criterion which is perpetually raised, like "How can I hand this out

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on the street corner?" Well, for theory, that is not the criterion. You can't hand it out on the street corner. You can't hand out *Capital*, Vol. I, II, or III, nor the *Theories of Surplus Value*. In fact, there is precious little you can hand out on the street corner. There is obviously the whole link of mediation between the more difficult theory and the more popular one. On that account, though, I would not say there is any value in being difficult and abstract in itself, nor is there any value in being simple and clear in itself. To say that at every moment we must be able to speak the language that can be understood is repressive; it means to speak the language of a commodity society.

QUESTION: I just think that you've essentially emasculated any theory of where change will come from. You're just sort of saying "Well, intellectuals are going to play some role in this." But why should I? There's no working class, apparently, or if there is it doesn't matter...

SURKIN: I don't think anybody said that there is no working class or if there is or isn't it doesn't matter!

PICCONE: I said the second!

SURKIN: Did you say that?!

PICCONE: Yes, indeed!

QUESTION: In terms of the changing imperatives of work, in terms of production, in terms of the service sector and the economy—I wonder if you see that as a significant development, even though some of it comes out of Daniel Bell's analysis of the development of industrial society.

PICCONE: Well, from the 1930s on, there has been a systematic attempt, associated with the internalization of opposition in the capitalist system, to phase out live labor in favor of dead labor, or, in different terms, to introduce capital-intensive technologies so that the corporatized working class could be paid a political wage for its successful integration. But organized labor only includes an increasingly diminishing number of people—which leaves out large numbers as unorganized, underpaid with respect to organized workers, and making very few demands, since they have no collective means of political expression (e.g., American Blacks who came North precisely during this process of capitalist transition, when organized labor was being integrated and *unorganized* labor marginalized into welfare rolls or prisons). The tertiary sector has taken up some of the slack created by the decimation of the former industrial proletariat into "organized" and Taylorized labor. The problem is that the growth in this sector feeds right into the logic of the system: as soon as these sectors begin to organize and flex their political muscle, after a few violent struggles, they will become corporatized and politically integrated like the former industrial proletariat. The way the system works is by somehow trying to meet whatever "legitimate" demands are made by these groups. This has been part of the logic of capitalist development from the 1930s on—the legacy of the New Deal and of the authoritarian, *de facto* Fascist state.

ARONOWITZ: I'd like to make an additional comment on that. I think that the

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Reisman and Gardner thesis about the growing significance of the service sector, as Paul has indicated, was because the opposition had been internalized by the system and they had a shift from productive labor to unproductive labor. That took place really in the beginning of the 1920s but it gallopped in the 1930s. If one wants to understand one of the most significant demands of the current crisis, especially the fiscal crisis of large cities and states, one way is to understand it in terms of a fairly decisive shift away from the service sector back to a re-industrialization. But the contradiction inside the re-industrialization is that they are beginning to eliminate living labor, because re-industrialization is by definition labor-saving. The technologies are becoming almost self-reproducing, as in continuous flow operations of the oil industry. The consequence of that is that there is a fairly substantial objective contradiction developing, because to a certain extent it becomes increasingly difficult under those circumstances first to finance the re-industrialization—that's a very substantial problem in this society at this point given the international obligations of the American ruling class. Secondly, one of the major ways in which the society has been able to legitimate itself is by delivering the goods at the same time as it has been displacing industrial workers. Somebody said before that 20% of the work force is industrial workers, 80% is not; those 80% in the private and public service sectors and various other places who really produce nothing in classical terms have been receiving income. Now, in the alst 10 years the service sector has been organized, especially the state sector. Four and a half million workers out of the 14 million workers in the state sector are in unions. The unions are no goddam good, but one of the things they have done is demanded equity with the workers in the industrial sector, which is not what is meant to be. The history of capitalism is the disparity between the wages in the industrial sector and the wages in the service sector. When that equity becomes a reality—which it in fact has—then there is a limit to the self-expansion of capital and there develops an accumulation crisis. That's what is happening right now.

Now the problem that we have been addressing throughout this panel, is, given those developments, which I think most of us pretty much understand, do they have any consequence for the development of socialist consciousness? And the answer that we have been reluctantly forced to make is: not necessarily, and probably not! And that is the problem, because the base-superstructure (the social-being-social consciousness trajectory) which Schroyer says is in another way a relationship between analysis and action, seems to have been severed. Look, there is a very important point to be made as we go down the road: the actions of the industrial workers and the actions of the state workers and all the service workers in making trade union demands have a transformative impact upon the fate of capitalism. The structure of the system, in fact, changes as they take action. The logic of the system is to incorporate that action and to make it part of the system. But this process does not happen smoothly. That is the problem with Bell, Reisman and Gardner: they think that it happens without causing a ripple. On the contrary, it must happen with tremendous contradictions and tensions. That tension, unfortunately, does not seem, over the past forty years at least, to have manifested itself as a new leap in certain types of political demands. And that is the problem that we are trying to address: the gap between the objective contradictions—which historically and theoretically should provide objective possibilities for change—and the reality of the lack of development of the mass revolutionary movement.

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JEWS AND GERMANS AT THE TURN OF THE CENTURY

by Russell Berman, Susan Hegger, Lynne Layton and Wolfgang Wiedersheim

According to the Frankfurt School analysis of anti-semitism, the Nazi holocaust was but a special case of capitalism's obliteration of particularity and otherness in its drive to commodify reality in its own images.[1] What this analysis provided was an account of the Jewish predicament as a paradigmatic expression of the crisis of Western civilization. Consequently, it vividly countered those prevalently fashionable accounts whereby nothing is fundamentally wrong with bourgeois formal rationality and the entire Nazi episode is explained away in terms of extraordinary psychologistic factors such as German irrationality, ambiguities concerning Jewish identity, and historical accident. Whereas in the Frankfurt account, the problem of anti-semitism explodes as the fundamental flaw of Western formal rationality, in the other case, the structure of the whole system is automatically exculpated, and the problem is ghettoized into an ethnic-centered posture of Jewish eternal vigilance within an otherwise uncritical acceptance of the given.

Yet, the obliteration of specificity and otherness may not have been typical of monopoly capitalism as such, but only of its transition phase. Its violent, genocidal versions were thus prevalent in places where the transition required authoritarian means (Nazism), unlike in the U.S. where the relative lack of internal opposition allowed for the smooth implementation of the New Deal. What this entails, however, is that, once the transition is completed, the vestiges of brutality and barbarity become counterproductive, and, to the extent that all internal opposition had already been obliterated, the system is forced to reverse its policy and actually encourage the artificial and managed growth of precisely that specificity and otherness that it had earlier annihilated. A new level of repressive tolerance is necessary in order to generate that negativity without which the system cannot operate.[2] If this is true, by avoiding an analysis of the system in its historical specificity, the psychologistic and accidentalist account of anti-semitism turns out to reinforce precisely that logic which originally generated it, thereby helping to reproduce its fundamental causes.

At the conference "Jews and Germans at the Turn of the Century: The Problematic Symbiosis," held in St. Louis on April 7-9, 1976, a variety of perspectives ranging from an historical and materialist interpretation of anti-semitism (Bieber) to a crude psychoanalytic biography of Buber as an interpretation of Zionism (Gilman) attempted to come to grips with this problematic. Understandably, what developed was more or less a confrontation of the two perspectives indicated above. Gershom Scholem,[3] in his keynote speech "The Social Psychology of German Jews: 1900-1920," forcibly defended the accidentalist and psychologistic thesis in arguing that assimilation in Wilhelminian Germany was a myth necessarily resulting in Auschwitz.

1. Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, trans. John Cumming (New York, 1972), pp. 168-208.

2. See Mario Tronti, "Workers and Capital," *Telos*, 14 (Winter, 1972), pp. 25-62; and Herbert Marcuse, *One Dimensional Man* (Boston, 1964).

3. Gershom Scholem was, ironically, a close friend of Walter Benjamin. His analyses of Benjamin's thought eliminate or underplay all traces of the latter's Marxism.

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He also provided the foundation for an anti-historical analysis based on eternal ethnic categories.

Egon Schwarz, in his description of the Viennese scene, provided a different perspective by putting forth a sociological reinterpretation of assimilation. Thus, instead of explaining the high frequency of Jewish intellectuals in Vienna by mythical Jewish qualities, he attempted to trace individual biographies through the mediation of inner family life. The families of these Viennese intellectuals typified the situation of those Jews who, because of exclusion from landowning, were particularly fit for the economic necessities created by capitalism. Over a series of generations, families moved from the Eastern provinces toward the urban capital, accumulating wealth and marrying upwards. The picture emerged of highly assimilated women instilling love for secular culture in their sons who then actively entered the metropolis' public intellectual life—one of the few ways in which Jews could attain social status. Schwarz's analysis did not simply recycle the theory of Hitler as purely a result of romanticism and German misery. He also elaborated a suspicion of aristocratic remnants with a recognition of the potentially oppressive consequences of the Enlightenment. As an example of the domination of Enlightenment rationality, one need only recall that it was precisely the radically enlightened monarch Joseph II who proclaimed religious tolerance while simultaneously sponsoring homogenization—the elimination of *particularity*—by imposing German as the official language throughout the non-German provinces.)

Erika Weinzierl reiterated Schwarz's thesis by providing a straightforward catalogue of important Jewish contributors to Austrian culture at the turn of the century. Her informal discussion of contemporary Austrian anti-semitism rejected liberal and orthodox Marxist accounts which point primarily to feudal remnants (i.e., Catholic conservatism).[4] Weinzierl explained the half-hearted de-Nazification by the victorious super-powers as the mechanism by which Austrians have avoided confronting their own racism. The myth of Austria as the first victim of Nazism prevented many Austrians from seeing the role they played in genocide.[5] Thus, the thrust of Weinzierl's remarks was that anti-semitism is not simply an accidental and irrational left-over from the past, but that it is regenerated by the present system itself.

Following Schwarz and Weinzierl, Pulzer also emphasized that Jews were highly conspicuous members of German and Austrian society, noting particularly their presence in the left in the early 20th century. While only 30% of the SPD were Jews in 1912, their higher education and the number of gifted journalists among them (e.g., Stampfer and Eisner) made them highly visible. With regard to symbiosis, Pulzer noted that while Jews were welcome as socialists in the SPD, socialists were not encouraged to be Jews.

A fuller socio-economic analysis of anti-semitism from 1880 to 1930 was offered by Hans-Joachim Bieber who linked anti-semitism to German industrialization. As already

4. This, of course, is still alive, even if the anti-semitism is not blatant and these days the Church spends its time and money persecuting women; it has now launched a massive campaign against Austria's liberal abortion laws.

5. Another element was the curious behavior of the Jewish Chancellor Kreisky—a miniature caricature of the dialectic of the Enlightenment. His anti-semetic statements and his opportunistic politics have only spurred on the unreconstructed fascists. It is significant that Kreisky also contributed to forcing Eli Wiesel out of Vienna. If Wiesel's attempt to uncover Nazi war criminals seemed futile in a world of Hiroshima, Siberia and Vietnam, it did represent at least a possibility that justice might be done. No wonder he was not allowed to continue in the world of détente.

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mentioned, during feudalism, Jews were excluded from those occupations characteristic of an agrarian economy. For this reason, they were urbanized and flocked into occupations related to trading and money-lending. With the transition to a capitalist economy, the Jews found themselves in a favorable position. Stressing that there was no unified picture of the Jews at the turn of the century, Bieber analyzed the German class system and the economic relations of each class of Germans to a reciprocal class of Jews.[6] As would be expected from this model, anti-semitism grew in periods of economic depression and became dormant in periods of economic prosperity. The German working class, according to Bieber, was the least anti-semitic. Like the other classes in German society, the working class saw the Jews as the "pinnacle of modernism," but, from their perspective, this was a positive attribute. Also, leading radical activists and theorists were Jewish. After World War I, anti-semitism became the means by which the ruling class attempted to channel working class alienation away from the problems of capitalism. This, of course, became extremely functional when the loss of the war had to be explained through some evil agency in order to safeguard the valor of Germany, while mediating the shift to monopoly capitalism. Anti-semitism reached a qualitatively new phase with the advent of the Nazis. The Jews, already portrayed as a marginal group, became the most logical scapegoat of the nationalistic propaganda; they were ideal exemplars of that specificity and otherness that the rising authoritarian state had to annihilate in its transition phase.

Many conference participants rejected Bieber's analysis. The first questioner demanded that Bieber recognize the Germans' irrational spirit, independently of which the force of this historical lesson is lost. Scholem delivered a tirade about the inadequacies of an analysis that excludes the description of an impoverished German spirit, without providing any real substantial criticisms of Bieber. As Scholem spoke, many participants' faces brightened up, as their belief in the corrupt German spirit was confirmed by a noted scholar. The image of Nazism as a unique experience clearly obscures the totalitarian character and potentials in the United States. Relegating the problem to Germany before 1945 implicitly whitewashes the present from complicity in those crimes. This is a specific case of the non-threatening quality of contemporary ethnic consciousness which is most conservative precisely when it thinks itself most critical.

Gary B. Cohen's seminar "Jews in German Society: The Case of Prague 1880-1914" could have been an opportunity to discuss the topic with the same analytical clarity that distinguished Bieber's presentation. Unfortunately, Cohen merely ran off a string of statistics to prove that Prague constituted a good example of a nearly perfect symbiosis between Germans and Jews.[7] While factual data is important, its significance emerges only through careful analysis which, in this case, was not provided. At one point, it seemed that Cohen would do so when he briefly mentioned that most Germans and Jews belonged to the upper middle class in Prague, but he went no further. Conflicts between the German ruling class and the oppressed Czechs were mentioned only in passing. However, these two unexplored points are the key to an explanation of the German-Jewish symbiosis. The conflict between the oppressed

6. For example, German farmers were acquainted with Jews as cattle dealers; the German petty bourgeoisie saw the Jews as owners of large warehouses and as representatives of banking interests. In other words, various segments of German classes were dependent on segments of the Jewish population in critical economic positions.

7. For example, Jewish children attended the same schools as German children and Jews lived in the same districts as the Germans. The different figures were even broken down to provide ratios of the housing situation of Jews and German Catholics and Jews and German Protestants.

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Czechs and the German ruling class made the symbiosis not only possible but necessary: this was facilitated by class conflicts in Prague which also explains lower class German and Jewish support for the Czech movement.

Approximately one-half of the conference papers were attempts (with varying degrees of success) to present socio-economic or historical models. The other half tried to illuminate this problematic symbiosis through the use of biographies of prominent Jews. The extent to which these succeeded was the extent to which an understanding of the individual facilitated an understanding of the social and historical processes of the times. Discussion periods following biographical sessions were most susceptible of degenerating into story-telling and anecdotal information about the individual in question. This was nowhere truer than Peter Loewenberg's seminar "The Jewish Consciousness of Walther Rathenau." Loewenberg's opening remarks offered an impressive and well-organized presentation of Walther Rathenau's different perceptions of his own Jewishness and Judaism in general. He developed a distinct analysis of Rathenau's particular struggle with his Jewish identity during four different phases of his development, characterizable as: (1) the racial phase, marked by self-hatred, (2) a religious phase integrating Judaism and Christianity, (3) nationalism and strong German patriotism, and (4) internationalism and cosmopolitanism. A fifth phase could be added dealing with how he was posthumously perceived by the Nazis.

In general, the audience did not want to view Rathenau's cosmopolitanism as in any way organically linked to the earlier phases--particularly the period of self-hatred. The emphasis was on his success rather than the drama of his being a Jew. Typical was the closing comment of one participant who thought Loewenberg had been too critical of Rathenau: "Despite all the arguments we heard today, we should remember Walther Rathenau as the most valuable politician of the Weimar Republic."[8] Rathenau symbolizes both successful German-Jewish symbiosis and its annihilation. As A Jew with political stature, he becomes the patrician leader, mollifying Jewish self-hatred. His personal success and legitimation become a symbol of the group's legitimation in society. His liberalism appeals to the desire for assimilation into the existing society, rather than the creation of a new order. For the non-Jews, his liberalism is fundamentally non-threatening, because it validates the political system by demanding incorporation and flexibility. Yet Rathenau, as a symbol of assimilationist hopes, is transformed into a symbol of its deepest fears through his assassination.

Loewenberg's description of a Jewish identity evolving and responding to the felt needs of an historical period is a stark contrast to Steven Schwarzschild's "Deutschtum und Judentum: Hermann Cohen as Paradigm of the German-Jewish Problematic." Defining Judaism as, above all, an ethic, Schwarzschild echoed and, in part, reinforced Peter Pulzer's claim that the Jews were identified with rationalism by non-Jews at the turn of the century. Hermann Cohen (1842-1918), member of the mostly Jewish, politically liberal Marburg neo-Kantians, elaborated an ethic based on two sources: Judaism and Germanity (the latter defined as German Enlightenment, particularly Kant's ethics). In Schwarzschild's discussion of the Marburg school's opposition to Hegel, it was often difficult for the listener to distinguish Cohen's voice from Schwarzschild's. It is Hegel's identification of the rational with the actual, a

8. It is difficult to gain an understanding of the social dynamics of the period independently of Rathenau's racial statements such as the following: "The Jews are an alien tribe of men in the midst of German life, an Asiatic horde on Prussian sand, not a living member of the people, but a foreign organism in its body." In Maximilian Harden's journal, *Zukunft*, published in 1897.

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formula embraced by the German non-Jewish middle class at the turn of the century (according to Schwarzschild), that the Marburg school opposed. Yet, his identification of Judaism and neo-Kantianism is simply preposterous, considering, among other things, that almost all leading Hegelians of the 20th century—Lukács, Adorno, Bloch, Marcuse and Benjamin, to name a few—are Jews. Schwarzschild failed to establish any necessary connection between the formal rationality of *Gesellschaft* and Judaism—a connection implicitly denied by Norbert Altenhofer's discussion of Gustav Landauer's notion of *Gemeinschaft*. Cohen's own opponents were not just the Hegelian non-Jews: there was a strong *völkisch*-Zionist movement at the turn of the century, represented by Martin Buber, Arnold Zweig and others.[9] Schwarzschild claimed that Cohen's opting for *Gesellschaft* over *Gemeinschaft* was both a rational and, therefore, essentially Jewish choice. Lumping protofascist *völkisch* thought with left *völkisch* thought, Schwarzschild, in essence, uncritically rejected, without any arguments, the critical communism of the Hegelian Marxists in favor of the formal rationality of the bourgeoisie (and of orthodox Marxism in the Second and Third International, old Lukács, Popper, etc.).

Schwarzschild suggested, in conclusion, that since Jewish-Western symbiosis is still being attempted, Cohen's theses are still important to study. Finally, arguing against Scholem on another major question that split the conference, Schwarzschild asserted that symbiosis was a serious and reasonable proposition at the turn of the century and should not be snickered at in hindsight. Whereas Scholem had accused the Jews of self-deception, claiming that there never was a German-Jewish symbiosis, Schwarzschild claimed that the proposition "Germany and Judaism should pool their resources for an ethical humanism" was a normative one which could not be refuted by descriptive factual accounts such as Scholem's. Cohen would have loved such consistent neo-Kantianism!

Altenhofer's seminar "Skepsis und Mystik: Gustav Landauers Anarchismus" represented a marked departure from other biographies. In contrast to Cohen's and Rathenau's primary identifications as Jews and their subsequent contributions stemming from this identification, Landauer's Jewish identity was depicted as an outgrowth of his political philosophy. In addition, Landauer's own vision of anarchism entailed an affirmative return to certain romantic and *völkisch* characterizations of *Gemeinschaft*, an ideal completely rejected by Cohen. As such, Landauer appeared more as a symbol of the indomitable spirit of Western civilization—unwilling to succumb to that unfulfilled Enlightenment which consequently reverted into myth—than as a neo-Kantian philosophical accountant abstractly calculating the logic of his own mechanical integration into a hostile society.

Referring to the development of Landauer's anarchism. Altenhofer briefly described the social and philosophical background in order to show its influence on Landauer's own development and critical thinking. Thereby he not only referred to Landauer's rejection of the Social Democratic Party (his controversy with Bebel) but also to his opposition to the squelching of workers' spontaneity. Landauer also criticized the theory of inevitable progress in history as espoused by scientific Marxism. In discussing Landauer's philosophy of history, Altenhofer noted the distinct parallels to that of Walter Benjamin. Certainly one of the most interesting figure of German

9. Stephen Magill, in his lecture on the Jewish press from 1914-1918, noted that many Jews in this period thought that anti-semitism was due precisely to Judaism's lack of unity. This spirit was reflected in the press by a decline in popularity of the liberal press and an increasing popularity of the völkish-Zionist papers.

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radicalism at this time, Landauer produced one of the first radical critiques of language and literature. In addition to his role as a theorist, Landauer played a leading and fatal role in the short-lived Munich council republic (Münchener Räterrepublik) after World War I.

In the last part of the lecture, Altenhofer examined the close relationship between Landauer's anarchism and his ideas about Judaism. In sharp contrast to both Scholem and Schwarzschild, Germans and Jews were referred to as two forms of *Gemeinschaft* using the anarchist definition. In Landauer's view, an identification as Jew must develop to the point where it is unconscious, a necessary precondition to membership in the *Gemeinschaft*. He criticized Buber's position on *Gemeinschaft* and nationalism as being formalistic, sharply criticizing Buber's thesis that a Jewish *Gemeinschaft* was only possible in Palestine. For Landauer, *Gemeinschaft* was not determined by national boundaries. Rather, the criterion for membership in the *Gemeinschaft* was a consciousness of the goals of the community and the role of the individual in reaching those goals. Here, Landauer unambiguously appears as the expression of the driving spirit of Western civilization. It is not accidental that his heritage became embodied in the Frankfurt School.[10]

The "rational" Jewish ethic was reiterated by Henry A. Lea's seminar "Mahler: German Romantic or Jewish Satirist." According to Lea, while most nineteenth century music readily incorporated nationalist material in the form of programmatic landscapes, folk idylls, or martial quotes, Mahler reformed those images of non-affirmative, non-proclamatory broken symphonies. Just as nationalism, albeit of different sorts, marks the works of Wagner, Liszt, and Tschaikowsky, Mahler, in whom the problematic un-national Jewish identity and the supranational Austro-Hungarian consciousness combined, intellectualizes romantic contents and creates grotesque distortions of the bad consciousness that barely hid the crisis which would soon become catastrophe. Mahler's marches are, so to speak, anti-marches. "It was not peace that Mahler sought in that language which disquieted the course of the world; rather he took it into violence in order to oppose violence with it."[11]

What remained problematic, however, was that Mahler himself was not a radical critic of contemporary mores. Despite his parodies, he was also devoted to the romantic tradition, which of course itself underscored ironic posture alongside its nationalism. While it is true, as Lea demonstrated, that Mahler rejected the chauvinist hysteria which has since been identified as somehow romantic, it is perhaps more useful to understand his work as a rejection of the solutions presented by the Vienna classicists while simultaneously remaining loyal to their emancipatory goals. The univocal structure of the classic symphonies as well as their conceptual program quoted in Beethoven's Ninth Symphony had already been outdated by the dialectical reversal in Napoleon's imperial posturing when they first appeared. The later anguish of the Great Fugue is answered by Mahler not with the false consciousness of a national hymn but with a call to prepare for life by throwing off dead forms and rediscovering subjectivity. Mahler's ambivalence could then be explained as a reaction to the ambivalence of Enlightenment rationality itself.

10. Nor is it accidental that, in the attack on Landauer's anti-authoritarian *Gemeinschaft* concept, Schwarzschild's neo-Kantian idealism falls into step beside the neo-Stalinist critique of the New Left, as in Hans G. Helms' *Fetisch Revolution* (Neuwied and Berlin, 1969), pp. 129-133. Both represent variations of the negation of subjectivity inherent in the Enlightenment rationality of domination.

11. Theodor W. Adorno, "Mahler: Eine musikalische Physiognomik," in *Gesammelte Schriften*, Vol. 13 (Frankfurt am Main, 1971), p. 153.

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In assessing the conference, it is important to examine the questions which did not arise or were treated only briefly. One question was repeatedly skirted, brought up only briefly in the final discussion: What are Jews? There was little agreement on this, if one examines the papers presented. One of the difficulties in providing an answer was that there is a difference between Judaism and a Jew, a difference which was often obscured. Judaism was implicitly viewed as a philosophical or religious system which is separate from its adherents. A "good" Jew is one who approximates in his daily life the ideal of Judaism. This ideal was variously described. Scholem combined both religiosity and an undefined ethnicity in his definition, while Schwarz saw Judaism as a series of cultural configurations which grow out of a religious affiliation and varied national identities. Thus, there is no unifying, cohesive Jewish culture, only French-Jewish culture, Austrian-Jewish culture, etc. Schwarzschild clearly considered Judaism to be an ethic of formal rationality, but it was unclear how he would classify a Jew (for example, the Jewish Critical Theorists) who did not conform to this ethic. This lack of unity and clear perspective on the definition of Judaism and Jew limited the conference. For example, it prevented a clear analysis of the selective anti-semitism practiced by Western Jews against Eastern Jews. In addition, it hindered a linking of the German-Jewish problematic to contemporary problems of assimilation, nationalism and racism.

A narrow historicism reinforced by the need to interpret the situation in Germany as a fundamentally irrational event brought on by the corrupt German mentality—an analysis particularly welcomed by the liberal audience—prevented a discussion of how this period can contribute to the understanding of the issues raised above. Schwarz's remark that Israel can be seen as a successor state to the Habsburg empire infuriated many, but generated no cogent arguments to the contrary. Later Schwarz, responding to a question concerning American Jewry, claimed that anti-semitism in the U.S. is deflected onto a more conspicuous target of prejudice, the American Blacks.

The most disturbing aspect of the conference was the unwillingness to categorize the holocaust as anything but an historical aberration and a Jewish tragedy. The historical aberration construct is a potentially dangerous way of analyzing history or societies in a particular historical moment. To accuse a culture of irrationality is to obscure the inner dynamic of the society and to turn a potentially generalizable phenomenon into an idiosyncratic, particularistic historical incident. Furthermore, this view, which appears to be propagated in the U.S., can be used to distract comment on past and present parallel policies of American genocide—the Amerindians being a primary example. The notion of the holocaust as a exclusively Jewish, rather than general human, tragedy prevents the examination of some serious questions. What are the potentials for genocide in the development of monopoly capitalism? What is the function of racism and racist images in this development? Has the holocaust become an ethnic emblem as an Irish shamrock or can it function politically as a negative utopia, offering a foundation for a critique of authoritarianism?

Is it possible to study anti-semitism and the Nazi era with objectivity at this point in time? As the conference amply demonstrated, feelings of horror and personal suffering still run deep. Is it possible to weave these authentic subjective feelings into a lucid account which would allow us to begin to develop an understanding of human oppression?

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UNIONISM AND THE LABOR FRONT

by John Zerzan

In "Organized Labor versus 'The Revolt Against Work' " (*Telos*, 21), I described spontaneous opposition to an increasingly bureaucratic and collusive unionism. Greater centralization of control over workers and more institutionalized business-labor-government cooperation have made transparent unions' role as the last effective police force of wage labor.

In passing, I suggested a developing similarity in some ways to the situation in National Socialist Germany, where labor discipline was maintained via the Labor Front, the forced membership of all people in one, big national organization. This suggestion met with much predictable ridicule, though it was buried within a paragraph and mentioned but once. Some research, however, convinced me that the point is valid and that the reference deserves discussion in its own right.

The standard thesis about German labor and the Nazis—generally accepted by bourgeois and Marxist commentators alike—is that the unions were the backbone of Weimar democracy and the consistent enemies of Nazism. They were, therefore, savagely attacked by the reactionary Nazis, and destroyed on May 2, 1933, when all union offices and resources were seized and union officials imprisoned. This event is seen as the effective inauguration of the dark night of German fascism, and the Labor Front which then replaced the unions is considered to have been a kind of giant concentration camp, the very antithesis of free trade unionism. The subject in fact has been largely ignored, owing to the absence of similarity between the unions and the Labor Front, and the fact of total enmity between unionists and Nazis. With these obvious facts and the zero degree of continuity, in other words, there has seemed little to discuss and certainly nothing much of relevance to an understanding of the role of contemporary unions.

Yet there may be very much in the German experience worth our consideration today, for this overall assessment does far more to conceal the truth than to reveal it. The connection between unionism and fascism, in fact, was a very real one.

If the Workers' Council movement was curbed and rendered non-revolutionary in the years immediately following World War I,[1] employer-union collaboratoin was begun in earnest in the closing days of the War. The unions (principally the Free Social Democratic Unions) formed the Cooperative Association of German Industrial and Commercial Employers and Workers with the employers' groups in November, 1918. In many ways a replica of the Nazi Labor Front, this institutionalized collusion endured until worker opposition and economic crisis in late 1923 brought an end to the effort.[2] This candid class collaboration was superseded by the Temporary National Economic Council, which assumed many of the Association's duties, and by a similar example of growing state involvement, the trend toward government arbitration, also supported by the unions. Franz Neumann saw this process

1. See, for example, Helga Grebing, *The History of the German Labour Movement* (London, 1969), p. 107.

2. Erich Eyck, *A History of the Weimar Republic*, Vol. 2 (Cambridge, Mass., 1962), pp. 111-112.

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accurately: "Bound so closely to the existing regime and having become so bureaucratic, the unions lost their freedom of action... The spontaneity of the working classes had been sacrificed to bureaucratic organizations... National Socialism grew in this seed-bed."[3]

Hermann Rauschning saw the unions' constant betrayal of the workers' interests as resulting in their becoming used up in the service of capital and in time a political liability to the ruling classes. A leading industrialist said, "It was quite all to make these trade union officials, the big and little busybodies alike, look thoroughly ridiculous. When we had flattered these gentlemen into donning dinner jackets and tail coats we had begun to make progress... The workers began to get sick of their own men... We just had to get rid of these fellows."[4] General von Brauchitsch echoes these sentiments, explaining why the unions were no longer useful to the Weimar rightists: "The trade unions were too ponderous and lethargic; and they had not struck roots deeply enough politically in the younger generation. They were the organizations of the old men, not of the younger generation, which was what mattered."[5]

Hence, "Labor's influence upon the fate of the German Republic was rapidly declining," as Adolf Sturmthal put it.[6] At the end of Weimar there had to be at least the public impression of their demise; to quote Sigmund Neumann, "The destruction of the pre-Nazi labor organizations was an inescapable result of political defeat."[7]

In the last months of the Weimar Republic, the unions had increasingly clamored, however, to be retained in the service of the bourgeoisie. In October, 1932, the ADGB (Free Trade Union Association, which represented nearly all unionized workers) printed an article in the Nazi Schwarze Front paper pledging its faith in the "National Idea,"[8] and in the November transport strike in Berlin, "the trade union leaders fought openly against the strikers."[9] Schleicher, the last Chancellor before Hitler, recognized the service the unions were giving the state and strongly considered their incorporation into the government leadership, based on his appreciation of their increasingly nationalist policy.[10]

After Hitler's accession to the Chancellorship on January 30, rightists and unionists continued to work for an open labor collaboration with National Socialism. On March 4, former Chancellor Papen declared that unionism could be a very strong support of the Nazi regime.[11] On March 20, the ADGB Executive Committee swore its fealty, reminding Hitler that "Unions are indispensable and inevitably integrated into the state." On April 1, the Metal Workers' Union, Germany's largest trade union, announced that it would solidly and loyally work with Nazism.[13] On April 7, Leipart (head of the ADGB) acclaimed the Nazi government and asked for a role in loyally

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3. Franz Neumann, *Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of National Socialism* (New York, 1966), p. 413.
4. Hermann Rauschning, *Men of Chaos* (Freeport, N.Y., 1942), p. 209.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 273.
6. Adolf Sturmthal, *The Tragedy of European Labor* (New York, 1943), p. 132.
7. Sigmund Neumann, *Permanent Revolution* (New York, 1965), p. 171.
8. Roy Pascal, *The Nazi Dictatorship* (London, 1934), p. 148.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 103.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 147.
11. Erich Matthias, "The Downfall of the Old Social-Democratic Party in 1933," *Republic to Reich*, ed. Hajo Holborn (New York, 1972), p. 81.
12. Daniel Guerin, *Fascism and Big Business* (New York, 1973), p. 129.
13. Pascal, *op.cit.*, p. 148.

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representing the workers.[15] On April 9, a statement to the government by the ADGB Executive Committee declared unreserved willingness "to place at the service of the new state the labor force's own organization which the trade unions have devoted years of activity to creating." It further pledged its full cooperation for National Socialist efforts to overcome "all tendencies toward disunity" and its support for state "efforts to unify the trade unions."[16] Other union statements and meetings with the Nazis led Erich Matthias to see the development of a "national trade unionism," in which the unions jettisoned any allegiance to democracy in order to obtain benefits from an all-powerful state.[17] On April 19, the ADGB decided to send out a call to all members, inviting their participation in the Nazi celebrations planned for May 1.

It should now be clear that when, say, Richard Grunberger admits that the trade union officers wanted to cooperate with the Nazis,[18] or Franz Neumann says that union officials agreed to step down if the trade union structure were retained,[19] a real understatement is being conceded. And when the trade union offices and equipment were confiscated and the top officials arrested on May 2, there was no resistance for a deeper reason than merely the unions' rottenness. Active cooperation was at work in the scenario, and a vital continuity was insured. When Labor Front head Dr. Robert Ley declared that the unions had been "brutally and ruthlessly" seized, then, he spoke for public consumption. Much closer to the truth of the situation was the August 7, 1933 article in the *Manchester Guardian*, which spoke of ongoing conferences between union and government officials, toward the organization of the Labor Front.

In terms of structure, personnel, and public policy, basic continuities are to be found between the Weimar unions and the Nazi Labor Front. B.N. Prieth's unpublished doctoral dissertation, widely considered the most completely study of the Front in English, acknowledges that it was built on the administrative structure of the old unions.[20] Similarly, Vaso Trivanovitch found that the Front was organized according to the basic industries. "There are 18 industrial organizations, corresponding to the former German trade unions."[21] Far from being the antithesis of the unions, the Labor Front "absorbed the former trade unions,"[22] and consolidated them in an extension of the centralization tendencies of Weimar unionism. As Florinsky wrote in 1935, "Within the Labor Front, the trade unions, whose number has been greatly reduced through re-organization, continue to retain their identity."[23] Rauschning perceived this continuity when he referred to "the Labor Front formed out of the trade unions."[24] Though nearly everyone has been confused by the formal inclusion of business in the Front, and by Nazi rhetoric intended to obscure the continuity involved, the National Socialists realized the necessity of unions. As Dr. Ley confided

14. *Ibid.*, p. 148.
15. Noakes and Pridham, *Documents on Nazism, 1919-1945* (New York, 1974), pp. 421-422.
16. Matthias, *op.cit.*, p. 82.
17. Graml, Mommsen, Reichhardt, and Wolf, *The German Resistance to Hitler* (Berkeley, 1970), p. 155. F.L. Carsten, *The Rise of Fascism* (Berkeley, 1971), p. 129.
18. Richard Grunberger, *The 12-Year Reich* (New York, 1971), pp. 19, 187.
19. F. Neumann, *op.cit.*, p. 413.
20. Benedict N. Prieth, *The German Labor Front*, unpublished doctoral dissertation, Stanford University, 1939.
21. Vaso Trivanovitch, *Economic Development of Germany under National Socialism* (New York, 1937), p. 23.
22. Michael T. Florinsky, *Fascism and National Socialism* (New York, 1936), p. 106.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 136.
24. Rauschning, *op.cit.*, p. 17. See also T.L. Jarman, *The Rise and Fall of Nazi Germany* (New York, 1956), pp. 153-154.

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late in 1933, "Nothing is more dangerous to a state than uprooted men deprived of their defense organizations... Such men undoubtedly become a constant source of disturbance."[25] Maxine Sweezy expressed this point well: "The National Socialist government recognized that destruction of the labor unions might strengthen radicalism among the workers."[26]

Related to the sameness of structure is the sameness of personnel and policy. "The trade unions were not simply dissolved," according to Pascal, and "Lower functionaries remained...in positions such as treasurers of branches [locals], etc. The subscriptions [dues] were still collected."[27] The discredited top leaders had to go, but the Labor Front "retained the services of minor officials of the former trade unions," to quote Helga Grebing.[28] Otto Nathan found that many Labor Front officials "considered themselves genuine successors of the earlier trade-union movement, and others actually had been functionaries in the pre-Nazi trade unions,"[29] a finding that would not contradict Karl Bednarik and others who saaw the co-existence of national socialist and Marxist views among Weimar unionists. Similar is Albert Speer's recollection regarding the Front's "Beauty of Labor" project: "We were able to draw former union leaders...into this campaign."[30] And C.W. Guillebaud, an expert on Weimar labor legislation, noted that often "the same individuals who had held important posts in the Labour ministry under earlier Governments were still in high offices there." He also found "a continuity of policy...which he had not altogether expected to find."[31] Indeed, an examination of Nazi Party documents illustrates the continuation of the Labor Service, created in the late Weimar period, and the Labor Courts, instituted even earlier.[32] Franz Neumann's assessment underscores the essential continuum: "The Labor Front has driven the process of bureaucratization to its maximum. Not only the relations between the enterprise and the worker but even the relations among the workers themselves are now mediated by an autocratic bureaucracy."[33]

It is also worth noting that even leading resistance figures saw the "benefits" of the Labor Front. Wilhelm Leuschner, a bourgeois Weimar parliamentarian, wanted its extension post-Nazism, as the "solution to the social problem." Other resistance leaders, such as Habermann and Wirmer, considered the Front a unified trade union and called for the change of its name to "German Trade Union," to be the only change necessary. The "German Trade Union," as Goedeler explained, was to be "an organic continuation of the equally comprehensive Arbeitsfront."[34] And the German Communist Party apparently shared this manipulative mentality: the KPD saw the Labor Front as probably the most useful vehicle for "the conquest of the trade union masses."[35] German Socialists, for their part, cynically adopted fascist ideas into their "neo-socialist" slogan of "Order, Authority, Nation." As the trend toward state capitalism seems to generally beget state trade unionism, the Left exhibits only its familiar opportunism.

25. Ley, November 15, 1933, cited in Guerin, p. 186.
26. Maxine Sweezy, *The Structure of the Nazi Economy* (Cambridge, Mass., 1941), p. 161.
27. Pascal, *op.cit.*, p. 141.
28. H. Grebing, *op.cit.*, p. 141.
29. Otto Nathan, *The Nazi Economic System* (Durham, N.C., 1944), p. 181.
30. Albert Speer, *Inside the Third Reich* (New York, 1970), p. 57.
31. C.W. Guillebaud, *The Economic Recovery of Germany* (London, 1939), p. 203.
33. F. Neumann, *op.cit.*, pp. 418-419.
34. Graml *et al.*, *op.cit.*, pp. 129-132.
35. *Ibid.*, p. 169.

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The Nazi factory cell organization (NSBO) engaged in many union-type activities before the establishment of the Labor Front, and in fact often displayed more militancy than did the trade unions. Thus, in February and March 1933, for example, NSBO partisans attacked company unions, breaking up their meeting and the like.[36] With National Socialism in power, state anti-depression measures caused real wages to rise, unemployment to decline, and the number of paid holidays was doubled. The tendency of workers to regard the Labor Front as their union, noted by Grunberger,[37] begins to appear less surprising, and Guillebaud went so far as to characterize it as having a "strong pro-worker bias."[38] As Noakes and Pridham observed, Front officials "did not hesitate to apply pressure on employers."[39] Peter Viereck saw its unionist nature perhaps most succinctly: "Ley's Labor Front is the world's largest labor union inasmuch as every single German worker is forced to join."[40]

It is significant, too, to consider the growth in relative power of this super-union, within the practical development of National Socialism. Dr. Ley, as head of the Front, gave more orders than anyone else in Germany and in effect supervised every human being, according to Wallace Deuel.[41] David Schoenbaum states that the Nazi Party declined and the Labor Front gained in power after 1933.[42] It "has more and more excluded all other organizations [with the exception of the Hitler Youth] from the field of social activity," in the judgment of James Pollock.[43]

When the Labor Front was established, it was proclaimed by the Nazis as "an achievement of working class solidarity."[44] At the same time, the factory cells were deprived of their authority, to preclude any possibility of worker organization at the local level. The "solidarity" was based, of course, on compulsory worker membership in the Labor Front. Under Weimar, the closed shop was not legal; it came with the Nazis. (One is reminded somewhat of the current drive for the closed shop in France, pushed by progressive employers since the factory occupation movement of May, 1968.) Dues to the Labor Front were thus automatically deducted from wages, along with such other practices familiar today, as the use of the work book, or union book, and the growth of compulsory arbitration. And the Nazis were more advanced than the Marxists in their appreciation of the changing work force: their conception of the working class, "workers of Faust and Stirn," included both blue-collar and white-collar employees. In fact, Nazi labor 'leftism' went so far as the Labor Front's demand, in the January 7, 1938 Party paper, *Völkischer Beobachter*, for nationalization of the war industries.

Regarding unionism today, we find increasing bureaucratization and centralization: more merging of locals and unions, more workers forced to join unions, the general absence of even formal union democracy, closer and more institutionalized collusion with business and government, more arbitration, bargaining taking place at ever higher levels. When Harvard's George Wald thought he saw a union-based fascism developing in the hard-hat violence of 1970, he missed the point. What he

36. Pascal, *op.cit.*, p. 149.
37. Grunberger, *op.cit.*, p. 194.
38. Guillebaud, *op.cit.*, p. 202. See also his *The Social Policy of Nazi Germany* (Cambridge, 1941), p. 36.
39. Noakes and Pridham, *op.cit.*, p. 435.
40. Peter Viereck, *Metapolitics* (New York, 1961), p. 289.
41. Wallace Deuel, *People under Hitler* (New York, 1942), p. 138.
42. David Schoenbaum, *Hitler's Social Revolution* (Garden City, N.Y., 1966), p. 280.
43. James K. Pollock, *The Government of Greater Germany* (New York, 1938), p. 171.
44. Max Kele, *Nazis and Workers* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1972), p. 3.

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witnessed was only a union-engineered release of the tensions built up from a growing imprisonment of workers. The developing fascism has deep roots. Jacques Ellul's description is instructive: "In reality, the growing integration of unions into the state mechanism makes them increasingly an element of state power, and their tendency is to reinforce that power; at that moment a union becomes a mechanism for organizing the laboring masses for the benefit of the state."[45]

The other side of the story is obviously the worker autonomy and resistance which makes this development necessary in a given form. The militancy of German workers is well-known, and the Labor Front was far from totally successful in containing it. (The miners resorted to passive resistance in 1938 and 1939, and in November, 1939 wage cuts were rescinded, due to plummeting productivity; this was a massive defeat for the regime.)[46]

The 'revolt against work' here—absenteeism, turnover, sabotage, low productivity, anti-unionism—is calling for a strenuous disciplinary effort from the unions. We will see whether the American Labor Front, apparently in the process of formation, is as successful as its German predecessor.

45. Jacques Ellul, *The Political Illusion* (New York, 1972), p. 174.
46. F. Neumann, *op.cit.*, pp. 344, 347.

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THE MYTH OF THE DECLINE OF U.S. CAPITALISM

by James F. Petras

During the early part of this decade a number of writers asserted that we were entering a new historical period marking the end of U.S. world supremacy. Mustering an impressive set of dramatic events, the argument against the American century was quite convincing. In the Third World, U.S. military-technological and economic power was decisively defeated in Indo-China, resulting in the establishment of non-capitalist regimes. In addition, primary producing countries were organizing and demanding better prices and more equitable terms of exchange from the industrialized countries. The successful effort by OPEC was interpreted as a major breakthrough, signalling a drastic shift in financial and political power toward the Third World, or at least its oil beneficiaries. In the advanced capitalist world, Europe, through the Common Market, and Japan were expanding at an unprecedented rate, competing with U.S. goods and services on a world-scale and showing signs of developing an independent foreign policy. In the Communist world, the U.S. was forced to come to *de facto* terms with China, agreeing to accomodation with the USSR and beginning discussions with Cuba. Containment was giving way to détente—ostensibly a recognition of the limits of U.S. power. Alongside these political-economic events was the declining value of the dollar, negative U.S. trade balances and the apparent weakening of the U.S. role as the world's banker. These external challenges were complemented by internal paralysis. The exposure of the Nixon regime's violation of bourgeois-democratic rules set off an unprecedented campaign of scrutiny and debate in the mass media and eventually in Congress. While executive authority was challenged, the basis of opposition was narrowly conceived and the outcome left institutional structures and practices virtually unscathed. Nevertheless, the decline in authority of the incumbent president and the element of uncertainty gave the appearance of instability and paralysis—suggesting that external decline and internal instability were two sides of the same coin, presaging an accelerated movement away from world hegemony. Both liberals and radicals, as well as conservatives, became convinced of declining U.S. world influence: from those who rejected decline there were speeches and articles discussing schemes for colonial revivalism, calls for an end to détente, as well as exhortations to show more willingness to use power; among those who welcomed the asserted decline there were proposals to focus inward, to show more concern for domestic priorities, to express more restraint and judiciousness in external involvements. Whatever the ultimate concerns, all opinions seemed to converge in the notion that the U.S. was losing influence and its structural position was being challenged on a world scale.

It appeared that the post-war advantages the U.S. had accrued were being wiped out. No longer could it command raw materials and resources at prices it could set; no longer could it dictate internal economic priorities and political regimes through loans and credits; no longer was European and Japanese capital dependent on U.S. goodwill for economic expansion and political-military protection; no longer could the U.S.

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organize a boycott and undermine a nationalist project in the oil countries; no longer could the U.S. count on the military as a last resort against economic nationalism. Bank flows went through Europe, Japan and the Middle East, as well as New York. The costs of raw materials increased with each new nationalist regime. Sheiks and Shahs quoted Arghiri Emmanuel on unequal exchange, while Peruvian generals bought Russian tanks and the International Monetary Fund overrode U.S. reservations and lent funds to Chile during the Allende years.

It was clear that the old basis of U.S. hegemony was cracking, that new alignments were developing and the old way of doing business on a world scale was coming to an end. It is also clear that the international conjuncture (1969-1973) was an unfavorable one for U.S. capital and the state which backed it. But this conjunctural downturn in U.S. influence was not the result of any global challenge to U.S. domination. In fact, the appearance of losses created conditions which allowed for a reconcentration of U.S. power and a relative stabilization of its influence over and against its challengers —East and West, North and South. The historical assessment of the decline of U.S. hegemony has been based on a conjunctural analysis which overestimated structural defects and underestimated the internal political strength and global structural underpinnings that facilitate reconsolidation of U.S. domination in global politics.

In its broadest terms, imperialism in the periphery has been involved first and foremost in the creation of a new social order, one in which social relations are tied to the dynamic of externally-induced expansion and accumulation. The foremost problem for the imperial state is to prevent political decay or disintegration through the creation of a durable political order, one in which social control over the labor force permits the continuous flow of capital and the reproduction of exploitative social relations. At the operational level, a number of imperial agencies, ranging from military missions to university advisory teams, have been involved in shaping the counterpart agencies, personnel recruitment programs, as well as forging converging perspectives within the state bureaucracy. Technical skills, such as budgeting, planning and project elaboration are transmitted within an ideological framework that reinforces external bonds. Imperial "state-building," however, does not merely involve piecemeal administrative "block-building" (imperial agency insertion in distinct administrative areas), but the integration of the commanding heights of the peripheral state into the overall politico-economic apparatus of the imperial state through long-term development agreements including trade, financial, and technical assistance. The imperial strategy is largely directed toward influencing elites, described euphemistically as "leadership training." The apex of the state pyramid is the central target; and within that pyramid the army and police have a central position. The astronomical sums of military "aid" during the post-World War II period channeled into the periphery are, in large part, efforts to create and later maintain the external allegiances of peripheral state apparatuses. Independently of social origins and within the context of technical preparations (professionalization), the military and police are pivotal groups in imperial state-building. Out of these "foundations" a whole series of other administrative programs have emerged within the imperial project. Tentative and isolated instances of neo-colonial parliamentary governments have been spawned, though the boundaries within which social and ideological competition take place are sharply limited.

The origins of the neo-colonial state are not always vested in elite transfers of power (from colonial to national). Moreover, national political leadership meshed in neo-colonial networks sometimes possesses a certain legitimacy derived from its role in the

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"national struggle." But this process also involves the formation of institutions of the post-independence national state, which may include conflict prior to national independence.

The whole point of imperial state-building is to provide access points to shape priorities and agendas in the hope of avoiding "external pressures" and having to act "from the outside." Within the periphery, the alienated state articulates the interests of imperial capital by promoting growth on the basis of the exploitation of national classes. Only sustained inflows of capital and an elaborate political-police-military apparatus can provide this state with durability.

Social polarities and political mobilization have frequently accompanied the exploitative social relations characteristic of imperial capital expansion. Equally important, the socially exclusive and economically constricting effects of externally-directed accumulation has set in opposition numerically and strategically important strata in the periphery. The process of imperial accumulation leads to concentration of wealth and opens opportunities to petty bourgeois strata for national capitalization through control over the state and its revenues. The emergence of national movements, and eventually governments, sets the stage for redefining relations with the imperial power. Yet, in most instances, controlling the government is not identical with controlling the state: the critical means of production, as well as important fractions of the army-police-state bureaucracy, remain at least initially tied to the metropolis and serve to countermand the orders of the national government. In this context, the imperial power may seek to renegotiate terms of dependency or undermine the national regime's development project through a variety of measures. The more decisively the national government challenges the process of external accumulation, the more likely efforts will be made by the imperial state to undermine the regime. The "incomplete" transformation from a neo-colonial or national development regime to a national popular state provides several opportunities for reversing changes. The imperial state utilizes the financial networks and military-administrative structures that were elaborated earlier to promote imperial-capital accumulation in order to coerce the national-popular state. Financial and credit constraints lead to disarticulating the economy and alienating the national bourgeoisie. External links with the military are reinforced in the process of disintegrating the state. Alienated from the national-popular goals of the government, the pro-imperial segment of the military seeks to overthrow the government, reversing changes and reconstituting a state to promote imperial capital accumulation.

State formation and disaggregation are then two crucial processes for imposing exploitative class relations in the periphery. Without the intervention of the imperial state, the neo-colonial state would be difficult to sustain; and without the neo-colonial state the conflicts generated by imperial-capital accumulation would become unmanageable. Without a "strong state" class polarization would produce insurgency; the alternative of a petty bourgeois-led popular-national alliance would either limit the capacity of imperial capital to extract surplus from the labor force or lead to a more profound transformation of society.

The imperial state network was shaken but not broken by recent events in Indo-China. The withdrawal of troops and resources allowed the U.S. to reconcentrate its efforts in other parts of the world. One of the very arguments of the self-styled doves during Vietnam was precisely the over-extension of the U.S. in the context of other imperial commitments. The defeat in Vietnam allowed the U.S. to concentrate on reconstituting its army as a mobile mercenary force capable of flexible involvement—a

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far cry from the disintegrating and demoralized force of 1969-70. The far-reaching military claims, found in the executive budget for 1975-76—the record-breaking $100 billion allocation—speaks precisely to this issue: the overseas military arm of the imperial state has not only recouped its pre-Vietnam position but is extending far beyond, with new weaponry, installations and capacity for ensuring U.S. overseas expansion. The control over international finance exercised by the U.S. in overthrowing Allende suggests that U.S. global power is very much a salient issue in shaping development agendas in the Third World. For example, U.S. control over overseas banks has grown immensely between the 1960s and 1970s. Rather than declining, both in terms of financial might and military capacity, the U.S. continues to control the major instrumentalities of the capitalist world. The only area of relative decline over the last decade is in the area of trade—where the relative share of the U.S. has fallen.

It could be suggested, citing the English example, that trade declines foreshadow investment and financial deterioration over the long run. Even if this were the case, we would be speaking of an historical process involving several decades or perhaps a half century, certainly not imminent and dramatic change. So long as U.S. imperial state power maintains its network, it is possible for U.S. business to oust competitors, receive lucrative contracts, reverse trade patterns, collect debts, and obtain loans; in other words, the U.S. continues to use global financial resources to compete successfully. When the Shah spends billions earned from Japanese, European, and Third World oil sales to purchase U.S. arms, industrial products and expertise, it is because the U.S. global military-political organization (the imperial state) not only put the Shah in power but organized his army, trained his economic advisors and technicians and penetrates the security apparatus from top to bottom. The U.S. manipulates the rise of certain Third World "nationalism" (especially in the oil countries where long-standing inter-state ties exist) into an effective instrument for weakening its competitors. The new oil nationalism has, with few exceptions, served to reallocate wealth toward the U.S. at the expense of the rest of the capitalist world—a not fortuitous development in this "interdependent" world.

The second foundation of U.S. world power concerns the nature of domestic political and social relations. Lacking any organized class challenge to capitalist hegemony, U.S. capitalism has an unlimited capacity to recuperate from economic crises without paying the political and social costs that its competitors must confront. Among the industrialized capitalist countries the U.S. has among the highest rates of unemployment and the poorest social services, while providing the biggest subsidies to privately controlled research and development. Lacking substantial political and social struggles that challenge this allocation of goods and services, possessing a party system that maintains these priorities, and a trade union bureaucracy that actively supports both the allocations and the parties while harshly disciplining internal challengers—U.S. capitalism is in an excellent position to 'modernize' industries, increase productivity and lower the cost of goods by maintaining high levels of unemployment and lowering the social costs of production.

No European or Japanese capitalist government can move with the impunity of the U.S.; demonstrations and major protests would lead to confrontation and serious declines in production, further accelerating a declining economy. With the Meanys and Woodcocks and Abels, the Shankers and Gottbaums in control of labor, U.S. capitalism can impose all the costs of its competitive position onto the workforce without fear of political retaliation: labor is tied to the Democratic Party and that

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party in turn is committed to providing the capacity for capital expansion, even if it means abandoning many welfare measures enacted in previous decades. The end product is that a politically and socially confined working class offers no obstacle to U.S. capitalism's potential for recuperating from any crises—local or global. Enough resources can be squeezed from the underlying population to finance new expansion and growth—the criteria by which capitalism judges its successes. There can be no talk of irreversible changes on a world scale as long as U.S. capitalism has the formidable weapon of a politically captured labor force capable of producing goods at costs which allow U.S. capital expansion. The imperial state which provides the essential network for U.S. capital expansion overseas depends on an unchallenged capitalist political hegemony within the U.S. The financing, staffing and operations of that network depend on control over every significant aspect of executive policy by capitalist politicians. Congressional scrutiny is neither effective nor directed at this level of policy-making. While investigations of past CIA operations in Chile proceed, the agency is busy undermining leftist support in Portugal. Over and against the needs of capitalism, all politicians become 'fiscal conservatives,' to quote the very liberal New York City Councilman Paul O'Dwyer. An imperial state backed by an unchallenged ruling class is indeed capable of suffering a number of severe defeats but it also has the capacity to re-enter the picture and, in many instances, transform losses into gains.

The third structural feature which underlies the persistance of U.S. world power is the relationships that exist between U.S. capitalism and its erstwhile leading competitors within the capitalist world. While some writers have noted the inter-dependence of these two areas in terms of trade, technology and manufactures, and others have noted the growing flow of capital to and fro, the crucial element is the difference in global reach and internal self-sufficiency. Japan needs U.S. markets more than the U.S. needs Japan. Hence any moves by the Japanese toward displacing the U.S. on a world scale is subject to retribution—a weapon well understood by the former Nixon administration. Likewise, while some European investments have been made in the U.S., they are only a fraction of U.S. investments on the continent and England. The notion of competing centers also assumes mutual accessibility to the world's resources—yet the U.S. has less dependence on raw materials than Europe; and furthermore the U.S. is in a better position than Europe to shift additional costs to its consumers—because of the inconsequential political opposition in the U.S. Moreover, because of its external reach, U.S. capitalism is in a position to reap the benefits of increased profits in Third World countries through its political-military contacts, thus adding to its advantages over Europe in a spiralling fashion. While Europe and Japan continue to depend on the U.S. economically for trade and investment, and while the U.S. continues to gain from European and Japanese trade losses to Third World countries, the notion of a polycentric world is easily undermined. The rhetoric of a new world order belies a global system in which a multiplicity of complex change results in the re-emergence of U.S. world hegemony.

Within the above structural framework, then, we can now return to examine the events which supposedly were ending U.S. world power. In the Third World, U.S. capital continues to expand, financing and capturing a greater surplus than ever before. In Latin America, particularly Mexico, Brazil, and Venezuela (among others) major markets are available for U.S. goods and investments—while Chile, Uruguay and Bolivia have been made safe for U.S. capital by the long reach of the imperial state. The overthrow of Allende (1973) and the 1975 coup in Peru all favor U.S. capital, albeit in different degrees within very different circumstances. The overall

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direction of the political momentum in Latin America has been toward the consolidation of regimes which collaborate with U.S. capital, the opportunities for local capital varying with time and place. Thus, the contrast between Peru and Venezuela on the one hand and Chile on the other are still substantial.

In the Middle East, though U.S.capital interests in some cases have been nationalized—but promptly and generously compensated—plenty of room has been left for profitable activity in the no-risk business of selling expertise, marketing and technology. Beyond the resource enclaves, U.S. capital has moved into a multiplicity of industries and services financed by the new wealth, thus shifting its area of exploitation. The recycling of earnings has led to a reconcentration of capital, shifting from the enclave mineral firms to multinational industrial-banking service enterprises. Further, the placing of large loans in the international banks has strengthened U.S. financial leverage by providing new capital without substantial shifts of decision-making in the banking institutions. In summary, the revolt in the Third World has not changed the balance of forces against the U.S. but has provided new bases of support for U.S. dominance against capitalist competitors as well as new sources of capital and markets. Increasingly, the U.S. exercises power through national-state structures with industrializing potential (Brazil and Iran, for example) whose national project and expansion coincides with U.S. imperial designs.

U.S. relations with the Communist countries in the early 1970s were designed essentially to stabilize U.S. global influence in the aftermath of the Vietnam debacle and the economic challenges emanating from capitalist competitors. Détente was a formula which allowed the U.S. to explore alternative economic opportunities, undercutting competitors, and at the same time to reassert its influence within the capitalist world. U.S. benefits were not only economic but political: for example, guarantees that revolutionary movements in the capitalist world would not receive substantial support from the détente partners. Unable to manage the world through the unilateral use of force, Washington conceived of détente as a means of developing clearly defined spheres of influence. As the U.S. recovers from the shock of Vietnam, it has moved into areas formerly under Soviet influence: in Egypt, with new political, economic and military ties: in Eastern Europe the multinational giants, including General Motors, have increasingly penetrated local industries and markets. In the USSR itself, U.S. agricultural exporters are increasingly capturing a substantial long-term market position. The new basis of U.S. influence is then shaped by the contingencies of power: temporary adaptation to adverse circumstance produced cooperation which, in turn, has led to increasing displacement of the Soviet Union from centers of influence through economic-political penetration, as well as relations of dependence through trade. Détente began as a policy to consolidate influence in a period of external challenge but has become a weapon for increasing U.S. power—hardly evidence of a decline in U.S. global position.

European and Japanese capacity to compete with the U.S. has severely deteriorated in the recent past, not only because of the "oil crisis" and the "recession" but because of the different ways each of these events have affected the U.S. and its competitors. Setting aside agro-mineral advantages possessed by the U.S., Europe and Japan were less in a position to recapture Third World earnings than was the U.S. In large part, the U.S. had greater access and received a greater proportion of the sales and cash flows from oil earnings than did their competitors—who paid more and got proportionately less.

Internally, European and Japanese capital faced well-organized labor opposition in

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its attempts to recover rates of expansion at the cost of workers—thus having to expend added state funds for welfare, while U.S. capital was using the recession to cut back on social programs. The costs for U.S. rivals went up as U.S. costs went down, opening new opportunities for U.S. overseas expansion and recapturing of markets, areas of investment, etc. U.S. capital is thus the beneficiary of an uneven political development of the world labor movement; the political backwardness of labor in the U.S. provides the basis for reassertion of U.S. hegemony.

Finally, the Watergate scandals were washed out by swapping Ford for Nixon: the Executive continues to fashion policies and programs to promote the internal and external expansion of capital. No permanent decline of executive power is in evidence. Even less has there been any alternative fashioned by a political opposition. Rather than signal a decline in authority of government, the whole episode has led to the consolidation of capitalist power with an "honest face." Congressional investigatory committees resemble electioneering activities; publicity-gathering Democratic politicians conduct endless hearings and uncover dramatic new political facts which have no institutional consequences. Lacking any real economic and social programs, unable to compete with the massive support which the Republican administration offers to industrialists and bankers, the Democrats hope to capture the electorate by recounting the scandals of by-gone years, hoping to discredit their opponents without endangering the institutions and policies which engender the authority of the capitalist state.

Rather than viewing the U.S. as a declining world power it is more accurate to consider it a reemerging power, the first among equals. The periodic shifts in position between capitalist countries, the relative decline in trade, the victory of this or that revolutionary power are suggestive of possible changes but in themselves do not indicate whether the underlying capacities have been adversely affected. The process by which apparent reverses have led to positive advantages, defeats into the reconcentration of power, temporary compromises into tactical advances underscores the importance of looking at the historical structures and relations that facilitate the assertion of world power.

Propelled by its internal recovery, U.S. imperialism finds cooperative partners in both Communist camps for its policy of external consolidation. The reemergence of U.S. capitalist power on a world scale proceeds through the growth of new nationalism in the periphery, Communist rivalries and the class struggle in Europe. Once again, it threatens to impose its single-minded control over the use and allocation of world resources, although increasingly the constraints it imposes on its capitalist rivals may lead to radical overturns. Third World industrialists tied to U.S. imperialism generate new exploited classes distant from the power, goods and services they produce. And, finally, new cycles of competition and rivalry may, at some distant time, create political conditions that will alter internal power in the U.S., weaken the imperial state and with it open a new historical period—the actual decline of U.S. imperial power.

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THE POLITICS OF CULTURE IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA

by Jacques D. Rupnik

The extraordinary Czech literary and cinematographic "new wave" of the 1960s was integral to the struggle to change a regime that had been introduced in Czechoslovakia in 1948, and which obstinately refused to undergo any transformations after Stalin's death.

Thus, when the miracle happened, and the reformist streams of the initially Party-controlled Prague Spring of 1968 overflowed into a nationwide tide of unrest, the intellectuals—writers in particular—were by their past experience often best equipped to help wipe out the Stalinist garbage that had accumulated for over 20 years. Overnight the Prague literary journal, *Literární Listy*, became the most avidly read paper in the country and its contributors, the spokesmen for popular aspirations (an understandable situation in a country where no legal means of opposition were available; writers and journalists had access to the media recently freed from censorship). The philosopher Ivan Svitak was calling for workers' councils, while Ludvik Vaculik, author of *The Axe* (Harper and Row), published his famous 2000-word manifesto, a political program for the whole country, which was to greatly anger Brezhnev.

If the Czech intellectuals played such a prominent political role during the Dubcek era, they also became one of the most exposed targets of the repression that followed the Russian invasion. Their films were banned, their works removed from libraries along with those of Sartre, Graham Greene and Aragon. Among the officially published translations, Russian works dominate; curiously, perhaps only Raymond Chandler can rival Sholokhov or Fadeev.

What happened to all the "bright young men and women" who made the new wave of the 1960s possible?

Antonin J. Liehm's *Closely Watched Films*, gives the most comprehensive picture of Czech cinema available in English.* Avoiding the technical, pseudo-professional jargon usually associated with film criticism, he presents an illuminating analysis of the origins of Czech film's new wave of the 1960s and a series of insightful interviews with almost all living Czech and Slovak film directors. With regard to the difficulties of filmmaking in the 1950s, Liehm says that "with the consolidation of a dictatorship that proved to be military-bureaucratic rather than revolutionary, it became increasingly clear that the liberation of the film from the dictates of the market meant its subjugation to the dictates of the state." In the West directors are permanently torn between giving way to their creative instincts and submitting to the demands of producers and viewers since, in the last instance, the very existence of film depends on its box office success. The situation is different with a nationalized film industry as in Czechoslovakia, where the previewer (the censor) and the producer are one: the Party establishment. This also explains why directors in Czechoslovakia were almost forced to become involved in politics since their chances of making films depended so much

*Josef Skvorecky's "All the Bright Young Men and Women" is, as the author puts it, a "personal history" of Czech cinema, bringing many details from the backstage of Czech film-making in the 1960s.

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on political conditions. But Liehm's book is not a long and dreary story of the artists' struggle against censorship. He shows how the post-Stalinist state, affected by the "disintegration" of the official ideology (including the dogmas of "socialist realism") ended up preferring strictly non-political art, while art in general and film in particular were playing an eminently political role as demystifiers of ideologies. In this global perspective of subtle interplay of politics and culture, Liehm sees the history of post-war Czech film from the viewpoint of generations.

The "golden age" of the 1960s is, for Liehm, the culmination of a long process which depended on political conditions and resulted in a close relationship between four generations of directors who, despite the differences in their outlooks and techniques, were animated by a strong feeling of solidarity. Both elements account for the richness and diversity of Czech film production.

Miloš Forman (*Loves of a Blonde*, 1965) and Ivan Passer (*Intimate Lighting*, 1965) rejected any theoretical approach to reality. Theirs is one of close, almost microscopic observation: they find "in that microcosm of human action a portrait of social reality as a whole." This accounts for the political dimension of a film with an apparently nonpolitical subject, such as *Firemen's Ball*, 1968. Others, like Jaromil Jires (*The Joke*, 1968) preferred social analysis and political generalizations, while Chytilova's *Dazies* or Nemec's *Report on the Party and the Guests* are philosophical tales in the Voltairean sense of the word.

Although having different and esthetic approaches to filmmaking, they all shared a common attitude toward actors (Forman and Passer introduced the use of non-professional actors) that is best defined by the director Jiri Weiss: "To me an actor is what five divisions of the Soviet army are for Sergei Bondartchuk [Soviet director, author of the gigantic film version of *War and Peace*]. And a conversation between a man and his wife is more interesting to me than the battle of Borodino. The miracle of cinematography is the reconstruction (or, if you will, the construction) of human life. Film magnifies human 'fleas' to superhuman proportions, and a tremor of the lips or the eye's loving glance is more powerful than a cannon shot."

The "ideal" conditions of the 1960s, freeing Czech directors from commercial constraint and political pressures as well, account in part for the emergence in Czechoslovakia of a dozen first class film directors of international recognition (winning two Oscars for *The Shop on Mainstreet*, by Jan Kadar and Elmar Klos, and in 1968 for Mencl's *Closely Watched Trains*). When the Russian tanks rolled in and put an end to the Dubcek experiment of "socialism with a human face," Czech film directors, as well as most other creative people, were faced with a choice: emigration abroad or "internal emigration." For most of the directors who stayed, the "normalization" meant no longer being allowed to shoot the kind of films they wanted. Sometimes they had to agree to film according to the expectations of the new regime. Thus Jaromil Jires, who revealed his extraordinary talent with *The Cry* (1963), and confirmed it with *The Joke*—a powerful critique of Stalinism—and with his surrealistic tale, *Valerie and her Week of Wanders* (1969), last year completed a new movie about the construction of the Prague subway, with heavy emphasis on Soviet technological assistance. Even Mencl had to agree last year to shoot a movie about the building of a dam on a river in Bohemia.

The alternative for those who refuse to become "engineers of human souls" as Stalin used to put it, was to leave the country and continue their film careers in the West, especially in America where chances for filmmaking are best (Forman, Passer, Kadar and Weiss now live in New York). All found themselves caught in the following

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dilemma: to continue the kind of work they used to do in Czechoslovakia that won them international fame, or to adopt the style of filmmaking of their adopted country.

What gave "discreet charm" to Czech films in the 1960s in the West was a certain atmosphere, their simplicity in the observation of everyday life, or ordinary people, a subtle sense of human combined sometimes with social satire. This required a deep and almost subconscious knowledge of place, people, and feelings. These qualities are impossible to transport to a new reality. In other words, it is impossible to make "Czech" movies in America. Ivan Passer's recent *Law and Disorder* just doesn't work when it tries to be a "Czech film" about ordinary Brooklyn shopkeepers and cab drivers, because Passer is not "equipped" by his experience to do this kind of film. Perhaps only the genius of Milos Forman transcended this difficulty; his *Taking Off* is certainly the best European film made in America, about America; and again, he reached the universal through microscopic observation of the most particular. Besides this rule-proving exception, the uprooted artist is inevitably driven to the other alternative: to try to become an American artist. This, too, is a difficult enterprise, since if the point is to make American movies many Americans would seem far better equipped to do this than Czech emigrés. Certainly, Roman Polansky has proved the contrary. Having started with the very Polish *Knife in the Water*, he has managed to become one of the best Hollywood directors with *Chinatown*. For most directors some kind of balance between the two alternatives has to be found. Milos Forman may perhaps come close to achieving this with his *One Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest*.

The future of Czech film directors in America is a different story from the future of Czech cinema. Some of the best have left the country (the last to leave was Jan Nemec who last spring in Cannes presented his first "Western" movie: *Le decolté dans le dos*). Those who stayed are on the blacklist, and thus denied the possibility of doing creative work for many years. Ivan Passer once related how eager he was to start shooting his first American movie, *Born to Win* (1971). He said that filmmaking had one thing in common with athletics: you have to practice, keep in shape, keep in touch with the draft. Thus, to lose the possibility of shooting for many years is a total disaster for a director. And even if in ten years (to be optimistic) a "thaw" comes in Prague, and new conditions for art appear, it is too late, you can't just pick up where you left off. Times will change and film with it. And for those outside the country it would be too late, too, since in the meantime they may have become American directors, cut off from the realities of their country of origin.

But was there not a feeling of the end of an era in Prague already in the spring of 1968, when Czech directors were suddenly, after 20 years, confronted with their newly gained freedom? As Jan Nemec says to Liehm: "the difference between today [1968] and yesterday is primarily that we all find ourselves in a situation that we were not ready for. The cards have been redealt, the game is open, and for a moment everyone can play what he wants. The moving force of all our activity today has been 'the struggle against the dark forces of reaction,' to borrow a phrase from Stalin's *History of the Bolshevik Party*. The driving force has fallen by the wayside, at least for the present. When one lives in a society that is essentially not free, it is the obligation of every thinking person to attack obstacles to freedom in every way at his disposal, which is what happened. Now, of course, everyone is faced with a choice: What does he really want? What does he feel must be done and said in the new situation, one that differs from the previous situation in that people are no longer behind barbed wire, but rather within a normal society, so that in our case, a different sort of activity will be called for?"

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Maybe 1968 signalled the end of the "new wave." However, a dozen directors of international standing were already turning to something different, finding new ways of expressing their talent. The Russian invasion not only put an end to the "new wave," but, for the time being anyway, to Czech cinema as such.

The 1960s also saw an extraordinary revival in Czech literature, expressions of which are only now available in English translation: they are accompanied by works written since the Soviet invasion but banned from publication in Czechoslovakia. Contrary to the situation in cinema, we have here much more of a sense of the continuity of this literary trend. Movie production is a "public activity" which requires substantial material means; once the political conditions had changed, the work of "undesirable" directors was stopped. Writers are more difficult to silence. They may not be published and thus lose touch with their readers, but they can still write "for the drawer" as they now say in Eastern Europe. Besides, the importance of a readership for the writer still has to be proved: Salinger has for the last 20 years deliberately secluded himself from a public he considers rather a nuisance to his creativity.

Writers also seem inclined toward a sense of mission (to preserve the national culture against totalitarian rule). Thomas Mann in his California villa remained the embodiment of German culture, resisting the barbarism of Goebbels & Co. Solzhenitsyn, though not published in Russia in the last ten years before he was expelled, still had a sense of speaking "for the people," representing the national values against the neo-Stalinism of Brezhnev. Similarly, Czech writers, particularly Kundera, Vaculik and Kohout sensed the necessity to remain in their country, in touch with their people, even in this period of darkness. This is also reinforced by the shared feeling that they have a debt to pay. In 1948 Kohout and Kundera warmly welcomed the communist takeover in Czechoslovakia. They soon found the Stalinist frame too narrow for their creative work and though materially privileged, launched a decisive attack on the ruling party elite. Frustrated from the results of a "revolution from above" in 1948, they helped to bring about another one "from below" in 1968.

Their works come to us at a time when no new literature worth reading is being published in Czechoslovakia. The "official" literature oscillates between two genres: trash novels and political pamphlets. Mr. Muller, a hardliner and current Central Committee cultural watchdog, gave us an example of the first type with his would-be sex novel, *With Elvira at the Spa* (published under the pseudonym Kapek—incidentally, the name of an important Politbureau member).

The other sort is best represented by Alexej Plundek's anti-semitic novel *Vabank*, the first to deal in literature with the events of 1968. As in any socialist-realist work, the characters must be archetypes. The "positive hero" is a working class Czech who just returned from Syria, where he was providing "brotherly help" on an engineering project. The "bad guy" is a son of the exploiting class, "pretentious, selfish and foreign to our country." The fact that he operates as the grey eminence of various literary and political circles is not "an indication of exceptional gifts, but rather a symptom of an egoistic character, in his case almost innate." Why almost? Isn't it obvious, since we learn later that his grandfather's real name was Bergmann. (The latter arrived poor from Galicia and within five years owned already all the pubs and breweries in town!) In a style reminiscent of the Nazi era or more recently of General Brown, Pludek presents the Czechoslovak reform movement of 1968 as only a part of a large, Zionist plot, which started with the 1967 six-day war in the Middle East and was to end with "the seizure of the governments of the major world powers."

While this book received the National Book Award in Prague, a dozen works by

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Czech writers not allowed to be published in their country were acclaimed by critics in the West. Whereas the "official" publications seem a rather desperate effort by third-rate writers (with the exceptions Hrabal and Fuks, allowed to publish after joining the "normalized" writers' union) to please their Russian-sponsored supervisors, those that are banned are linked with the Czech literary tradition.

This tradition is best represented by the work of two authors writing at Prague at the end of World War I: Franz Kafka and Jaroslav Hasek (*The Good Soldier Svejk*). This tradition could be called the literature of the absurd: with Kafka it is expressed through the feeling of alienation, with Hasek through a satiric sense of humor. Joseph Skvorecky continues the latter tradition with his novel *The Tank Brigade*, where the contemporary Svejk is confronted with the stupidity and absurdity of the Czech army at the height of the Stalinst era, instead of the Austrian Army of Franz Joseph.

Ludvik Vaculik's novel *The Guinea Pigs* (New York: Third Press) is a most brilliant venture in the Kafka-esque vein. Like Joseph K. in *The Trial*, Vaculik's hero is a bank employee. He lives a monotonous life with his wife Eva, "two tolerable little boys" and a couple of newly acquired guinea pigs that soon become the center of the family life. Our clerk works in a weird bank; enigmatic employees walked out every day with bank notes in their pockets. Sometimes the money is confiscated by guards at the exits, but the whole thing seems absurd since the guards don't return it all to the bank. What an economist would diagnose simply as a supplementary cause of inflation under socialism deeply puzzles our clerk, who hopelessly tries to understand the whereabouts of this clandestine circulation of currency. The more he tries, the less he knows and the more confused he becomes, as his investigations lead him to the mysterious and dangerous basements and sewers of the Prague underground. Even a state bank in a socialist state did not remove from Prague the obscure forces that haunted Joseph K. . .

Another prolific, but now silenced Czech writer is Milan Kundera. While he became famous in the West with his political novel, *The Joke*, his work became a classic in Prague where anybody would know the famous quotation from it, where Ludvik, replying to his enthusiastically communist girlfriend who wrote to him about the "healthy atmosphere" prevailing at the summer party school, quips on a postcard:

> Optimism is the opium of the people!
> The healthy atmosphere stinks!
> Long live Trotsky!
> —Ludvik

The Joke is the story of an individual's life destroyed by the absurdity of a socio-political system (and of an era) that was deadly serious. Kundera's new novel *Life Is Elsewhere* explores the individual's motivations for joining that system and playing a part in its arbitrary destructive powers.

In *Life is Elsewhere* the Hero (Jaromil) is an overprotected mother's boy who discovers and embraces at the same time, love, revolution, poetic strength, political intolerance and impotence. Youth, poetry, revolution and sexual immaturity fit together for Kundera.

Jaromil is a frustrated and extremely jealous lover. With the triumph of the "revolution" (the communist takeover in 1948), he joins the Party and exchanges private beauty, which he alone understood, for public "beauty," which can be understood by everybody. With a Party card in his pocket, he discovers a way to satisfy his

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jealous anxieties. His girlfriend, late for a *rendezvous* with him, does not find anything better to appease him than to invent a story about her brother leaving the country for the West. Jaromil (who by this time has achieved prominence by giving poetry readings to police agents) goes immediately to denounce her to the National Security. In the evening once she is already in jail, it occurred to him "that at that very moment his girl was no doubt surrounded by men—policemen, interrogators, guards. They could do with her whatever they wanted. Watch her change into prison clothes, peer through her cell window while she was sitting on a pail, urinating... One thing puzzled him: these images did no arouse a single spark of jealousy! You must be mine or die upon the rack, if I want you, Keats' cry rings through the ages. Why should Jaromil be jealous? The redhead girl now belongs to him more than ever. Her fate was his creation. It was his eye watching her as she urinated into the pail; it was his hand touching her when a guard treated her roughly. She was his victim, his creation; she was his, his, totally his own! Jaromil was no longer jealous. That night, he slept the deep sleep of a real man."

Kundera actively hates poetry as much as he hates the crimes perpetrated under the banner of poetic political slogans. But he is certainly wrong when he equates the surrealistic slogans of the May 1968 revolt in Paris ("L'imagination au pouvoir," "La poesie est dans la rue!" "Soyez realistes—demandez l'impossible!") with the Stalinist slogans Jaromil is editing for the May Day parade in Prague some twenty years before. Nothing was more foreign to the spontaneity and libertarian spirit of the May 1968 revolt than the oppressive regimentation of the Stalinist era in Czechoslovakia; the Parisian May had probably more in common with the Prague Spring of 1968 (in which Kundera played an active role) than he suspects.

Maybe that is so, because of his theoretically biased premises: while Kundera equates lyric poetry, in its quest for the absolute, with revolutions that often turn into dictatorships, the novel is the art of reason, maturity, and *truth*, where you cannot cheat. That is why there are no great Stalinist novels. But Stalinist poetry (like Nezval in Czechoslovakia or Kundera himself in his youth) left us beautiful verse because "through the magic of poetry, all statements become the truth, provided they are backed by the real power of real experience. And the poet certainly experiences deeply, so deeply his emotions smolder and blaze. The smoke of their fiery feelings spread like a rainbow over the sky, a beautiful rainbow spanning prison walls..."

Not surprisingly, *Life is Elsewhere* (his short stories, "Laughable Loves," were published simultaneously by A. Knopf) won Kudera the Medici Literary award for the best foreign novel published in France. Whether or not works such as this one fit into Western anti-communist predispositions, they vividly express the efforts of a whole generation of writers whose fate so closely parallels that of their country.

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KELLNER ON KORSCH

by Henri Rabasseire

The essay by Douglas Kellner on "Korsch's Revolutionary Historicism" in *Telos* 26 offers a penetrating interpretation of Korsch's thought and is certainly conceived in his spirit. However, it is not always historically accurate. What I miss in Kellner's essay is the feeling for the spirit of the twenties, and here I claim to speak from personal experience. There is always a certain discrepancy between the personal recollections of the participants in an historical action, and the historians (I am one myself) who must work on papers which are mere sediments of the whirling matter in the agitated waters of history. In the present case, memory is able to correct the shadowy evidence of the papers. For Hedda Korsch is correct in remembering that Korsch, with many others who joined the KPD in 1920, "had great reservations about the 21 points." But this issue, which now looms so large, was then a minor objection if compared with the large issues: the principle of Räte (Councils), the principle of the proletarian dictatorship, recognition of the Soviet Union as the first country in which a proletarian revolution had been successful.

Incidentally, what the 21 points meant became clear to Korsch only much later, I believe in 1928, after he had already broken with Leninism, when he obtained a French translation of *What Is to Be Done?* No German translation was available of this work either to Korsch or to Lukács, and their interpretation of Leninism so far had depended on what they *believed* the Soviet system meant. On this assumption, Lukács' memorial pamphlet on Lenin and Korsch's praise of it are unexceptional. When Korsch had read *What Is to Be Done?* he gave it to me with the words: "This is very embarrassing," indicating that he had not known the full extent of his earlier errors about the Soviet Union. Even after that, he continued to keep on the shelf in his study a photo of Lenin as a boy which he loved very much. It is characteristic of Korsch that even in his "Leninist" period he never had one of the familiar photos of Lenin the leader, just as it was characteristic of him that he did not join all the other delegates to the V World Congress in Moscow when the lined up to visit Lenin's grave in front of the Kremlin. "I am sorry I did not see Lenin," he said later, "but this way I couldn't bring myself to do it." He was never a follower, least of all of Lenin or Luxemburg.

To return, however, to the situation of 1920, Korsch enthusiastically joined the Comintern and said so, as Buckmiller and Kellner correctly point out. I don't think that the Kapp putsch was so decisive in bringing about this conversion. Korsch had been a Fabian and Kantian before World War I. He was consistent, throughout his career and through his many zigzag developments, only in his pursuit of one idea: self-activity of the class. In joining the Independents (USPD) he adhered above all to the *Räte* idea which he also believed had been realized by the Constitution of the Soviet Union. He supported the left wing of the party, led by Däumig and Stoecker who were strong exponents of both the *Räte* idea and the merger with the KPD. It may be impossible now to reconstruct the enthusiasm which the Russians then aroused on the Left; the desire to unite all proletarian forces was so overwhelming that one could not allow 21 paper points to stand in the way. After all, the USPD represented 17 percent

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of the voters, the KPD was a small sect—what was there to be afraid of? The SPD at that time, of course, represented the opposite of proletarian self-activity; it had been guilty of suppressing the revolution. It was either-or, and if Korsch wanted to support forcefully the merger, he had to keep his private reservations in check. He did write enthusiastically about the Comintern, about Russia, about the Russian party, even about a person who was then rather unknown outside Russia but to whom Lenin had given the rather insignificant post of keeping the Party's files—how should anyone know about Lenin's "Testament" in 1925? Or that Joseph Djugashvili would become the inventor of Stalinism? Korsch wrote about a Leninism and about a Soviet state which existed in his imagination and in the imagination of many who thought of themselves as revolutionary at that time.

However, there were other things to be considered: infighting between factions. Zinoviev had run a vicious attack against "the profesors"—Lukács and Korsch; it may have been sweet revenge for Korsch (who could be mean) to give a favorable review to the book of Zinoviev's rival. For Zinoviev had cynically used "the professors" to bolster his own position which had already begun to be shaky. Korsch has told me and others again and again that his editoriship of *The International* was a constant fight with factional influences, and that he used his position to give a voice to the interests of the council movement which he still represented—hence the "Boris" article which raised such a scandal. Roniger was a close friend of Korsch and a true "ultra-left;" his article went to the heart of the Bolshevik pretensions, and in publishing it Korsch showed his hand. There can be no doubt that his position on all practical and theoretical questions was different from the so-called Left leadership under Ruth Fischer and Maslov. He never belonged to that inner circle of "bolshevizers" but must be grouped with Rosenberg, Katz and Scholem who were the ultra-left. Kellner overstates his case when he denies this connection, and he is equally wrong when he denies a connection between Korsch and Bordiga. I will simply state for the historical record that I know, from personal involvement, that Korsch's international connections included the following: Bordiga in Italy, Treint in France, as well as the syndicalist groups of Laurat and of Monatte-Rosmer, the Sapronov-Shlapnikov group (Workers' Opposition) and Miasnikov in Russia. His relationship with Lukacs was precarious; he supported Lukács' effort but thought that Lukács' philosophy was too idealistic, and they were not connected either factionally or by a community of thoughts about Lenin. In favorably reviewing Lukács' pamphlet on Lenin, Korsch simply tried to emphasize what he thought usable in Lukács.

About this usable content of Leninism I am happy to support Kellner. Korsch thought in the early 1920s that the Comintern represented a total break with the social democratic heritage. As is well known, especially in the preface to *Marxism and Philosophy,* Korsch convinced himself later that the Comintern was only another version of the Second International. But in the early 1920s, all that mattered to him was the break with reformism, positivism, bourgeois materialism. He saw "bolshevization" as the restoration of the historical Marx, and he felt that only the opportunism of the two workers' parties prevented the class from using the permanent crisis of capitalism. He held on to this conception much longer than the real conditions of the European workers warranted. He made terrible mistakes in judging political situations, political groups and persons, but my point is that all those mistakes since 1924 were ultra-left mistakes, and Kellner is quite right in saying (note 53) that "Korsch never abandoned the workers' councils concept."

I turn to some smaller mistakes in Kellner's essay: "Korsch should have been 'the least

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sectarian'?" The truth is that he split and split and split, and in the end was totally isolated. He never joined Katz's *Spartakusbund*. He was critical of Lenin even in his most "Leninist" period; but he was careful in voicing his criticism. Thus, in a lecture to the communist students at the Berlin University, he said: "I have compared Lenin's *Imperialism* with Hilferding's *Finance Capital* word for word, and I find that Lenin took most of his ideas from Hilferding." Hilferding was then Finance Minster of a coalition cabinet, and to say that Lenin stole from him was tantamount to saying that God got the idea of creating the world from the Devil. On the other hand, he was always critical of Rosa Luxemburg's economic theories and of her sterile attitude toward Marx, even at the time when he had reason to re-emphasize her theory of spontaneity and her critique of the Russian revolution. But he believed that Rosa, had she lived, might have returned to the fold of the SPD—which he excluded for himself.

Concerning Kellner's main thesis—the historicity of Marxism and Leninism—I would like to say first that the point is well taken and important. But I have never heard Korsch discuss the question in these terms. After he was through with Lenin, or with Marx for that matter, he would say, of course: this was true for one period of the labor movement. But while he was an orthodox Marxist or Leninist or what he held to be orthodox at that time, he would insist that these positions were not relative. He was not only the best teacher of Marxism, but the most orthodox Marx-philologist I have known. Even while condemning Byzantinism, he would shut up an opponent with a Marx quotation. He believed that Marx had made mistakes and that he had been dogmatized, but he also believed that Marx had discovered, once and for all, the correct method of revolutionary thinking. By contrast, his relationship to Leninism was more utilitarian; as long as there was an opportunity to push the Comintern in the desired direction, he would quote Lenin. But he also said ironically in private: whatever I think, is correct Leninism. After his hopes of reconquering the Comintern were gone, he also discarded Leninism.

Let me add a few words on the notion of "historicity." Korsch never used it and of course, it is not a Marxist word. The German *Geschichtlichkeit* was introduced, if I am not mistaken, by the "Prussian" historian, Dreysen, who was probably as close to historical materialism as a bourgeois historian can get. It was taken up later by Dilthey, an idealist philosopher and historian of ideas. Hence, even though Marx certainly agreed that all intellectual phenomena must be discovered in their historical context, this insight is not a specifically Marxist discovery. As to the "historicity" of Marxism itself, it is well known that Marx sais, "I am not a Marxist" and that Eduard Bernstein, the father of revisionism, may claim the distinction of having stated explicitly that Marxism represents only the proletarian ideology of a specific period in the intellectual development of the working class. After him, Max Weber became known for the quip, "Marxism is no taxi-cab which you can stop at the next corner." If Korsch used this same tool of *Ideologie-kritik*, he did not indicate any method by which it could be turned into a revolutionary theory. To understand the "historicity" of Marxism in the Korschian sense, it is necessary to admit at least two propositions: (1) we stand on Marx's shoulders to the same extent and in the same sense as we stand on Plato's, Kant's, and Hegel's shoulder; (2) among the legitimate heirs of Marx we find the Second International, the Communist International, the various syndicalist sects and perhaps Korsch himself, or better: those neo-Marxist groups (notably in Germany and the Scandinavian countries) which use Korsch's ideas as guiding principles, but not, e.g., the Frankfurt Institute which is not connected with any movement of the working class. Excluded also is Hilferding, the only Marxist who has ever brought *Das Kapital* up to date, because in

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the Preface to his *Finance Capital* he wrote—and Korsch used to quote this in his course—"There is no reason why the bourgeoisie should not use Marxist insights."

Admittedly, there is a deep contradiction between these two last paragraphs, and it is not even a dialectical one. The Korsch who saw the historicity of Marxism as the cause of its many facets and uses, is in sharp conflict with the Korsch who defended an orthodox, revolutionary Marxism based on what he called "the historical Marx." He constantly wavered between the latter whom he loved and the former—the father of Marxism—of whom he became more and more critical.

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REVIEWS:

Lucien Goldmann, *Cultural Creation in Modern Society*. Translated by Bart Grahl, Introduction by William Mayrl. Telos Press: St. Louis, 1976. $6.50 cloth; $3.00 paper. 180 pages.[1]

Almost six years have passed since the sudden death of Lucien Goldmann at the height of his fame and influence. His method had come to represent all that was rigorous, creative, and undogmatic in Marxist criticism.[2] But to some structuralist critics, his genetic structuralism appeared as a neo-Hegelian Marxism characterized by reductionism, one-dimensionality and "vulgar historicism."[3] Ironically, as critiques of Goldmann emerged, his response to valid objections, combined with the impact of world events (most importantly, May 1968), led him to modify many of his old positions and to approach a new theoretical synthesis.

Since 1970, countless articles about Goldmann have appeared. What is surprising, however, is that most of them do not grasp the significance of Goldmann's last writings. Although there is no discontinuity between the earlier and later Goldmann, there is a developing trajectory from the beginning up to his death. Goldmann would have spoken of his theory's potential as opposed to real consciousness; he would have probably agreed that the major issue of his work was whether it integrated structure, objectivity and "science" with subjectivity, praxis and telos. Central to this matter of theoretical integration is of course the non-dialectical use of identities or homologies.[4] Goldmann persisted in resorting to homologies to the very end. But in the end, he perceived tendencies toward the breakdown of social structures that had seemed fairly permanent. Accordingly, he lay less emphasis on identity, homology, and unity, and more on "partial identity, functionality and multiplicity."[5] Goldmann sought to

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1. This edition also contains an extensive bibliography of Goldmann and his critics, as well as an appendix containing tributes to Goldmann by Marcuse and Piaget and a discussion between Goldmann and Adorno, all from "Hommage à Lucien Goldmann," *Révue de l'institut de sociologie* 3-4 (Brussels, 1973). The authors wish to acknowledge the help of Bart Grahl and the Minnesota Marxist Scholars in writing the final draft of this review.

2. Cf. Rita Schober, *Im Banne der Sprache: Strukturalismus in der Nouvelle Critique, speziell bei Roland Barthes* (Halle, 1968), pp. 20, 24. See also the tributes to Goldmann in *Praxis*, 3-4 (1970), pp. 281-282); *L'Homme et la société*, 17 (July-Sept., 1970), p. 3, etc. An important, if uncritical, summary of Goldmann's work is Jean-Michel Palmier's "Goldmann Vivant," *Praxis*, 3-4 (1971), pp. 567-624.

3. An important negative assessment is Serge Doubrovsky's *The New Criticism in France* (Chicago, 1973). But the most comprehensive of the negative critiques is Miriam Glucksmann's "Lucien Goldmann: Humanist or Marxist?" *New Left Review*, 56 (1969), pp. 49-62.

4. Glucksmann sees Goldmann's reliance on homologies as an outgrowth of his "neo-Hegelianism [which] views society as a homogeneous totality revolving around one central contradiction; constituent elements are dissolved into an undifferentiated unity, and the internal contradictions and interrelationships of specific levels and structures within a given social formation are ignored... Neo-Hegelianism is a purely reflective, if critical activity..." Glucksmann, *op.cit.*, p. 49. In *The Prisonhouse of Language* (Princeton, 1972), pp. ix and 214, Fredric Jameson amplifies his attack on Goldmann's "dialectical passivity" (see *Marxism and Form* [Princeton, 1970], pp. 375-382).

5. Zimmerman's unpublished dissertation on "Genetic Structuralism" (University of California, San Diego, 1975), gives a fairly complete account of partial identity and functionality, as well as their relation in literature to multiplicity. Goldmann has all three concepts in his arsenal in the 1950s, but his use of them develops. On multiplicity and how it enables Goldmann to transcend Glucksmann's critique, see Francis Mulhern, "Introduction to Goldmann," *New Left Review*, 92 (July-August, 1975), pp. 24-28; for an extended treatment, see Rudolf Heyndels, "Reflexion sur la notion de 'cohérence' dans la théorie de Lucien Goldmann," *Révue de l'Université de Bruxelles* (1974), pp. 3-23. Most succinctly, see William

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develop his theory to new levels of inquiry and to incorporate objections into a higher synthesis. Perhaps he did not succeed. But his efforts were all but buried with him, and most of the continuing attacks on his work would have it appear as if his "theoretical revolution" had not begun at all.[6] Thus the "homological fallacy" may be as much his critics' fault as that of the theory in its final forms. Efforts to rethink Goldmann's work must avoid facile assumptions about any homology between his early and later studies.

These matters are important because American non-Marxist scholars have often turned to Goldmann to understand and evaluate, accept or reject Marxism itself. The condescension often greeting Marxist criticism emanates from a one-sided view of only some of Goldmann's works, and this is facilitated by the fact that translations of those works which would round out the picture of Goldmann have not yet been published or have appeared in obscure journals.[7] Without these works in English, the evaluation of Goldmann remains in the hands of literary specialists whose interests preclude a full critique, and whose negative treatment delays a more satisfactory synthesis. Meanwhile, many American Marxists remain without his critiques of Marcuse, Sartre, and Althusser, his views on Marxist humanism and politics, on opposition to capitalism in art and philosophy, on the "new working class" and other potentially revolutionary groups.

For these reasons, we can only welcome the publication of *Cultural Creation*—a posthumous collection of six essays written between 1965 and 1970. The chronological ordering of the articles traces Goldmann's development from his most fully homology-based position toward his ultimate stance. Representing a cross-section of the two works of 1970, the book sets forth Goldmann's important final emphasis on partial identities and functionality, and it implies (though it does not state) the corollary notion of the multiplicity of signification. Thus, the articles capture much of the essence of Goldmann's last period and constitute the simplest and most accessible introduction to his total achievement yet available in English.

Goldmann's search for a Marxist view of modern society, his concern for a method explaining the structures of artistic creation, his contribution to the study of new forms in literature, theater and film, and to the questions of mass media and the communications network are all elaborated in this work. By virtue of its schematic and yet synthetic nature, the book provides a succinct review of almost every application Goldmann made of his theories. But what is crucial about this version is its strong political dimension which enables us to grasp Goldmann's life work as a political project.

Cultural Creation belies the academic appearance of Goldmann's best known work.[8] His studies in literature and philosophy now emerge clearly as examinations of

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Boelhower's review article, "Lucien Goldmann: Towards a Sociology of the Novel," *Minnesota Review*, 6 (Spring, 1976), pp. 140-43.

6. For a negative but fairly balanced critique of the later Goldmann, see Robert Weimann, "French Structuralism and Literary History: Some Critiques and Reconsiderations," *New Literary History*, IV:3 (Spring, 1973), pp. 437-470.

7. This is especially crucial for the two important collections of Goldmann's last year, *Marxisme et sciences humaines* and *Structures mentales et création culturelle*, published respectively by Gallimard and Anthropos. The first is a collection of theoretical and political essays providing a detailed account of Goldmann's final positions; *Structures mentales*, an anthology of literary and philosophical analyses based on these positions. The lead essay of the second work has been translated as *The Philosophy of the Enlightenment* (Cambridge, Mass., 1973). See Mayrl's fine critique in *Telos*, 27 (Spring, 1976), pp. 199-208.

8. Cf. Mulhern, *op.cit.*, p. 37. See also George Lichtheim, *Collected Essays* (New York, 1973), p. 354.

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distinct periods of capitalist development and the oppositions they generate, with the emphasis on the past as a laboratory for studies of the present and future. It becomes evident that his interest in homologies was not to discover identites, but to probe them in an effort to find potential differences. On the social level, this interest emerges as a concern with the conditions of class struggle. Goldmann sees the radical intellectual as articulating humanistic revolutionary tendencies of bourgeois culture in order to free bourgeois culture from the repressive uses it has been made to serve and to enable it to transcend itself and its identity with capitalist society.[9]

The central question with Goldmann may now be restated: having given in to homologies, have we not created conditions which make praxis virtually impossible? Almost all the critiques of Goldmann either fail to see or distort how the issue of homology serves as the nexus of a theory in which politics is an inseparable part.[10] *Cultural Creation* focuses on the whole capitalist history to investigate the issue of possible praxis. As such, the work is a testimony to the issues, doubts, and achievements of a representative Marxist intellectual of the 1960s. A proper critique of this book demands a critique of Goldmann, his politics, and his time.[11]

Maryl's introduction gives us perhaps the fullest biographical sketch of Goldmann that we yet have in English.[12] It reveals a slow process of intellectual maturation tempered by hopes and disillusionments in Marxist claims for overcoming the traumas of a capitalist world beset with Fascism, the Cold War and economic re-structuration; it explains Goldmann's position in the European Left, his struggle to maintain Marxist

9. Goldmann is careful to root given literary expressions in the relations of their own creation. Thus many critics (most notably Weimann) have said that he enables us to grasp the past but not the present meaning of literary works. This view underplays the latent aspect of Goldmann's project which emerges in his final period as an effort to approximate the emphasis in Ernst Bloch on the extreme possible while giving due consideration to the Lukácsian emphasis on a work's relation to its historical context. On structural analogies between historical periods and elements that endure from epoch to epoch, see Goldmann's comments in Michel de Gandillac, *et al.*, *Entretiens sur les notions de genèse et de structure* (The Hague and Paris, 1965), p. 333.

10. Glucksmann catches the nexus, but in a purely negative way: "Theory is denied any autonomy, and becomes an expression of class consciousness rather than a science capable of rigorous analysis and of providing a framework for political strategy." Following Glucksmann, Jameson asserts: "Insofar as [the doctrine of homologies] encourages intellectuals in the belief that with a little ingenuity their analysis of historical reality can be manufactured inside their own heads, it reinforces their occupational idealism by isolating consciousness from the resistance of the infrastructural context and the social ground itself; as a method, the search for homologies is open to ideological as well as theoretical criticism." *Prisonhouse, op.cit.*, p. 214. Mayrl says that there is a homology between Goldmann's theory and his politics. But Mulhern objects: "Theoretical positions are not mere emanations of political stances... The former cannot be evaluated in terms of their political consequences," *op.cit.*, p. 35. For us, there is a crucial but problematic interaction (a partial identity, or functional relation) between his theoretical development and his politics.

11. Goldmann's politics has been treated more with innuendo than actual analysis. Maynard Solomon, in *Marxism and Art* (New York, 1974, p. 504) and Lee Baxandall, in a review in *New German Critique, 3* (Fall, 1974, p. 174), raise passing doubts as to whether Goldmann's theory is genuinely Marxist. Solomon simply wonders if world views and tragic visions are not pre-Marxist concepts, and he excludes Goldmann from his mammoth anthology. Baxandall, complaining about the inclusion of Goldmann in Lang and Williams, eds., *Marxism and Art* (New York, 1972), suggests a political dimension, since for him homological emphasis implies ruling class ideological domination over the aesthetic patterns generated by particular classes. But the Communist Hobsbawm, the Trotskyist Mandel and the anti-Communist Lichtheim agree in seeing Goldmann as an important dissident Marxist theorist.

12. In French, see the biographical note by Annie Goldmann in Lucien Goldmann, *Situation de la critique racinienne* (Paris, 1971). For a brief circumstantial sketch in English, see Laurent Le Sage, *The French New Criticism* (Pennsylvania State University Press, 1967), p. 87.

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theory and practice while distancing himself from the only representative of the Left that held power, to maintain socialist hope in the midst of what he saw as the petrification of Marxist theory and extraordinary developments in the bourgeois social sciences. We can now understand Goldmann's fascination with Pascal's "yes and no" wager for salvation, his interest in the "tragic vision" of a group disillusioned with a state bureaucracy that counters hopes for a communal, harmonious world. From the beginning Goldmann rejects Marxist orthodoxy and implies that all valid Marxist developments are "revisionist." In his early years, he lay the groundwork for a theory emphasizing the development of mental structures generated by the situation of different classes and finding expression in literature and philosophy. His Marxism accented the ethical and aesthetic dimensions of the young Lukács, stressing totality, reification and potential consciousness, but hardly accepting any of the economic and political aspects of Lukács' work. His two years with Piaget gave him a theory for the way consciousness assimilates and adapts to material conditions, and enabled his Marxism to enter into dialogue and confrontation with Lévi-Strauss' structuralism, which came to dominate the social sciences in the late 1950s.[13]

The goal of Goldmann's later work is to rethink the standard Marxist view of the proletariat's revolutionary potential by the assimilation and transcendence of the New Left-Marcusean view of one-dimensionality and the structuralist view of history. He attempts to establish a continuity between his synthesis of Marx, Lukács and Piaget, and the Yugoslavian theme of self-management—especially as reformulated by Serge Mallet. Politically, this development involves a shift toward the Communist Party, then back to a "non-aligned" stance in the Cold War years, and then, in his last phase, back to a more overtly political position once again, in relation to the New Left in May 1968. This trajectory is firmly rooted in Goldmann's amalgamation of Austrian and Hungarian Marxism, and is essential for understanding his work.[14]

A reorganization of the concepts utilized in *Cultural Creation* indicates the book's inner logic and sets forth an advanced formulation of genetic structuralism. Thus the last article, "The Dialectic Today," shows how the dialectic emerges to oppose forms of reified bourgeois thought and to express tendencies toward revolutionary struggle in relation to given forms of state bureaucracy. For Goldmann, all bourgeois thought is positivist and dualist. Its dominant forms, Cartesian rationalism and English empiricism, combine in Enlightenment thought and find fulfillment first in 19th century positivism *per se* and then in the neo-positivism of contemporary structuralism. In the midst of these structures of domination, dialectics emerges in Pascal, but more so in certain Enlightenment tendencies culminating in the transition from Kant to Hegel and then Marx and Lukács, and most recently in genetic structuralism; in fact, dialectics emerges in groups crucially implicated in the economic and bureaucratic structures at stake in the uprisings of 1650, 1789, 1848, 1917 and 1968. The two main dialectical ideas formulated by Marx and Lukács are totality and a subject-object identity whose partial as opposed to total nature creates a space for praxis and implies that societies can never fully totalize themselves.

In the second article, Goldmann draws on Piaget to emphasize two tendencies

13. For Goldmann on Piaget and Marxism, see *Recherches dialectiques* (Paris, 1959), pp. 118-145.

14. Clearly it is the context for Goldmann that has not been adequately studied. Here we take Eric Hobsbawm's view as our guide: "The history of Marxism among intellectuals in the West is...largely the history of their relationship with the Communist Parties which replaced social democracy as the chief representative of Marxism." *Revolutionaries* (New York, 1973), p. 25.

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essential for the dynamism of historical structures: adaptation toward a given equilibrium and the going beyond of one equilibrium to a higher one. These two tendencies are based on praxis in the fifth article, in the course of establishing the relation of Goldmann's theory to modern forms of bourgeois thought—especially to structuralism and Althusser's efforts. Here Goldmann appeals to the concepts of totality and subject-object partial identity. The subjective aspect of history makes it impossible to establish a rigorous human science. But history without an active subject is not human history at all. While the individual subject in Freud and the later Sartre cannot account for the precisely structured relations among phenomena, Lévi-Strauss' and Althusser's "negation of the subject" cannot account for structural genesis. Nor can structuralists give any value to theory itself since for them, the subjective is only a structure homologous to what is, or is subject to a "relative autonomy" that leaves theory outside of the social totality. In either case, the relation of theory to reality and the possibility of its acting *on* reality are left in a limbo.

Goldmann shows how structuralism fails to deal adequately with functionality—the fact that structures are always in the process of structuration-destructuration, in relation to different groups' shifting functional needs. Thus, he attacks the structuralist interpretations of Marx's 1859 "Preface." The real point of Marx's "structural argument" is that certain groups struggle to maintain or overturn given structures because they function or don't function for their benefit. The question for Marxism, then, is to what an extent is a structure really dysfunctional, since a dysfunctional structure may be homologous or functionally related to a new total structure which has not yet been born. Here it becomes clear why Goldmann emphasizes mental and literary structures. In the first article, he stresses the Lukácsian distinction between real and potential consciousness in relation to modern communications theory. Whether messages are passed, distorted or blocked depends on the receiver group's relation to the social totality and its limits of thought and action. Group maximum potential consciousnes must be studied in each phase of capitalism, and especially the present one, when the capacity for imagining beyond the given seems eroded by capitalism's drive for one-dimensionality.

The fourth article shows how great philosophical and literary works are crucial in this study. As products of individuals whose role is to elaborate structural totalities of extreme unity and coherence, they tend to express the maximum potential consciousness of privileged groups. Goldmann's emphasis on the "inverse effect" of superstructure on base and on the depetrification of these very concepts is central to his critique of capitalism and particularly contemporary society with its mass media circuit of signs for consumption (as important a part of the totality as material production itself). In fact, Goldmann's thesis is that in a society of affluence, not economic rewards but humanistic, cultural ones, become fundamental to the struggle for socialism.

Thus, the very evocation of base-superstructure discourse signals the main trait of capitalism. The economic sector becomes autonomous and begins to dominate over the others, making them homologous or functionally related to production for the market. Formerly transcendental values become transferred to commodities and the ensemble of social life becomes impoverished. Consciousness enters into a process of gradual reification. Here we find a historicization of Goldmann's early themes. Originally, he had thought that world views were a constant occurrence in history and could be used as general conceptual instruments in genetic structural analysis. Gradually, he has come to see that his definition precluded their existing when, under

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capitalism, the inability to grasp the totality becomes a dominant trait.[15]

This is why in *Cultural Creation* world views are the fragmented pre-capitalist achievements of different groups aiming toward the lost equilibrium of the feudal world or the institution of a new world seen as one of communality and harmony. In the 20th century, this fragmentation process undermines class structures of consciousness; reality becomes opaque and atomized, and there are no longer significant groups directly concerned with totality. As world views lose their significance as conceptual tools, the analysis shifts to possible movement toward them. In Goldmann's theory, the very conditions leading to modern class divisions and world views and to the possibility of proletarian action can generate counter tendencies, so that the possibility of a revolutionary world view can be negated or displaced to other groups.

Finally, as capitalism affects structures of consciousness, it affects the literary works that express them. In fact, the relation between literature and society changes with capitalism. Previously, literary works were imaginary transpositions of world views related to a group's structure of maximum potential consciousness. They functioned to heighten group consciousness, and compensated for the frustrations created by a fragmented world. Under capitalism, the novel emerges as the dominant genre which is increasingly realistic, individualistic, and reified; thus, the novel cannot serve its old functions for groups because there is no totalizing collective consciousness to express or serve.

In pre-capitalist society, works could be tied to a revolutionary or oppositional group, but they were never an expression of the opposition between the individual and his group. With capitalism, the novel becomes just this medium for expressing the opposition of the bourgeois writer to the bourgeoisie. Subsequently, the novel begins to distance itself progressively from the bourgeois reality it initially attempts to imitate. Goldmann turns to the novel again and again, observing its development and mutations as a means of grasping "de-reification" and movements toward collective consciousness in the midst of the three stages of capitalism. Yet, while Goldmann frequently states that there are these three stages of capitalist history, this work and others point to four stages; i.e., a pre-capitalist or mercantilist capitalism precedes those stages he explicitly designates as liberal, monopoly, and finally organized capitalism.

Locating this period in France (1650-1789), Goldmann stresses the consolidation of the centralized state bureaucracy emerging from the uprisings expressive of the 17th century crisis. The bureaucracy organizes various social groups for political and economic growth: development of state-monopoly manufactures for an international market, capitalization of land holdings, transformation of dispossessed agriculturists into a disciplined work force to win and supply markets at home and abroad. The new order implies an advance for state-monopolist elites, a setback for others—mainly the landed and court nobilities, the *noblesse de robes* and what will become the revolutionary bourgeoisie.

These and other groups find ideological and artistic expression for their opposition to what may be described as a distorted form of Cartesianism justifying the Absolutist,

15. This transformation in Goldmann's theory is first developed in Goldmann's *Towards a Sociology of the Novel*, chapter 1. Its implications are best examined in Rodolphe Roelens, "Les avatars de la médiation dans la sociologie de Lucien Goldmann," *L'Homme et la société*, 15 (Jan.-Mar., 1970), pp. 295-316; also, in Rudolf Heyndels, "Vision du monde et réification (Réflexions sur la sociologie de littérature de Lucien Goldmann)," *Révue de l'Université de Bruxelles*, 1-2 (1974-75), pp. 593-619.

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mercantilist world view of those in power. The court world view is expressed in Gassendi and Molière; the legal nobility in Pascal and Racine. The bourgeoisie develops a neo-Cartesian Enlightenment world view in what becomes a struggle against Absolutism. The ideological struggles of the elites are also expressed in the transition of dominance from dramatic to narrative forms; the latter influence the former, turning them toward prose and bourgeois historicism, steadily asserting hegemony over them. Because of the incomplete and uneven development of capitalism in this period, neither the rural nor urban masses emerge as independent revolutionary forces with autonomous world views. Their discontent and uprisings largely serve bourgeois ends. The period closes with the Jacobin dictatorship, followed soon by Napoleon. In the latter, less and less freedom is possible—even though the dictatorship is objectively progressive, since it opposes the Ancien Régime and is founded on land distribution and support for the peasants. Displacing his focus to Germany, Goldmann points to a "tragic disillusionment" in the hopes that revolution would generate a community of transcendent freedom and totality—a world expressed in Kant and Schiller. The Revolution leads to a *dialectical* concern for freedom in relation to an order seen as necessary to achieve it. The question of ends and means, of freedom embodied in the authoritarian state, are set forth in Goethe and Hegel.[16] Similar questions will reemerge in 1917.

This period of liberal capitalism (1815-1917), is based on competition for profits in a world market, leading to constant revolutions in production and capital-labor struggles. Bourgeois culture is represented by a social layer, the "notables": independent and critical bourgeois intellectuals and leaders of political groups, including working class parties and unions. Their constituency consists of small and middle enterprise directors who are active enough to constitute the basis of parliamentary democracy. Thus, the notables bridge the gap between decision-makers and masses; they mediate the main contradictions between capitalist organization, which submerges all individuals, and the democratic character of the market, which seemingly emphasizes individual autonomy. Positivism conforms to the "objectivist" tendencies of this system; the novel now centers on contradictions between the objective and the subjective. Until Zola, the novel is the most complete representational form for liberal capitalism, essentially critical of the society generating it and presenting the failure of those who advocate socially engendered illusions of individual possibility. The typical liberal novel portrays a problematic hero accepting and rejecting certain crucial values of a "degraded" social order—values of which the hero is often unconscious and which he is prevented by his society from achieving. Thus, the novel projects a world simulating positivist reality: it demonstrates the failure of the individual under capitalism.

Finally, Goldmann points to the formation of complex bureaucratic structures in this period. There is a great development in the working class and it veers toward revolution in 1848 and 1871. But it is only potentially a revolutionary class, and this potentiality is progressively diverted through labor's own syndicalist victories (Lassalle and later the Second International leaders). The workers' movement thus led to the creation of unions and even political parties, a series of "counter-bureaucracies," which, while economically and politically integrating workers, fostered a counter-culture promoting a radically oppositional ideology of liberty and socialism and thus retarding workers' cultural and psychic integration with capitalism. But this counter-

16. Cf. "Goethe et la révolution française," *Récherches dialectiques*, pp. 211-28.

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culture was not enough to generate united opposition or prevent the capitulation of many socialists to the "Great War" of the imperialist powers.

What many Marxists had seen as the final crisis of capitalism turned out to be a period of transition. To be sure, it was a moment of great impact, involving a movement from the action of the individual entrepreneur to that of larger impersonal capitalist units, which brought about the World War I clash of nations and interests beyond the wishes or calculations of particular capitalists. One paradoxical aspect of the war period is the open integration of the European working class parties with existing state bureaucracies, and yet, within a short time, the revolutionary victory of a bureaucracy opposed to the existing state. The Leninist party is not a proletarian organization, but a revolutionary party of the Jacobin type which organized various discontent sectors and was determined by the strength of the internal and external opposition to the revolution. In the West, the war brought a disillusionment in individual possibilities and a veering either to revolutionary collective hope or toward those tendencies that eventually culminated in existentialism.

In monopoly capital (1917-1945), we find the development of all the tendencies emerging in the transitional period. The first phase, culminating with the depression, involves a search for political formulae to cope with the new economic vicissitudes. In the most advanced countries, this implies an effort to coopt worker opposition and the Left program, while in others we see the emergence of fascist dictatorial control. In Russia, the "Stalinist bureaucracy" parallels the "Napoleonic dictatorship." Its basis was the failure of revolution in the West and in China and the elimination of the Trotskyist and Bukharinist oppositions. For Goldmann, the formation of the Stalinist bureaucracy was a matter of an underdeveloped country which must either develop or collapse.

The situation is one of complete encirclement and economic crisis: the need is not to antagonize capitalist nations because revolution leads to counter-revolutionary unity. Thus, in the wake of fascism, the role of the party is not to throttle but *modulate* revolutionary action in relation to overall international conditions. The various national CP's throughout the world generally follow this policy while maintaining and developing the counter-cultural consciousness of the Second International period.[17] During this period, too, the old layer of notables begins to dissolve; with the increased bureaucratization and technologization of power, we have the further dissolution of the individual, an extension of the reification process, the growing hegemony of existentialist thought.

Goldmann points to efforts to generate novels dealing with collectivities (above all, the revolutionary group) as in Malraux. But because the collectivities are prevented from transforming society this form fails to become dominant. Instead, the clearly prevalent formal tendencies among the critical bourgeoisie culminate in the "existential" novel of Sartre and Camus. As socio-economic and political forces go beyond individual capacities to regulate them, the focus shifts on to death as the limit *par excellence*: a disillusionment with human possibilities and a general sense of futility. Thus the relation of the novel to exchange leads to its increased distancing from human mimesis and from group possibilities.

The imbalances of monopoly capitalism reach their paroxysm in World War II. The economy is revitalized; Keynesian regulatory devices are extended, and a new economic momentum begins to take effect. We enter a new stage of capitalism that

17. For the French PC counter community, see Annie Kriegel, *Les communistes françaises* (Paris, 1970).

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appears to eliminate all opposition. The socialist bloc and many Western European CP's have grown, but CP acton seems little different from its liberal opposition elsewhere, as it is conditioned by a struggle for accomodation and legitimacy in the midst of oppression from capitalist state bureaucracies. Economic boom, union achievements and Cold War dynamics combine to minimize opposition. Industrial crises diminish, and so do internal crises. During the first years of organized capitalism, pauperization seems successfully displaced to underdeveloped nations where life level differences are extreme and misery is evergrowing. Revolutionary struggle develops but will not register on the total system for some time.

But for vast numbers in the advanced countries, the rise in living standards has intensified the tendency toward social integration. The proletarian counter-culture still exists, workers still act when their interests are threatened, but as they achieve higher wages, their counter-culture is weakened, and they tend to identify their interests with those of capitalist expansion in which they participate. Thus, assumption of the pauperization of the masses seems disproved—and it is the Marxist thesis of growing reification which seems all too well demonstrated.

Characterized by self-regulation and structuration, organized capitalism occupies a special place in the drive toward ever-growing efficiency in the manipulation of consciousness and the integration of opposition. In this period of mass media and mass culture bourgeois ideologues, liberals and radicals concur in their picture of society either by celebrating or by mourning its emergence and the prospects for a long period of alienation. By the mid-1950s, one-dimensionality seems to cover the globe; and technocratic bureaucracy seems a dominating structure common to both capitalist and Soviet society.

The group of notables and the radical impact on public opinion they have mediated is suppressed. Society is divided into large numbers with relatively high incomes who are passive and used to following orders, and a relatively small number of technocratic experts who have access to the totality, are aware of mass behavior, and monopolize productive decisions, information, and consciousness. Even highly qualified technicians are left out of the decision-making process. The general effect is a great reduction of individual psychic life; people are divided into "illiterate specialists and non-specialists"—both subject to manipulation. Yet, for society to function, a minimum of intellectual life remains essential. The system needs intelligent but passive individuals. It wants ideal consumers and executors. Thus, the mechanisms of production and distribution are introduced into private life, into family structure and education, so that there is no room left for resistance. Television, movies, paperbacks, etc., "raise the cultural level" of the people. But at the same time, they maintain and promote conservative capitalist institutions and ideology by displacing active with passive consumption as required by commodity exchange.

Organized capitalism also displaces violence and domination away from those who participate in production to those who are marginal to it. The basic problem with the former group is the reentrenchment of consciousness leading to a reduction of their sense of the possible. If this continues, people will simply come to live a life completely organized and controlled. This is why Goldmann is interested in mass media in connection with cultural homologies created by the system and with the struggle between genuinely critical cultural production and pseudo-cultural integrationist production tied to market relations.

Thus, existentialism, as a last stand of individualist humanism, is eventually

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displaced by a brand of positivism which insists not on the autonomy of the individual but on the permanence of structures. Hence, the perfect historicity of structural linguistics, which reconceptualizes past and future by making them mirror images of the present provisional equilibrium. In literature, the dissolution of the hero reaches its extreme in Camus and passes over to the *nouveau roman*. Here, individuals disappear from their familiar universe: subordinated to things, they reappear in a stable world that is rigorously ahuman.

In this situation the tendencies of earlier stages find their fulfillment. The homology between art and society no longer passes through a group's collective consciousness because it is impossible to find a third homologous structure related to this level of consiousness. The work no longer represents the contact point between individual and collective consciousenss. What has happened is that the complete rupture with earlier bourgeois society is objectified in the novel as well as in non-figurative painting, modern film and language itself. This rupture eventually bursts the limits of the novel and in the late 1950s gives rise to the avant garde theater of absence whose content is the disappearance of all human community. The experience of the century is transposed to the imaginary: we end up in a closed absurd universe of incommunication and despair.

At every level, then, the first image organized capitalism expresses is one of the negation of possibility, with few glimpses into possible sources of opposition and change. Early Socialist writers had projected an oppositional humanistic culture tied to the development of a revolutionary proletariat. But Western societies have denied these possibilities by integrating the proletariat. Yet, in spite of the negative aspect of organized capitalism, Goldmann cannot share the pessimism generated by the Marcusean vision of one-dimensionality. This is why he searches within philosophy and literature for alternative possibilities. Thus, he scans Sartre's career to show how a dialectical collective current enters the work of an important writer and anticipates a parallel development in the collectivity this writer expresses.[18] Since Sartre passes beyond existentialism and toward Marxism through the study of Genet, Goldmann turns to Genet. In tracing the latter's development beyond the point of Sartre's biography, he comes to anticipate developments in literary structures that will move through and beyond Paris, 1968.

Just as the *nouveau roman* and the theater of absence are extreme expressions of non-opposition so two important counter-tendencies begin to emerge in them. First there is the formal revolt of a given art form which opposes present society and finds new modes of rejection; second, there is the theme of revolt in certain writers. The second tendency emerges most significantly in Genet's plays concerning which Goldmann develops his most remarkable analysis.[19] Since literature may still come to express emerging potential consciousness, Goldmann does not follow Lukács in opposing modernism, but continues to look for possibilities in it.

What he discovers in Genet's career is a replication of the movement out of the novel into the theater of absence, but then, tentatively, a movement beyond absence toward a theater of community. All of Genet's plays center on the struggle between the dominating and the dominated; but the sequence of his plays shows a movement from negation to tentative affirmation. Further, there is a still more complex relation

18. Cf. "Problèmes philosophiques et politiques dans le théâtre de Jean-Paul Sartre," in *Structures mentales*, and "Jean-Paul Sartre: Question de méthode," in *Marxisme*.

19. Cf. "Le théâtre de Genet" and "Microstructures dans les vingt-cinq répliques des 'Negres' de Jean Genet," in *Structures mentales*.

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between the successive plays and capitalist development: it is a movement from an internal European problematic (in *The Balcony*), followed by a displacement to the colonies (in *The Blacks* and *The Screens*).

Goldmann's analysis is more complex than this, though. There is a partial homology between *The Balcony* and the first stages of European capitalism. But there is a fuller homology between the arc projected in Genet's writings from *The Balcony* through *The Screens* and capitalist history as a whole. The significance of his work is that the problematic of his marginal *declassé* group (rejection, yet need of existing society—revolt, never revolution) becomes transposed in terms of a perspective which transforms the problematic itself and extends to other collectivities. *The Balcony* portrays an unstable corrupt world menaced by revolution and then reinforced by its negation. The image of the revolutionary as a "notable" is transferred to the Chief of Police whose enshrinement in the Hall of the Notables signals the end of the Notables, their displacement to an "underworld" and the confirmation of a total, enclosed system in which function, not identity, rules. This is the recapitulation of the movement from liberal to organized capitalism. The next two works are in the colonial underworld, where the equilibrium is maintained and yet threatened. *The Blacks* portrays a revolt that succeeds, but only on the imagined, ritual level. *The Screens* presents the realization of the imagined. Here we have three orders: (1) the world of exploitation; (2) the world of the victorious (one where the dominated win, but keep the state, i.e., it is not yet the ideal society); and (3) the world of the dead, i.e., a society resolving global contradictions. These stages correspond to a Marxist view of world transformation; their emergence in Genet's plays expresses shifts in the consciousness of some groups and fractions of classes, who, stirred by contradictions abroad and at home, are moving toward open rebellion against the repressive and alienating conditions of organized capitalism. They come to merge with and transform that shifting array of groups that constitute the radical left.

We approach the unfinished last stage of Goldmann's thought. Where Genet's plays are the poetry of Paris 1968, Goldmann's genetic structuralism is its philosophy. Here we come to the last article in *Cultural Creation*: Goldmann's analysis of resistances to the capitalist technocracy, originally read at Korčula three months before his death.

Goldmann tells us that in the 1960s, Marcuse's pessimistic theories were opposed by the Western theoreticians of self-management, Trentin, Foa, Mallet and Gorz. For them, new forms of opposition were developing out of the new state technocratic bureaucracy—especially the "new working class" of qualified workers, technicians, medium salaried levels, etc. According to Goldmann, this class could either accept or oppose capitalism: what was involved was a struggle to awaken class consciousness and actualize potentials. Now, looking at his former hopes and expectations for this group, Goldmann sees his earlier analysis as unilateral. First, technocrats themselves veer toward self-management in an effort to maintain capitalism. Since their old petty bourgeois and peasant base is disappearing, the problem is to find a new one. If it is to be the technicians, the technocrats will have to make concessions; and this time, wage increases will not suffice—if only because as revenues rise, their political importance declines. The technicians will demand something approaching self-management, and dominant groups flexible enough to survive will win compliance by allowing greater participation in the organization of production, though not self-management *per se*.

Elsewhere,[20] Goldmann uses the term co-management to describe a crucial compromise between capital and labor, hopefully a turning point in their struggle: a

20. Cf. *Marxisme*, p. 37.

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shared responsibility in which workers will learn how to manage and will push for increasingly radical and democratizing reforms only possible through a qualitative transformation of the system. But in the wake of 1968, Goldmann sees that even this modulated move toward self-management may fail to become revolutionary if it is relegated only to some sectors of the work force. It might simply mean "greater participation"—something quite conceivable for certain privileged sectors and implying not the death of capitalism, but its possible reinforcement through a further integration of technicians.

In his final formulation, Goldmann envisions revolutionary struggle as generated by a coalition of several groups: the traditional proletariat (many sectors of which had shown their non-integration in 1968), the petty-bourgeoisie, and the new layers: university people, the most radicalized sectors of the new working class, national minorities and the enormous mass of paupers engendered by the new technocratic society. Goldmann finally developed the notion of "co-management" because he saw that the Yugoslav model of self-management could not be applied directly to France.

But even in modified forms, how has self-management fared in varying contexts? In what ways does it actually counter the central bureaucracies of the USSR and elsewhere? Goldmann rejects what he understands as the Trotskyist and Maoist models of development, as well as the Soviet—though he does recognize the needs which Stalin's bureaucracy served, why it came into existence, etc. Yugoslav self-management was supposed to challenge these models, to provide control and development for and by the workers themselves. Yet, Yugoslav self-management has moved toward capitalist development: anarchy and disequilibrium of production, extended differentiation between town and country, rich and poor, etc.[21] Even official Yugoslav bureaucratic apologists recognize the need to modify current self-management procedures to struggle against the reification generated by technological rationality and hierarchization.[22] In Western Europe and the U.S., the struggles for workers' control have presupposed the industrial system as the framework for social struggles and have mainly served "to ameliorate the most authoritarian aspects of corporate management of the workplace. . .[that] do not transcend the structure itself."[23] Here we come full circle: self-management ends up creating those very aspects of bureaucracy it was trying to avoid in the first place. The same would hold for France itself.

While economic boom persisted after May 1968, Pompidou put forth a pseudo-version of co-management to make capitalist domination more palatable. Simultaneously the revivified SP and the CP sought to incorporate students and the middle strata by making the self-management and life-style themes of the May movement part of their Common Program of 1972.[24] In the process, they watered down these themes and led many New Left groups to see them as mere window dressing to be cut from the program the second they caused problems. At the same time, these New Left groups did not have any workable alternatives. The closest they

21. See Bill McBride, "Philosophy in Yugoslavia: An Update," in *Radical Philosophers' Newsjournal*, Vol. 4 (1975), pp. 23, 23-26, and Svetozar Stojanovic, "From Post-Revolutionary Dictatorship to Socialist Democracy," in *Praxis* (1973).

22. Cf. Stane Dolanc, "Self-Management—Motto of Modern Man," and Vladimir Milic, "The Technocratic Nature of Capitalism," in *Socialist Thought and Practice* 14:4 (April, 1974), and McBride, *op.cit.*

23. Cf. Stanley Aronowitz, *False Promises* (New York, 1973), p. 425.

24. *Programme Commun de gouvernement du parti communiste et du parti socialiste*, introducton by Georges Marchais (Paris, 1972).

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came was the LIP strike of 1973.

Led by the PSU-oriented Confederation Française Démocratique du Travail, which was aligned with the left wing of the SP, the LIP strike showed that self-management could still serve as a rallying cry and goal of workers' struggles in a country with a strong and growing left base. In the end, of course, the strike seems to have shown how a capitalist government and its international connections (LIP was partly Swiss) could throttle even a genuine mass and mass-party supported move toward self-management unless the party base and alliances have grown strong enough to support or defend worker gains—unless the movement extends beyond the boundaries of one particular segment of production in the isolated factory.

A fuller critique of Goldmann[25] would have to deal with his overall view of the stages of capitalism and the relation of reification, bureaucracy and cultural creation to these stages (which correspond roughly to Immanuel Wallerstein's periodization.[26] Goldmann's book is weakest on bureaucracies and their relation to different social totalities; and yet this is essential to his view of capitalist history and the very concept of self-management.[27] Moreover, Goldmann should have provided a better conceptualization of the dependency or relative autonomy of different global sectors. What is missing is a rich grasp of the complexity of capitalist interactions, contradictions and mediations. Specifically, Goldmann seems to have little sense of what Wallerstein calls the intermediary, semi-peripheral countries and their relation both to central and peripheral sectors.[28]

It is not that Goldmann is "blind to the Third World," nor is he unable to see that theories formulated for under-developed sectors cannot be applied elsewhere. The impact of Cuba, Algeria, and Vietnam on French intellectuals in the 1960s was enormous and even inordinate (given the crude mimicry or worship of Che *et al.*).[29] In fact, the chronological ordering of the six essays of *Cultural Creation* shows how the Third World enters from parenthesis to subclause to mainclause in Goldmann's thought.

Another major gap exists between Goldmann's theoretico-political scheme and his concept of "totality." Basing himself on the party politics he knew, Goldmann

25. It would be interesting to criticize Goldmann's interpretation of the development of the novel (see Alan Swingewood, *The Novel and Revolution* [London, 1976]), or to compare his developmental stages with, say, Fredric Jameson's extrapolations based on Deleuze and Guattari's *L'Anti-Oedipe: Capitalisme et Schizophrénie* (in "Beyond the Cave: Demystifying the Ideology of Modernism," *Bulletin of the Midwest Modern Language Association*, Vol. VIII [Spring, 1975]).

26. Cf. Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World System* (New York, 1974), pp. 10-11.

27. For a still further development of this theme by Goldmann, see his posthumous article, "Révolution et bureaucratie," in *L'Homme et la société*, 21 (July-Sept., 1971), pp. 77-95.

28. These perspectives may be related to a further difference between Wallerstein and Goldmann schemas: Goldmann fails to see Wallerstein's first stage (1450-1640) as capitalist at all. This may account for his underplaying of the underdeveloped agricultural sectors in his "global" totalization. There may be a relation between this apparently narrow view of capitalism itself (is capitalism tied to the existence of large industry alone?) and the weaknesses in the treatment of bureaucracy in Goldmann's work. For Wallerstein bureaucratic organization is crucial to the question of development under mercantilism or modern socialist conditions: in both cases, it is a matter of the organization needed for development. Cf. Wallerstein's article, "The Rise and Future Demise of the World Capitalist System: Concepts for Comparative Analysis," in *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, XVI:4 (September, 1974).

29. Cf. Carlos P. Mastrorilli and Fernando Alvarez, *Marcuse, Sartre, Nizan, Gorz y el Tercer Mundo* (Buenos Aires, 1969). See also Tom Good's review of three books by Régis Debray, in *Telos*, 25 (Fall, 1975), pp. 233-238.

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contrasts two possible viable peaceful transitions to socialism: the parliamentary-bureaucratic route of the CP and the supposed syndicalist-anti-bureaucratic route of the PS. It is not clear that either one alone represents a more adequate left politics than the other; nor that their combination today (something which Goldmann should have, but apparently did not envision) could constitute a workable means toward socialism. It is still debatable if the failure of Paris 1968 is because of the CP's inability to have set in motion a "politics to grip the masses," or if the failure is traceable not so much to "party revisionism, bureaucratic self-serving or a narrow conception of the proletariat."[30] One of the main reasons for the May movement's collapse was a lack of left unity and cooperation. And this unity is precisely what is being attempted today. By 1974, many PSU holdovers had joined Mitterand's PS which, as early as 1972, joined the CP in the electoral Common Program to constitute the most viable left politics in Europe.

The extreme left may or may not be justified in its doubts of CP intentions or ability to implement anything. But in a situation increasingly dominated by a right-left polarization, what other possibilities are there for any move toward socialism in the foreseeable future?[31] And what else can minority groups do but give critical support and serve as a pressure force working to bolster and extend the most democratic and revolutionary aspects of the CP-SP coalition? In recent months, the New Left has had its most significant effect in turning the coalition toward the questions of minorities, women, etc. The CP in particular has strengthened its emphasis on these issues and has advocated democratic and even cultural themes—including "all the liberties which are the fruit of the great democratic bourgeois revolution."[32] It has sought to avoid any position which would cause a loss of broad left support. It joined the Italian and Spanich CP's in asserting the possibility and desirability of a democratic transition to socialism, and deploring the Portuguese CP's disrespect for the electoral process. It strained against the CPSU line for greater "bolshevik militancy";[33] simultaneously, it protected its militant wing and sought to avert the recent SP tendency to win left support and then move toward a right coalition[34]—all this by stressing the need for not only supporting but encouraging LIP-style workers' strikes, at Rateau and elsewhere.[35]

30. On the issue of spontaneity, see Gorz, "May '68 and the Limits of Spontaneity," in *Socialism and Revolution* (New York, 1973), pp. 36-43; also Hobsbawm, *op.cit.*, pp. 29-30, 82-91, 234-244, and Ronald Tiersky, *French Communism 1920-1972* (New York, 1974), pp. 349-400. On the vast literature on May 1968 and CP motivations and actions, see, in addition to the works cited above, Andrew Feenberg, "The May Events," in *The New Scholar*, 4:1, pp. 51-7 651-76.

31. Tiersky quotes Mitterand: "One may doubt the sincerity of communist intentions, but to found a political strategy on the intentions one imputes to others makes no sense. What is important is to create conditions which make these others act as if they were sincere," *op.cit.*, p. 400.

32. Cf. the joint declaration of the Italian and French CP chiefs, Berlinguer and Marchais, November, 1975.

33. Cf. Marchais' address to the CP Central Committee, April 15, 1975, presented in *L'Humanité*, April 17, 1975.

34. In February, 1976, the Marchais faction calling for "Communism under the French colors," won a vote of confidence at the national congress of the French CP. This implies a loss for Roland Leroy's "dictatorship of the proletariat" line, which had been gaining support in 1975. On the whole business as a "reformist, bourgeois line" whose triumph was a result of years of manipulation, etc., etc., see *The Guardian* (March 3, 1976), p. 13.

35. French strikes and moves toward self-management are discussed glowingly in Mary Polin's "Fightback in France," an article appearing in none other than *The Daily World* (October 30, 1975—magazine edition), p. M-2.

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This unstable situation points to limits in Goldmann's vision. Thus, while he sees a possible union between the new working class and other groups, he fails to indicate that the very conditions which give these groups their potential for radical unity are also the basis for deep divisions among them. He fails to account for the fact that the entry of minorities implies increased hierarchization along ethnic lines and thus increased tensions—approximating within the French context the situation which Aronowitz describes for the U.S. work force.[36] In France, although those remaining in the PSU have criticized the Common Program for underplaying the minority issue, only the "revisionist" CGT has been able to attract significant numbers of immigrants, cut into the capitalist engendered work divisions and thus build a bridge to the rest of the French workers and even working class and new working class sectors of the PS base. But Goldmann himself leaves us with this chasm which he abstractly hopes will be closed, while the chasm between parties falls away in the wake of European economic crisis.

We are approaching the core of the Goldmannian problematic: the nexus between a practice that must embody theoretical bases and a theory that must crystallize practice. Goldmann has rejected Althusser's rigid, mechanistic conception of social structuration based on a clear break between base and superstructure. He has also rejected Marcuse's notion of bindings between the "sensual essence" of cultural products and economic reality, as indeterminate and insignificant in modern society, and of praxis as generated not so much by capitalist structural relations as by a biological, libidinal rebellion against them. In contrast, Goldmann asserts that the struggle is to maintain links between productive and social relations, prevent base and superstructure from becoming rigid antinomies reflecting or having little relation with each other and generating no contradictions. Just as his effort is to go beyond CP and non-aligned New Left positions, so his effort is to transcend the closed energy system models implicit in both Althusser and Marcuse. Thus he appropriates Piaget's approach to equilibrium construction to conceptualize a passage from structural determinism or non-structural voluntarism to structured praxis. And thus he finds the sources of opposition to capitalism as stemming from disequilibrium generated by the system itself, along with values surviving from less alienating days—the merging of these with partial glimpses of a possible alternative future seen in socialist countries and in certain features of capitalism itself.

While this seems a reasonable starting point, it provides no principles for determining even the relative efficacy of oppositional tendencies. Piaget's theory does not seem to achieve full dialectical status, and does not necessarily bridge the gap between mental and material activity, theory and practice. We are led to the possibility that genetic structuralism remains either too mechanistic or too vague.[37]

Goldmann's acceptance of capitalist domination (homology) prior to an effort to plot oppositions may point to that "lack of imagination" he finds in other Marxists, and to a theory which, like the social class it most represents, is unable to grasp reality adequately or transcend its limits into the realm of genuinely revolutionary formulation. Genetic structuralism may not have the means to overcome the theoretical

36. Even without referring to the current growing importance of minorities and women which Feenberg stresses in his article, Hobsbawm emphasizes the "secular divisions among Frenchmen—even those who 'ought' to be on the same side... The aim of the French left has always been to become a movement of both workers and intellectuals at the head of the nation. The problem of the Comunist Party has arisen largely from the extreme difficulty of achieving this ancient Jacobin object in the mid-twentieth century."

37. The first charge is in Weimann, "French Structuralism," *op.cit.*, p. 449.

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effects of the capitalism and structuralism it attempts to transcend. From our vantage point, then, Goldmann's genetic structuralism appears not as a new form of Marxism, but as a last expression of a form whose major merit was to preserve the basis for future creative theorization through the hard times of Stalin. Too much a product of the historical moment, it cannot fully grasp the present and future. Genetic structuralism seems an uncritical reflection of Goldmann's own situation as a member of a new working class still carrying the ideological baggage of its petty bourgeois past, and too much subject to dominant capitalist structures to constitute an independent force. Thus, as praxis, the theory is abstract in being uncritical of its own genesis; as theoretical product it does not overcome this abstract praxis which forces certain connections instead of investigating the mediations they evidence. Finally, there is the academic drift to his work which tends toward a privileged subjectivization of the subject-object unity and an at least partial insulation of revolutionary impulses from the bombardment of daily reality.

These problematics may originate in the isolation of that group with the greatest access to Marxist culture from the other sectors of society which may be capable of transforming society. Goldmann joins other intellectuals in attempting to validate the role of the intelligentsia to counter both uncritical spontaneity and the popular use of Leninism to justify extreme pseudo-revolutionary and macho posturing. The danger is that while avoiding a fetishization of the proletariat, intellectuals come to see themselves too uncritically as the subject (almost the only one) of the revolutionary process. The risk is in an intellectual subjectivism and elitism which, along with spontaneity, Goldmann correctly saw as dominant tendencies in the 1960s.

To the degree that these reservations apply to our situation today, they must be made, but also carefully qualified since they may invite the anti-intellectualism so pervasive and destructive in the Left since the late 1960s. While granting that the division of labor and institutional structures have variously determining effects on the activity of the theorist, we should also see with Goldmann that theory is a part of this overall practical social milieu. Goldmann's situation structures certain limitations into his approach. Ironically, we might find insufficient methodological abstraction on his part—i.e., an abstractionism based on what too readily emerges behind the phenomenally given and thus unable to discover the latent and not yet fully born that he so much sought. In this respect, the middle strata's potential to integrate with or oppose capitalism (as well as the degree of distortion which comes with institutionalized intellectual privileges) constitute the key questions. But at least Goldmann has the virtue of speaking to these questions, of raising, if not answering them, and of elevating the quest to new levels.

1970 marks the year of Goldmann's death and the end of his effort to extend genetic structuralism. While the project did not succeed in his lifetime, its importance is shown in his ongoing struggle to grasp society, his drive to overcome the bourgeois subject-object split in reality as well as in theory. It is shown in the continued efforts of Mallet until his death in 1973, and in the continuing activity of all those whose efforts may be related to Goldmann's life work. Just as Goldmann's work enables us to see his own limitations in our context, so it enables us to see its value as an effort to confront the difficulties and seek the means for grasping the deepest issues of his own time. *Cultural Creation* cannot tell us precisely what he would have said about the capitalist world today. But by providing us with glimpses into his final totalization, it enables us to see the value of his successes and failures for the future.

Ileana Rodriguez and Marc Zimmerman

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Robert William Fogel and Stanley L. Engerman, *Time on the Cross: The Economics of Negro Slavery*. Little, Brown & Co.: New York, 1974. 186 pages.

Eugene D. Genovese, *Roll Jordan Roll: The World the Slaves Made*. Pantheon: New York, 1974, 823 plus xxii pages.

1974 was a boom year for American slave historiography, a year which saw the publication of two new reinterpretations of the Afro-American experience under slavery: Fogel's and Engerman's *Time on the Cross: The Economics of Negro Slavery*,[1] and Genovese's *Roll Jordan Roll: The World the Slaves Made*. Both works were received with great fanfare, not only by the academic community, but also by the popular press which published condensed versions of each for popular consumption. Considering the somewhat tranquilizing message of these two works, such popular attention is not surprising. Both preach similar sermons—sermons that purport to restore Black pride in the slave experience, eradicate White guilt concerning the "peculiar institution" and, at the same time, allow the South to transcend its identity as a backward section of the country. For historians these works represent an attack on traditional interpretations of the slave experience as well as an attempt to utilize new data and methods in American slave historiography. However, what is most significant and has thus far been overlooked in analyses of these works, is that their reinterpretations of slavery converge on a number of points which may influence and legitimate current U.S. social policies towards Blacks and the poor. Consequently, this review is not concerned with establishing the truth or validity of what these works have to say about slavery, or the primacy of one interpretation over another; rather, our concern is mainly with the social functions that these works may perform in the context of present socio-historical realities.

Time on the Cross has received by far most of the critical attention,[2] since the authors chide historians for their humanistic and ideological biases, which allegedly can only be corrected if history is done in the universal scientific language of mathematics.[3] Thus, *Time on the Cross* is based on new mathematical and statistical "techniques, and hitherto neglected sources" whose conclusions contradict "the most important propositions in the traditional portrayal of the slave system" (p. 4). As economic historians, Fogel and Engerman are concerned first and foremost with the

1. This work is actually two separate volumes, the first containing "in as nontechnical a manner as possible" the author's principle findings, the second presenting their defense of method, statistical formulae, graphs and charts, and a scathing critique of previous slave historiography. Cf. Robert William Fogel and Stanley L. Engerman, *Time on the Cross: Evidence and Methods—A Supplement* (Boston, 1974). We will deal only with the first volume, since the second is significant only for specialists interested in methods and sources.

2. The critical discussions of *Time on the Cross* are voluminous. Particularly important are the following: Herbert G. Gutman, *Slavery and the Numbers Game: A Critique of Time on the Cross* (Urbana, 1975); Paul A. David *et al.*, *Reckoning with Slavery: Critical Essays in the Quantitative History of American Negro Slavery* (New York, 1975); and "Symposium on *Time on the Cross*," in *Explorations in Economic History*, Vol. 12 (Fall, 1975). Surprisingly, the most venomous attacks come not from traditional historians, who were likewise scathingly criticized by Fogel and Engerman, but from historians who are themselves committed to the cliometric paradigm. For an excellent summary of how *Time on the Cross* has failed to withstand the onslaught of criticism, see Thomas L. Haskell, "The True and Tragical History of *Time on the Cross*," *New York Review of Books*, 22:15 (October 2, 1975), pp. 33-39.

3. Fogel and Engerman, *Time on the Cross: Evidence and Methods—A Supplement*, *op.cit.*, p. 4.

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economy of slavery. In particular, they seek to demonstrate the economic vitality of the slave South and the rationality of the slave-holding class in its pursuit of profit within a capitalist economy. The trading of slaves was not an irrational system kept alive by men "who failed to perceive or were indifferent to their best economic interest" (p. 4); rather, it represented a highly profitable investment which yielded rates of return comparable with the best investment opportunities in manufacturing. But what is genuinely new in this work is what Fogel and Engerman have to say about slave behavior and beliefs and how they were shaped by the economic system of which they were a part. As a number of observers have noted, Fogel's and Engerman's crucial theme concerns the establishment of "the record of Black achievement under slavery."[4] The hero is the hard-working, diligent, and productive slave whose greatest merit lies in his or her ability to internalize the master's Protestant Ethic. As a ratonal and paternal master, the slaveholder provided the incentives for such behavior, ranging from small pecuniary rewards to mobility within the system, e.g., advancement from the fields to more skilled positions that entailed more freedom and control. In a nutshell: "Sambo...was really a black Horatio Alger, made so by his owner, who was nothing more than a rational profit-maximizer whose everyday decisions were determined by the powerful imperatives of the free market."[5] In other words, the economics of slavery affected both master and slave in such a way that the supposed cruelties of slavery—for example, substandard material conditions, the breaking up of slave families—were tempered by a market which made the pursuit of profit more important than the pursuit of any self-indulgence on the part of the master.

Genovese's work has received far less attention, but its influence on slave historiography may be far more pervasive.[6] *Roll Jordan Roll* is meant to be the story of how under slavery, Blacks had to "struggle to survive spiritually as well as physically—to make a livable world for themselves and their children within the narrowest living space and harshest adversity" (p. xvi). Genovese is well aware that master and slave are so interconnected as to make any discussion of one impossible without the other.[7] He

4. Gutman, *op.cit.*, p. 5.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 1.

6. *Roll Jordan Roll* has become the Marxist rebuttal to *Time on the Cross*. The left has uncritically accepted Genovese's analysis while flogging *Time on the Cross*. Cf. Sarah Elbert, "Good Times on the Cross: A Marxian Review" and Elizabeth Fox-Genovese, "Poor Richard at Work in the Cotton Fields: A Critique of the Psychological and Ideological Presuppositions of *Time on the Cross*" both in *Review of Radical Political Economy*, 7:3 (Fall, 1975). Likewise, academic liberals have also embraced Genovese's "Marxist" interpretation while fleeing the implications of *Time on the Cross*. Exemplary of this is C. Van Woodward's review of both *Time on the Cross* and *Roll Jordan Roll*. Woodward is skeptical of Fogel and Engerman's findings but also pleasantly surprised by these two economists who, armed with statistical methods, have produced a controversial yet cogent tract on Negro slavery. Cf. "The Jolly Institution," *New York Review of Books*, 21:7, May 2, 1974, p. 306. But ultimately, Woodward buys Genovese's "Marxist" analysis of slavery: "If this is a fair sample of Marxist history (and alas I am afraid it is not) then American historiography could do with a good bit more of it." Cf. "Seeing Slavery Whole," *New York Review of Books*, 21:15, October 3, 1974, p. 21. Critical reviews of Genovese's work are hard to come by, and those in circulation remain unpublished. An excellent critique is William E. Perkins' "The World Genovese Made: Marxism without Marx, Slave Culture without Slaves," presented at the National Caucus of Black Political Scientists, Washington, D.C., 1975.

7. Genovese's work cannot be understood independently of his other books on slavery and the slaveholding class. See his *The Political Economy of Slavery: Studies in the Economy and Society of the Slave South* (New York, 1961); and *The World the Slaveholders Made: Two Essays in*

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sees slavery as inextricably connected with the ideology of paternalism, and thus he begins with a discussion of its foundations. Paternalism implied a certain equality in a situation that was obviously unequal. It referred to a system of "mutual obligations" that bound both slave and master in a community where all "found some measure of self-interest and self-respect" (p. 6). Although defined from above (by the slaveholding class), paternalism left some room for Blacks to assert their own humanity. The crucial fact for paternalism was that "it created a tendency for the slave to identify with a particular community through its identification with its master" (p. 6). If this blunted the slaves' ability to assert themselves, this thrust was countered during the times when slaves worshipped freely, created a family life, and participated in their own social activities: i.e., while slaves forged a culture. Genovese's work is filled with moving accounts of how slaves fashioned "weapons of defense" such as religion to counter the system's tendency toward dehumanization.[8]

For Genovese the slaveholding class used paternalism to temper the system and maintain hegemony. In his discussion of "The Hegemonic Function of the Law," Genovese observes that the judicial system is not only the expression of class interest but may also "become an instrument by which the advanced section of the ruling class imposes its viewpoint upon the class as a whole and the wider society. The law must discipline the ruling class and guide and educate the masses" (p. 27). For example, while setting the limits to slaves' punishments the law served to keep in line those sections of the ruling class which seemed too concerned with self-interest and not enough with the interest of collective society. Elsewhere, Genovese argues that "In the Name of Humanity and the Cause of Reform," slaves' material conditions were better than those of slaves in the Caribbean and Brazil, that the length of the slaves' working day seemed comparable to that of European proletariats, and that the whip was used far less than one might suspect.[9]

According to Genovese, Blacks responded to paternalism by claiming certain rights and, when possible, transforming those rights into living space which allowed the development of a greater degree of self-determination. But in so doing, slaves implicitly asserted the legitimacy of the very relation, thus strengthening precisely that dependence they were trying to break. Caught in this dialectic, Blacks went on to establish a family, a social life, work patterns, religion, language, occupational roles, and other aspects of their existence that were accommodations to the paternalistic system and at the same time attempts to break out of that system. Genovese seeks to explain how Blacks both accommodated and resisted paternalism by forging a culture that is a product of both African and Southern society.

Although it will be necessary to consider these works in more detail, this brief overview should make it clear that *Time on the Cross* and *Roll Jordan Roll* share a common perspective: both view the milder side of slavery. Both accounts see Blacks as

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Interpretation (New York, 1971). The evolution of his thought on the slaves themselves is recorded in the two essays "American Slaves and Their History" and "The Legacy of Slavery and the Roots of Black Nationalism" both reprinted in *In Red and Black: Marxian Explorations in Southern and Afro-American History* (New York, 1971), pp. 102-128 and pp. 129-157.

8. As Perkins points out, "tendency" is a very important word in Genovese's analysis, for paternalism fostered certain tendencies among both master and slave, which were in the last analysis dependent upon the slaveholder's conscious attempt to maintain hegemony in a pre-capitalist society. Cf. Perkins, *op. cit.*, pp. 9-10.

9. Citing one of the better known masters, "The harsh Bennet H. Burrow of Louisiana," Genovese estimates that he used his whip more than most, which meant that "...his slaves averaged one whipping a month and many only one a year" (p. 64).

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successfully accommodating to a dehumanizing system and forging a Black culture as a result of factors ranging from the dictates of the market to the needs of the slaveholding class to maintain hegemony. Why is this type of analysis being developed in the 1970s? What are its implications? Obviously, intellectual work does not take place in a vacuum. Historical work is particularly responsive, albeit unconsciously in most cases, to pressures from social and political sources. Thus, in shedding light on these sources, we may speak of the "politics" of slave historiography. What is most important, for the present purposes, is how history is received and used, regardless of the intended aims of historians. But in order to attempt to socio-historically locate this latest interpretive perspective and its latent political functions, it is necessary to briefly investigate the historicity of slave historiography itself.

When most reviewers spoke of *Time on the Cross* and *Roll Jordan Roll* as challenging the "traditional interpretation," few bothered to specify the nature of that interpretation. Upon closer examination, it turns out that the traditional interpretation of slave historiography is not one unitary whole, but rather two competing accounts which can be designated as the "pro-slavery argument" and the "neo-abolitionist argument." Both held sway in identifiable historical periods: the "pro-slavery argument" can be dated from 1910 to the mid-1940s, while the "neo-abolitionist argument" held its own for a shorter period ranging from about 1944 to the mid-1960s.

The pro-slavery argument begins with Phillips' work, which for over a quarter of a century stood as the definitive account of Southern slavery.[10] The thrust of his work was to intellectually demolish the abolitionist critique of slavery. As a Southerner, Phillips had another story to tell—a story backed by the most thorough research yet conducted on Southern slavery. Yet, this work was informed by one basic assumption: the innate inferiority of Blacks. Every shred of Phillips' evidence was associated with this racist assumption, which explains his sympathetic account of the old regime.

Phillips' main focus was on the material conditions of slaves, since the abolitionist critique of slavery had erred precisely on this point. The abolitionist had argued that slaves were kept on the brink of starvation while living in sub-standard living conditions. According to Phillips, slavery was not the inhumane system pictured by the abolitionist. Given the slaves' inherently inferior character, the conditions under which they lived were more than adequate. Also according to Phillips, reports of cruelty were overdrawn; for every act of "injustice, oppression, brutality and heartburning" there were also "gentleness, kind-hearted friendship and mutual loyalty to a much greater degree than abolitionists could ever believe."[11] Allegedly, slavery "was less a business than a life," the main concern of which was racial control. In arguing this, Phillips downgraded the economic value of slavery, noting that "it made fewer fortunes than it made men." He was particularly impressed with the plantation system which allowed Whites to bring culture to heathens and served as "the best schools yet invented for the mass training of that sort of inert and backward people, which the bulk of American negroes represented."[12] As Elkins put it, Phillips' "emphasis is on the genial side of the regime, on cheerfulness and contentment, on the profoundly human relationships between paternal master and his faithful and childlike blacks."[13] These themes do not disappear, but return in very similar ways in

10. Ulrich B. Phillips, *American Negro Slavery* (New York, 1918).
11. *Ibid.*, p. 514.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 343.
13. Stanley M. Elkins, *Slavery: A Problem in American Institutional and Intellectual Life* (New York, 1959), p. 11.

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all later works on slavery—including *Time on the Cross* and *Roll Jordan Roll.*

Phillips' work did not usher in a new era in the South, but rather provided an intellectual rationale for existing relations between Black and White. The Great Compromise of 1877 had left the South free to create its own social system, the only stipulation being no re-institution of slavery. It is not surprising that during this period racism reached its zenith, serving as an important means for Southerners to reassert their domination over Blacks through legal and extra-legal forces such as Ku Klux Klan terror. Even with slavery officially dead in the South, Blacks were kept economically and socially subservient within a "peonage" system which resembled slavery in all but its name.[14] By 1910, "Jim Crow" laws had legally separated the races in the South.[15] Thus, rather than promote a new brand of politics, Phillips' interpretation of slavery merely endorsed past and present policies for the future.

During the next two decades Phillips' hegemony in the field of American slavery increased. A number of his students produced state studies of slavery patterned after his *American Negro Slavery.*[16] Yet dissenting views were heard, if only faintly, in the historical profession. Eventually the devastating critiques that led to Phillips' downfall came from three main sources: Blacks who pointed out that Phillips' view left out the most important participant in slavery, the Blacks themselves;[17] sociological and anthropological data that dismissed Phillips' basic assumption of the genetic inferiority of Blacks;[18] and Hofstadter's critique.[19] What eventually destroyed Phillips' work was the most evident yet unspoken aspect of it: his racism. According to Hofstadter, a "materially different version of the slave system" would emerge if and when scholars with different biases would subject "the system to a similarly intensive study."[20] His challenge to future scholars was to undertake studies from the "viewpoint

14. The horrors of peonage faced most black farm workers, whether officially or in their capacity as so-called free laborers. The Assistant Attorney General's report in 1908 made this very clear: "I have no doubt...that the chief support of peonage is the peculiar system of State laws prevailing in the South, intended evidently to compel services on the part of the working man. From the usual condition of the great mass of laboring men where these laws are enforced to peonage is but a step at most. In fact, it is difficult to draw a distinction between the condition of a man who remains in service against his will, because the State has passed a certain law under which he can be arrested and returned to work, and the condition of a man on a nearby farm who is actually made to stay at work by arrest and actual threats of force under the same law." Cited in W.E.B. Dubois, *Black Reconstruction in America: 1860-1880* (New York, 1970), p. 696.

15. C. Vann Woodward, *The Strange Career of Jim Crow* (London, 1955).

16. Examples of the Phillip's school include Rosser H. Taylor, *Slaveholding in North Carolina: An Economic View* (Chapel Hill, 1926); Ralph B. Flanders, *Plantation Slavery in Georgia* (Chapel Hill, 1933); Charles S. Snydor, *Slavery in Mississippi* (New York, 1933).

17. The father of Negro History, Carter G. Woodson noted early in a review of Phillip's *American Negro Slavery* that Phillips may have adequately dealt with the economics of slavery, but that he had faltered through "his inability to fathom the Negro mind." Cf. *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, Vol. V (March, 1919), p. 48. In another review, he prefigures later attempts at writing about slavery when he noted that *American Negro Slavery* "lacks proportion in that it deals primarily with the slaves as property in the cold-blooded fashion that the southerners usually bartered them away. Very little is said about the blacks themselves, seemingly to give more space to the history of whites, who profited by their labor, just as one would in writing a history of the New England fisheries saying very little about the species figuring in the industry, but more about the life of the people participating in it..." *Journal of Negro History*, Vol. IV (January, 1919), pp. 102-103.

18. The principal formulation of this view is found in Gunnar Myrdal, *An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy* (New York, 1944).

19. Richard Hofstadter, "U.B. Phillips and the Plantation Legend," *Journal of Negro History*, Vol. XXIX (April, 1944), pp. 103-124.

20. *Ibid.*, p. 122.

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of modern cultural anthropology," and with the assumption "that any history of slavery must be in large part from the standpoint of the slave."[21] This laid the groundwork for the development of the neo-abolitionist argument, an argument which cannot be fully understood independently of a new set of socio-historical conditions requiring a very different attitude toward the descendants of the "peculiar institution."

Systematically displaced by the industrialization of Southern agriculture after World War One, Blacks kept moving to Northern urban centers in growing numbers. Yet, only the outbreak of World War Two and its urgent need for manpower precipitated the limited integration of Blacks into sectors of society previously closed to most of them. Post-World War Two prosperity along with the demands of more militant Blacks consolidated these slight gains. What followed, of course, was an assault on several fronts—legal, social, and economic—that culminated in the historic *Brown vs. the Topeka Board of Education* decision that ruled *de facto* segregation unconstitutional. The neo-abolitionist argument concerning slavery was therefore developed not only in reaction to Phillips and the pro-slavery argument, but also, and more importantly, in response to the need of U.S. capitalism in its monopoly stage to integrate Blacks into the northern working class.

The neo-abolitionist argument was fully developed by Stampp's work which, as one observer has noted, represents the "culmination" and "quintessence" of the anti-Phillips reaction.[22] Although self-consciously written as a rebuttal of the Phillips position, it was also an elaboration, since it raised few, if any, questions that Phillips had not already endeavored to answer. What differentiates Stampp from Phillips is his reconstruction of "abolitionist fervor," along with his assumption of the basic irrelevance of race. As he put it: "I have assumed that the slaves were merely ordinary human beings, that innately Negroes *are*, after all, only white men with black skins, nothing more, nothing less. This gives quite a new and different meaning to the bondage of black men; it gives their story a relevance to men of all races which it never seemed to have before."[23] Thus, Stampp saw the slave system as a dehumanizing enterprise whose legacy is still with us in the form of the unskilled, unschooled, and unmotivated "Negroes," while at the same time he also attempted to present Blacks as active participants in a conflict between oppressor and oppressed. The elaboration of this view was necessary if white America was to understand Blacks' social demands in the 1950s and if American society was to attempt to remedy the wrongs of the past. As Davis put it: "Stampp sought to resurrect a usable past, a past that could serve as a therapy. If white Americans could understand the psychic and cultural traumas occasioned by generations of bondage, they would presumably experience the necessary guilt to undo the wrongs of the past. The sympathy, it needs to be stressed, required some evidence of the slaves' resistance as proof of their persevering humanity."[24] *The Peculiar Institution* reminded white Americans of the evils heaped upon Blacks during slavery and, as such, was fraught with guilt for the White reader, the type of guilt that Stampp had hoped would lead to ameliorative social action—which would, moreover, bring about the integration of Blacks into the working class of the new post-World War Two corporate state.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 124.
22. Elkins, *op. cit.*, p. 20.
23. Kenneth M. Stampp, *The Peculiar Institution: Slavery in the Ante-Bellum South* (New York, 1956), pp. vii-viii.
24. David Brin David, "Slavery and the Post World War II Historians," *Daedalus*, 103:2, Spring, 1974, p. 3.

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Whereas Phillips had stressed the attractiveness of the slaves' material conditions, especially in regard to most of the Northern working class, Stampp demonstrated the opposite.[25] He also challenged the Phillips and pro-slavery view that plantation life was one of "harmony" and contentment for both master and slave.[26] In describing the associated horrors of slavery Stampp stressed the slaves' conscious repudiation of such a system. Unlike Phillips, Stampp never assumed Blacks were satisfied with their lot as slaves.[27] The result of Stampp's analysis is a description of a slave system that fostered both dehumanization and the intense desire to resist that dehumanization.

Elkins' further development of the neo-abolitionist argument emphasized the dehumanizing tendencies of the slave system. Still following Hofstadter's lead, Elkins' *Slavery* provided a social-psocyhological evaluation of the effects of slavery on the slaves themselves. The slave system in the United States was said to have produced a modal personality among black slaves which Elkins labels "Sambo": "The typical plantation slave was docile but irresponsible, loyal but lazy, humble but chronically given to lying and stealing; his behavior was full of infantile silliness and his talk inflated with childish exaggeration. His relationship with his master was one of utter dependence and childlike attachment: It was indeed this childlike quality that was the very key to his being."[28] According to Elkins this personality type existed only in the American slave system.[29]

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25. The comparison between free laborers and slaves was faulty if limited to food, clothing, and shelter. A host of advantages were enjoyed by free laborers which were denied to slaves: "...Unlike the free laborer, the average slave could not attain an appreciably higher living standard, no matter how hard he strived. The slave's labor was controlled labor: his bargaining power was, by design, severely circumscribed. His labor was cheap labor: his compensation was, also by design, kept to a minimum. The free worker was inevitably more independent, more successful in his efforts to increase his material comforts: and as a rule was therefore more expensive," Stampp, *op. cit.*, p. 282. From a purely economic standpoint "...freedom was clearly a practical advantage to the laborer himself." Other components of the pro-slavery argument on material conditions were met with similar rebuttals based, as Hofstadter had hoped, on an examination of the same sources that had been used to construct the original pro-slavery argument.

26. As Davis put it, Stampp's book crackled with the conflict between "...the oppressed and the oppressor, between the weak and the powerful, between the innocent and the guilty" Davis, *op. cit.*, p. 3. The cruelties of slavery were recounted vividly from descriptions found in traveler's accounts (a source which Phillips hesitantly used and then only very selectively), and in some cases from plantation records themselves. The genteel institution that evolved out of the work of Phillips was transformed in Stampp's hands into the very essence of Dante's Hell.

27. Stampp makes it clear that "Few slaves ever really adapted successfully to their servitude..." and the result was "...a troublesome property" which kept many slaveholders in fear of their lives at one extreme, and at the other, frustrated at the *apparent* laziness, clumsiness and stupidity of their slaves. Although most masters felt they "knew" their slaves well, they were at a loss to explain why they followed the "North Star" to freedom, or poisoned their mistress on the plantation, or why they had just broken a plow or shuffled to and fro when working on a task. All of these actions, according to Stampp, were part of a conscious protest by slaves that in one way or another confirmed their dignity and humanity. A record of few organized mass slave rebellions does not point to passivity on the part of slaves but to a recognition that "...no slave uprising ever had a chance of ultimate success" therefore the majority of slaves "...had to express their desire for freedom in less dramatic wys." Stampp, *op. cit.*, p. 140. If the opportunity arose, fleeing to the North was a successful rebellion but, when that was not feasible "...they protested by shirking their duties, injuring the crops, feigning illness and disrupting the routine" *ibid.*, pp. 108-109.

28. Elkins, *op. cit.*, p. 82.

29. The reason for this development is given in a comparative analysis of the differences between Latin American and American slavery. Whereas the Latin American system protected the humanity of the slaves through various institutional controls—namely, legal, religious, and

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The neo-abolitionist focus on the dehumanizing effects of slavery on Blacks not only elicited guilt from Whites, but also served to stimulate a social policy which attempted to erase those handicaps suffered by the "disadvantaged" under particular historical circumstances. The "Sambo" thesis and its corollary of "black matriarchy" was popularized in the social sciences by Nathan Glazer; its full impact became apparent with the publication of the famous "Moynihan Report." Moynihan took Elkins at face value and concluded that "At the heart of the deterioration of the fabric of Negro society is the deterioration of the Negro family."[30] Thus, it is not surprising that, confronted with the new knowledge of its harshness and cruelty to Blacks in slavery, America's liberal conscience soothed itself with social programs designed to help those "disadvantaged" by the wrongs of the past. Furthermore, in the light of the failure to bring about full integration in the 1950s, it became necessary to help Blacks achieve corporate status so as to successfully enter within the logic of monopoly capitalism: disenfranchised Blacks not only constitute a moral opprobrium, but also tend to develop into those "outsiders" which Marcuse had identified as the main threat to the system.[31] In other words, Blacks, like the white working class before them, had to be formed into a corporate group whose demands could be rendered legitimate and satisfied by the State, but only on the condition that such demands were translated according to the logic of the system and thus effectively defused.[32]

Clearly, *Time on the Cross* and *Roll Jordan Roll* share more with the pro-slavery argument than with the neo-abolitionist argument. This is not to say that the authors share Phillips' racist assumptions or his desire to return to antebellum Southern society. Rather, regarding the issues of material conditions, the master-slave relationship, and the nature of the plantation community, both—for different reasons and through different methods—have come to similar conclusions.[33] This reappearance of the pro-slavery argument may be better understood by reference to the socio-historical context within which *Time on the Cross* and *Roll Jordan Roll* were written.

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governmental—American slavery was not so kind. Having no traditional institutions from which to draw precedents, American slavery developed within the confines of "unopposed capitalism" which gave primacy to the "individual needs" of those in search of profit over and against any "institutional requirements." Therefore the plantation system grew without those institutional controls which would have allowed the majority of slaves the "living space" to develop a personality different from "Sambo." The American plantation system fostered a "closed system" in which "...for the generality of slaves in their nature as men and women...contacts with free society occur only on the most narrowly circumscribed of terms," *ibid.*, p. 81.

30. For this document along with assorted critiques, cf. Lee Rainwater and William Yancey, *The Moynihan Report and the Politics of Controversy* (Cambridge, 1967).

31. Herbert Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man* (Boston, 1964).

32. Cf. Claus Offe, "Political Authority and Class Structure: An Analysis of Late Capitalist Societies," in *The International Journal of Sociology*, 2:1 (Spring, 1972), pp. 73-108. An excellent description of the way in which black corporatization was taking place during the 1960s is Robert L. Allen, *Black Awakening in Capitalist America: An Analytic History* (New York, 1970).

33. Genovese's predilection for Phillips comes as no surprise to close students of slave historiography. In a forward to a new edition of *American Negro Slavery* Genovese views Phillips' interpretation of slavery, which stresses its paternalistic nature, as closer to an adequate portrayal than Stampp's picture of "troublesome property": "So long as we remain on the level on which Phillips placed the discussion and Stampp chose to keep it, we cannot get much further along, but if we must choose between the two one-sided views, it is difficult not to regard Phillips' as closer to the norm." Reprinted in Eugene D. Genovese, *In Red and Black: Marxian Explorations in Southern and Afro-American History* (New York, 1968), p. 271.

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Time on the Cross and *Roll Jordan Roll* implicitly legitimate the already existent policy of *benign neglect* toward Blacks. Shortcircuited by the cost of the Vietnam War, the remedial programs of the mid-1960s, which were meant to organize Blacks into a corporate body fully manipulable within the logic of monopoly capitalism, have been drastically curtailed in the austerity of the 1970s. Once again historical work on slavery steps in to shape the past so as to serve the present. Whereas attempts to cut federal programs designed to remedy the low economic conditions of Blacks may have been justified initially on the groudns of increasing costs and obvious inefficiency, the rationale can now be that those programs are simply unnecessary. For if it appears that previous historians had distorted and mythologized the Blacks' past by portraying them as terribly handicapped and disadvantaged by the circumstances of slavery, the grounds for the argument in favor of ameliorative social and economic programs are thus nullified. The implication is clear: any disadvantages that Blacks now confront are not the consequences of slavery but a result of *personal or group deficiencies*, and therefore entail no ameliorative response on the part of American society as a whole.

The ammunition for such a policy is found in abundance in both *Time on the Cross* and *Roll Jordan Roll*. For example, both works attempt to show that, in contradistinction to the picture painted by the neo-abolitionist, the Black family was strong and vibrant under slavery. The most influential writings on the Black family have emphasized the destructive effects of slave-breeding, slave-trading, and sexual exploitation on the structure of slave families. Translated into 1960s public policy this meant a concentration on efforts to make the Black family function in a manner akin to the White middle class model.[34] The success of White families in mobilizing and motivating their youth to take their proper places in society was taken as the prototype. When this family structure was found to be absent among groups of Blacks, it became the missing link in improving the status of American Blacks. But *Time on the Cross* dispels any notion that family structure was destroyed under slavery. According to the authors, keeping the slave family together was important if the planter was to achieve any economic success. The family served as the central organizational unit during slavery, functioning as the administrative unit for the distribution of food, clothing and shelter (the chief instrument for increasing the slave population) and, most importantly, as the main instrument for maintaining labor discipline. Owners perceived their interests as best served not by breaking up families, but by keeping them intact. Incentives used by owners to keep families together ultimately strengthened the Black family: "By encouraging strong family attachments, slave owners reduced the danger that individual slaves would run away. By permitting families to have *de facto* ownership of houses, furniture, clothing, garden plots and small livestock, planters created an economic stake for slaves in the system. It was possible for some families to achieve substantially higher levels of income and *de facto* ownership than others" (p. 127). Based on statistical data from the New Orleans trade market, Fogel's and Engerman's conclusions "sharply contradict the popular view that the destruction of slave marriages was at least a frequent, if not universal, consequence of the slave trade" (p. 43).[35] Regarding sexual exploitation, the authors ask whether such exploitation was so "frequent that it undermined

34. A critical dissection of this logic may be found in Charles A. Valentine, *Culture and Poverty: Critique and Counter-Proposals* (Chicago, 1969); and William Ryan, *Blaming the Victim* (New York, 1971).

35. Their records indicate that from 1804 to 1962 "...more than 84 percent of all sales over the age of fourteen involved unmarried individuals of those who were or had been married, 6

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or destroyed the black family" (p. 130). Once again their statistical evidence leads them to conclude that although sexual exploitation existed, the consequences were far less serious than others had made them out to be. Likewise, Fogel and Engerman point out that Blacks themselves were not sexually promiscuous as sexual myths had indicated, but were as "prudish" and "victorian" as their masters.[36]

The broad outlines of a strong family life under slavery are portrayed in *Time on the Cross*, while the details and color are provided by *Roll Jordan Roll*. Genovese's account of the Black family, like his whole book, is sensitive to the complexities of Black family life under slavery. But his remarks concentrate on the "record of countervailing forces even within slavocracy but especially within the slave community" which serve to highlight the strengths of the Black family under slavery, rather than its weaknesses.[37] Genovese is very close to *Time on the Cross* when he notes that masters' interests were central in their motivations to keep slave families together: "The master understood the strength of the marital and family ties among their slaves well enough to see in them a powerful means of social control" (p. 452). In a paternal relationship masters were not immune to the feelings of slaves, especially on a matter so important as the maintenance of congenial families. Thus Genovese stresses that a number of slaveholders did not yield to pressures to sell their slaves: "An impressive number of slaveholders took losses they could ill afford in an effort to keep families together. For the great families, from colonial times to the fall of the regime, the maintenance of family units was a matter of honor. Foreign travelers not easily taken in by appearances testified to the lengths to which slaveholders went at auctions to compel the callous among them to keep family units together" (p. 453). Genovese also concurs with *Time on the Cross* in its evaluation of sexual exploitation and of slave sexual mores. His re-evaluation of the role of the father in the slave family notes that "Slave men provided for their families to a greater extent than has been appreciated." He does not deny that the powerless position that Black males found themselves in was debilitating. Yet, as active agents of resistance, they managed to forge "solid norms for family life" that led Black slaves to "value a two-parent, male-centered household, no matter how much difficulty they had in realizing the ideal" (pp. 491-492). As in *Time on the Cross*, the Black family survives slavery strong and in command of a tradition of nuclear, male-centered households of which Blacks should be proud.

Black employment has always been seen primarily as a problem in the unemployed themselves. This "blaming of the victim" centers attention on the victim rather than

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percent were sold with their mates; and probably at least one quarter of the remainder were widowed or voluntarily separated. Hence it is likely that 13 percent or less, of interregional sales resulted in the destruction of marriages." (p. 49) Only 13 percent becomes a statistically insignificant amount!

36. Their statistical data does not support the image of the "castrated" black male. On the contrary, he assumed his proper role as patriarch of the household: "For better or worse, the dominant role in slave society was played by men, not women. It was men who occupied virtually all of the managerial slots available to slaves." (p. 141).

37. Indicative of the stress that Genovese places on the strengths of the Black family is his discussion on the social significance of the marriage ceremony for both slave and master. Their ceremony, nothing more in many cases than having the married couple jumping over a broomstick, indicated the seriousness of the nuptual ties and the concern of the master in legitimate marital ties. According to Genovese, this cemented social ties in a paternal community: "...the wedding ceremony served the vital function of lifting the couple out of their private relationship and reminding them that the bond between them also bound them to their community and entailed wider responsibilities. Masters and slaves sought this effect as a means of social control, but not quite the same kind of control" (p. 481). This concern with seeing marital ties bonded publicly was complemented by the masters' desire to keep such a bond intact.

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on the vicissitudes of the system which perpetrates the victims' ills. The neo-abolitionist argument gave ample attention to the fact that Blacks, while slaves, were denied the training and education necessary to compete in the industrial marketplace. Job training for the disadvantaged became a slogan during the 1960s. Along with the strengthening of Black family structure, this was to insure that Blacks start the race from a position equal to that of their competitors rather than ten yards behind. Yet today, less than a decade later, most of those programs are defunct and those remaining are on the verge of collapse. *Time on the Cross* and *Roll Jordan Roll* once again combine to rectify past errors by dispelling the myth of "Black incompetence"—a myth that says Black labor was less efficient than White, and therefore unsuited for industrial production. Evidence for this myth supposedly came from the poor economic returns of plantations. The weak link was thought to be Black labor. In the hands of the neo-abolitionist scholars this myth was challenged by reference to social conditions: slaves feigned illness, stole, behaved childishly, and shirked their duties as a form of "day to day" resistance. But Fogel and Engerman argue that the slave economy was much more productive than was previously thought. Far from stagnating or being "economically moribund on the eve of the Civil War," the South had been growing quite rapidly: "Between 1840 and 1860, per capita income increased more rapidly in the South than in the rest of the nation" (p. 6). Such a system was led by a group of optimistic businessmen (the slaveholders) who had at their disposal a vibrant agricultural economy whose variable capital, human slaves, was becoming more interchangeable as time went on. Rather than being incompatible with slavery, industrialism was very amenable to it: "the demand for slaves was actually increasing more rapidly in the urban areas" (p. 5). As for Black labor itself, Fogel and Engerman maintain that, "Far from being 'ordinary peasants' unused to 'pre-industrial rhythms of work,' black plantation agriculturalists labored under a regimen that was more like a modern assembly line than was true of the routine in many of the factories of the antebellum era" (p. 208). Genovese concurs and points out that any myth that declared Blacks a "lazy people" was based on a misunderstanding of the "Black Work Ethic" which was compromised upon by slaves and their masters: "The actual work rhythm of the slaves, then, had to be hammered out as a compromise between themselves and their masters. The masters held the upper hand, but the slaves set limits as best they could" (p. 303). Not only were Blacks productive laborers, but through their labor they could advance into a relatively varied occupational hierarchy. Fogel and Engerman once again provide the bold outlines while Genovese fills the empty spaces with descriptive and colorful accounts. *Time on the Cross* emphasizes the rewards that masters used to keep slaves disciplined and integrated into the plantation economy;[38] Genovese provides the actual imagery by looking at a number of different occupations that were open to a limited number of slaves: maids, the "Mammy," drivers, mechanics, blacksmiths, and carpenters.

In a sense, Blacks are being told to look at their past through different glasses and to

38. The rewards were of different types, and our interest are in those they label "long term." These are described as "...often requiring the lapse of a decade or more before they paid off. Thus slaves had the opportunity to rise within the social and economic hierarchy that existed under bondage. Field hands could become artisans and drivers. Artisans could be allowed to move from the plantation to town where they would hire themselves out. Drivers could move up to the position of head driver or overseer. Climbing the economic ladder brought not only social status, and sometimes more freedom; it also had significant payoffs in better housing, better clothing, and cash bonuses" (p. 149). This negates the picture of slavery as possessing only a two-layered occupational and stratification structure of field hands and house servants.

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see through those glasses a past of which they can be proud. At the same time, such a past can be used to justify the denial of State aid. Since Blacks no longer seem to pose a threat to domestic order, it is assumed that the task of forging Blacks into a visible corporate body has been completed. "Objective" historical scholarship then rushes in to provide ideological ammunition to justify the shift to benign neglect. But the historical picture presented in *Time on the Cross* and *Roll Jordan Roll* presupposes an historical reality that actually does not exist; American Blacks have not achieved corporate status. Without full corporatization Blacks as a group will be left out of the important decision-making processes in the 1980s since they have yet to undergo the collective politicization required to participate in the monopoly phase of capitalism. Since one of the most serious problems facing America today and in the future is the urban crisis, and since Blacks increasingly become the prime inhabitants of the inner cities, without adequate political clout, Blacks will be increasingly confronted with more housing deterioration, crime, abandonment by businesses, and the moral decay which will further contribute to the crisis.[39]

Cruse has partially captured the dilemma in which Blacks find themselves. He argues that Black Americans have long misunderstood the group-nature of American society, opting instead to advance according to the "Great Ideal of American Individualism." Thus he states, "the individual Negro has, proportionately, very few rights indeed because his ethnic group (whether or not he actually identifies with it) has very little political, economic, or social power (beyond moral grounds) to wield. Thus it can be seen that those Negroes...who have accepted the full essence of the Great American Ideal of individualism are in serious trouble trying to function in America."[40] Cruse's error lies in his identification of ethnic groups as the basis of group power in American society. In the context of entrepreneurial capitalism he is correct, but in the present situation of monopoly capitalism his analysis misses the mark. Blacks have failed in achieving group power at this phase in history precisely because monopoly capitalism has no use for Blacks. The historical works under review here function to declare that the responsibility for this uselessness cannot be laid on the doorstep of slavery, for Blacks emerged from slavery with the necessary tools to fit into industrial society.

Such an historical analysis fails to adequately explicate the unique role of racism and the changing social and technological conditions that have affected Blacks since slavery. When Blacks entered the urban industrial environment, the kinds of service they had to offer were no longer needed, since capital-intensive technologies in the 1930s largely made unskilled labor-power unnecessary. In fact, it was the development of such capital-intensive technology that constituted a primary thrust of capitalism's monopoly phase. Furthermore, the frontier that had absorbed waves of unskilled immigrant labor no longer existed. As Wilhelm notes, "The mass of European immigrants arrived when America developed an industrial economy, private enterprises flourished, and individuals owned many small businesses. Today the demand for unskilled labor fades; at the turn of the century it was urgently needed.

39. One of the most popular myths that grew out of the "Black power" stage of the civil rights movement was the belief in the immanence of Black political control of the major cities. Projections point out that this will not be the case. As cities become high on the agenda of national priorities, regional government may replace city government with the result that Blacks may experience colonial indirect rule at the hands of state legislatures dominated by Whites who have little political stake in the central cities. Cf. H. Paul Friesman, "Black Control of Central Cities: The Hollow Prize," *Journal of the American Institute of Planners,* 35:2 (March, 1969).

40. Harold Cruse, *The Crisis of the Negro Intellectual* (New York, 1967), p. 6.

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The Negro now abandons the agricultural South for the automated North and immediately confronts the definite prospects of unemployment."[41] The situation grows graver as the fruits of technological improvements become embedded in the labor process: "The nation simply does not generate new opportunities for manual work as technology displaces muscle and nominal skills."[42] Thus, because Blacks arrived on the Northern industrial scene during the shift to capital-intensive technology, they now face unemployment at a rate which if found among the total population would constitute evidence of a depression. What has occurred is essentially that the Black "becomes a victim of neglect as he becomes useless to an emerging economy of automation. With the onset of automation the Negro moves out of his historical state of oppression into one of uselessness. Increasingly, he is not so much economically exploited as he is irrelevant."[43] It is clear that present American domestic policies reflect precisely this attitude, an attitude that leaves Blacks out in the cold and further exacerbates the urban crisis.

In a situation in which the chances of *qualitative* social changes in the near future are minimal, the foreclosure of programs meant to allow Blacks to attain full corporate status means nothing less than the perpetuation and aggravation of the social conditions that have characterized the American urban crisis during the past decade or more. Unfortunately, the ideological impact of *Time on the Cross* and *Roll Jordan Roll* will be to support this premature closure and thus extend the crisis, rather than contribute to solving it.

Melvin L. Oliver

41. Sidney M. Wilhelm, *Who Needs the Negro* (New York, 1970), p. 22.
42. *Ibid.*, p. 202.
43. *Ibid.*, p. 210.

János Maróthy, *Music and the Bourgeois; Music and the Proletarian.* Translated by Eva Rona. Budapest: Akadémiai Kiado, 1974. 588 pages. Approximately $27.00.

János Maróthy studied aesthetics with Georg Lukács and composition and musicology with J. Viski and B. Szabolcsi respectively. The purpose of translating Marothy's new book from Hungarian was clearly to reach a wider readership of professional musicologists. Interest in Marothy's approach, however, should not be confined to musicology alone as it illustrates even more generally the creative and not so creative insights of orthodox Marxism (modified by a view with a characteristically Lukácsian twist) in culture and aesthetics.

To read Maróthy is to discover a kind of incessant, aesthetic motion in the minds of serf-peasants, wage-earning shepherds, segregated small commodity producers, bourgeoisie, petty bourgeoisie, and the proletariat. His willingness to view society in its segmentations knows few limitations. Each individual has a particular social reality in the historical chain from antiquity to socialism, and each of these social realities has a music of its own with more or less clearly defined rhythmic, melodic, tonal, and formal characteristics, Positivistic musicologists will find themselves drowning in a sea of strange terminology and outwardly outrageous assumptions. What are the industrial 6/8, large-arched pentatonism, the workers' song, paraphonic, and the goliardic-swineherd-kolomeyka circle of rhythm? And what musicologist understands

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the public singing house of the nineteenth-century worker as a characteristic forum of "collective loneliness" created by the commodity-producing society as "a place where everybody can go in and buy individually (vaporized into the generality of the 'conumser') the goods of entertainment in relation to his money" (290)? However, these features for Maróthy represent not the mere prolegomena with which musicologists tend to preface any methodological approach to music in society (when they deign to consider society at all), the tenuous remarks which attempt to glue music back upon the world from which it has been severed by positivist analysis, but are rather the terminological elements and the fundamental dialectic of what the author feels to be the only authentic way to base a study of man and his music. At least in urban areas one need only move the radio dial across the spectrum to confirm the fact that there are worlds of music for which contemporary musicology has not interest, insight, or heritage. In a word, the musicologist has become deaf to the very phenomenon he attempts to observe.

There are a number of reasons for this state of affairs and it is unnecessary to review them here. But in 1969, when H. Wiley Hitchcock brought out his *Music in the United States*, it became apparent to musicologists (but not to ethnomusicologists who had known it all along) that we had been ignoring a vast body of literature to which Hitchcock applied—it seems in desperation—the name of "vernacular." While music history books have traditionally been concerned with high European musical culture as the bedrock from which sprang all good musics, someone here finally decided that mass music in America, where it had always been vital and could be fairly easily documented, had to be honored for what it was—the music of a people's heritage. The value of Maróthy's work for scholars who are concerned with the music of mass culture can hardly be overstressed.

Because the differences between folk and bourgeois "high" culture are historically so great, Maróthy is able to separate out two characteristic ways—*collective variativity* vs. *monocentric songlikeness*—in which the fundamental elements of music (rhythm, melody, form, pollyphony) are fused into cohesive tonal statements of historical significance. But rather than treat each musical element *in vitro*, song is made to serve as the formal, tonal vehicle indicative of both bourgeois and proletarian music making. Maróthy believes that man acquired songlike thinking only as he acquired the ego consciousness that is characteristic of small and large commodity production. Primitive man was a tribal being and his music was also tribal. His process of making music was what Maróthy (and ethnomusicologists) call collective-variation. This process was authorless. There were no particular composers; there was only the communal re-creation of a set of tribal, monomotivic meoldic and rhythmic elements. Through a process of continual variation of these elements, each subsequent singer altered and added to the basic communal repertoire until typical melodic and rhythmic versions came about, which in turn were subtly varied for as long as a specific song could be said to exist. This assumption is one of the standard concepts of ethnomusicology, since the process can still be observed in many folk cultures in uncontaminated or largely uncontaminated styles.

In addition to this way of making music, and beginning in the early stages of feudal small commodity production, there arose a kind of proto-songlike thinking quite different from the collective-variative method of music making. It was ego-centered rather than community oriented, had whole lines of text and tune rather than mere motives, and its form exhibited recapitulation and symmetry which collective variativity did not. Eventually it became tonal in the sense of key-centeredness, this as

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another expression of monocentrism.

But the former way of making music did not perish. It behaved very much like a dominated class within a larger social order, participating and changing in relation to the whole of music. It is instructive here to examine at close range one of the classic problems of musicology, the "birth of polyphony." Traditionally, this is explained as the outgrowth of 1) theoretical speculation on its possibility (the boredom theory); 2) the natural division of human voices (the placement theory); and 3) inattention to pitch or a tone-deaf singer (the accident theory). Whatever the causes, and these are mercifully never pressed very far, by 850 A.D. we have textbook definitions and examples of polyphony, the performance of two or more independent melodic lines sung simultaneously. But perhaps polyphony was not born at all; perhaps like Topsy it "just growed."

Maróthy presents polyphony as a continuing process within history, as the conscious and determined outgrowth of that *heterophony* which was probably characteristic of man's music since he first joined forces with a clansman to make music together. Heterophony is often defined as accidental harmony but such a definition is too simplistic since it discourages further analysis. Heterophony is somewhat analogous to the type of music which results yet today in unrehearsed musical expression when non-musicians (e.g., campers around a bonfire) "try to sing in harmony." A group of singers breaks into two or three parts—often at the harmonic interval of a third or sixth in parallel motion—and continues in this fashion through the tune's duration. Or the singers embellish the tune at certain points with held-over notes, passing notes, grace notes, and trills, all of which form intervals against the tune as sung straight by other performers. Or they do both practices at once, since they are certainly not mutually exclusive. These ways of performance, however, cannot be called accidental, because they arise from the desire somehow to embellish the melody and the determination of what is suitable is judged by what "sounds good." But since this rough and ready method of achieving some kind of polyphony is not a textbook practice, it has been judged uncultivated by musicologists and relegated to the sphere of accident.

But heterophony is a far richer concept for Maróthy than our above example of "campfire harmony" can indicate. He posits polyphony *in the form of* heterophonic thinking as simply (but very importantly) a part of collective-variative performance within primitive communities, which landed sometime near the ninth century on the soil of the serf-peasant and proto-bourgeois development towards songlike thinking. (Musicologists may recall a similar view by a Russian scholar of some decades past. See Victor Belaiev, "The Folk-Music of Georgia," *The Musical Quarterly* 19 [1933], 417). Here heterophony was raised to the level of authentic music making with a remarkable history. As it permeated high musical culture from below, it transcended its authorless and collective forms and reified itself as academic polyphony. As collective variativity and monocentrism collided, new methods of composition emerged in the whole of music history. Maróthy's analysis of this musical process as described through the presentation of his musical examples is sometimes ambiguous and arbitrary, but it is reasonable to assume (as ethnomusicologists have discovered) that heterophony is a fundamental feature of communal re-creation, that it affected medieval high culture from below, and that when the ninth-century author of *Musica Enchiriadis* explained how *organum* was made, he was documenting a musical appearance already in mass culture. Polyphony was not invented in the "schools" of St. Martial or Notre Dame. In Maróthy's words: "As far as the *Middle Ages* are concerned we have several times emphasized that its polyphony was, on the one hand, *still* a feature of the primitive

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communal variative technique, whereas, on the other hand, it was *already* the first appearance of the differentiated 'composed' music culture which, although arising from the popular heterophonic-variative elements, was approaching the homophonic-harmonic system of bourgeois songlikeness in its final tendency" (301). Surely this is a more rational thesis than the foundering among causes to which our present "birth of polyphony" theories give evidence.

Before considering other issues which Maróthy raises, it should be noted here that in general the book is poorly organized. The numerous spot summaries should have been condensed in favor of a few definitive ones. Material covered in his earlier works is duly cited in footnotes, yet the centrality of his material to the argument of the present study leaves only these citations to fill some rather important gaps; it is reasonable to assume that for most of his English language readers, Maróthy's untranslated works remain inaccessible. It takes, moreover, a good deal of stamina to follow all the musical examples, and the reader is better off isolating a few and studying them in detail; and this only after he or she has digested the basic thesis of the book, which unfortunately is never quite given the clear statement it demands. Nor is the book devoid of a few howlers. To our knowledge, Augustine wrote no hymns, yet Maróthy speaks with confidence that he did. Perhaps Hungary, which has the greatest collection of folksong literature in the world, is also guarding a medieval manuscript which is yet unknown to the West. Secondly, it is gross injustice to clinical neurosis to annex Gesualdo's tortured emotions via Cole Porter to modern bourgeois loneliness. The Prince of Venosa had a number of acute psychological problems. He would not urinate unless he was lashed with whips, and he murdered or had murdered his wife and her lover *in flagrante delicto*. But his brooding madrigals became no particular chromatic vanguard of the new baroque style; and his works remained largely unheard even by the next culprit in Maróthy's chain of tonal levellers who sought to deny any kind of "natural" articulation, Richard Wagner.

While most of Maróthy's organizational difficulties can be negotiated by the careful reader, his assumption of familiarity (or at least access) to his early work is more than a minor irritant. It is unfortunate that we do not have his *Az europai népdal születése* (The Birth of European Folk Song, 1960) also in English. Since the detailed description of collective-variative musical forms is already developed in the earlier book, it is only summarized hastily in the present study. It is thus impossible to determine, for example, what features of this development pertain to the history of Greek music. The general task of outlining the process of collective-variativity and monocentric songlikeness in Greek music from Homer and the epic tradition to Bacchylides and lyric song in the fifth century is rapidly treated in three pages under the heading of "Slave Society." Nevertheless, Maróthy refers frequently to Greek music when he wishes to bolster his thesis, without first committing himself to the implications of such selection. Does he want to admit that the variative vs. monocentric principle has had a full-fledged existence and development in at least one other historical era where the principles of Marxist analysis have not been (perhaps can never be) uniformly fixed? And how much more secure are we in late Roman antiquity (where Maróthy begins his analysis in earnest) when Gregorian song is in such a fluid and oral state and the early feudal tradition from "below" of serf-peasant song can be assumed but lacks any genuine documentation? When we push back further into history, we are confronted with even less evidence. Márothy is willing to admit that in the undivided culture of primitives there is no "above" and "below," no separate differentiated music culture, nor any separate "art" in the strict sense of the

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word. But he decides that the basic type of music for primitive culture is "monomotivic-variative" and that its development consists of constant melodic and (especially) rhythmic variation of basic tonal patterns. This may be true, but is it an adequate picture of what we are presently discovering about primitive musics? It would seem here that Maróthy has failed to take advantage of the vast corpus of ongoing research in nonliterate musics throughout the world. There are studies which undergird the communal re-creation processes of small isolated societies. But there is also evidence that the primitive musician also composes song as an ego-centric expression of his own privatized emotion. (See Alan P. Merriam, *Ethnomusicology of the Flathead Indians*, 1967). Thus, while the "above" and "below" of class distinctions are absent in these societies, we nevertheless have the two differing ways of musical composition as emergent aesthetic behaviors. Maróthy is to be commended for trying to illuminate the methods of musical composition in class and protoclass societies, but he is also to be criticized for not recognizing the limitations of his analytical tools. The transition from *anthropos* to *homo faber* is too ambiguous for anything other than calculated—albeit Marxist—guesswork. Certainly a body of evidence accurately fixed in the feudal, gothic, and renaissance eras is to be desired. But ancient Greece is a musical twilight into which Maróthy too often rushes for clues only to emerge empty-handed, or with highly contestable data which he later treats as incontrovertible fact. It must be borne in mind that the two principles of music making are for Maróthy vital historical processes. In terms of music he seems to be fairly dispassionate in judging them; but a teleological aspect surfaces always at that point when he feels himself nearing the enemy camps of unacceptable ideologies.

It is Maróthy's firm conviction that until classless society has been achieved, the music of the proletariat is the only authentic music with a future. Thus a large portion of the book is concerned with the negation of the bourgeois world picture by the separate tonal expressions of primitive communities, peasant folk music, and "urban folklore:" these lead to *workers' folk music*, which is the revival of collective-variative types of music but which synthesizes with bourgeois songlikeness as a "variativity beyond the song." The inexorable motion of collective-variative technique which existed before bourgeois commodity production, persists through it, and emerges after it in forms which can serve as a permanent basis for folk creation is the basis of a *Kunstwerk* of the future. This music is suddenly illuminated very late in the book by the light of a positive "Dionysian complex" which at last recovers the lost public experience that various artists—including Rameau, Beethoven, Wagner, and Scriabin—had sought to achieve but failed. Thus, 550 pages into the book we discover that the experience of mass music is something we might like to have.

Describing this "variativity beyond the song" as "workers' folk music" seems innocent enough at first glance, yet it serves to conceal some important problems in Maróthy's treatment of instrumental musical forms. His reason for rejecting W. Steinitz's categories of "workers' folk song" and "workers' song" in favor of "workers' folk music" (266) ostensibly lies in the fact that only the latter concept can fully embrace instrumental and dance music. But his generosity is not substantiated by instrumental genres that have the folkloric continuity which he claims for workers' folk music. The worker in renaissance commodity production did not own a musical instrument nor could he afford the newly printed instruction books (made available by the invention of movable type) on how to play one. The predominant contribution by mass culture, to which Maróthy's own evidence testifies, has been and probably will remain word dominated.

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But Maróthy's difficulty in dealing with instrumental music reflects a fundamental weakness in his approach which goes beyond a mere inappropriate choice of terminology. As previously stated, it is a particular achievement that his analyses of music pay meticulous attention to its historical roots; it is a particular failing, however, that his analyses are at times just not historical enough, i.e., that his attention to detail frequently displaces a genuinely historical examination by subsuming these details under pseudo-dialectical categorizations. His reliance on schematic designations like "above" and "below" as universally applicable categories misrepresents very real differences in the class composition of various societies. A similar tendency toward schematic abstraction gives rise to statements like "from the given social reality it is possible to deduce *exactly* the given art" (91—italics ours). But this tendency toward schematism has as its worst result the fact that Maróthy's two most thorough attempts to treat instrumental music—jazz and classical instrumental forms—are fraught with contradictions.

Rather early in the book Maróthy characterizes folk culture as the " 'eternal adversary' of the superstructural system of a given economic-social formation" (145), and his choice of examples from primitive communities through urban folklore tends to support the substance, but not the ontological form, of his thesis. From this view the role of jazz is crucial. By implication it is jazz which bears the responsibility of realizing this oppositional role in the twentieth century as the vital, Dionysian instrumental form of proletarian tonal consciousness. But here ontology runs afoul of history and even Maróthy is forced to admit that "after its 'discovery' by the bourgeoisie, we can no longer speak of jazz as the product of the proletariat but only as the product of an *incessant, intricate mutual effect* resulting from the tastes and efforts of both the capitalist and working classes" (530). The Dionysian element in modern worker' folk music is thus eliminated in effect, even if its absence is never fully acknolwedged; and the hopes for an oppositional, proletarian instrumental form are temporarily shelved, if only to be belatedly (and somewhat unconvincingly) revived in Marothy's discussion of socialist realism.

The emergence of generalizing forms in bourgeois evolution—of which the sonata-form principle is the crowning achievement—unfolded within the domain of the bourgeois Ego concentrically "in order to conquer for itself and from its own viewpoint the entire external world" (104). This struggle for a rational music had "a tremendous positive effect on the emancipation of content and the full expression of the possibilities of bourgeois music" (125). But when this struggle is resumed again by the "new Viennese school" (Schönberg, Webern, Berg), Maróthy sets up a bewildering array of objections: Schönberg is irrational, privatized, and redundant, even though the perfection of serialist technique provided (what music always provides) a concrete "mode of reflecting reality" (548). Setting aside Maróthy's critique of atonality, what is this disguised longing for the lost innocence of the bourgeois age of classical tonality and forms? Is it because the end product of musical evolution must appear to reach its culmination in socialist realism, whose harmonic substance is a reified tonality and whose structural expression is blatantly eighteenth-century formalism? The result is a neoclassic music to be vitalized by working-class mentality. Unfortunately, it is used for the same purposes of which Maróthy accuses the baroque age—self-aggrandizement and repression.

At least implicitly, Maróthy's discussion of jazz recognizes discontinuities in historical development; the long-standing oppositional tendency of folk culture is obviated by the incorporation (via commercialization) of the outstanding product of

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modern folk culture, jazz, into the capitalist superstructure. This recognition weakens the claim of workers' folk music to the possession of proletarian-Dionysian instrumental content, but preserves the integrity of Maróthy's research. However, in his treatment of the modern Vienna school, he does not display the same willingness to view history in its possible deviations from an orthodox Marxist developmental model, and hence derives the ambiguities and self-contradictions of his attitude toward musical classicism. The schematic feudal-capitalist-socialist model is rigidly maintained. The first Viennese classicists are commended as expressing the tonal high tide of bourgeois rationalist egoism. But the egoism of Schönberg, Webern, and Berg is condemned, in the words of Georg Lukács, as "accepting without any struggle the tendency of privatizing" (548). There is a hidden assumption here, one which renders schematic Marxists the equals in error of bourgeois liberals: both assume the continued vitality of eighteenth-century egoistic rationalism into the twentieth century. Where is their awareness of changed historical conditions, of conditions which produced the ego-destructiveness and irrationalism of Nazism, Stalinism, one-dimensional society, the H-bomb? Under these conditions, the emphasis of the modern Viennese school on reason and the ego is not a simple and ultimately redundant continuation of past emphases, but a musical-political struggle *for* reason, *for* an independent ego—a struggle at least as difficult as that which the original classicists waged against the truncated ego and irrationalism of the feudal age.

The last chapter of the book, on "Socialist Realism," is the most disappointing. It seems to be tacked onto the central thesis merely to please party critics who will fail to understand what the book is musically about but who expect all books to pay allegiance to the glories of Communism. Consequently, Maróthy says what he thinks ought to be said. Although he promises a future study on recent musical developments which are "representative of socially determined human qualities" (7), his present remarks are a trivialization of critical issues concerning music in Soviet culture.

The Russian bourgeois tradition of nineteenth-century music is a national heritage which Maróthy admits is a "highly developed" one with now classically differentiated *professional* genres. Combined with this tradition, the emergence of socialist realism is not to be viewed as a simple continuation or extension of workers' folk music but rather "*a full artistic world picture* which, through the totality of the genres, embraces the whole of reality from the angle of working-class ideology" (570). This full artistic world picture fuses the monocentric and collective-variative elements of chiefly nineteenth-century bourgeois and proletarian music making in such a satisfactory union that Maróthy admits only minor aesthetic problems: the working class is made to assume an upward mobility toward classical, aesthetic tonal expression; after reviewing their professional compositional techniques, composers in turn are instructed to attend to the demands of a mass cultural need for state art. Unfortunately, this fusion produces little else but an attenuated, albeit inflated, program music with a studied political rhetoric. The baggage of the bourgeois tradition is shopped home and the decadent forms are given a good scrubbing. The music forms most in need of criticism and revision are the "large" ones, and, although they are not mentioned by name, it is clear from the context that the sonata-form principle (and its various genre types—symphony, concerto, overture, and chamber music) must not be permitted to get out of hand. After theme-developing, transition, and "heightening" as "workshop" mannerisms of form-building are eliminated, the purged form is ready to be filled with a people's rhetoric hopefully enriched by "outstanding artistic talent." But does this cleansing of compositional methods

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produce essentially new forms? Maróthy's failure to see these standard compositional techniques of theme-developing, transition, and heightening in the symphonies of Shostakovich, where they become mannerisms just as they do in the symphonies of Mahler, makes further communication with him impossible on any critical analysis of large musical form. The "division plus wider unit" of large-scale composition which he proclaims as "the birth of a new and more comprehensive unified world image" (574) has been substantively achieved several times in our musical past—by Bach, Mozart, Beethoven, Wagner, and Mahler. It was not Shostakovich but Mahler who said to compose a symphony "means creating a world with all the technical means available," and his works certainly bear this out. Is, then, Mahler's only defect that his Seventh Symphony is a song about the night rather than the October Revolution? The dilemma here is of course not who does or does not use transition passages in large-scale composition but who other than a party critic (hopefully a composer) could tell the difference between a "degraded" transition passage and one which was not. Although this point appears somewhat facetious, it is not, for it is a problem which will plague and frustrate many readers. How many dotted quarter notes make a Communist? Maróthy is so certain of his thesis that at one point he determines the difference between variative change and functional change (the collective-variative vs. monocentric principle differently stated) on the basisi of one musical interval (30).

Maróthy makes no attempt to hide the utilitarian function of music within socialist realism: music exists to serve the "people's" interests. Threre is no need for that *promesse de bonheur*, that vision of a better society that is so often emphasized in the aesthetic criticism by the Frankfurt School;[1] in the perfect (or near-perfect) society, fundamental artistic criticism is superfluous. It is to be regretted that Maróthy, who sees so clearly how contradiction explodes the stability of historical styles, cannot also see that socialist realism propounds an ideology of music which blithely attempts to camouflage all contradictions in existing socialist societies in the name of "scientific direction." As Herbert Marcuse wrote in *Soviet Marxism* (1961), "Soviet aesthetics... insists on art, while outlawing the transcendence of art. It wants art that is not art, and it gets what it asks for" (116).

Richard Norton
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1. For a comparative analysis of the views of Maróthy's teacher, Georg Lukács, to those of T.W. Adorno, see Ferenc Fehér, "Negative Philosophy of Music—Positive Results," *New German Critique* 4 (1975), pp. 99-111.

Anthony Giddens, *The Class Structure of the Advanced Societies*. Harper & Row: New York, 1973.

It is not accidental that questions of class structure and class consciousness have recently become central concerns of both academic social scientists and Marxists: contemporary reality has promptly disposed of the various announcements of the obsolescence of class conflict made by the former while contemporary turmoil has fractured most shibboleths invoked by the latter. Thus, it may be useful to examine Giddens' recent study which *does* claim to break new ground. This ambitious book

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attempts to critically appraise liberal, Marxist and "post-industrial" theories of class, and to make some positive contributions. It contains interesting insights into the differences between some of the "advanced societies," as well as abundant material contrasting various theories. Yet, when measured against its far-reaching aim, the book fails. It may be, as Giddens implies, that an adequate prespective lies beyond both academic sociology and Marxism, but the route to that point remains uncharted.

Giddens presents his work as an example of the "new departure" in social theory which he believes is required by the present crisis of sociology. He heads for the heart of the problems caused by orthodox Marxist rigidity, on the one hand, and the demise of structural functionalism on the other. Other standpoints on contemporary issues of class have been piecemeal and regressive: i.e., conflict theory, "radical sociology," sociology of knowledge, and "a crude voluntarism linked to...a retreat from institutional analysis" (presumably ethnomethodology). Giddens hails what he calls the contemporary Marxist rehabilitation of Lukács and Korsch, but rejects it too, claiming that it has "produced a form of 'Marxism' which, relying almost wholly upon ideas selectively drawn from Marx's youthful works, has introduced a one-sided and defective voluntarism as that advocated in some contemporary streams of adacemic social theory" (p. 16).[1] In fact, his glib dismissal of this Marxist tradition contributes to Giddens' failure to develop an adequate theory of class, and forces him back—more than he would like to admit—into a conformist academic tradition.

The first half of the book consists of summaries and criticisms of the main theories of class: Marx, Weber, Dahrendorf, Aron and Ossowski, concluding with the new working class theory. This is followed by two chapters entitled "Rethinking the Concept of Class." The second half analyzes developments in Western capitalist countries, looks at the middle and working classes alongside the appropriate theories, and examines state socialist class "structuration." At one point in the introduction, Giddens euphemistically refers to his book as a "sometimes closely textured work." Indeed, especially in "Rethinking the Concept of Class" the discussion utilizes an inordinate amount of dense and cumbersome jargon, with the key terms of "market capacity" (taken from Weber), "mediate structuration," and "proximate structuration." Despite the effort, the rewards are disappointing.

Giddens suggests that we should speak of class *structuration* rather than of the existence or non-existence of classes. This "new" approach would thus dispense with the dichotomous Marxist model of class structure, and make room for the "new middle class," without at the same time abandoning the notion of class conflict. With this accomplished, the (Weberian) notion of "market capacity" replaces the (Marxist) relation to the means of production. But now his problem is to avoid the defects of Weber's theory of class, which he has already identified and criticized: namely, the tendency toward an incoherent proliferation of classes if class situation is identified with market position, the failure to account for economic classes becoming conscious or active, and the inability to translate economic relations into social structures. In fact, Giddens emerges with a Weberian view of classes as clusters of market situations linked by common chances for mobility. To this "mediate structuring factor, Giddens adds on several "proximate" factors connected to the division of labor and authority in production, and to common patterns of consumption or life-style, all of which tend to overlap in advanced capitalist societies, yielding a three-class system—upper, middle,

1. In his footnote on this matter, Giddens cites Erich Fromm's *Marx's Concept of Man* (!) which may indeed represent 'one-sided voluntarism,' but which is hardly an example of the rehabilitation of the work of Lukács and Korsch.

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and lower or working class. This is one of the major results of his "new departure" in social theory. While we sympathize with Giddens' plea for more empirical study of class, we disagree when he disposes of concepts such as labor, surplus value, or domination.

In this and his other writings (such as *Capitalism and Social Theory*, 1971), Giddens is most impressive in his succinct explications of the various theoreis, and in his capacity to zero in for sharp criticism. In the book under review here, these talents emerge most clearly in the analysis and critique of Marx's critics, especially Dahrendorf and, more generally, the post-industrial society theorists. He clearly exposes the shortcomings of their theories regarding the containment of the working class by capitalism, politics superseding economics and so forth. Yet, one of the curious but central features of the book is that in later pages Giddens clearly accepts these "post-Marxist" appraisals of advanced capitalism. One of his key claims, for example, is that English and U.S. capitalism have contained revolutionary class consciousness by separating the economic and political domains; he sees this as a definitive achievement, the assimilation of the labor movements having precluded explosive contradictions.

Now, this is nothing new; social theorists have been analysing this development for many years. But Giddens seems to think that *his* analysis is different because he refutes the faulty empirical data on which the liberal critics of Marx base their arguments (e.g., managers do not own property which signifies fragmentation of the capitalist class; more and more skilled and semi-skilled workers are required; both a new middle class and social mobility have expanded [p. 55-58]), and yet does *not* disagree with their conclusions. So, for example, we have Dahrendorf's thesis that economic and political conflicts were superimposed on one another in the 19th century, but have been separated in "post-capitalism," thus foreclosing revolutionary class conflict. Giddens does not disagree with this, except to say that it refers to the *essence* of capitalism, not its supersession.[2] In other words, for Giddens the separation of the political and the economic characterizes advanced capitalism—as it does for the liberal, social-democratic and post-industrial theorists. Yet, Giddens attacks these theorists and Marcuse: "If Daniel Bell is advanced capitalism's most successful advertising man, Herbert Marcuse is the author of its most successful publicity stunt" (p. 21). It is hard to see how Giddens exempts himself from this purported 'hype' of late capitalism.

Moreover, if the upshot of Giddens' argument is not new, it is also highly questionable: is he claiming that the "fundamental separation of economy and polity" pertains to the *ideology* of advanced capitalism, or what is closer to his apparent intention, to the reality of advanced capitalism itself? In his view, the U.S. and Great Britain have prevented revolutionary class consciousness from developing by institutionalizing a collective bargaining process concerned exclusively with 'economistic' demands. This has oriented the working class away from 'control' issues, which are political and which "...necessarily involve attempts on the part of working

2. "The institutional separation of [manifestations of] class conflict in the industrial and political sphere, far from marking the transcendence of capitalism, is the normal mode of structuration of class conflict in capitalist society... The separation of industrial and political conflict, once the incorporation of the working class has proceeded in a considerable way, is merely symptomatic of the generic character of capitalist society as predicated upon the fundamental separation of economy and polity. Although influenced by specific forms of working class structuration, 'conflict consciousness' is in a certain sense inherent in the outlook of the worker in capitalist society; 'revolutionary consciousness' is not" (p. 202).

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class associations to acquire an influence over, or in the most radical context to gain full control over, the 'government' of industry" (p. 205). The difficulty here is that Giddens himself seems to share the view that economic and 'control' issues are *in reality* separate issues under capitalism. He mistakes appearance for reality, accepting the achievements of advanced capitalism as a given, since he along with Bell, Marcuse, and millions of others do not see many signs of revolutionary working class consciousness.

Hence, Giddens omits the roles played by domination and consciousness; and ignores the ways in which the economic appears separated from the political. The point is that this way of seeing things is itself part of capitalist reality, an imposed capitalist reality. Thus we would argue, when Giddens or his predecessors speak of the separation of politics and the economy in late capitalism, they are accepting a political condition which has been created by capitalism. In other words, they are making a *political* observation. As a result, the depoliticization to which Giddens refers is reproduced in his own analysis. We must accuse *him* of believing in the publicity stunt of capitalism.[3] In what follows, we will address three specific themes in Giddens' work: his evaluation of Marx, of white-collar workers, and of women.

The critique of Marx has several dimensions. Giddens showed how the division of labor and the connection between technology and social organization stood at the crux of the differences between Marx's alienation, Durkheim's anomie, and Weber's rationalization. Here he adopts a Weberian stance, arguing that Marx conflates two senses of alienation—occupational specialization in the division of labor (alienation from the labor *process*), and class division (alienation from control over the *product* of the labor process); and that this error stems from the "uncertain role [Marx] allocated to technique" (p. 88). According to Giddens, Marx's mistake was in not allowing a sufficiently independent role to the demands of technique, of productive efficiency. Instead, Marx assimilated the nature of the division within capitalist industry (and indeed within and between all the institutions of capitalist society), to requirements of domination. Thus, Marx assumed that its alienated character could be eliminated with the abolition of *class* society. Giddens prefers Weber's rationalization thesis, which dissolves the integral connection between the division of labor and the demands of the class structure, and sees the explanation for the spread of hierarchical specialization in the division of labor in terms of its "technical superiority over other types of organization," that is, as an "inevitable," "irreversible" imperative of advanced industrial society itself.[4] It is not a conceptual confusion, though, but a theoretical and political position that divides Marx from Giddens. This method of argument is typical of Giddens' whole book: the disinterested observer busily clearing up other thinkers' confusions. But it is precisely this apparent disinterestedness that we find at the heart of Giddens' ultimate failure to offer a penetrating account of the class structure of the advanced societies.

3. In this connection, Giddens, along with many other social scientists, seems to assume that the incorporation of the working class into the mainstream of the body politic has taken place peacefully and gradually. This is either ignorant or irresponsible, in view of the history of misery and resistance which accompanied industrialization in the U.S. and England. Using Michael Mann's *Consciusness and Action among the Western Working Class* (1973), Giddens proposes that the picture in Italy and France is different: there is a violent and uneven transition from feudalism to capitalism issued in more revolutionary tendencies in the respective working classes (p. 213). This is suggestive, but as he presents the case, it conveniently overlooks the violent and uneven character of the transitions in England and America, including the militant opposition to capitalist industrialization among farmers, craftspeople, families, immigrants, and women.

4. Cf. *Capitalism and Social Theory*, p. 235.

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Giddens' rendition of the Marx versus Weber issue can thus be fruitfully evaluated in light of perspectives in Braverman's *Labor and Monopoly Capital*.[5] By showing that historically the development of technology in America has been integrally fused with imperatives of domination, with the systematic expropriation of skill and potentially subversive knowledge from the working class, Braverman adds weight to Marx's position and opens new terrain. To be sure, Braverman's book raises questions in terms of documenting the deadening and divisive effects that the degradation of work has had on workers' experience and consciousness. But at the very least, the book undercuts any glib assertions of the "technical superiority" of the capitalist division of labor over other types of social organization. The *capitalist* division of labor, Braverman argues, differs from the 'spontaneous' *social* division of labor according to task or occupation (which is a feature of all known social organization of any complexity), as well as from the internal division of a complex labor process, which is typically—and 'spontaneously'—accomplished by independent craftspeople for their own convenience and efficiency. Industrial capitalism for the first time in history *imposed* on working people a qualititatively different kind of division of labor—within the workshop, within the task—that not only separated the different occupations from one another, but assigned them to different workers, thus creating the "detail worker," the "machine appendage," the fragmented, alienated human being of Marxist critical imagery.

Giddens, apparently following Durkheim, criticizes Marx for his utopian speculation that in an advanced industrial socity, *occupational* specialization, which he takes to be the content of alienation from the labor process, could ever be transcended. He thus bepasses the links that Marx established between alienation from the *product* of the labor process (the class structure) and alienation from the labor *process* itself, the result of capitalist domination and control over it. In fairness to Giddens, he is not alone here; he simply echoes the commonplaces of most standard sociology, (and Marxism) in their fascination with technology.

The second major problem in Giddens' critique of Marx is connected closely to the first, and is developed in his discussion of Marx's distinction between productive and unproductive labor. For Marx, productive workers are all those who create the surplus value from which "unproductive" workers and non-workers live. To the extent that this distinction is immediately translated into a criterion of class, Giddens argues, it tends to ignore what seems to be crucial development in the unfolding of capitalist society, namely, the growth of a new middle class. Giddens regards Marx's theory as essentially inspired by a feudal imagery where the upper classes parasitically derived their existence from the surplus *product* appropriated from the peasants. In capitalism, however, class "structuration" is distinctively complicated by the intervention of the market and the proliferation of administrative functions which that entails. Marx's theory of exploitation as the extraction of surplus value, thus yeilding a two-class model, is too simple, according to Giddens. In particular, it "serves to obscure the significance of the administrative structure" of capitalist society, which will "become expanded in significance rather than become diminished with the davent of a socialized *market*" (p. 96, emphasis added). Again Giddens opts for Weber and obscures the fact that Marx did not fail to notice the complications introduced into the class structure of capitalist society by the market—indeed, that was his major theme. Marx took a theoretical stance which explicitly linked (at least parts of) the "administrative structure" of capitalism to relations of exploitation and domination.

5. Published by Monthly Review Press (New York, 1974).

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The point of the distinction between productive and unproductive labor—as much of the current Marxist discussion makes clear—was to expose the difference between the *technical* necessities of complex industrial production (such as distributive mechanisms, etc.) and the *social* necessities of domination (such as foremen, managers, etc.). Workers who accomplished the former were "productive" in Marx's sense; the latter, "unproductive." In conflating the two, the classical economists (and Giddens) made it appear as though the specific requirements of capitalist production were eternal requirements for any complex productive organization. But Giddens has sniffed out a critical locus of problems for Marx's theory of class. He rightly sees that the theory of surplus value, the distinctio between productive and unproductive labor and Marx's theory of class as a theory of social change are all connected, and that the changing occupational structure of late capitalism (most aparent in the proliferation of "white collar" occupations) cals these connections into question.

Marx's labor theory of value sought to unveil the dynamics of capitalist production—to explain why capitalism develops in the irrational and unfree manner it does. At least in the period of primary accumulation, the only labor relevant to capital (and will absorb the bulk of employment) is labor that is "productive" *for capital* by generating surplus value and making profits possible.

Here Braverman's account becomes important.[6] By remaining loyal to the critical and dynamic content of Marx's categories rather than to their immediate application, he is able to unfold them in a way that analyses the internal development of capitalist society since Marx's day. He shows that Marxist concepts are needed to uncover the movements of capital that result in the changed occupational structure and changes within occupations in late capitalism.[7] Having dispensed with the Marxist concept of exploitation Giddens can only document and uncritically describe the separation of manual and mental labor, blue and white collar work, viewing the expansion of the latter sector as a *benign* development. He sees them as products of increases in the levels of education and skill ("market capacities") in the working class as a whole. Fastening on their superficial characteristics, Giddens fails to see these developments as requirements of domination.

Giddens assembles most of the generally accepted sociological information on white collar workers and their work, much of which depends on David Lockwood's *The Black-Coated Worker*. (1958) He offers no new insights into this area of work and its meaning in the class structure, although at other points in the book, he does discuss the existence of a dual labor market, with many of white collar jobs concentrated in the secondary market, and also mentions an "underclass" of the white collar sector. However, he never draws any of this together in a satisfactory way. Marxism has always had the problem of fostering a closed system in the minds of many Marxits so that

6. Braverman's achievement is to have analyzed the changing occupational structure of monopoly capitalism by tracing the movement of capital (and thus of employment) from the traditional industrial sectors of production into the whole range of clerical, administrative, and retail sectors of 'non-production.' But in so tracing the movement of capital and the resulting proletarianization of the greater part of the population (as more and more work processes became subject to capitalist labor discipline, whatever their concrete content), Braverman confesses that he may have failed to accomplish the task of a Marxist theory of class as a theory of social transformation; he may have failed to uncover in this expanded working class a coherent subject of revolutionary change. Cf. *op.cit.*, p. 410.

7. For example, the separation of conception and execution, which Braverman sees as the essential principle of the capitalist division of labor, accounts for both the proliferation of white collar administrative and clerical jobs removed from the shop floor and concerned with "tracking" the extracted value *and* for the subsequent degradation of these jobs as well.

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answers to real and theoretical problems may come *too* easily. We do not accuse Giddens of not having answers; however, it becomes clear that he simply misses many of the important developments of late capitalism. In his hurry to go beyond the Marxian notions of labor, exploitation, relations to the means of production, he quickly arrives at many conventional sociological categories.

To begin with, Giddens is cautious about using the U.S. as a model for other capitalist societies, since, for example, the enormous growth in the white collar sector is not as characteristic of other advanced countries. He maintains that there has been no overall merger of manual and non-manual workers; that there has been an enormous rise in employment in the white collar sector, with a preponderance of women in these jobs; and that social mobility is "short range" or "...takes place in such a way as to minimize achieved differences in market capacity" (p. 182). He describes a 'buffer zone' between the two 'class' groupings of white and blue collar workers, and states that most mobility takes place in and out of this zone. While there are trends which indicate that the earnings of the white collar sector are relatively declining, Giddens claims that not too much can be made of this. Furthermore, according to Giddens, the white collar worker has better hours, job security, fringe benefits and promotion possibilities than does the blue collar worker. Following Lockwood, he says clerical workers have conditions of work more in common with higher-level managerial workers than with those on the shop floor. The non-physical, cleaner aspects of work which manipulates symbols, the location of offices, the hours—all serve to set office workers apart from manual workers, as well as from one another. Moreover, the former are said to participate in higher levels of the pyramid of authority, regarding themselves as belonging to management, while the latter "confront management as a grouping subject to direct commands, without themselves being part of a command hierarchy" (p. 183).

In rejecting the notion of a proletarianization of white collar work, Giddens argues that unionization and mechanizaton in this sector are accomodated within the existing pattern of society and contain no particular consequences. Regarding mechanization, he states that "it is misleading to suppose, as Marxist authors commonly do, that the effect of the mechanization of office work, the beginnings of which can be traced to the last two decades of the nineteenth century, has been progressively to eliminate the differences between office and shop floor. Mechanization, as involved in factory labor, tends to define the total character of the labor task, often reducing the role of the worker to 'machine-minding.' But this has generally not been the case in the office, where typewriters, adding machines, dictating machines, etc., appear as adjuncts to clerical labor, rather than as transforming it altogether" (pp. 193-4). This is followed by a single sentence saying that women monopolize these occupations. Giddens then states that there is a recent trend toward automating office tasks, which rather than promoting proletarianization of clerical employees, leads to a need for more highly trained and qualified personnel. In other words, Giddens does not see the office worker downgraded to a more routine job as a result of automated office techniques. Giddens concludes by suggesting that theories of the 'new working class,' (scientific and technical workers in the university, etc.) are potentially more interesting and sophisticated than the "naiveté" of the 'proletarianization' thesis promulgated by the evidently desperate Marxists.

Yet, as Braverman demonstrates, the work performed in factories and the work of clerical and service workers *is* increasingly similar. The working class must now be expanded to include the traditionally non-working class sectors: "The mental

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processes are rendered repetitious and routine, or they are reduced to so small a factor in the work process that the speed and dexterity with which the manual portion of the operation can be performed dominates the labor process as a whole. More than this cannot be said of any manual labor process, and once it is true of clerical labor, labor in that form is placed on an equal footing with the simpler forms of so-called blue-collar manual labor." Contrary to Giddens, Bravermen shows that mechanisation and especially computerization of office procedures weakens the position of skilled workers; there is little or no upgrading around computerization of office work. Finally, regarding the significance of these changes he writes that: "The problem of the so-called employee or white-cllar worker which so bothered early generations of Marxists, and which was hailed by anti-Marxists as proof of the falsity of the 'proletarianization' thesis, has thus been unambiguously clarified by the polarization of office employment and the growth at one pole of an immense mass of *wage workers*. The apparent trend to a large non-proletarian 'middle class' has resolved itself into the creation of a large proletariat in a new form. In its conditions of employment, this working population has lost all former superiorities ove workers in industry, and in its scales of pay it has sunk almost to the very bottom" (p. 355).

It is not only Braverman's conclusions but, and most importantly, his method which critically illuminates Giddens' work. The latter's focus on "market capacities" or, with regard to white collar work, on the official skill and educational requirements of expanding job categoreis, is superficial. By neglecting questions of the content of work and the relations of production as components of class, Giddens bypasses the radical transformation of work, especially white collar work, in the course of the twentieth century. To speak as he does of class "structuration" and "new middle class" with no reference to, for example, the quality and nature of work, is to proceed in the manner of the stratification theorists Giddens so effectively criticizes. In the face of end of ideology ana post-industrial society theories, Giddens' insistence on the relevance of class analysis appears radical, but this is undercut when it emerges that for him class is a purely descriptive notion, bearing no essential relation to questions of domination, resistance and revolution.

Ultimately, Giddens fails to address the subjective costs extracted by those developments in capitalist production that he otherwise so aptly describes. This failure, however, is shared with Braverman, who himself assiduously avoids exploring the problem of class consciousness. No doubt, the apparent lack of manifest revolutionary consciousness among the proletariat makes this omission all the easier. Yet, the question of the potential link between exploitation and revolutionary class consciousness, must be confronted at some point. While there seems to be no lessening of the poverty, degradation and manipulation described by Marx, yet, revolutionary proletarian class consciousness is not apparent—regardless of how narrow or expanded our definition of the proletariat. It may be that the effects of the daily experience of powerlessness, of deadening, stupefying work on people's consciousnesses, on their capacity to conceive and act on a vision of a new society—even on their (our) capacity to think coherently at all—force the conclusion that a Marxist analysis of the dynamics of late capitalism leads one away from the proletariat, expended or not, as the agent of revolutionary change.

In several places Giddens notes that women "largely monopolize" white collar work, and are systematically discriminated against in career opportunities and income levels. He remarks at one point: "Given that women have to await their liberation from the family, it remains the case in the capitalist societies that female workers are largely

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peripheral to the class system; or expressed differently, women are in a sense the underclass' of the white collar sector. They tend to monopolize occupations which not only have a low economic return, but which are lacking in subsidary economic benefits, have limited security of tenure, and offer little in the way of chances of promotion" (p. 288). Yet further on, Giddens seemingly contradicts himself: "...in relation to class structuration itself, a new process of 'polarisation' is taking place which is effectively swelling the working class through a massive declassement of routinized white-collar labor. The fact that most of the occupations in question have become dominated by women workers probably acts to solidify as much as to dissolve the 'buffer zone' between the working and middle classes, and certainly must lead us to reject any of the more sweeping assertions about the 'proletarianization' of the lower levels of the white collar sector" (p. 288).

This statement seems to indicate the massive lowering of the white collar sector from a lower middle class definition to one that can be identified as working class. (This would seem to contradict his rejection of the 'proletarianization' thesis for white collar workers). *But* since these jobs are always dominated by *women*, this does not signify proletarianization. Women have *always* played that role (reserve army of labor, jobs on the secondary market, etc.), so that this process cannot mean anything significant. In other words, according to Giddens, the domination of the routinized white collar sector by women means nothing with regard to class structuration, since women have *always* been discriminated against, have always had to leave work because of marriage and childbirth, have always been marginal. Hence, there is no need to fit them into a description of class structuration.

Giddens consistently separates the manual and non-manual underclass, apparently because the former are men, and their unemployment or underemployment pose more of a problem for stability and the economy. He proposes the emergence of a manual underclass (after clearly suggesting that a white collar underclass has developed as well) and suggests this as one of the serious problems the advanced societies will have to deal with. Because he accepts the social divisions of labor based on sex, Giddens ignores the significance of this growing female proportion of the work force and consequently overlooks the importance of the increasing degradation of white collar work. It enables him not to take seriously the role of women as the "underclass" of the white collar sector. And, further, according to Braverman, this is not an underclass; it is a description of most manual and non-manual jobs in this society; it is the norm, rather than the exception. In addition, since the expansion of jobs has and continues to take place in the white collar sector and is consequently of great significance for capital, it is crucial to try and understand this correlation between female labor and the nature of these jobs under capitalism.

The most we can do here is to raise questions about women workers. It is important to keep in mind that if more and more women are working in white-collar employment, in fact, simply working, then there is a double exploitation here: the sexual discrimination and the increasing "declassement." Clearly, these are not separate. It is intriguing to wonder whether women (and third world people) are the logical candidates for this increasingly mechanized, mindless and low paying work because of sexism and racism. And further, it is worth thinking about the cultural and political implications of the fact that the job categories which are increasing and coming to dominate the economy are the ones that have previously been sex-typed or assigned to black and third-world people.

Despite crucial failures Giddens' book does make important constibutions: e.g., his

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emphasis on the importance of the historical and comparative study of the internal development of advanced societies. He criticizes academic sociology for confining the study of development to societies undergoing the transition from a "traditional" to a "modern" order, "as though social change stops when a society becomes industrialized" (p. 24). And he indicts Marxists for too often invoking imperialism as the *sole* explanation for the failure of revolution in the West at the cost of ignoring factors intrinsic to post-19th century capitalist development. It is in the identification of those factors, however, that we part company with Giddens.

No theory of class emerges from this book. There are various components, but no formulation bold enough to serve as a way of getting at the class structure and the success of the separation of the economic from the political. Owing to his failure to penetrate the cultural apparatus of domination, Giddens retreats into institutional analysis. Ultimately, the elimination of surplus value and his lack of interest in domination testify to the success of capitalism's project of depoliticization, the separation of the political and the economic, in his own work.

Wini Breines and Margaret Cerullo

Perry Anderson, *Passages from Antiquity to Feudalism.* New Left Books: London, 1974. 304 pages.

Perry Anderson, *Lineages of the Absolutist State.* New Left Books: London, 1974. 573 pages.

Perry Anderson, the editor of *New Left Review*, has embarked upon a monumental project unprecedented in Marxist historiography. He is attempting a synthetic history of Europe from classical antiquity to the present. These are the first two of what will be a four volume study. The impetus for this work was provided by a state of affairs described by Anderson in the preface to *Lineages*: "Conceived as a Marxist study of Absolutism, the work below is deliberately situated between two different planes of Marxist discourse, which normally lie at a considerable distance from each other. It has been a general phenomenon of the last decades that Marxist historians, the authors of a now impressive corpus of research, have not always been directly concerned with the theoretical questions of implications raised by their work. At the same time, Marxist philosophers, who have sought to clarify or solve the basic theoretical problems of historical materialism, have often done so at a considerable remove from the specific empirical issues posed by historians" (p. 7). A final determination of the success or failure of Anderson to fill in the space between these poles will have to wait until his project is completed, but these two volumes are significant enough in themselves to warrant immediate attention.

Passages from Antiquity to Feudalism is conceived as an introduction to the second, much longer work. But, in many respects, *Passages* is the more interesting of the two. It is Anderson's central thesis here that the specificity of European feudalism, and of historical development thereafter, is a consequence of the conjuncture of the social structure of classical antiquity with that of the Germanic tribes which followed on the dissolution of the Roman Empire. This conjuncture produced a dynamic social system that emerged in Western Europe as feudalism. In Eastern Europe, where this

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conjuncture did not occur, feudalism was largely a consequence of Western expansion. This pattern of conjuncture, transition, and uneven development forms the framework of *Passages from Antiquity to Feudalism.*

Anderson argues that Greek and Roman society was based upon a slave mode of production, from which he draws several conclusions. He maintains that classical society was predominantly agrarian, containing virtually no urban economy at all, and that it was precisely the dominance of agrarian production utilizing slave labor that allowed for the growth of an urban culture and polity. The dominance of slave labor was unique in history (although Anderson correctly notes that slavery was not the singular labor system in either Greece or Rome), and provided the basis for landowners to live in cities (the centers of slave exchange) rather than on their land. An urban culture was thereby able to flourish, drawing its wealth from the countryside.

Another consequence of the slave mode of production Anderson emphasizes is the resultant degradation of labor, which blocked the development of a labor-saving technology. Expansion of wealth was not accomplished through intensification of labor or a rise in productivity, but through territorial expansion and military conquest. Anderson argues that in the case of Greece, expansion was necessarily limited because of the political form of the *polis,* while in the case of Rome, the slave mode of production developed to its furthest extent, and collapsed through internal stagnation once expansion reached its geographical extremities.

The different pattern of Roman expansion in the Eastern and Western areas of the Empire is crucial to Anderson's argument. In the East, Roman expansion consisted principally of taxing the Hellenistic social structures, which were strongly entrenched, without attempting fundamental structural alterations, whereas in the West there were enormous areas of land devoid of urban settlement, which allowed for the transplantation of the Roman social system, originally developed in Italy: "The West. . . was the true proving-ground of Roman imperial expansion, the theatre of its authentic and decisive enlargement of the whole universe of classical Antiquity. It was there that the Republican slave economy perfected in Italy was successfully transported and implanted in virtually virgin social terrain. It was there that Roman cities were overwhelmingly founded. It was there that the bulk of the later provincial ruling class which rose to power with the Principate always resided. It was there that the Latin language became the basic—first official, eventually popular—spoken idiom" (p. 97). The Eastern Empire survived as Byzantium, which consisted of an overlay of classical bureaucracy on a base of small-holder communities, without a structural integration of the two. No feudal system was able to develop in this framework.

The Germanic tribes that moved into the former Western territories of the Empire preserved more of the Imperial social structure than is usually conceded. Anderson points out that the internal organization of the tribes had already been affected by contact with the Empire. Following the first invasions, land was distributed among the conquerers in a fashion more closely resembling the mode of Roman expansion than the land distribution patterns of tribal customs. The lands which were given over to the Germanic warriors (which was always only a portion of the land, never all of it) were appropriated by the leaders of clans, who then settled tribesmen on them. Within a generation, according to Anderson, a Germanic aristocracy was consolidated. Imperial economic and political structures remained more or less intact, as a Germanic structure developed along side them.

The second wave of invasions had far greater cultural impact, and it was only then

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that the dual institutional framework began to be replaced by a synthesis in agriculture, political structure, and language. Anderson is particularly sensitive to linguistic developments, and to the continuity through change manifested by the institution of the Church. Slowly, gradually, this synthesis resulted in the social relations and cultural framework characteristic of feudalism. Anderson discusses the lineages of the institutions of vassalage, benefice, the manor, communal villages, the estates system, and the monarchy.

The Carolingian epoch marks the final stage in the feudal synthesis, because it was in this period that donations of land became tied to service bonds, and it is the specificity of the relationships which resulted from and supported this practice that Anderson understands as feudalism. Anderson treats this ensemble of relationships with a good deal of sensitivity as he explores the overlapping matrix of parcellized sovereignties. One of the most interesting results of this exploration is Anderson's identification of "spaces" created by the feudal pattern of interlocking responsibilities. It is the existence of these "spaces" which enabled the specific development of medieval towns: "In the Roman Empire, with its highly sophisticated urban civilization, the towns were subordinated to the rule of noble landowners who lived in them, but not from them; in China vast provincial agglomerations were controlled by mandarin bureaucrats resident in a special district segregated from all commercial activity. By contrast, the paradigmatic medieval towns of Europe which practiced trade and manufactures were self-governing communes, enjoying corporate political and military autonomy from the nobility and the Church" (pp. 149-150). According to Anderson, and following Marx on this point, "a *dynamic opposition* of town and country was alone possible in the feudal mode of production: opposition between an urban economy of increasing commodity exchange, controlled by merchants and organized in guilds and corporations, and a rural economy of natural exchange, controlled by nobles and organized in manors and strips, with individual peasant enclaves" (p. 150). This interpretation is far more illuminating in reference to the role of towns in the relationship between feudalism and capitalism than the usual satisfaction with describing the role of towns in functional terms within the feudal economy, i.e., as having arisen as points of exchange. Anderson's explanation demonstrates the continuity of towns in Western European history, while showing the specifically dynamic features of medieval towns due to their relative autonomy.

After a brief description of what he takes to be the basic features of the feudal mode of production, Anderson goes into greater detail about the particularity of feudalism in England, Spain, France, Portugal, Italy, and Scandinavia. He then goes on to claim that feudalism demonstrated a far greater economic dynamism than classical antiquity, as evidenced by the growth of agricultural surplus and urbanization. A principle source of the former, according to Anderson, was the technological innovations developed by peasants on their own strips of land. While a manorial lord increased his surplus principally through acquisition, the peasant was forced to improve the yield on his fixed amount of land, and it was there that many of the advances in cultivation occurred. Land reclamations on the part of both lords and peasants also facilitated the rise in surplus yield.

Anderson's discussion of the so-called "crisis of feudalism" is extremely important. It is his contention that feudalism in Western Europe reached a technical and ecological barrier: "it seems clear that the basic motor of rural reclamation, which had driven the whole feudal economy forwards for three centuries, eventually overreached the objective limits of both terrain and social structure. Population continued to grow

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while yields fell on the marginal lands still available for conversion at the existing levels of technique, and soil deteriorated through haste or misuse" (p. 197). Anderson pushes this interpretation in terms of a forces of production—relations of production contradiction, but his own argument tends to weaken this position, since he has inextricably bound technique and social relations in his entire presentation to this point. It is therefore somewhat surprising to suddenly find him arguing that the example of the feudal experience shows that "the relations of production generally change prior to the forces of production in an epoch of transition, and not vice versa" (p. 204). This may be an improvement on the technological determinism typical of the crasser versions of "historical materialism," or of much mainstream economic history for that matter, but such broad characterizations only serve to blunt what is an otherwise intelligent and provocative theory: the crisis of Western feudalism resulted from an ecological crisis brought on by the ensemble of social relations (including technique) which Anderson has characterized as specifically feudal. This theory is not without its difficulties, but it is one which should be explored in the future through more detailed and specific historical research. It also has an obvious bearing on the condition of contemporary capitalism.

One of the consequences of this crisis of feudalism was the collapse of serfdom in the West, and its replacement by wage labor and commercialized agriculture. Here again Anderson is particularly sensitive to the role of towns, arguing that they were crucial in providing the impetus to and support of many of the numerous peasant revolts of the late middle ages.

After bringing his discussion of Western feudalism to a close, Anderson turns his attention to the East, where the critical conjuncture of social systems did not occur. Instead, he argues, Eastern development was characterized by a continuation of the Germanic social formation, influenced by nomatic incursions. Eastern feudalism was therefore a product of Western expansion, and consequently took a different form than in the West. Among the most significant differences were the lack of strong urban centers and the much later imposition of serfdom. The enserfment of the peasantry in the 16th cetury is often characterized by historians of the period as a "second enserfment" brought about as a consequence of the grain trade with the West. Anderso convincingly argues against this iterpretation, seeing it instead as a consequence of the whole structure of Eastern feudalism. It was also as a consequence of this structure that serfdom in the East was more total and oppressive than its Western counterpart. An important aspect of this mode of enserfment was the narrower limits of tenant and peasant production. It is in this aspect of Eastern feudalism that Anderson sees the cause of its relative stagnation as a productive system. Unlike the West, there were no interstices of autonomy, no room for innovation or change.

The discussion of Eastern feudalism serves as counterpoint to the argument contained in the first part of the book. Through his detailed accounts of feudalism in Russia, Poland, and the Balkans, Anderson strengthens his interpretation of Western European development, while also providing an original and provocative reading of Eastern European history. At this point, Anderson brings *Passages from Antiquity to Feudalism* to an impressive and highly successful close.

The main theme of *Lineages* is simply stated: Absolutism was the political instrument of class rule by the nobility in the period following the decline of serfdom. According to Anderson, and in contradiction with Engels, among many others, Absolutism represented a continuation of feudal power relationships in an era of changed social relations at the most fundamental levels. What makes *Lineages* a

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somewhat tedious book to read is not this line of argument, which is itself important and, in its mode of argumentation, unique. The problem lies, rather, in Anderson's division of labor. Unlike *Passages, Lineages* is concerned solely with the level of political power, while the changes in social relations whih occur durig the period under cosideration have been left to the next book in the series, which will be concerned with the bourgeois revolutions. In a sense, *Lineages* is half a book. *Passages from Antiquity to Feudalism* is intended to serve as an introduction to *Lineages of the Absolutist State*, and probably for that reason is so integrated and totalizing, although also, of course, extremely abstract. It is only with *Lineages* that certain of Anderson's methodological presuppositions become fully apparent.

Lineages is organized according to an Althusserian conception of historical temporality in which each structural level contains its own time. The book, therefore, has no uniform time span. For example, the section on England concludes in 1640, with the "bourgeois" revolution which destroyed Absolutism, whereas the chapter on Russia carries through to 1917. The next book in the series, which will deal with the bourgeois revolutions and the consolidation of capitalist states, will, therefore, overlap chronologically with *Lineages*. The problem with this temporal structure is not the uneven chronology, but with the structural isolation upon which it rests. Anderson makes no attempt to justify this approach at the outset, and one can only wait for the next volume to see whether it will be validated *a posteriori*.

Lineages of the Absolutist State is, therefore, a difficult book to assess in isolation. Unlike the first volume, it is not a unified work. As a "political history" of the formation of modern European states it is very good, but limited. Anderson's treatment of institutions such as the army, state bureaucracy, and law is first rate and insightful—as far as it goes. There is very little here of the interaction of these institutions with the population as a whole and, consequently, little room for ideology or the self-understanding of historical *praxis* outside of a small group of elites. *Lineages* is essentially "history from above," a fact which does not elude Anderson himself. He defends this aspect of his approach in the foreword to this volume: "secular struggle between classes is ultimately resolved at the *political*—not at the economic or cultural—level of society. In other words, it is the construction and destruction of States which seal the basic shifts in the relations of production, so long as classes subsist. A "history from above"—of the intricate machinery of class domination—is thus no less essential than a "history from below": indeed, without the latter it in the end becomes onesided (if the better side)" (p. 11). But this reasoning only compounds the difficulty, since *Passages from Antiquity to Feudalism* was itself a history of domination in the period before the emergence of "states" as such. This, and the ambiguous use of "class" in discussing pre-capitalist social relations, only serves to illuminate the problems involved i conceiving history in terms of structural levels. Anderson begins to lose the historical specificity of the very phenomena which he is investigating.

It is perhaps inevitable that a project as enormous as this would be uneven, but there is less of the explicit self-reflection which Anderson as rightly seen as necessary to Marxist historiography than one would have hoped—at least in these volumes. The project as a whole can only be judged fully in its completed form, but the impression begins to emerge that the philosophical developments which Anderson wants to unite with empirical historical research have the effect of pre-judging that research. The historical material, therefore, serves to fill out the theoretical plan. The promised dialogue is turning into a lecture for which we have already seen the outline.

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Because of the restricted field of theoretical investigations to which Anderson has limited himself, remaining wholly within the Althusserian problematic, it is unlikely that he will succeed in bridging the gap that he has identified. On the basis of these two books, however, it seems certain that he will succeed in a second declared aim, which is to "propose elements for discussion." The broad conception of early European history contained in *Passages from Antiquity to Feudalism* invites further inquiry and debate. The same is true for the two self-contained essays which form an appendix to *Lineages of the Absolutist State*. These "notes," which account for over a hundred pages, deal with Japanese feudalism and the "Asiatic mode of production," and are intended as complements to the combined argument of both books. The second essay is particularly interesting in that Anderson has provided an attack on the whole concept of the Asiatic mode of production, beginning with Marx's initial formulation. The main body of *Lineages* will also provoke discussion, although at this point, without the next volume, the discussion can only be as limited as the book.

Perry Anderson's project will, upon completion, surely assume its place as a lasting contribution to European historiography. Few people have attempted a work on this scale, and fewer still have done so with comparable mastery of an incredibly wide range of secondary sources. The project will certainly compel us to rethink European history, and even though that rethinking may lead to an ultimate rejection of Anderson's interpretation, these books will have thereby served an important and admirable function.

Nick Xenos

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SHORT JOURNAL REVIEWS:

AESTHETIK UND KOMMUNIKATION, Nos. 22-23 (December-February 1976)
Scriptor Verlag, 6242 Kronberg—Ts. Schreyerstr. 2. West Germany. DM 7.50. Subtitled "Contributions to Political Education," this issue is concerned with tentatively evaluating an experimental school in Hannover. DIETER RICHTER, *"Die Schule fürs Leben oder Man muss sich halt nach der Decke strecken. Zum Problem der 'gerechten Auslese'."* An introductory survey of the implications of the crisis brought about by the emerging surplus of highly qualified middle class workers and the resulting intensification of competition and reassessment of the system of educational selection. Current West German efforts to rationalize the selection process through the technicization of assessment procedures are severaly criticized and the process of selection itself, rather than particular method, is singled out as the most fundametal issue. The standardization of achievement controls threatens to undermine the capacity for self-constitution which alone can be the basis of a meaningful transformation of the educational system and society. The author ultimately avoids, however, coming to terms with the vexing question of an alternative to a system based upon the necessity of some kind of selection process. LIENHARD WAWRZYN, *"Der sanfte Terror. Zu den Bildern von Gabi Sanft."* Commentary on the accompanying drawings of Sanft whose grotesque studies of the world of children provide remarkable insight into the terrors of childhood socialization. OSKAR NEGT, *"Schule als Erfahrungsprozess."* As one of the key initiators of the project and the source of much of its theoretical inspiration, Negt outlines the broad conceptions and limited goals of the school. This must be situated in the West German context where such an experiment is practically unique, especially at the elementary level. And unlike the "free schools" and the counterculture movement, this project is not oriented toward eliminating the traditional curriculum or pretending that the outside world does not exist. Rather, it is being carried out with the full cooperation of the city of Hannover and is accompanied by a complex ongoing process of assessment involving social researchers, the school staff, the children, and their parents. While the conciliatory and social scientific tone of the article is conditioned in part by these circumstances and the way in which this interim assessment is directed toward the educational establishment of West Germany, it is also evidence of the fundamental retrenchment of the critical left and its turn toward less provocative forms of activism. The remaining articles report on various aspects of the school during its three year history: DORIS KRAMMLING, ERICH BRAUN provide a case study of an aggressive boy; ANE KROVOZA, INGE NEGT explore the problems of self-regulation and motivation; HEINZ-DIETER HERMANN discusses the place of mathematics in the curriculum; MARGRIT BRAUN, RENATE DITTSCHEIDT, UWE TWIEHAUS, consider the experiences with parental participation; JOHANNES EHRHARDT indicates the tensions of action research torn between practical innovation and scientific assessment; HELMUT GOOS, ERNST MANZKE outline the methodological problems of participant observation and interviewing which seek to avoid the distortions of quantitative precision while preserving some degree of reliability; and finally, PETER WEIGELT takes up the classic problem of "boredom" in the context of the practice of self-regulation.

DAS ARGUMENT, No. 95 (January-February, 1976)
Argumentverlag, Box 210730, Karlsruhe, West Germany. DM 86. PETER EISENBERG, *"Wissenschaftliche Grammatik im Sprachunterricht."* WALTHER DIECKMANN, *"Bedarf an Rhetorik."* J. ELLERBROCH, P. JARITZ, W. KUEHNERT, U. SCHNILTZ, *"Arbeit und Sprache bei Rossi-Landi, Habermas und Leist—Ansätze materialistischer Sprachtheorie."* An attempt to show that the three approaches aiming at the full development of a materialist conception of language do not fulfill their promise. The most common problems in establishing such a theory result, according to the authors, out of either a false hypostatization of political economy as a complete theory of society or a hypostatization of language as an ontology of social development. FRIEDRICH TOMBERG, *"Warum an unseren Hochschulen Marxisten unentbehrlich sind."* An interesting commentary on the situation at the West German universities.

CULTURAL HERMENEUTICS, Vol. 11, No. 4 (February, 1975)
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Hermeneutics and Critical Theory. Presentations of taped sessions of a Boston College symposium arranged to provide a forum for dialogue between philosophy and social theory. Includes a bibliographical guide to hermeneutics and critical theory. HANS-GEORG GADAMER, *"Hermeneutics and Social Science."* A description of the relevance of heremeneutics "for the problem of society and social life." From a concern with the role of philosophy in the contemporary scientific epoch, Gadamer develops a critique of cultural self-understanding which finds itself dominated by the concept of scientific procedure. With the collapse of traditional political and moral orientations, the contemporary problem of society has become compounded between the theory's search for some order of orientation and the citizenry's turn to the technical expert as the source of order. RICHARD PALMER, FRED LAWRENCE, RUEDIGER BUBNER, *"Responses to 'Hermeneutics and Social Science'."* RUEDIGER BUBNER, *"Theory and Practice in the Light of the Hermeneutic-Criticist Controversy."* A redefinition of the methodological opposition between hermeneutics and critical theory posed at the level of the relatio of theory and practice. He characterizes both hermeneutics and critical theory as forms of idealism and opposed them to a theory of action. THOMAS BLAKELEY, THOMAS McCARTHY, HANS-GEORG GADAMER, *"Responses to 'Theory and Practice'."*

CRIME AND SOCIAL JUSTICE, No. 5 (Spring-Summer 1976)

School of Criminology, 101 Haviland Hall, University of California, Berkeley, CA 94720. $6 per year (2 issues). Collectively produced, CSJ is a journal of radical criminology whose purpose is to challenge the hegemony of liberal and reactionary perspectives in a discipline that, perhaps more than any other, has been characterized by direct organic links with the most coercive institutions of American society. Previous issues have included major articles on the prospects for radical criminology in the U.S., rape myths, the garrison state in liberal democracy, political prisoners in India, the prison movement in Scandinavia, the emergence of the public defender, the history of the Buffalo police, and the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration as a case study in the development of a social-industrial complex. In addition, the journal has carried reports on specific struggles in and around the criminal justice system, interesting discussions of various problems in teaching criminology-related courses from a radical perspective, and reports on significant conferences. The current issue begins with an editorial entitled *"The Politics of Street Crime,"* by the CSJ COLLECTIVE. First, the article takes up the controversy of whether crime is on the increase. While agreeing with the conventional assessment that it is, the authors qualify their judgment by arguing that 1) the rise in criminal activity is by no means limited to the working class and unemployed, and 2) the rising crime rate is symptomatic of the increasing contradictions and deteriorating social relations of advanced capitalism. Second, the authors discuss the material basis of street crimes in terms of the capitalist process of marginalization and the destruction of social relations. They are especially concerned to correct widely-held romantic views about criminals as "political rebels." Finally, the authors distinguish their position from conservative demands for law and order which tend to mystify and legitimate exploitation. While supporting many specific programs for reducing street crime, the CSJ collective calls for 1) worker and community control of the crime control apparatus, and 2) linking up the immediate struggle against street crime with the struggle against the criminogenic capitalist system as a whole. JULIA AND HERMAN SCHWENDINGER, *"Delinquency and the Collective Varieties of Youth."* Ths essay traces the emergence of juvenile delinquency to its origins in a process of marginalization parcelling capitalist development. Early, labor-intensive capital accumulation relied heavily upon children and adolescents as a distinct and highly exploitable species of human labor. But later, with the increasing shift to capital-intensive exploitation, young people are gradually all but eliminated from the economy and, as a result, come to take their place either in the secondary labor force or in the industrial reserve army. The consequential prolonged dependency of the young means elevated importance for socialization agencies—especially the school—which, through an analogous but separate process of marginalization, generate a youthful population of prototypical marginals. The remainder of the article discusses in detail three types of adolescents, who personify basic structural relations within a local society of youth. DARIO MELOSSI, *"The Penal Question in* Capital." Through an examination of original Marxist texts, Melossi illuminates the methodological principle which requires that crime and punishment be considered as expressions of the human condition under capitalist domination. The article reconstructs the capitalist matrix of the penal question in terms of the process of primitive capital accumulation in which, through forcible expropriation, the emerging bourgeois society first produced widespread vagrancy, while the bourgeois state proceeded to criminalize it. In this context, the institutional function of workhouses and later of prisons was to teach the

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proletariat factory discipline. Melossi concludes by arguing that the present crisis of deviance management in mature capitalist countries necessitates a new Marxist inspired analysis that would take possession of the field of criminology and abolish it *as such* within an overall critical theory of contemporary monopoly capitalism. DORIE KLEIN, JUNE KRESS, *"Any Woman's Blues: A Critical Overview of Women, Crime, and the Criminal Justice System."* This essay provides a radical examination of the changing nature of women's position in the work force and the family in American society, with special concern for the impact of these changes on female participation in crime and the response of the criminal justice system. The special oppression and super-exploitation of women has meant that female criminality has largely consisted of petty offenses, while prevailing sexist stereotypes have accounted for their differential treatment within the criminal justice system. The changing position of women will likely entail changes in the types of crimes women commit, while the increasing militancy of women will doubtlessly cause them to come under more blatantly repressive fire from the state, including the institutions of criminal justice.

DIALECTICAL ANTHROPOLOGY, Vol. 1, No. 2 (February, 1976)

Elsevier Publishing Co., Box 211, Amsterdam, Holland. $38.50 per year. LAWRENCE KRADER, *"Social Evolution and Social Revolution."* Krader tries to explicate the dialectical tension in Marx's writings between evolutionary and revolutionary moments by demonstrating the relationship between the general historical development of humanity and the critique of political economy. The history of mankind has been an evolution from the primitive community to the individualism of the capitalist state. Revolutionary practice will restore primitive communality. The article is of interest for its treatment of Marx's *Ethnological Notebooks*, which Krader edited, and in particular for its analysis of Marx's concept of the Asiatic mode of production. It suffers from an inadequate categorial treatment of the two basic notions in question. ROBERT PAUL, PAUL RABINOW, *"Bourgeois Rationalism Revived."* A scathing critique of the work of Marvin Harris, an anthropologist who has been extremely influential in restoring the validity of mechanical materialism as a method in anthropology. The authors show that Harris' famous distinction between etic (objective) and emic (subjective) science is not only confused in its content but is employed in an inconsistent manner by Harris himself, who is thus able to claim a spurious objectivity for his reductionist interpretations. The authors provide an emic analysis of Harris' system, which concludes by seeing it as based on the very "technocratic scientism" that today serves as a support for the "exploitative premises of civilization." DAVID ZIL'BERMAN, *"Ethnography in Soviet Russia."* STEPHEN P. DUNN, *"Reply to Zil'berman."* ETHEL DUNN, *"Reply to Zil'berman."* Zil'berman's article is critical of the *Introduction to Soviet Ethnography*, edited by the Dunns. He claims that the editors have based their interpretation of Soviet ethnography on external observation and that only the participant observation of a Soviet ethnographer, such as himself, can provide a "deep semantic comprehension" of Soviet ethnography as a "social and ethnic process." The substance of Zil'berman's detailed critique rests on two principles: 1) The Soviet system is Marxist through and through; therefore Soviet ethnography is profoundly influenced by Marxist ideology, even when it is seemingly at its most descriptive and non-ideological. 2) Soviet Marxism is a *political* system which represents the death of culture and its replacement by the "Soviet style of life." In this respect, "Soviet ethnography" is a contradictory concept. The entire debate is fascinating as a touchstone for reflections on the relation between science, ideology and everyday life. GERALD M. SIDER, *"Lumbee Indian Cultural Nationalism and Ethnogenesis."* Sider discusses the internal contradictions between cultural and political nationalism among the Lumbee Indians of North Carolina. He sees cultural nationalism as integral to the self-formation of a people (ethnogenesis) only if it is united with a demand for political and economic equality. MAURIZIO TOSI, *"The Dialectic of State Formation in Mesopotamia, Iran, and Central Asia."* Tosi reviews recent archaeological data and concludes that the model of state formation worked out by Marx in the *Grundrisse* is fundamentally sound. The author rejects a technical determinist interpretation of Marx, stressing instead an "original exploitative nucleus, consisting of population increase, the personification of power, and the irreversibility of specialization." JOEL WHITEBOOK, *"Reflections on the Evolutionist Controversy."* A brief analysis of Leslie White's and Emmanuel Terray's defenses of Morgan's evolutionism. While Whitebook agrees that Morgan's detractors have failed to distinguish adequately between the general schema of evolution and particular cultural processes, he suggests that this defense needs to be grounded in an epistemological account of the relationship between law and instance in social science (such as Habermas provides).

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DIALECTICS AND HUMANISM, Vol. II, No. 3 (Summer 1975)

Ars Polona Ruch, Krakowskie Przedmiescie 7, 00-068, Warsaw, Poland. $5. This is the second issue devoted to the philosophy of Roman Ingarden and the Marxist critique of phenomenology. N.V. MOTROSHILOVA, *"The Problem of the Cognitive Subject as viewed by Husserl and Ingarden."* JOHN FIZER, *"Ingarden's Phases, Bergson's Durée Réelle, and W. James' Stream: Metaphoric Variants or Mutually Exclusive Concepts on the Theme of Time."* MICHAL HEMPLOINSKI, *"On Ingarden's Conception of 'Pure' Epistemology as a Starting Point to his Criticism of so-called Psychophysiological Epistemology."* T.I. OISERMAN, *"E. Husserl's Philosophy of Philosophy."* Basing himself on Marx's and Engels' critique of speculative idealism, Oiserman defines Husserl's conception of philosophy and criticizes it as a continuous separation of human consciousness from external, empirical objectivity. ANDRZEJ POLTAWSKI, *"Ingarden's Way to Realism and his Idea of Man."* A discussion of Ingarden's use of concepts such as man, time, constitution, and action as found in his *Time and Modes of Being.* ALBERT SHALOM, *"On the Structure of the Person: Time and Consciousness."* R.D. SWEENEY, *"Axiology in Scheler and Ingarden and the Question of Dialectics."* JANUSZ KUCZYNSKI, *"Homo Creator vs. Homo Contemplator. The Dialectical and Phenomenological Conception of Man."*

ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, Vol. 5, No. 1 (February, 1976)

Broadway House, Reading Road, Henley-on-Thames, Oxon RG9 1EN. $20 per year. JARIUS BANAJI, *"Summary of Selected Parts of Kautsky's 'The Agrarian Question'."* Heralded here as a classic of Marxism, Kautsky's *Agrarfrage* is seen to be a study of the development of agriculture in capitalist social formations. It deals with the questions: why does the development of agrarian capitalism proceed at a pace and take a form different from that of industry? Why does the capitalist mode of production, despite the dominance attributed to it, coexist with precapitalist social relations of production? What is the effect of this coexistence on the social formation? JEAN PIERRE FAYE, *"The Critique of Language and Its Economy."* This is a translation from chapter one of his book of the same title. A central figure in the French *Change* collective, Faye's "transformationism" is an attempt to understand the facts and basic variations of ideologies (understood à la Althusser) from transformations of language. Distinguished from semiology, this approach is based on the Chomskyan theory of syntax, and seeks to constitute a "semantics of history" as a theoretical science. TERRY COUNIHAN, *"Epistemology and Science—Feyerabend and Lecourt."* A review of *Against Method* and *Marxism and Epistemology.*

GREEN MOUNTAIN QUARTERLY, No. 3 (May, 1976)

462 North Main Street, Oshkosh, WI 54901. $5 for 4 issues. This issue, through reconstructed narrative and original documents, relates the class milieu, labor issues, and public trial which comprised the Oshkosh (Wisconsin) woodworker strike of 1898. The journal's reconstruction of this event is an excellent case which illuminates the broader character of class relationships in the competitive capitalist era: the mindless ravaging of nature, the importation of Eastern European peasants as unskilled laborers, the institutions of community among the ethnic workers through which they forged their solidarity, the destitute conditions of millwork and family survival, and the resulting class struggles between workers and owners. The issue is thus an original contribution to the social and poltiical history of the American working class. One value of this form of history is to enable us to uderstand the extent to which these earlier conditions no longer prevail in most modern industries and why the consciousness of most workers is formed around themes other than the exploitation of their labor. But perhaps the greatest contribution of the issue is the inclusion of Clarence S. Darrow's concluding defense of the strike leaders who were prosecuted as criminals for leading the strike against private property. This speech is an eloquent ideological argument for the rights of the working class to live as unfetishized and unexploited human beings over the rights of private property. Reminscent of Deb's great public speeches, Darrow's defense is surely one of the great, and overlooked, socialist documents of the period. His speech also illustrates an integral feature of the early era of labor-capital struggle: the important mediating role which intellectuals and socialist ideology played in the day-to-day struggles of the American working class. Not a plea for stability, harmony of interests, or conciliation, Darrow's speech is a socialist demand for the worker's right to control the institutions of their employment and their lives. In this sense, the document is timeless and useful for the restoration of ideology in modern American politics. The issue concludes with how millhands achieved workers' control over the woodworking industry in Oshkosh following the Depression and how this institution has functioned in the post-war period. A good idea of the

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conditions which created workers' control and the political value and limitation of this institution in the modern period can be obtained from this issue.

INSURGENT SOCIOLOGIST, Vol. 6, No. 3 (Spring 1976)

Sociology Dept., University of Oregon, Eugene, OR 97403. $4 per year—low income: $8 per year otherwise. GÖRAN THERBORN, *"What Does the Ruling Class Do When It Rules?"* A critique of two basic sociological approaches to the study of power in society—one dealing with "who rules" and the other dealing with "the amount of power in a system." Therborn opts for a structural-processual approach which turns out to be a crude form of dialectical materialism. The ruling class' actions are embodied in the 'objective laws' whereby capitalist social relations are reproduced—laws supported by the state and a number of other mechanisms. MARTY LANDSBERG, *"Multinational Corporations and the Crisis of Capitalism."* Instead of increasing national antagonism, rivalry and international collapse, the crisis of accumulation can possible precipitate a higher level of international reorganization and integration through the development of a new international mode of production. Landsberg takes his cue from some themes already presented by Samir Amin and Andre Gunder Frank. FEMINIST THEORY COLLECTIVE, *"Comment on Szymanski."* A response to an article in a previous issue of IS. DOUGLAS PARKER, *"Comment on Johnson."* Another reply to a previous article. THERESE BAKER, *"Impressions of the Socialist Feminist National Conference."* CHARLOTTE O'KELLY, *"A Note on Markoff and Lembcke's Review of the* Hidden Injuries of Class*."* ELLEN TRIMBERGER, *"On Perry Anderson's* Passages from Antiquity to Feudalism *and* Lineages of the Absolutist State*."* A review essay.

KURSBUCH, No. 41 (September, 1975)

Kursbuch-Rotbuch Verlag, 1 Berlin 50, Potsdamer Strasse 98, West Germany. DM 8 per issue. Issue theme: *"Alltag"* (The Everyday). KARL MICHEL, *"Unser Alltag: Nachruf zu Lebzeiten."* A multifaceted and richly textured effort to characterize the fundamental form of perception and expression in bourgeois literature in terms of three basic narrative rules: personalization of agents, sequencing of events in terms of individual biographies, and their balancing with moderating calculation. This framework hence implies that a great number of experiences are not captured and are either suppressed or the capacity for them atrophies, putting in question the very "continuity" of social life. ALEXANDER KLUGE, EDGAR REITZ, *"In Gefahr und grösster Not bringt der Mittelweg den Tod."* A brief description of the content, full text of the screenplay, and an analysis of the audience reception of the recent film of the same title. While thematically built around the street battles over housing demolition in Frankfurt (*Faschings-Samstag*, 1974), it is also designed as an attack on conventional conceptions of realism, a theme further developed in a recent book. KLAUS LAERMANN, *"Alltags-Zeit. Bemerkungen über die unauffälligste Form Sozialen Zwangs."* A historical reconstruction of the origins of the concept of the "everyday" in the late 18th century. It is traced to the emergence of abstract "clocktime" whereby the concrete, task-limited "workday" is replaced by the endless "everyday," culminating in the substitutability of time and money that accompanies the rise of capitalism. RAINER PARIS, *"Befreiung vom Alltag?"* A penetrating critique of the absurd (and finally, totalitarian) notion of an abolition of the everyday through its total politicization. Drawing upon Agnes Heller, Paris develops a cogent analysis of the implications of the everyday for a comprehensive social movement within which organized politics is only one—if an essential —dimension. LIENHARD WAWRZYN, *"Feste: Die Zerstörung der Zumutungen des Alltags."* A description of a typical politically-oriented festival (a money-raising party for Chileans) which concludes that the emancipatory moment of a successful festival lies in its challenge to everyday compulsions, hence its demonstration that the old rules can be transcended. HARALD WIESER, *"Von Masken und Menschen. Ein paar Szenen aus dem Alltag des Genossen X."* Reflections on everyday experiences. KARIN RESCHKE, *"Anschaffen und Aufräumen."* Letter from a mother in Prague to her son in West Germany. PAUL SCHUSTER, *"Würde man meine Schwiegermutter fragen... Alltag—aus (nichtalltäglicher) rumänischer Sicht."* A comparison of life in Berlin and Bucharest. *"Berufsstruktur in der BRD."*

LIBERATION, Vol. 19, No. 8-9 (January, 1976)

339 Lafayette Street, New York, NY 10012. $10 per year. FRANCIS FOX PIVEN, *"Slicing the Big Apple."* An interview of Piven concerning the role of post-war Black migrants, municipal employee unions and the Democratic political machines in New York City's "crisis." ROBERT ZEVIN, *"Taking Care of Business."* A study of the New York municipal government's policies of

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deficit spending, the over-extended public services in the metro area and the major banks' senseless public borrowing policies are reviewed as the root of New York City's and other major cities' political and economic csrises. MURRAY BOOKCHIN, *"The Urban Vacuum."* Bookchin rehearses his familiar comments on the obsolescence of modern cities and recommends the formation of citizens' councils and popular municipal self-management groups to save the cities from the fatal mismanagement of professional politicians and bureaucrats.

MERKUR, No. 333 (February, 1976)

Klett Verlag, Box 809, Stuttgart, West Germany. DM 51. IRING FETSCHER, *"Von der Dialektik des Fortschritts: Wer kann die Entwicklung steuern?"* A critique of the liberal 'invisible hand' principle in the context of its inability to rationally control measures aiming at solutions of globally relevant socio-economic problems. Fetscher grounds such a critique in the necessity of constituting a social subject capable of transcending the calculating egoism of the bourgeois 'homo oeconomicus.' The sphere of everydayness is suggested as fertile ground for such a transition. The weakest aspect of the article is the rather mechanistic conception of the relationship between the realms of individuality and collectivity which partially manifests itself in Fetscher's vague pro-Chinese sympathies.

NEW GERMAN CRITIQUE, No. 7 (Winter 1976)

German Department, Box 413, University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee, WI 53201. $6 per year (3 issues). PETER UWE HOHENDAHL, *"The Use Value of Contemporary and Future Literary Criticism."* An analysis of the social function of literary criticism argues that its forms are part of the consciousness industry supporting the hegemony of the capitalist public sphere. DIETER RICHTER, *"Teachers and Readers: Reading Attitudes as a Problem in Teaching Literature."* An attack on the positivist pedagogy of German curriculum planning which advocates an alternative attitude of "productive reading" rooted in the interests and fantasies of individual subjectivity. RAINER NAEGELE, *"Aspects of the Reception of Heinrich Böll."* The stages of development in Böll's political consciousness as reflected in his literature are juxtaposed against the changes in attitudes towards him manifested by both the cultural elite and mass media. Böll's work is shown to contain a fundamental tension between uneasiness with capitalism on the one hand, and its indirect affirmation through the use of traditional bourgeois forms of objectifications on the other. MARC ZIMMERMAN, *"Polarities and Contradictions: Theoretical Bases of the Marxist-Structuralist Encounter."* Comparison of the structural concerns in Marx's thought with the main aspects of structuralist theory shows that structuralism's principles only permit a non-Marxist use of Marxist concepts, a problem only partially overcome by serious theoretical attempts to produce a synthesis of the two. Zimmerman sees structuralism and Marxism as complementary, but admits that their potential unification has not yet been attained. PAUL PICCONE, *"From Tragedy to Farce: The Return of Critical Theory."* The contemporary relevance of critical theory is seen in the light of its emergence in post-World War I Europe as a response to workers' councils. Hegelian Marxism in the 1920s elaborated the problem of collective subjectivity; when the authoritarian changes in the rationalization of capitalism's social context made these concerns irrelevant, critical theory was forced to fight against the eclipse of bourgeois autonomy. The loss of faith in subjectivity manifest in the critique of identity theory led to the premature rejection of Husserl; however, the modern American reality requires a transcendence of this limited approach. HANS-JOCHEN BRAUNS, DAVID KRAMER, *"Political Repression in West Germany: 'Berufsverbote' in Modern German History."* The recent policy of professional proscription by the Social Democratic government is shown to be in practice a reactionary weapon aimed at leftists in government employment. The analysis shows that the "Berufsverbote," applied repeatedly as a direct or indirect means of social control, has the effect of reinforcing conservative anti-democratic bureaucratic tendencies, and though formally directed against all extremists, puts both leftists and centrists at a disadvantage. The history of such policies since the 18th century shows the present government to be continuing the tradition of German capitalist legitimation. HOWARD GADLIN, *"The Return to Freud?"* Review article of Jacoby's *Social Amnesia*. DAVID HELD, LAWRENCE SIMON, *"Towards Understanding Habermas."* Review essay of *Legitimation Crisis*. FRIEDERICKE J. HASSAUER, PETER ROOS, GUNTHER WEIMANN, *"Sociology of Literature Without Literature."* Review of Lutz Winkler's *The Production of Cultural Commodities*.

NEUES FORUM, No. 261 (September, 1975)

Museumstrasse 5, Vienna A-1070. DM 6.50. *"Was wählen? Was tun?"* A series of articles on

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strategies for the upcoming (last fall) Austrian elections by representatives of the major left splinter groups. Aside from the Maoists, all advocated some form of participation despite a consensus regarding the immobility of the socialist party in power and the contraints of electoral politics. MICHAEL SIEGERT, *"Sozialdemokratie und Imperialismus. I. Teil: Kriegsziele und Beutehoffnungen 1914-1918."* The first part of an informative and well-documented analysis of the unsavory role played by the Austrian socialist party in World War I. ALFRED DALLINGER, *"Frischluft nur für den Computer? Wie die Gewerkschaft die Maschinen zähmt."* A technocratically optimistic commentary on the future of automation which is significant only because its author is a leading trade union official who is at least trying to envision the long-term imperatives of workers' participation. MICHAEL SELTZER, HOWARD KARGER, *"Von Vietnam ins Schulzimmer. Elektronikkonzerne und Lernmaschinen."* Translation of a *Ramparts* article on the effort of the communications industry to penetrate the education market. SUSANNE KELLER, *"Tests machen dumm. Warum man 'Intelligenz' nicht messen kann."* A survey of the ideological content of recent discussions on the hereditary component of academic achievement.

NEUES FORUM, No. 262 (October, 1975)

"Russen, Popen und Gepisten." Three pieces on the Soviet Union: a satirical travelogue based on a recent visit by the editor Günther Nenning and excerpts from Solzhenitsyn's *Memoirs* attacking the Soviet literary figure Alexander Twardovsky coupled with a reply and defense by his daughter Valentina. DOM HELDER CAMARA, *"Für aktive Gewaltlosigkeit. Vortrag in Wien."* Vienna lecture of a Brazilian activist priest on the problems of development and the Church. ADALBERT KRIMS, *"Helder Camara—Prophet einer Kirche der Armen."* Background essay on Camara's career. ADOLF FROHNER, *"Scheinsexualität. Studien zur pornographischen Kommunikation."* Photopainting collage on the similarity between pornography and everyday life. PETER GORSEN, *"Unser täglicher Sex im Büro. Erotik als Klammer und Markenartikel."* An essay accompanying the preceding graphics which analyzes the functions of repressed sexuality in office work. ERNEST BORNEMAN, *"Sex im alten Rom. Wie das römische Patriarchat die Sexualität deformierte."* Excerpt from the author's recent book on patriarchy; this chapter describes sexuality in the Roman Empire. ANDREAS BURO, GUENTER DILL, *"Warum Thieu stürtzte. Hintergrund des Sieges der vietnamesischen Revolution (I. Teil)."* First part of a detailed and well-documented account of Thieu's fall. CLAUDIE and JACQUES BROYELLE, *"Klassenkampf in China. Widerstreit zweier Linien in den Fabriken."* On the basis of a recent follow-up study, two French sociologists provide an intimate account of the political cleavages introduced by the introduction of more efficient technology in Chinese factories.

NEW LEFT REVIEW, No. 96 (March-April, 1976)

7 Carlisle Street, London W1V 6NL, England. $16 per year. RONALD FRASER, *"Spain on the Brink."* An examination of the problems of the Spanish left and the possibilities of establishing a bourgeois democracy as a medium between the reform of state authoritarianism and the immobilism of a violent social conflict. PABLO FLORES d'ARCAIS, FRANCO MORETTI, *"Paradoxes of the Italian Political Crisis."* The political endorsement of the PCI in the June 15 elections suggests its eventual participation in government and a possible change in the political balance of the state. The PCI has gained a strength of electoral force, yet the state's economic and political base confronts the opportunity for the Party to form a national coalition government, suggesting a potential radical social conflict. NICOS MOUZELIS, *"Capitalism and Dictatorship in Post-War Greece."* An examination of the Greek military regime and its relation to economic and class developments in the state. The crisis of the dictatorship is explained by the contradiction between the mass radicalization of capital accumulation and the political containment of political control. MICHAEL LOEWY, *"Marxists and the National Question."* A theoretical and methodological examination of the Marxist debate on the national question. Any authentic internationalist course must be drawn from the policies of the Comintern (1919-23) and the Second International's 1896 Congress. TAMARA DEUTSCHER, *"Intellectual Opposition in the USSR."* A survey of the dissident writers' groups, drawing out the contradition between the original ideas of socialism and its Moscow presentation. ELI ZARETSKY, NANCH CHODOROW, *"Discussion:* Psychoanalysis and Feminism. *A Rejoinder to Richard Wollheim."* JOHN SOLOMAS, *"Report from Cyprus."*

OUR GENERATION, Vol. 11, No. 2

Our Generation Press, 3934 rue St. Urbain, Montreal 131, Canada, $10 per year. *"Portugal."* A

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special section featuring an interview with M. Lucas, a Portuguese anarchist; a diary excerpt from April 1975 by William Graham relating to the National Elections; observations by Jeremy Boultbee, a Canadian journalist, on the rightist bias of the international press as it covers Portugal. MARTIN GLABERMAN, *"Work and Working Class Consciousness."* Vague, discursive remarks on aspects of working class consciousness, suggesting that such consciousness comes from, believe it or not, work. FRED CALOREN, *"The Urban World of Manuel Castells."* A succinct critical review of the works on capitalist urbanization, modern urbanism and urban class-based politics written by the left-wing urban sociologist, Manuel Castells. DIMITRI ROUSSOPOULOUS, *"Beyond Reformism: The Ambiguity of the Urban Question."* A continuation of a polemic with Henry Milner (*Our Generation*, Vol. 10, No. 4), which also continues a discussion of the Montreal Citizens' Movement as an example of urban neighborhood councils working for decentralization. MARTIN MEISSNER, *"Women and Inequality."* A theoretical and empirical study of the sexual division of labor in Canadian families investigating the amount of time spent at leisure and work by each sex.

POLITICS AND SOCIETY, Vol. 5, No. 3 (1975)

Geron-X Inc., Publishers, Box 1108, Los Altos, CA 94022. $9.50 for 4 issues. JOHN H. MOLLENKOPF, *"The Post-War Politics of Urban Development."* The dual political crisis of American cities in the 1960s (i.e., both the neighborhood community's insurgency and pressures from within city politics) is examined as part of a larger dialectic between the local government's attempt to solve a central city land value and revenue crisis and the political consequences of the solution chosen. Examining the period between 1945 and the present, the dual political crisis is understood as a class-based struggle over the nature of urban development. It is argued that politics and the activities of local government played a central role in determining the outcome of this struggle, but were also shaped by it in turn. JAMES O'CONNOR, *"Productive and Unproductive Labor."* Examining modes of production and class struggle, this paper discusses productive and unproductive labor in both circulation and production. The main thesis is that production labor in capitalist society is simultaneously productive and unproductive and that the analysis of the contradictory and dialectical character of labor in production is essential to a scientific understanding of the decline of capitalism and the rise of primitive socialism. WILLIAM SCHEUERMAN, *"Economic Power in the United States: The Case of Steel."* Analyzing the structural characteristics of the U.S. steel industry, this essay attempts to understand the extent to which a handful of producers controls the production of steel and how steel corporations attain their level of economic consolidation and coordination. IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN, *"Class Formation in the Capitalist World Economy."* Before analyzing the nature and workings of social classes and the process of class formation, the specific mode of functioning of this world system is examined. Asserting that the class struggle is politically centered around the attempt of the dominant class to create and sustain a third tier against the attempt of the oppressed classes to polarize both the reality and the perception of the reality, this essay examines class in relation to "ethno-national groupings," the form which this relative privilege has been understood to take. HELEN ICKEN SAFA, *"Class Consciousness Among Working Class Women in Latin America. A Case Study in Puerto Rico."* This paper argues that because of the centrality of women's family roles, particularly in Latin America, they cannot be ignored in the formation of female class consciousenss. It further demonstrates that the class consciousness in women involves not only oppression in the workplace, as members of the working class, but sexual subordination in the home, resulting from a strong patriarchal family structure. Some of the changes taking place in women's family and occupational roles and their impact on class consciousness, particularly in the younger generation, are also discussed.

RADICAL AMERICA, Vol. 10, No. 2 (March-April, 1976)

P.O. Box B.N., Cambridge, MA 02140. $5 for 4 issues. RENATE BRIDENTHAL, *"The Dialectics of Production and Reproduction in History."* Working to evolve a theory which will restore and reintegrate women's experience into written history, this essay rejects both the structural-functional and the Marxist historiography, because neither is seen to have done justice to historical evidence about women. Combining Juliet Mitchell's framework with Marx's (i.e., Mitchell's categories of sexuality, reproduction, and socialization of children are subsumed under the term 'mode of reproduction'), a relationship is sought between it and the "mode of production." DAVID MONTGOMERY, RONALD SCHATZ, *"Facing Layoffs."* Recalling various ways in which workers have coped with layoffs and widespread unemployment, this article examines why even the sharp economic slumps during the 1950s failed to generate a

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significant revival of the types of organized activity at the base, characteristic of earlier crises. WOMEN'S WORK STUDY GROUP, *"Loom, Broom, and Womb: Producers, Maintainers and Reproducers."* Women's work and the development of American capitalism is examined in three historical phases: the pre-capitalsit phase prior to 1820; the phase of competitive capitalism between 1820-1890; and the monopoly capitalist phase from 1890 to the present. Each period is briefly described in terms of the organization of production and the implications of this organization on the lives of women. ANN WITHORN, *"The Death of CLUW."* Briefly reviewing the CLUW's even briefer history, this article examines the original conflict between women in the upper levels of the trade union bureaucracy and women from the various parts of the left. In an attempt to understand why the bureaucrats gained control over the organization, their victory and the consequent destruction of the CLUW as a widely based mass organization within the trade unions is discussed. TOD ENSIGN, CARL FEINGOLD, MICHAEL UHL. *"Portugal: The Meaning of November 25."* This article describes the defeat suffered by the Portuguese left and the working class in the events of late November when two major areas of revolutionary influence—the military and the media—were taken over by the reactionary forces. CHRISTOPHER KNOWLES, *"On the Death of Augustin Tosco."* An informative obituary on the Argentine trade union's most lucid and popular militant leader.

RADICAL PHILOSOPHY, Vol. 13 (Spring 1976)

40 Langdon Park Road, London N6 5QG, England. $7.50 for 3 issues. TED BENTON, *"Winch, Wittgenstein, and Marxism."* This paper was originally written to defend "genuinely intellectually liberating" aspects of Wittgenstein's philosophy against the tendency to submerge its particular characteristics into "an ill-defined and amorphous 'bourgeois-culture'." The central advances in Wittgenstein's work and the original dismissal of him as a bourgeois philosopher is discussed. The more recent attempts to uncover a progressive Wittgenstein and connect him with Marx are examined in an attempt to achieve a more reliable and objective assessment of the place of Wittgenstein in British intellectual history. AARON SLOMAN, *"What are the Aims of Science?"* By undermining the slogan that science is the search for laws, and subsidiary slogans, such as that quantification is essential, that scientific theories must be empirically refutable, and that the methods of philosophers cannot serve the aims of scientists, this essay is directed at liberating some scientists from the dogmas indoctrinated in universities and colleges. Philosophers are shown how they can contribute to the scientific study of man, and some of the old philosophical distinctions (e.g., between subjectivity and objectivity and the battles between empiricists and rationalists) are examined. BERTELL OLLMAN, *"In Defense of Internal Relations."* To be included in the forthcoming second edition of *Alienation: Marx's Conception of Man in Capitalist Society,* this response to the critics of Ollman's account of Marx's philosophy of internal relations develops his defense of this philosophy beyond the brief remarks found in the appendix to the first edition. LEONARD WILLIAMS, *"The Politics of Aggression."* Describing the revolutionary significance of the great deal of new knowledge from the field of primate ethology, this essay assesses its value for strengthening socialist thought in areas of cultural, social, and historical study. JOE McCARNEY, *"The Theory of Ideology: Some Comments on Mepham."* A critical response to Mepham's essay, "The Theory of Ideology in *Capital*" (RP, Summer, 1972).

RADICAL RELIGION, Vol. II, No. 2-3

P.O. Box 9164, Berkeley, CA 94709. $5 for 4 issues. Double issue on class origins and class readings. S. ROSTAGNO, *"The Bible: Is An Interclass Reading Legitimate?"* Interclass reading is illegitimate, as is the reading in which scientific analysis of production relationships is seen within a biblical context of which it really has no need. J. DUS, *"Moses or Joshua? On the Problem of the Founder of the Israelite Religion."* The cultural and political community of Old Israel actually came into being through a religious-social revolution, where Joshua (not Moses) was reconciler and liberator of the Palestinian Hebrews. N.K. GOTTWALD, *"Biblical Theology or Biblical Sociology? On Affirming and Defining the 'Uniqueness' of Israel."* Outlines the preconditions for a theological method employing biblical records as ideological products and instruments of social formation. H.P. NEWTON, *"The Son of Man."* The tradition of a Messianic duality of sovereignty and humility is a very crude explanation for the dynamic of a politico-mythic dialectic. J.P. BROWN, *"Techniques of Imperial Control: The Background of the Gospel Event."* The Gospels mention aspects of Galilean and Jerusalem culture and economy which under scrutiny contribute to our understanding of the Gospel message. G. THEISSEN, *Itinerant Radicalism: The Tradition of Jesus Sayings from the Perspective of the Sociology of*

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Literature." This examines how the original oral transmitters of the Gospel understood themselves (as itinerant charismatics) and how the contemporaneous social conditions shaped their accounts of the Gospel. M.C. Calloway, *"The Mistress and the Maid: Midrashic Traditions Behind Galatians 4: 21-31."* Explanation of Paul's class-based interpretation of Genesis in Galatians. Y. REDALIE, *"Conversion or Liberation? Notes on Acts 16: 11-40."* A French theologian-community organizer cooly suggests that Luke's (and perhaps our own) priorities in "mission" may feed into the structure of exploitation, both then and now.

RADICAL RELIGION, Vol. II, No. 4

"Filipino Theology of Liberation: A Working Paper." Filipino liberation theology identifies with the poor; seeks insight from Marx, Lenin, and Mao; re-orders the categories of theological reflection to match practical liberation activity. KIM CHI-HA, *"To All who Cherish Justice and Truth."* A letter of Christian conscience from an imprisoned Korean non-cooperator describes oppression in Korea, its political future. M. RUSSELL, *"Women, Work, and Politics in the U.S."* In organizing for social change we must join our needs with the needs of the rest of the world (especially the Americas), not merely reproducing our privatized values, but working collectively. L. CORMIE, R. STACK, D. IRARRAZAVAL, *"How Do We Do Liberation Theology?"* This explains concretely a way to combine reflection on the Bible and religious experience, with informed practice of specific action on behalf of justice to the oppressed. H. MORRISON, *"Theoretical Questions of Marxist-Christian Unity."* The Marxist critique of religion seems to assume that transcendence can be affirmed only at the expense of the material world, but in fact Christians can struggle for socialism by the same Marxist science as other socialists. D. TURNER, *"Marxism and Christian Praxis."* The nexus of Marxism and Christianity is historical praxis. R.M. BROWN, *"From Detroit to Nairobi and Beyond."* Recent convocation of World Council of Churches engages Christians in the struggle for liberation. M. McKALE, *"From Reservation to Global Society."* An interview with Vine Deloria on the exploitation of American Indians.

REVIEW OF RADICAL POLITICAL ECONOMICS, No. 8 (Spring 1976)

Union for Radical Political Economics, Ann Arbor, MI 48104, $30 per year. First of two issues on Women and the Economy. TERRY FEE, *"Domestic Labor: An Analysis of Housework and its Relation to the Production Process."* A useful review of treatments of whether housework is productive or unproductive labor, arguing that it is neither. Warns against determining women's revolutionary potential simply on the basis of an analysis of the political economic role of housework. CARMEN DIANA DEERE, *"Rural Women's Subsistence Production in the Capitalist Periphery."* Discussion of how women's role in agricultural production allows capitalists to hire men at wages less than those required for the reproduction of the family. Notes similarities and differences between the roles of women in center and periphery countries. The purpose of this piece is never made clear. LOURDES BENARIA, *"Women's Participation in Paid Production under Capitalism: The Spanish Experience."* An account of the beginning of the legal-economic emancipation of women during the Republican period, the drastic rollback under Franco, and, since 1960, a renewed liberalization in the treatment of women, with some interesting commentary on the women's movement during the Republican period. BATYA WEINBAUM, *"Women in Transition to Socialism: The Chinese Case."* Interesting, though difficult, analysis, similar to Deere's, which points out how family members have participated in variable ways in both agricultural and industrial production and how this allows the Chinese to cope with the problems accompanying the onset of capitalism and later accelerated accumulation under the Communists. Since this beneficial consequence has been heavily at the expense of women, the piece ends with a discussion of how the socialization of the household, necessary to further the emancipation of women, can and may occur. HAROLD BARNETT, *"The Political Economy of Rape and Prostitution."* An unconvincing explanation covering the racial and income-group differentials in the treatment of rape victims, prostitutes, rapists, and those dealing with prostitutes in terms of the view of women as property. RUTH MILKMAN, *"Women's Work and the Economic Crisis: Some Lessons from the Great Depression."* Interesting critique of the widespread notion of women as a reserve labor pool which claims that the unemployment rate for women was lower than that for men during the Depression. Describes the steps women took to deal with the financial and psychic strains imposed on the family, but doubts that family members are willing or able to take similar steps in the present crisis. JANE HUMPHRIES, *"Women: Scapegoats and Safety Valves in the Great Depression."* Deals with the various ways women and families are used to sustain capitalism, but concentrates on the socio-

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political functions of the 1920s and 1930s backlash against the feminist movement and the growing labor force participation of women, especially married women.

SALMAGUNDI, No. 33-34 (Spring-Summer 1976)

Skidmore College, Saratoga Springs, NY 12866. $6 one year; $10 two years. A useful, diverse anthology of texts on dance of which half are reprints of significant material on classical and folk dancing. HAVELOCK ELLIS, *"The Art of Dancing."* A historical discussion of the origins of dancing's primal functions (practical and symbolic) in religion, love, morality, and art. FRANK KERMODE, *"Poet and Dancer Before Diaghilev."* Interprets the turn of the century dance renaissance and provides interesting insight into the biographies of Loie Fuller and Jane Avril in order to illuminate the role of dancing in Mallarmé's poetry. MARTIN POPS, *"The Rape of Sleeping Beauty: Dance in Our Time."* On the 20th century's assault on 19th century classical ballet's puritanism. The editor of this issue on dance looks at modern dance through the eyes of Norman O. Brown, Bachelard, McLuhan and others in arguing that dance plays a primary formative role in modern consciousness. PAUL VALERY, *"Philosophy of the Dance."* Articulates a philosophy of dance defined as "the action of the whole human body" which transposes evryday space and time. Demonstrates the gradual development of a need and utility for artistic creation. SUSANNE LANGER, *"The Dynamic Image: Some Philosophical Reflections on Dance."* Reprinted from *Feeling and Form*. Examines philosophical problems posed by dance in terms of perception and expression of direct human experience. Concludes that "every art image is a purified and simplified aspect of the outer world, composed by the laws of the inner world to express its nature." HEINRICH VON KLEIST, *"Puppet Theatre."* Reflections written in 1810 on the complexity and pleasures of marionette-theater. RUDOLF ARNHEIM, *"Concerning the Dance."* On the narcissisms and fusion of subject and object specific to dance. Defines the representational limits of the dance in terms of the body as both raw material (content) and form. STEPHANE MALLARME, *"Ballets."* Lyrical praise for the "illiterate" symbolic forms of the ballet and of a "ballerina," Loie Fuller. MARTIN BUBER, *"Brother Body."* On the liberating gestures of dance as physical and spiritual enjoyment of the body. ANTONIN ARTAUD, *"On the Balinese Theater."* Marvels at the effect of hallucination and fear produced by the Balinese theatrical performance and the superiority of its masterfully executed ritualistic conventions for restoring the pre-linguistic power of pure theater lost in the West. EDWIN DENTY, *"Forms in Motion and in Thought."* Compares dance movements and styles from the Paleolithic Age to modern Brooklyn and from classical ballet to spontaneous forms of community dance. D.H. LAWRENCE, *"The Hopi Snake Dance."* Wry but serious account of this annual ritual from a sympathetic tourist who, like the Hopis, grapples with the terrible cosmic forces and revels in the strange malevolence of snakes dangling from priests' mouths. JILL JOHNSTON, *"The New American Dance."* Looks at the upheavals of technique, form and subject matter in traditional ballet of this century. GEOFFREY GORER, *"The Function of Different Dance Forms in Primitive African Communities."* Informative discussion of dance in French West Africa, Senegal, and Ivory Coast which compares such factors as topography, class divisions, religions, life styles, and financing. MAYA DERNE, *"Drums and Dance."* Study of the collective forms and religions or metaphysical inspirations of Haitian dance which, while attentive to techniques and organization of group artistic creation, reduces content to aesthetic phenomenalism. LINCOLN KIRSTEIN, *"The Position of Balanchine."* DAVID MICHAEL LEVIN, *"Balanchine's Formalism."* ROBERT GARIS, *"The New York City Ballet."* Three articles paying tribute to the master Balanchine. *"Bibliography."*

SCIENCE AND SOCIETY, Vol. XL, No. 1

Room 4331, John Jay College, CUNY, 445 W. 59 Street, New York, NY 10019. ROBERT PADGUG, *"Problems in the Theory of Slavery and Slave Society."* A classification of slave societies into the categories of Asiatic, Ancient, and American models of slavery is presented along with a good discussion of the conceptual problems of defining slavery and slave society. FRANCO ANDREUCCI, MALCOLM SYLVERS, *"The Italian Communists Write Their History."* A review covering the PCI's keeping of detailed, accurate, and critical historical records on its own political activities and major personalities, re-emphasizing the cultural and political importance of such historical accounts. JANE BEITSCHER, E.K. HUNT, *"Insights into the Dissolution of the Feudal Mode of Production: A Case Study of the Limousin."* A mainly historical piece fulfilling the promise of its protracted title by blaming at least one feudal economic collapse on inter-familial rivalries among the nobility of the Limousin.

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SCIENCE AND SOCIETY, Vol. XL, No. 2

DAVID BOOTH, *"Cuba, Color and the Revolution."* Booth presents a detailed study of both pre-revolutionary and post-revolutionary race relations in Cuba based, in part, on field research. Although the revolutionary regime has successfully improved the day to day lot of black Cubans, Booth suggests that the access to government, party, and managerial positions still denied to many blacks is an old historical practice that can only change more slowly. Yet, the "racism" of Cuban society is seen as both different from and less violent than that of North American society. STEPHEN WHITE, *"Colonial Revolution and the Communist International, 1919-1924."* An historical review of the Bolsheviks' initial schemes for fomenting world revolution and their eventual recognition that Marxism had little organic significance in most colonial situations. Consequently, the International is presented as forming its own theory of colonial revolution in the course of aiding nationalist revolts against the colonial empires. RENATO SANDRI, *"Chile: An Analysis of an Experiment and a Defeat."* Translation of a very good analysis originally in *Critica Marxista*, No. 5 (1973), of the events leading up to the September 1973 Chilean coup. CRISTOAL KAY, *"The Chilean Road to Socialism: Post Mortem."* N. MARK MUSSACHIA, *"Further Comment on Karl Popper and Historical Predictability."*

SIGNS, Vol. I, No. 1 (Autumn 1975)

University of Chicago Press, 5801 Ellis Ave., Chicago, IL 60637. $9.60 per year students; $12 other. Issue theme: Power and Powerlessness. *"Editorial."* Sets forth a policy of rigorous and original interdisciplinary scholarship on the "totality of women's lives" with emphasis on institutions and ideologies. The avowed aim is to create a "forum" for varied methodological approaches that would yield a distinctive feminist scholarship. However, it is not yet clear in what respects this pluralistic stance views itself as critical of traditional scholarship. CARROLL SMITH-ROSENBERG, *"The Female World in Nineteenth-Century America."* Introduces one heretofore ignored aspect of the 18th and 19th century female experience of the American middle classes: the female "friendship" as a prevalent social phenomenon. This sensitive exploration of female sexuality symptomatic of a given cultural era yields the surprising conclusion that Victorian mores may have been more responsive to individuals' needs than are those of the 20th century. ALLISON HEISCH, *"Queen Elizabeth I: Parliamentary Rhetoric and the Exercise of Power."* A study of the rhetorical styles whereby Queen Elizabeth I wielded her monarchical powers which also illuminates aspects of the "Virgin Mother's" singleminded personality as the source of many political disputes. JULIA KRISTEVA, *"On the Women of China."* The revolutionary impact of agrarian reform and the Marriage Law (sometimes known as the Divorce Law) on patriarchal economic and ideological structures in China is analyzed in this translation of a chapter of Kristeva's *Les Chinoises*. On the whole this highly informative historical and legal discussion criticizes the continuing sublimation of the libidinal and imaginary functions of familial life in China. ELIZABETH HARDWICK, *"Reflections on Simone Weil."* A well-informed account of Weil's tragic life and work as a voluntary martyr which centers upon her linguistic expression, religion, ethics and identification with the lower classes. ROBERT LECKACHMAN, *"On Economic Equality."* An optimistic assessment of the possible consequences of remuneration for housework which focuses upon the implications for wage scales for both sexes, social expectations and consumption patterns. ELIZABETH JANEWAY, *"On the Power of the Weak."* This brief look at anthropological evidence supporting legends and myths of women's power argues that the male-female dichotomy is the most fundamental paradigm of power relations. BARBARA BELLOW WATSON, *"On Power and the Literary Text."* A confusing proposal to "distinguish between literatures, on the basis of their ability to imagine *all* characters as subjects" which fails to examine the complex factors conditioning the constitution of the female subject. More persuasively, she shows how a feminist interpretation of female power in literature reveals a three-stage progression of the experience of females in literature *vis-à-vis* power relationships which sheds light upon the historical experience of political and sexual domination. Six review essays.

SOCIAL STUDIES OF SCIENCE, Vol. 5, No. 2 (May, 1975)

Sage Publications Ltd., 44 Hatton Garden, London ECI N8ER, England. $14 individuals; $22 institutions. G.N. CANTOR, *"The Academy of Physics at Edinburgh, 1797-1800."* GILBERT WHITTEMORE, *"World War I, Poison Gas Research, and the Ideals of American Chemists."* Examination of the role played by chemists and chemistry in the rapidly expanding industrial activity of 1914-1917. R.G.A. DOLBY, *"What Can We Usefully Learn from the Velikovsky Affair?"* WILLIAM LEISS, *"Ideology and Science."* A discussion of the problem of

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technological rationality, with particular reference to telling critiques of the author's book by D'Amico [*Telos* 15) and Easlea (*Science Studies*, January 1974). The latter correctly criticize Leiss for his blindspots on the problem of the internal conceptual structure of the natural sciences. Leiss' response is twofold: first, there is little substantive political disagreement in this debate; second, the task of castigating ideas for the emergence of repressive social developments is a fruitless undertaking. LARRY W. DEWITT, *"On Bloor's Transformation of Popper's Pluralism."* BOHDAN WALENTYNOWICZ, *"The Science of Science in Poland: Present State and Prospects of Development."* ANDREW JAMISON, AANT ELZINGA, *"Science: Its Theory and Practice."* An excellent extensive bibliography related to a course dealing with the internal and external relations of scientific knowledge and practice from a critical standpoint.

SOCIALIST REVOLUTION, No. 27 (January-March, 1976)

396 Sanchez St., San Francisco, CA 94114. $10 for 6 issues. MAX GORDON, *"The Communist Party of the 1930s and the New Left."* An historical account of the CP's heyday attempts to affect the immediate problems of existence through reforms. If today's New Left is to become effective, it must learn some of the organizational techniques from the Old Left, without falling into such traps as a confusion between organization and structure and "democratic centralism." This is followed by a *"Response"* by JAMES WEINSTEIN and a further *"Reply"* by MAX GORDON. SAMIR AMIN, *"Population and Development."* Contrary to neo-Malthusian themes of population control and development, Amin argues that an absolute increase in population can improve conditions in come countries depending on the variation in the ratio of population to natural resources. Not overpopulation but dependency is at the root of underdevelopment. BRUCE DAVIS, *"Socialism and Women in the U.S. 1900-1917."* This article traces the history of feminism from the Socialist Party of America and the latter's ambiguous treatment of marriage, monogamy, the home, sexual relations, women's suffrage, working women, socialization, etc., to the emergence of separate Women's organizations to the Women's Suffrage Movement. ROBERT ALLEN, *"Racism and the Black Nation Thesis."* The struggle for a separate black state obfuscates the struggle against racial oppression and the material basis that feeds it.

SOCIALIST REVOLUTION, No. 28 (April-June, 1976)

HARRY CHOTINER, *"The American Revolution and the American Left."* This essay discusses the historical roots of bourgeois hegemony in the U.S. by tracing out the capitalist orientations of the American revolutionaries. Contrary to popular belief, the author suggests that the American Revolution did not create a situation conducive to true democracy, individualism, and liberty because of the capitalist intention to found a republic which would restrict such privileges to white, male, upper-class citizens. This legacy, Chotiner argues, must be reckoned with in any American socialist revolution. DAVID FERNBACK, *"Toward a Marxist Theory of Gay Liberation."* The sexual revolution recently begun in advanced industrial societies has led to the possibility for a militant gay liberation, as sexual roles and demands change due to revolutionary re-definitions in capitalist society. DAVID PLOTKE, *"The End of the Portuguese Empire."* A lengthy analysis, including a chronology of events, of the Portuguese 1974 revolution, its aftermath and the Angolan situation. Plotke poses four challenges that must be met by the left in advanced industrial social revolutions: the role of the military, the nature of the communist party, the fragmentation of the non-communist party left, and defining the meaning of taking state power. A weak discussion of the MPLA in Angola up to the fruitless January 1976 OAU conference is also included. LOUIS MENASHE, *"Solzhenitsyn and the Soviet Experience."* Menashe considers Solzhenitsyn as a Soviet writer whose faults are those of a general *Soviet* experience. Solzhenitsyn's inability to distinguish Marxism from Soviet Marxism and to transcend as a writer the Soviet Marxist reality is explained as his greatest flaw as an artist. FAUD FARIS, NOAM CHOMSKY, *"Exchange."* Faris reacts to Chomsky's article in SR 24 on Israel and the Palestinians. A response by Chomsky.

SOCIALIST REVOLUTION, No. 29 (July-September, 1976)

JOHN H. MOLLENKOPF, *"The Fragile Giant: The Crisis of the Public Sector in American Cities."* A well-organized treatment of the post-war emergence of the post-industrial city, which is mainly an administrative and commercial center, as well as a consideration of the capital crisis created by public sector borrowing to sustain such urban centers. JUDY MACLEAN, *"N.O.W."* A short review of the recent change in NOW from a narrow, bourgeois reformist, upper class organization into a diverse, militant, revolutionary working class group. The author suggests that

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NOW can be of great benefit to organizers of a socialist revolution. JOHN JUDIS, *"California's New New Left: Tom Hayden and the CDC."* Documenting the history of the California Democratic Council from 1952 to the present, this study claims that Hayden's new leadership in the group offers a meaningful, practical political opportunity for leftists to pursue an anti-corporate, working-class political program in California, and perhaps later, nationwide. *"Declaration of the French and Italian Communist Parties."* The PCF and PCI joint statement affirming their commitment to and outlining their program for a constitutional and democratic transition to socialism. KYLE STEENLAND, *"Chile: The Dictatorship in Crisis."* An overview of the worsening social, economic and political crisis in Chile giving full attention to the American role in propping up the Pinochet regime. The article also covers the terror campaign directed against the left, the effectiveness of international opinion in moderating the regime's terrorism and the poor prospects for any significant change under a bourgeois-Christian Democratic government. TERRY A. KUPERS, *"Schizophrenia and Reification."* An interesting discussion of how schizophrenia is an escape from the general reification of a capitalist society. PEGGY DENNIS, *"On Learning from History."* Drawing on her own personal experiences as a socialist, Dennis criticizes Weinstein's *The Ambiguous Legacy: The Left in American Politics* as too simplistic, overly subjective and largely insensitive to much of the history of socialism in the U.S.

THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW, Vol. 23, No. 4 (November, 1975)

University of Keele, Staffordshire ST5 5BG, England. $10 for 4 issues. BRYN JONES, *"Max Weber and the Concept of Social Class."* ROBERT TRISTAM, *"Ontology and Theory: A Comment on Marx's Analysis of Some of the Problems."* DEREK SAYER, *"Method and Dogma in Historical Materialism."* JANET WOLFF, *"Hermeneutics and the Critique of Ideology."* An attempt to consider the importance of the hermeneutic tradition (Schleiermacher, Heidegger, Dilthey) for critical theory, as well as the objections raised against Gadamer by members of the Frankfurt tradition. Through the work of Apel and Habermas hermeneutics is neither abandoned nor superseded—it is transcended and incorporated into *Ideologiekritik*. Ideology, though no longer taken seriously, becomes the basis of this critique. HANS-JUERGEN KRAHL, *"The Political Contradiction in Adorno's Critical Theory."* This appeared previously in *Telos* 21.

LES TEMPS MODERNES, No. 353 (December, 1975)

26, rue de Condé, Paris 5, France. F 14. RICHARD MARIENSTRAS, *"Pierre Goldman ou le procès de la justice et de l'Histoire."* BERNARD CHOURAQUI, *"Pierre Goldman—Les niveaux de l'innocence."* W. RABI, *"Esquisse pour un portrait de Pierre Goldman."* These three articles examine the case of Pierre Goldman. The latter is charged with a series of robberies and murders and sentenced to life imprisonment. In an extraordinary book, *Souvenirs obscurs d'un Juif polonais né en France*, the accused makes his case for his innocence (with respect to the murders, but not the robberies), and examines the evidence with which he was convicted in such a way as to cast doubt on the epistemological foundations of both the judicial process and the reader's judgment. The latter is further complicated by an autobiographical dimension—Goldman's self-judgment. He sees his life, both his guerilla adventures in Latin America and his fall into petty crime, as ruled by the bipolarities of his status of exile, his "Jewishness": by the need to live his rebellion absolutely—to live history in the universal as heroism; and the expectancy, even desire, for martyrdom. FABRICE PINTE, *"Eh! Papa, écoute!"* A poem. VASSILIS VASSILIKOS, *"Le procès des grands résponsables de la dictature."* The author of *Z* comments at length on the recent show-trial of the Greek colonels. SERGE-CHRISTOPHE KOLM, *"Portugal: quelle révolution, vers quelle société?"* In this optimistic article, presumably written before the recent defeat of the left, the author, after having examined changes in the proprietary structure, searches for the potential of a "self-managing" society in Portugal's future evolution. JEANINE AILTOUNIAN, *"Comment peut-on être Arménien?"* Ruminations on genocide (the massacres of Armenians by Turks in 1915) and ethnocide (the loss of memory of these events both within and without the Armenian community). *"Dossier Mongo Beti."* The French government's attempt to rescind the citizenship of an African professor after having forbidden publication of his book, *Main basse sur le Cameroun. Affaire Astudillo.*

LES TEMPS MODERNES, No. 354 (January, 1976)

FRANCOIS EWALD, *"Présentation."* BRUNO MATTEI, *"La normalization des accidents de travail: L'invention du risque professionel."* ENTRETIEN, *"Un Lip judiciare."* HENRI PASCAL, *"Quelques réflexions à propos de la catastrophe de Liévin."* BERNARD LEROY, *"Les enquêtes du service des Mines."* This collection of articles examines the relation between judicial

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mechanisms and industrial accidents. This particular problem was suggested by two recent cases in France in which representatives of the managerial strata were judged responsible for the death of workers under their command, and were subsequently imprisoned. Of course, after the protests of the patronal class, and in one case, of workers, the "guilty" were released and the judges reprimanded. The point, however, is that these cases, by breaking the norm, illuminated the separation of the legal from the factory order. The factory is revealed as a closed and private space with a disciplinary order of its own, outside the judicial process, although underlying and legitimating the latter. Such was not always the case. As Mattei's article demonstrates when the problem of industrial accidents first emerged at the judicial level at the end of the last century, the original impulse was to declare the manager guilty until proven otherwise. However, after patronal pressure, industrial accidents were seen to be "professional risks" (i.e., a necessary cost of progress for which no one was responsible) and compensation to the victim was to be socialized by means of insurance and social security plans. The recent cases mentioned earlier in some sense reverse this historical process—and judging by the article of one of the judges involved (Pascal) and by an interview with radical members of the union of magistrates this reversal was conscious. That is, members of the judicial profession seem consciously bent on preventing the multiplication of private spaces, and rendering the existing private spaces public, thereby revealing the "criminal" nature of the factory system. CLAUDE LISCIA, *"Le travail social, le logement, l'argent."* Critique of organizations and institutions responsible for social work, particularly those that attempt to "socialize" the household. VACLAV HAVEL, *"Lettre à Gustave Husak."* Written in Prague, this looks below Czechoslovakia's surface prosperity and reveals the regression and stifling of the arts, a loss of the sense of time, generalized fear, privatization and the subsequent consequences; the indifference and irresponsibility of the population. The author concludes rather pessimistically that the effects of the present repression can never be truly eradicated, even with a change in regime.

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MANUEL CASTELLS, *"La crise urbaine aux Etats-Unis: vers le barbarisme."* This article provides a well-researched and in-depth analysis of post-war urban and suburban developments in the U.S., which the author links to a model of accumulation presently in crisis. The only false note comes with the conclusion: as the crisis deepens American society will polarize between the masses on the one hand and the corporate elite on the other, and political struggles of an orthodox nature will finally be at hand. Obligatory wishful thinking. MARC RAKOWSKI, *"L'union du capital et de la science passé et présenet."* ANDRE GORZ, *"Réponse à Marc Rakowski."* Rakowski begins his article by noting that Marx's critique of the division of labor tended to be purely external, i.e., it left the forces of production untouched by the relations of production. This was due to the historical situation in which Marx was writing: there had as yet been no large-scale encounter between science and production; production had not yet been "liberated" from the subjective limits of the worker, etc. That this external critique was maintained by the socialist after Marx was due to its perception of poverty as the problematic central to capitalism; a problem whose solution required an increase in production and consequently the maintenance of hierarchical discipline. An internal critique of the division of labor could only emerge when the consumption patterns implied by this productivist model were questioned by certain intellectual strata and later when workers contested the extreme parcellization at the level of production, which was becoming increasingly dysfunctional. Gorz notes that in fact the internal critique was first voiced not by "romantic" intellectuals, but by workers resisting the introduction of Taylorism. Rakowski then argues that the internal critique should be generalized beyond the level of micro-economics to a critique of the whole structure of development (Gorz agrees). But instead of being generalized, the internal critique has undergone a false radicalization, expressed by the desire to suppress all specializations. The latter corresponds to the predictable failure of the anti-hierarchical movement to incorporate technical and scientific specialists against their own interests. Gorz replies that the notion of "false radicalization" merely reflects Rakowski's acceptance of working-class stratification and the corresponding authority relations. He denies that the more specialized strata can only act in terms of their narrow interests. The experience of 1968-72, he states, is that intellectuals join a movement to the degree that its autonomy, dynamism, etc. allow them to create and propagandize ideas. PAUL SWEEZY, *"Transition au socialisme ou transition socialiste."* Sweezy declares that, while the contents of the term "communism" are clear, those of "socialism" are not. Thus one can only speak of a "socialist transition"—as opposed to a "transition to socialism." He personally reserves the term "socialist" for those societies that are clearly progressing toward

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communism (e.g., China). BERNARD CORIAT, *"Usines et Universités d'usines dans la Chine d'après la révolution culturelle."* An examination of the attempts in China to suppress the division execution-conception at the level of production relations. The article focuses on the educational system; recruitment of students from the ranks of workers and the return of the former to the latter, and the integration of universities into the factory system under the direction of the worker: and at the workplace; the critique of scientific management, the participation of party members in production and workers in management and in the groups of triple union for technical innovations. JUDITH BELLADONA, *"Le cas Dora."* In 1889 Freud treated an 18 year old by the name of Dora who terminated treatment after 3 months. Freud's analysis of this case is reproduced along with Belladona's commentary. The latter interrogates the "distance separating the Real evoked by the Interpretation. . .which turns away from, reduces and travesties the lines of Reality." It interrogates Freud's male chauvinism. ANNIE DEQUEKER, *"Un souris verte."* After commenting on the legacy of Descartes, and after relating her experiences testing dominance in mice, the author concludes that the lack of an adequate conception of "durée" in modern science is due to the phallocentric nature of the latter.

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